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# THE CHINESE

## Their History

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# THE CHINESE

# Their History and Culture

FOURTH EDITION, THOROUGHLY REVISED

TWO VOLUMES IN ONE

KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE

*Sterling Professor of Missions and Oriental History,*

*and Fellow of Berkeley College, Emeritus, in Yale University*

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# PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION

Here is an attempt to tell the story of a great people and a high civilization. That story is filled with aspiration, achievement, and tragedy. It involves many millions of people, for centuries the largest fairly homogeneous portion of mankind. It embraces more than three thousand years. In the twentieth century the entire world has been involved. Increasingly the Chinese have made their weight felt in both hemispheres. Before the present century their influence was confined chiefly to East and Southeast Asia. Cut off from the rest of mankind by oceans, deserts, and mountains, although receiving varied contributions from abroad, they created a distinct civilization. That civilization was potent in shaping their immediate neighbors, notably the Japanese, the Vietnamese, and the Koreans. Other portions of mankind were indebted to it, especially for such commodities as silk and tea, for porcelain, paper, and possibly for printing, and for some forms of art. But not until the twentieth century did the Chinese attain major global importance. Then, subjected to the world-wide cultural and political revolution which issued from the Occident, on the one hand their ideals and institutions underwent more drastic and basic changes than those of any other major group of mankind, and on the other hand, they became more active participants in the life of the rest of the human race than in any previous age.

The Chinese and their achievements can be best appreciated by the way of history. They themselves have been markedly historical-minded. They, their civilization, and the sweeping developments to which they have been subjected and to which they have contributed can be best understood if the past out of which they came is traced. First comes a description of the geography and natural resources of China, with an appraisal of the fashion in which they have helped to shape the development of its people and its culture. Then follows a summary, comprising more than half of the work, of the nation's history from the beginning to the present. That in turn is succeeded by a chapter on the population and chapters on the main phases of the culture and institutions of the country: political, economic, philosophical, religious, social, aesthetic, and intellectual. Under most of these topics a description is given of what developed before the coming of the European and is followed by an account of the changes which have resulted from the impact of the Occident.

To each chapter is appended a brief bibliography (by no means exhaustive) of what the author deems the more important books and articles on the subject. The order of each bibliography is (1) translations of Chinese works, (2) books in European languages on the general subject

of the chapter, and (3) books and articles on special phases of the subject arranged in the sequence in which these phases are treated. Immediately before the index a list of the Chinese names and words in the text will be found, arranged alphabetically according to their romanization, each with its corresponding Chinese characters. No one system of romanization meets with the approval of all Sinologists, but in the main the one most frequently employed in books in English, that associated with the names of Sir Thomas Wade and Herbert A. Giles, has been followed.

The book is designed as an introduction for the more serious student who comes to the subject with little or no previous knowledge of China, and as an easily accessible volume of reference for those who wish information and an introductory bibliography to what are generally regarded as the more important figures, events, and features of the history and culture of the country. The professional Sinologist will find little if anything which he does not already know, but it is hoped that to him the book will prove an accurate and useful summary. The value of such a work is not in fresh research in specialized fields but in a summary and interpretation of what is available in detailed but unconnected studies. To those for whom the volume is their first introduction to China, much of the text may seem overloaded and confused with strange names. The effort has been made, however, to reduce such names to the minimum which should be known by all who seek to become familiar with the main features of the history and achievements of the Chinese. The expert, indeed, may feel that too many names, movements, and events have been omitted.

No one can be more conscious than the author of the inevitable defects of such a work. Brevity, condensation, and the choice of what to include and what to omit cannot be avoided. For many topics and fields specialized monographs do not exist and later researchers will modify or invalidate some sections. Even at its best the book cannot hope to be standard for many decades. New studies, both by Chinese and by non-Chinese, will quickly render several portions obsolete. Such advance in our knowledge is, indeed, not only to be welcomed but also encouraged. China, too, is moving so rapidly that those pages which seek to portray and interpret contemporary conditions and movements will soon be out of date. Even on the basis of our present knowledge some mistakes will have crept in. However, the following pages may succeed in achieving a fairly well balanced summary of what is now familiar to experts and may encourage further investigation in many of the fields covered.

What follows is the fourth edition of a work which was first published in 1934 and whose latest revision appeared in 1946. So much research has since been done in the areas covered by the previous editions and so much has happened in the past seventeen years that a complete rewriting was imperative. Advantage has been taken of what was in the earlier editions, and here and there sentences and even paragraphs have been reproduced

with only slight modifications. But every word has been rescrutinized, and in many respects the result is a new work.

The author wishes to repeat his gratitude to Doctors A. W. Hummel and B. Laufer and to Professors M. S. Bates, M. L. Chen, Lewis Hodous, William Hung, Ellsworth Huntington, Frank W. Price, and L. S. C. Smythe for their assistance in the first edition and to express again his debt to Mrs. Charles T. Lincoln, who has turned into faultless typescript all of the editions and whose suggestions for improvements in style have been invaluable.

For counsel in the present edition the author is deeply indebted to Professor Homer H. Dubs, Professor Arthur F. Wright, and Dr. John M. S. Lindbeck.

The author is deeply and gratefully under obligation to Yale University for his introduction in his student days to the subject of this book, for the opportunity which its administration gave him to give the course (long the only one of its kind at Yale), out of which the book grew, and for the use of the ample libraries.

No history can be free from the writer's preconceptions. The author who claims full objectivity is either self-deceived or is seeking to deceive his readers. The very selection of facts entails judgment as to the relative importance of the myriad actions and events which constitute the crude stuff with which the historian must work. The present author has attempted to achieve an attitude of detachment. He is aware, however, that he has stressed the political aspects of the story more than some Sinologists would do. His warm sympathy with the Chinese may have betrayed him into seeming to be an apologist for them. He regards as a major tragedy the domination of the mainland by the Communists, but he has striven to be objective in depicting and appraising their regime, for only with that attitude can the post-1949 China be understood and policies toward it be wisely conceived and carried out.

The author craves the privilege of dedicating his effort to Samuel Wells Williams and Frederick Wells Williams. The former, long a missionary and diplomat in China, spent his last years at Yale as Professor of the Chinese Language and Literature, the first chair of its kind in the United States. His *A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language* (Shanghai, American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1874, pp. lxxxiv, 1252) and *The Middle Kingdom,* first published in 1858 and given a final and enlarged revision in his later years (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 2 vols., 1882), are evidence of the scholarship which made him the most eminent American Sinologist of his day. The latter work was long the standard book in English on China's history and civilization and still has value for the light which it sheds on some events of the nineteenth century. His son, Frederick Wells Williams, assisted in the final revision of *The Middle Kingdom* and long taught Oriental history at Yale, specializing on China. It was with the

son that the present author majored as a graduate student, and on his teacher's retirement the latter's title, Oriental History, was added to his professorship, that of Missions.

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# THE CHINESE

## Their History and Culture

VOLUME I

CHAPTER ONE

# GEOGRAPHY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE CHINESE

## THE NAME

The name China is a foreign appellation, probably derived from a dynasty which reigned over the Empire in the third century B.C. The Chinese long held it as an ideal that there should be only one political administration for civilized mankind and regarded their own as that government. Hence no pressing need existed to distinguish their country from another. They might speak of China as *T'ien Hsia*—"Under Heaven." The most frequent name employed was *Chung Kuo*—"The Middle Kingdom." The Chinese often denominated themselves *Han Jên,* or the "Men of Han," after a famous dynasty of that name. *T'ang Jên,* or the "Men of T'ang," after another famous dynasty, was frequently on the lips of the Chinese in the South.

## THE TWO MAIN DIVISIONS OF CHINA

What now appears on the map as China falls into two main parts, China proper where the major proportion of the population has long been Chinese, and what, intermittently, have been the outlying sections of the Empire, where until recently the Chinese were in the minority. China proper is often known as the "eighteen provinces," from the administrative divisions which existed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The distinction between the two divisions is not so closely drawn as in the nineteenth century. Indeed, it is fading and no longer conforms strictly with administrative and racial realities. Large parts of the dependencies have been officially organized as provinces, with the same status as those of China proper. Chinese have migrated extensively into some of them. In Manchuria Chinese constitute the overwhelming majority of the population and they are the largest element in Inner Mongolia. Even now, however, the division preserves a degree of rough approximation to the facts which renders it a useful framework for classification.

## CHINA PROPER

China proper is made up chiefly of the valleys of two great rivers, the Yellow and the Yangtze, and of one smaller one, the Hsi Kiang ("West River"), which, taking their rise in the vast tablelands and mountain fastnesses to the west, flow eastward into an arm of the Pacific. In fertile plains along the middle and lower course of the Yellow River was the seat of primitive Chinese culture. In comparatively early times the Chinese state incorporated the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze basin. Later, in the centuries just before and just after the Christian Era, the Chinese occupied the basins of both rivers and of their tributaries up to the mountains and plateaus of the West and annexed the coastal regions to the south, where numerous smaller valleys, notably that of the Hsi Kiang and its confluents, afforded inviting homes. Migration, settlement, and more or less complete amalgamation with earlier stocks followed occupation and annexation, although in some sections very tardily. The area of China proper is approximately a million and a half square miles—about half the size of the United States without Alaska, and two-fifths that of Europe. The total is probably above rather than below this figure.

A more detailed description of this region will disclose the features which have made it a natural unit and the seat of a numerous and civilized people, and which have helped to give the Chinese some of their outstanding characteristics.

Nature has divided China proper into four main sections: the North, made up chiefly of the valley of the Yellow River (Huang Ho) and its tributaries; the upper portion of the Yangtze Valley and the adjoining mountains and tablelands; the lower part of the valley of the Yangtze River; and the coastal regions south of the Yangtze. Each of these, in turn, has natural subdivisions.

## CHINA PROPER: THE NORTH

The North of China proper comprises most of the provinces of Shantung, Hopei (formerly Chihli), Honan, Shansi, Shensi, and Kansu and the northern portions of Anhui and Kiangsu. Topographically it shades off into a tier of new provinces, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyüan, and Ninghsia, which were carved out partly from some of the older northern provinces and partly from what is often denominated Inner Mongolia, and which under the Communists were partly superseded by new administrative units. Its major stream is the Huang Ho ("Yellow River"), which, rising in the mountains and plateaus that fringe Tibet, by a devious route flows into the Yellow Sea. Its name describes its color, and this in turn is due to the

vast amount of sediment which the river carries, and which, lodged in shifting bars, in spite of the size of the stream, makes difficult or impossible navigation by all but the smaller craft.

With this sediment the Yellow River and some smaller adjacent streams —principally the Pai Ho on the north and the Huai Ho on the south— have built up a vast alluvial plain on either side of the Shantung promontory. This plain, which extends over much of Honan, Hopei, and Shantung, and over the northern portions of Kiangsu and Anhui, and which on the south merges with the delta of the Yangtze, was laid down in what was once sea bottom. It extends for scores of miles without prominent hills or valleys.

In common with other fluvial heavy carriers of sediment, along its lower reaches the Huang Ho has tended to raise for itself natural dikes and a bed higher than the adjoining plain. This tendency, reinforced by the embankments built by man, leads to devastating floods. As its bed rises higher and higher between dike-like banks the stream inevitably breaks its bounds, and spreading its waters over the surrounding country, seeks a new bed on a lower level. As a result, its mouth has been now south and now north of the Shantung mountains, by shiftings which have brought untold distress to the dense population of the adjacent area. Appropriately the Huang Ho has been known as "China's Sorrow."

The northern plain has been, however, the friend of civilization, because, except for a few stretches marred by alkali or sand, it is very fertile. Together with a smaller plain in the valley of the Wei, a tributary of the Huang Ho, it was the scene of the development of the culture which shaped the rest of China. On it rose most of China's ancient capitals, and on it today stand several of her largest cities—notably Peking (lately also Peip'ing), Tientsin (near the mouth of the Pai Ho), Tsinan (the capital of Shantung), Hsian (formerly Ch'angan), and K'aifêng (a former capital).

The sediment that furnishes the material for the plain is derived largely from the loess, a kind of soil which blankets many of the regions of North China. Loess occurs from the borders of Mongolia on the north and the Tarim basin in Sinkiang on the west into Shantung on the east and in spots into the Yangtze Valley on the south. It is densest in Shensi and Kansu. Often scores of feet in depth, in some places it forms plateaus and in others it fills valleys. It is very friable and, while of varying texture, is usually reducible by rubbing to a fine powder. Extremely fertile and easily cultivated, it is the source of much of the agricultural wealth of North China. It has a vertical cleavage and often is worn down into gullies and canyons with steep walls. It is also easily eroded and accordingly chokes the rivers that drain it. The loess is of wind-borne origin and the product of thousands of years of dust storms not greatly dissimilar to those now familiar to the inhabitants of North China. It is of varying ages, the rate of deposition seemingly having been much more rapid in some eras than

in others. In some areas it can still be seen in process of formation. While originally laid down by the wind, streams have carved it and have redeposited a large portion of it, so that much of it is now in alluvial strata.

The fertility of the northern plain has been partly offset by deficient and irregular rainfall, especially inland. From the dawn of history, droughts and floods have repeatedly scourged with famine larger or smaller sections of the plain and the adjoining highlands.

Parts of the eastern boundary of the North China plain are formed by the mountains of Shantung. These consist chiefly of ancient rocks of the same formation as the hills of the Liaotung Peninsula, just to the north, in Manchuria. Erosion has rounded their contours and broadened their valleys. The most famous peak is T'ai Shan, slightly over five thousand feet high, the chief of the sacred mountains of China. To it for centuries the Chinese have looked with veneration, and to it have come thousands of pilgrims. Thanks to its rocky formation and to the subsidence of the coast, the Shantung promontory possesses excellent harbors, notably Kiaochow Bay.

To the north of the North China plain, high hills lead up to the Mongolian tableland. To the west rise first the mountains and plateaus of Shansi and then the mountains and valleys of Shensi and Kansu. Loess blankets much of the country, but the cultivated land is largely in the valleys and on the adjacent terraced hillsides. There are a few plains. How much of the land was wooded in primitive times we do not know. It seems fairly certain that over portions of the area trees were sparse or entirely lacking. However, forests once covered much more of the country than now. When they were cut, the hillsides were rapidly eroded and the valleys often gutted with debris.

Most of the valleys are narrow, but there are exceptions. The principal one is where the Wei flows through a broad and fertile plain, just above its confluence with the Yellow River as the latter breaks out of the mountains on the southern leg of its great northern bend to turn sharply to the east. Here was an early seat of Chinese culture. Here, too, have been some of China's capitals, notably Hsian (Ch'angan), and here have been enacted many of the most famous scenes of China's history.

Shansi is, as has been said, made up largely of mountains and plateaus. These buttress the Mongolian highland and contain extensive coal measures. The most notable peak, and one of the chief Buddhist sacred mountains, is Wu T'ai Shan, near the northeastern border of the province. The major river, the Fên, drains southwestward into the Huang Ho—above the junction of the latter with the Wei.

West of Shansi the mountains become higher until in parts of Kansu they attain to elevations of twenty thousand feet and more. As one proceeds westward, moreover, the valleys become narrower and the popula-

tion more sparse. The Yellow River encloses in its northern bend the Ordos, a plateau which is mostly desert. The river itself is navigable as far as Lanchow in Kansu, but above its junction with the Wei many rapids interrupt its course.

To the southeast the North China plain shades off imperceptibly into the delta of the Yangtze River. However, a series of mountains and hills, with gradually diminishing heights, reaches eastward from the great ranges and tablelands of the West and forms an effective watershed between nearly all the lower length of the Yangtze, to the south, and the Huai and Yellow rivers to the north. The Huai River, draining much of the territory between the lower courses of its mightier neighbors, the Huang Ho and the Yangtze, constitutes one of China's major engineering problems, for it has no adequate mouth, and any unusually rainy season has sent its waters over the adjoining thickly settled countryside. The Communist regime has undertaken extensive engineering projects to remedy the situation, but with far from entire success.

## CHINA PROPER: THE UPPER PART OF THE YANGTZE VALLEY

The Yangtze is one of the greatest of the world's waterways. Rising in Tibet, the streams that go to make it cut their way in enormous canyons off the roof of the world to form, still in rugged country, what in its upper reaches is poetically called the River of the Golden Sand. To the south of this upper course, and partly drained by it, lies the southwesternmost province of China proper, Yünnan—literally, "South of the Clouds." The tableland which forms the most populous portion of Yünnan is high enough to have a salubrious climate and is well watered by streams and lakes. Its natural outlet is to the southeast and this was facilitated in the twentieth century by a railway built by the French. From Yünnan, also, a pass by way of Bhamo leads into the valley of the Irrawaddy and so into Burma—a route traversed through the centuries by merchants and armies. To Yünnan led, in the second world war of the twentieth century, the "Burma Road" and the "Ledo Road" which gave "unoccupied" China land access to the outside world.

Next on the course of the Yangtze is the great province of Szechwan (the "Four Streams"), the largest of the eighteen, and an empire in itself. The heart of Szechwan is a hilly, arable region known as the Red Basin—from the underlying sandstone. Toward the western edge of the Red Basin is a fertile plain, which is watered by an ancient irrigation system and is the seat of the chief city of the province, Chengtu. The Red Basin has an abundant rainfall and a subtropical climate and hence supports a dense population. It is also rich in minerals. It is cut by several rapid rivers, notably the Min, which waters the Chengtu plain.

To the southeast, Szechwan is bounded by the mountainous province of Kweichow, to the west stretches Tibet with its great ranges and high plateaus, to the southwest lies Yünnan, to the north Shensi and Kansu are reached only through passes over a fairly formidable chain of mountains, and to the east rise more curtaining hills. Szechwan is, therefore, a geographical entity. The Yangtze provides it with its most important gateway to the outer world. That river, on leaving the most thickly populated parts of the province, for scores of miles cuts its way through the opposing hills in a series of huge gorges. The accompanying rapids make navigation hazardous, but for centuries boatmen have traversed them, and in the present century, especially constructed steamers have regularly made the run. Air travel also connects Szechwan with other parts of China. Properly dammed the Yangtze gorges could be a major source of hydroelectric power.

## CHINA PROPER: THE LOWER PART OF THE YANGTZE VALLEY

From the gorges eastward the valley of the Yangtze begins to widen, only occasionally to be constricted by hills. More tributaries enter. On the south are two lakes, the T'ung-t'ing and the P'o-yang. These are practically continuous with the Yangtze and serve as reservoirs of flood waters of the great river. Into each empty streams from the hinterland. The basin of the T'ung-t'ing Lake and of its affluents is roughly conterminous with the province of Hunan ("South of the Lake"). Hunan is largely mountainous and wooded, but numerous streams provide it with many fertile valleys. The P'o-yang Lake and the valleys of the streams which flow into it are nearly identical with the province of Kiangsi ("West of the River"). Kiangsi, like Hunan, is hilly, and also possesses valleys which support an extensive population. From the upper reaches of the Hsiang, the chief stream of Hunan, and of the Kan, the main river of Kiangsi, important passes across the hills give access to the south coast.

From the north, the chief tributary of the Yangtze is the Han, and at its junction with the main river lie the three cities, Hankow, Wuchang, and Hanyang, or, as they are known collectively, Wuhan. The province of which these three constitute the metropolis is Hupeh ("North of the [T'ung-t'ing] Lake"). Wuhan forms a natural commercial center, and so huge is the Yangtze that at high water ocean-going steamers have made it a port of call, nearly six hundred miles from the coast. East of Hupeh and Kiangsi lie the two provinces of Anhui and Kiangsu, both of them spanning the river.

From the point where it leaves the gorges, the Yangtze is flanked by fertile alluvial plains of varying width and of its own building. At Chinkiang, about a hundred and fifty miles from its mouth, these broaden into

a delta and are being steadily extended by the silt-laden waters. Kiangsu possesses, as might be expected, several large cities—among them Nanking, on several occasions the capital of China, Soochow, Wusih, Ch'ang-chow, Yangchow, and the modern commercial metropolis of China, Shanghai. Shanghai, the result of the ocean-borne trade with the Occident, sprawls along the Huang-p'u, a small river which empties into the mouth of the Yangtze. In the Kiangsu delta are several lakes, among them the T'ai Hu. From the gorges eastward the Yangtze and its main tributaries lend themselves to navigation. For this purpose they are supplemented, especially on the delta, by an elaborate network of canals. The Grand Canal, connecting the South and the North, begins at Hangchow and runs northward, originally to the outskirts of Peking (Peip'ing). Through traffic is no longer able to traverse its entire length, sections of it are still in use, in some places very extensively so, and the Communists have sought to improve it.

### CHINA PROPER: THE SOUTH COAST

South of the mouth of the Yangtze, the coast of China becomes rugged and deeply indented, and the main mountain ranges run parallel to the coast. The cultivated land lies in the valleys or on artificially terraced hillsides. The ancient rocks which compose most of the region have been much eroded. Subsidence of the coast has given rise to islands and estuaries. The coastal region, divided politically into the four provinces Chêkiang, Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, is separated from the basin of the Yangtze by barriers of hills, most of them averaging from three to six thousand feet in height. Many of the hills are covered with small timber and bamboo. The region is traversed by numerous streams, most of them comparatively short and punctuated by rapids, and, accordingly, is divided into many little valleys. These valleys favor the development of clans and of local dialects, so that it is not strange (although geography is not the sole cause) that the greatest variations in language occur here. The most considerable valley is that of the Hsi Kiang ("West River"). Its broad delta is fertile and densely populated. On its estuary (near where it is joined by other streams from the North) stands the city of Canton. The Hsi Kiang is navigable to the borders of Yünnan. Next in importance ranks the Min, which empties into the sea just below the city of Foochow. The scenery along its banks is famous for its picturesque beauty.

The northern portion of Chêkiang encloses a section of the Yangtze delta. The major part of the province is mountainous. The chief cities are Hangchow and Ningpo. Hangchow, near the mouth of the main river of the province, the Ch'ien-t'ang, and flanked on one side by the beautiful West Lake, has been renowned for many centuries. Ningpo, on a plain near the mouth of a stream farther east, is a populous and well-known port. The

Chusan archipelago, to the north of Ningpo, owes its fame chiefly to the island of P'u-t'o, one of the secred centers of Buddhism. Fukien is almost entirely mountainous, and its largest city, Foochow, has already been noted. A second port, Amoy, to the south, has supplanted as a commercial center the nearby medieval mart of Ch'üanchow. Since its foundation over a century ago as a British colony, Hong Kong, rocky islands and adjacent mainland (from December, 1941, to the summer of 1945 in Japanese hands) has been an important commercial rival of Canton. On the populous delta of the West River are still other cities, and on a plain near the mouth of another stream, the Han, close to the Kwangtung-Fukien border, is Swatow, the entrepôt to a larger metropolis, Ch'aochow. Kwangtung, save for the delta on which Canton is situated, is chiefly mountainous. To the south of Kwangtung, separated by a narrow strait, lies the rugged island of Hainan. The mountainous province of Kwangsi is really a westward extension of Kwangtung, being made up principally of the upper part of the valleys of the West River and its tributaries. Better supplied with harbors than most of the north coast and nearer to the East Indies, the Malay Peninsula, Thailand, India, and Europe, the south coast has had most of the ports for ocean-borne commerce.

## CHINA PROPER: CLIMATE

As to climate, China proper lies almost entirely in the temperate zone. Only portions of the three southernmost provinces, Yünnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung, are within the tropics. Seasonal differences are marked. In the spring and summer, the arid land masses to the north and northwest of China proper heat more quickly than do the seas to the east and south, and the warm air, rising, creates areas of low pressure. As a result, moisture-laden winds sweep northward from the ocean, bringing rain. In the autumn and winter the process is reversed. The air over the great northern and western land barriers cools more rapidly than that over the tropical and subtropical seas to the south, and moving southward, brings clear skies and lower temperatures. Consequently, China proper has most of its rain in the spring and summer.

To the south, nearer the sources of the cloud-carrying winds, and where the coast is backed by mountains which precipitate the moisture as it comes in from the ocean, the rainfall is heavy. At Hong Kong it amounts to more than eighty inches a year; along the south coast it averages about forty inches a year, and in the Yangtze delta, forty-five. In both South and Central China the summer humidity is high. In the North, farther from the sources of moisture, the rainfall declines, usually being between twenty and thirty inches on the coast and much less inland.

Torrential rains are known in the summer, in both the North and the

South. In Southwest Hopei twenty-three inches fell in thirty-three hours in the summer of 1924, and more than once Hong Kong has had over twenty inches in twenty-four hours. The heavy summer rains account in part for the rapid rise of the rivers in that season and for frequent floods.

Throughout China, because of the monsoonal climate, the autumns are usually bracing and the winters cool or cold. Ice occasionally forms as far south as Canton—about the latitude of Havana and Calcutta. No other large seacoast tropical city in the world has so cool a winter. Light falls of snow are common in Central China—about the latitude of Cairo and New Orleans and with only a slightly higher elevation. In North China the winters are cold. Peking, at approximately the same latitude as Athens, Washington, and San Francisco, and not far inland, has much lower temperatures in January and February than any of them.

So marked a difference between North and South in rainfall and temperature helps to make North China quite distinct from the Yangtze Valley and the south coast in appearance and crops. In the South the plains and hills are green, the growing season is six to nine months in length, two or three crops a year are raised, and the prevailing grain is rice. In the North the hills and plains are brown and dust-blown during the winter, the growing season is shorter (four to six months), no more than two crops a year are obtained, wheat, kaoliang, and millet form the staple grains, and beans are raised extensively. The North suffers periodically from drought and the subsequent famines. North China, too, shades off gradually into regions where true desert conditions prevail. In the North, moreover, the heat and the rain of the summer encourage a luxuriant growth, but the cold and dry winters kill off all but the hardier plants. Trees, accordingly, do not easily start, and the characteristic forest is of broad-leaved, deciduous varieties. At least as early as the second millennium before Christ, in the North the climate was warmer and wetter than now and forests abounded, but later the climate became colder and drier and men cut off most of the surviving trees. On the other hand, the longer growing season and the heavier rains of the South favor trees. Vegetation is much more luxuriant and forests grow more quickly.

The difference in climate between the North on the one hand and the Yangtze Valley and the South on the other accounts in part for other contrasts between the two sections. In the North the slight rainfall with its frequent failure means numerous famines. The cold winters militate against health. The cold and the dust storms tend to keep people indoors, in an unsanitary atmosphere. Since fuel is dear, houses remain poorly heated. Heavy clothing is customary, and winter laundry and bathing difficult. Under such circumstances disease flourishes. Moreover, the short growing season has made for intense activity during part of the year and enforced idleness during much of the remainder. Home industries have

only partially occupied the time of the slack seasons. In the Yangtze Valley and the South, on the other hand, the winter temperatures are milder, dust storms do not occur, and outdoor life and frequent bathing are possible. The longer growing season shortens or eliminates the winter idleness of the farmer. Famines are less frequent. The undoubted fact that of late centuries the Chinese of the Yangtze and the South average much higher in initiative and leadership can, therefore, probably be attributed in part to the climatic contrasts between the great sections of the land.

Even in the Yangtze Valley and the South the climate is not altogether favorable. The enervating humid heat of the summers partly counterbalances the benefits of the cool winters.

To the climate, too, may be ascribed in part (but not entirely) the paucity of such domestic animals as the cow, the sheep, and the horse, which depend largely upon pasture and hay for food. The rank growth in the humid, damp summers makes for coarse grasses which prove difficult to eat and digest. The dependence for animal food on such scavengers as the pig and the chicken may have a climatic factor back of it. The Yangtze Valley and the South, with their hot, wet summers, show the effects of this absence of pasture grasses more than does the North.

To the monsoonal nature of the climate must be assigned, too, some of the floods which often afflict China. The concentration of the rain in a few months frequently means torrential downpours and the consequent overcongestion of the drainage system.

It is possible that Chinese architecture has been to a certain extent determined by the climate. The heavy summer rains make necessary sound, sturdy roofs if the house is to be protected, and one of the most prominent features of the Chinese building is the heavy tiled or thatched roof.

## CHINA PROPER: MINERAL RESOURCES

China proper is well stocked with useful minerals. Gold, silver, and copper are found in several of the provinces, but not in the rich deposits characteristic of some other countries. The relative dearth of the precious metals, especially of gold, may account in part for the failure to use gold as currency and for the frequent recourse to paper money. China's supply of sulphur, lead, and zinc is probably inadequate to supply the needs of an extensive industrial development. China possesses large deposits of tin and some manganese and molybdenum. She has important stores of tungsten and chromium, and in antimony she recently dominated the world's markets. She possesses more mercury than any other country. Coal is found in every one of the eighteen provinces of China

proper, and in some of the other sections, notably Manchuria. Experts' figures for the extent of these deposits vary greatly, but it is clear that China contains by far the largest coal reserves in East Asia. Estimates as to the amounts to be found in the various provinces differ widely. Shensi and Shansi are said to have seventy per cent of the whole. Other well-stocked provinces are Hopei, Hunan, Szechwan, Kweichow, Yünnan, Honan, and Shantung. Until recently no very great stores of petroleum had been discovered. Now it seems clear that much more exists, chiefly in oil shale, than had previously been suspected. Iron ores are extensive and are widely distributed. Bauxite, important for aluminum, is reported to be plentiful.

### CHINA PROPER: FLORA AND FAUNA

China has an abundant stock of plants. One expert botanist has declared that she has the richest temperate flora in the world. Competent authorities believe that there are fifteen thousand species, fully half of them peculiar to the country. Many of these plants and trees are useful to man, and the number has been enlarged by the introduction through the centuries of scores of others. The great variety in the flora makes for an almost equally rich fauna. The waters of China teem with fish, a large proportion of them edible. A few of the many kinds of domesticated animals may have been indigenous to China and made subject to man there. More of them seem to have been introduced from abroad, some in prehistoric or early historic times.

### CHINA PROPER: ARABLE LAND

In arable land on which to raise food, China proper has reached its limit. It has wide areas of rich soil, but these constitute only a fraction of the whole. Deserts, mountains, and eroded land account for most of the surface.

### THE OUTLYING SECTIONS

The second main division of China, what we have called the outlying sections, is made up chiefly of what are usually known politically as Tibet, the New Dominion (Sinkiang), Mongolia, and Manchuria.

The political organization and boundaries of these districts have varied greatly from time to time, even during the past two hundred years. The classification here given is only a rough one and to it exceptions can be taken. Moreover, as we have suggested, for a generation Sinkiang has been classed as a province, and parts of what the older maps show as Tibet

and Mongolia have been organized into provinces and then given a different structure by the Communists. The Chinese bitterly resent, too, any implication that Manchuria is politically in any way distinct from the China which lies south of the Great Wall.

### THE OUTLYING SECTIONS: TIBET

Tibet is a vast plateau, probably between seven hundred thousand and a million square miles in extent, a large proportion of it—possibly half—over fifteen thousand feet in height. It is thus the most extensive region of such an elevation on the planet. Tibet is a land of rounded hills and great plains, presumably the result of long erosion in an earlier geological era. It contains many lakes. Numbers of them are salt, and most of them show marked signs of shrinkage. The rainfall apparently was once much greater than now—although this is disputed. On the northern borders of Tibet rise the K'un Lun and the connecting Altyn Tagh and Nan Shan ranges, some of whose peaks soar to heights of twenty thousand feet or more and are crowned by snow fields and glaciers. They form the natural boundary between Tibet and Kansu and Sinkiang. To the south of Tibet rise the Himalayas, the loftiest mountain range on the earth, and, geologically speaking, comparatively young. In deep canyons to the north of the Himalayas and in the eastern portions of Tibet flow the upper waters of the chief rivers of northern India, Burma, Siam, Indo-China, and China. High mountains border the Tibetan plateau on the east, separating that region from China proper, notably from Szechwan.

### THE OUTLYING SECTIONS: THE NEW DOMINION (SINKIANG)

The New Dominion (Sinkiang), so called because it was the last of the major outlying districts to be brought into the Manchu Empire, but also known as Chinese or Eastern Turkestan, in average elevation is decidedly lower than Tibet. In contrast with the high plateau to the south, much of it seems to the traveler a great depression in the earth's crust. One oasis, indeed, Turfan, is slightly below the level of the sea. Sinkiang is made up of two main divisions separated by a range of mountains, the T'ien Shan. That south of the T'ien Shan is geographically an extension of the Gobi Desert. Most of it constitutes a huge basin drained by the Tarim River eastward into a marshy lake, the Lob Nor. In many places, once extensive oases supporting prosperous populations have become desert in historic times, but whether this indicates progressive desiccation is still debated by travelers and experts on climate. To the north of the T'ien Shan stretch more desert and semidesert plains and valleys (not as forbidding as the Tarim basin) known politically as Ili or Kuldja and

Zungaria. To the west and northwest, mountains form a natural boundary between Sinkiang and Central Asia.

Across Sinkiang have run for untold centuries overland trade routes between China and the outside world. One main route follows the northern side of the Tarim basin to such cities as Kashgar and Yarkand, at the eastern foot of the Pamirs—the barrier between China and India and the trans-Caspian regions. Another leads north of the T'ien Shan to Kuldja, near the head of the Ili River, and thence down the valley of the Ili to the steppes east of the Aral Sea.

### THE OUTLYING SECTIONS: MONGOLIA

To the north of China proper and to the north and east of Sinkiang lies Mongolia. Much of Mongolia is a tableland of from three to five thousand feet elevation. The area immediately north of the Eighteen Provinces—the so-called "Inner Mongolia," for a time divided politically into new provinces (formerly special administrative districts), Jehol, Chahar, Suiyüan, and Ninghsia—is much of it only semiarid, a transitional region between the lands to the south and the Gobi. The Communists changed the administrative structure. They abolished Chahar, Suiyüan, and Ninghsia, added Ninghsia to Kansu, and incorporated most of the remainder into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. The Gobi and the adjacent Ordos are for the most part rocky, gravelly, and sandy wastes traversed by low mountains and hills. To the north and west, steppes, mountains, and valleys occupy much of what is called Outer Mongolia. A good deal of the North and West possesses grazing land and parts of it are fairly well watered by rivers. The higher mountains in the Northwest are forested.

### THE OUTLYING SECTIONS: MANCHURIA

Manchuria, the most easterly of the outlying portions of China, is also the best endowed for human habitation. Divided into three provinces of Liaoning (also called Fengtien and Shengking), Kirin, and Heilungchiang, it was often known as the "Three Eastern Provinces." The Communists revived the structure, with modifications.

To the west Manchuria is bounded by Mongolia, from which it is separated by the escarpment which ascends to the Mongolian plateau and which is crowned by the Hsinganling (Khingan) mountains—a range which averages about four thousand feet in height. To the north rise more mountains, and just north of them the Amur River (or the Heilungchiang) forms a convenient boundary. On the east mountains separate Manchuria from the valley of the Ussuri and the Japan Sea. To the south the gulf of Chihli (or P'o Hai) and the Yellow Sea afford access to the

Pacific. The only easy land route into China proper lies along the coast where spurs reaching out from the hills recede only far enough to allow a narrow pass. Manchuria, therefore, has usually been distinct politically from the rest of China—not so much so, however, but that it has repeatedly been a part of the Empire.

Extensive plains, valleys, and low hills largely make up the central portion of Manchuria. Several rivers furnish the drainage, chief among them the Liao, running southward, and the Sungari, with its leading tributary, the Nonni, running northeastward into the Amur. The area of level, arable land in central Manchuria probably totals somewhat less than in the North China plain. East of the mouth of the Liao juts the Liaotung Peninsula, geologically a continuation of the mountains of Shantung. To the east of the Liaotung Peninsula, in turn, flows the Yalu River, the natural boundary between Manchuria and the Korean peninsula. Korea, as we shall see, has in whole or in part been at various times politically a dependency of China.

The valleys and plains of Manchuria are fertile and fairly well watered. Forests cover many of the mountains, and deposits of minerals, notably coal and some gold, tempt the miner. Rigorous winters and hot summers make the climate one of extremes. Agriculture prospers. Until late in the last century the land was sparsely settled, but in the twentieth century Chinese poured in at the rate of hundreds of thousands a year. Koreans, seeking escape from the economic pressure in their native land, crossed the borders by the tens of thousands. While some regions in Manchuria now display familiar and distressing signs of overcrowding, large portions of it remain relatively undeveloped and constitute a land of opportunity.

## LANDS TO THE SOUTH

To the south of China proper lie other lands, today not held by the Chinese but formerly from time to time politically subordinate to the Empire.

The valleys of the Irrawaddy and the Salween, streams which rise in the mountains and highlands in the southeastern portion of the Tibetan massif and flow southward into the Bay of Bengal, are politically known as Burma. Roads from Yünnan penetrate them, and until the latter part of the nineteenth century, for many decades Burma made periodical gifts to Peking which the Chinese regarded as tribute. Thailand, included principally in the valley of the Menam, is so separated from China by mountains that only infrequently and vaguely was it politically an appendage of the Middle Kingdom.

What we now call Vietnam comprises several former states, of which the northern ones have long oscillated between political independence

of and subjection to China. The chief districts are Tongking (the heart of which is the delta and valley of the Red River, a stream which flows southeastward from the Yünnan tableland), Annam (the seacoast and mountains south of Tongking), and Cochin China (on the fertile delta and lower portion of the Mekong River, a stream which, like the Yangtze, the Salween, and the Irrawaddy, rises in the great mountains and plateaus to the west of China proper). The boundaries and political relations of Tongking, Annam, and Cochin China have been subject to many changes. As might be expected, the region shows the effect of Chinese and Indian cultural influences, the Chinese strain being strongest toward the north.

## EFFECTS ON THE CHINESE OF THEIR ENVIRONMENT: CHINA PROPER

From the foregoing description of the face and climate of China, the effects of geographic environment upon the Chinese must be at least partially apparent.

In the first place, China proper is fitted by nature to be the home of a great, fairly unified culture. It possesses extensive, fertile valleys. It displays a marked diversity and a rich supply of plants, many of them useful for food, clothing, and shelter. Its fauna shows variety and a large degree of serviceability to man. Its mineral resources suffice for all the more pressing needs of civilization before the recent development of industrialism. Except for the Northwest, Szechwan, and the Southwest, the internal barriers of hills do not seriously discourage the spread of peoples and extensive intercommunication. Along the south coast the hills offer something of an obstacle, enough to account for the differences in language between that region and the North, but not enough to prevent political and cultural unity with the rest of the country. Navigable streams, particularly those of the Yangtze system, penetrate most of the land and facilitate internal commerce. China proper is one of the regions of the globe fitted to be the seat of a great empire.

Possessing a home richly endowed with the physical bases of civilization, as a rule the Chinese have been economically all but self-sufficient. The country is so large that they have had their energies chiefly engrossed in occupying, developing, and defending it. With some marked exceptions, only recently have they begun to look outside for an outlet for their surplus population. Not until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did the Chinese go in numbers to Formosa (T'aiwan), and not until the twentieth did they begin to flood Manchuria.

Certain qualifications, due partly to the natural features of the country, must be noted. Natural obstacles to an integrated country are fully as great as in western Europe, where they have helped to give rise to sepa-

rate nations. India, too, with no more formidable internal barriers, presents an almost infinite diversity, and never until the British forced it on them did all its inhabitants submit to one imperial rule. But for their political genius and the remarkable system of government which they devised, a similar fate might have overtaken the Chinese. Cultural and political unity, while not forbidden by the natural environment, must be ascribed chiefly to the Chinese themselves.

Even with their extraordinarily successful machinery of empire, the Chinese have frequently suffered from divisions which have arisen in part from topography. At best their unity, while marked, is by no means complete. Barriers of hills and of mountains outside the great alluvial plains form obstacles to intercommunication, favor variations in culture, and make difficult the achievement of political empire. In North China commerce and movements of troops must be mostly overland rather than by streams, for the lower course of the Yellow River is obstructed by sediment, and the upper course—above the juncture of the Wei—is hampered by rapids. Much of the Yangtze, that natural artery of communication, is precarious for traffic, as we have seen, because of the rapids through the hills which separate its lower reaches from the province of Szechwan, and above the gorges the rate of fall renders navigation hazardous. The hills and mountains along the south coast and in the Southwest have made these regions somewhat hard to hold and have favored rebellions. Even yet the Chinese have not fully occupied the hills in the Southwest, and for the most part have pushed their non-Chinese neighbors only out of the valleys.

The very size of the country militates against unity. Nowhere else has any group of mankind succeeded for so long a time as have the Chinese in holding together under a single rule so large a section of the earth. The Roman and Spanish empires did not endure for as many centuries as did the Chinese Empire. The extensive domains ruled by the Persians, Alexander, the Arabs, the Mongols, and the Turks broke apart, at most after a few hundred years. China, in spite of periodic internal disruption and occasional conquests by foreigners, has continued. Of the modern empires, with the railroad, the steamship, and the telegraph to tie them together, only five—the British, the Russian, the French, the American, and the Brazilian—have surpassed it in area, and only one, the British, has been more populous. The British and French empires have been ephemeral. Europe west of Russia, an area not far from the size of China proper, has never been politically unified and is split into many tongues and states. It is not surprising, therefore, that provincial feeling has run high, that much more power was wielded by local and sectional and provincial governments, and the clan and the guild than in some highly centralized modern states, and that from time to time the country has

been politically divided. The Communists have appeared to overcome those obstacles, but to date their rule has been brief.

Moreover, variations in climate and in physical surroundings favor a certain diversity in culture and in national characteristics. The Chinese of the North are more stolid and conservative than those of the South. This is probably due in part to a difference in blood, but it may also be ascribed to the famines which, because of drought and flood, have periodically devasted the North. The phlegmatic seem better adapted to surviving times of prolonged dearth, and the highly strung and energetic who do not perish apparently are inclined to migrate to regions of less forbidding climate. Through the centuries, therefore, this selective process may well have produced a variation in type. Differences in the staple grains are accompanied by divergences in tillage. Domestic animals vary, donkeys and mules being characteristic of the North, and the water buffalo of the Yangtze Valley and the South. Probably allied to this is the fact that in the North freight has been moved partly by carts, and elsewhere by river, canal, and wheelbarrow, and that in the North roads and streets have been broad and adapted to the wagon, the cart, and horses, and that in the South even the highways have been narrow tracks between rice fields or over the hills, suited only to the wheelbarrow, the sedan chair, the burden-carrying coolie, or occasionally the donkey. Then, too, the Yangtze Valley and the South, with mist-crowned hills and mountains and with abundant verdure, in contrast to the semiarid and brown North, may well have stimulated differences in the expression of the aesthetic feelings, both in the painter and the poet.

Still again, China's natural resources, while heretofore ample for almost all her needs, have ceased, or are about to cease, to be so. Her population has caught up with and congested her arable lands, fertile and extensive though these are. Improvement in agricultural methods and scientific seed selection may enable the Chinese to utilize types of land, very extensive, which now produce little, and to increase the yield from land now cultivated. In Manchuria and possibly in Inner Mongolia some virgin soil remains. Much of this, however, must be classed as marginal—tillable in seasons of more than average rainfall, but failing to yield a paying crop when the precipitation does not rise above its normal median. A stable and efficient government and improved methods of transportation could afford some relief from the pressure of population. These possible solutions, however, at best offer merely a reprieve. At the rate of increase maintained under the comparative peace and prosperity of the latter part of the seventeenth and of the eighteenth century, the leeway afforded by them would soon be taken up. Increasing famines, therefore, and a further accentuation of the present grinding poverty can be avoided only by one or more of three expedients: emigration on a scale such as the world has never

seen, an extensive industrialization of the country and the exchange of the products of factories for foodstuffs, or a drastic reduction of the birth rate. Other nations have already restricted Chinese immigration to most of the more salubrious, relatively unoccupied areas of the globe, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, and are likely to continue to do so—if they can. China probably does not possess sufficient resources of coal and iron to sustain an industrial development as extensive as that in the United States and in western Europe—although in some sections water power may partially overcome this handicap. Industry, moreover, will not permanently solve the population problem. The structure of Chinese social life has so far encouraged rather than discouraged a high birth rate. It seems obvious, therefore, that the limit of China's natural resources is in sight, and that only the widespread teaching and practice of birth control can ward off disaster.

## EFFECTS ON THE CHINESE OF THEIR ENVIRONMENT: THE OUTLYING SECTIONS

When the effect of China proper upon the Chinese people has been appraised, only part of the story has been told. It still remains to recount the influence upon them of the outlying territories.

First of all, these regions have, as we have seen, a marked effect upon the climate of China proper. The heating of the great arid land masses to the north in the summer and the cooling of them in the winter help to determine the direction of China's winds and with them the regularity or irregularity of the rainfall. Upon rainfall China's food supply largely depends.

Then, too, these territories, especially Tibet (including the provinces carved from it), are the sources of China's main rivers.

In the next place, the outlying territories have been the origin of repeated invasions. What are now Mongolia and Sinkiang are, as we have seen, arid or semiarid, and except for occasional oases their populations have, perforce, been chiefly limited for their livelihood to the herds which pasture on the grasses nourished by the scanty and uncertain rainfall. These peoples, accordingly, have been nomadic or seminomadic, with the hardiness and capacity for quick movements and great sudden physical exertion which such a manner of life begets. They have also been warlike. Moreover, they have looked with envy upon the fertile and prosperous valleys toward the east and south and repeatedly have attempted to force their way into them.

Invasions from Mongolia and Sinkiang have been encouraged by the ease of access to China proper from these regions. From the Mongolian plateau several passes lead down into the plains and valleys of China.

Sinkiang is comparatively low and is provided, in the Tarim basin and oases to the eastward and in the valleys to the north of the T'ien Shan, with natural highways, relatively unimpeded by mountains, into the valley of the Yellow River. It has, accordingly, been both an avenue and a source of invasions.

Manchuria, too, has been a menace. While its valleys are fertile and its climate much more favorable to civilization than that of Mongolia, it was much slower to develop a civilization than was the Yellow River Valley. Its peoples, therefore, have been lured by the lands to the south, and the narrow route along the seashore has resounded again and again with the tramp of marching armies—from early historic times down into recent years.

There have been times, moreover, although less frequently, when the Tibetans have invaded China. For centuries border struggles between Chinese and Tibetans were a fairly constant feature of Chinese history.

The Chinese, therefore, have had almost constantly to be on their guard against their neighbors to the north and west. Until the nineteenth century the security of their northern frontiers loomed as their chief foreign problem. This problem they handled in a variety of ways: partly by attempting to play off one "barbarian" tribe against another (a policy which they later tried with Occidental peoples, with some success), partly by garrisons reinforced by extensive fortifications (including notably the Great Wall), often by treaties with potential invaders, and occasionally by carrying the war into the enemies' territories and holding them in subjection. This last policy was particularly effective under the Manchus.

Fortunately for the Chinese, the peoples to the north were not always able to form coalitions. By their nomadic manner of life they were condemned to warring tribal divisions. Repeatedly, however, a line of rulers welded into a fighting force a sufficient number of them to seize part or all of the coveted prize to the south. At varying intervals, therefore —either because of internal weakness in the Empire or because of the generalship of the invaders—all defensive measures broke down, and China proper, particularly the North, was overrun. Again and again peoples from the north set up dynasties which ruled part or all of China. We shall encounter the more prominent of them in succeeding chapters —several of them in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries of the Christian Era, the Liao, the Chin, and the Hsia in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, then the Mongols, and finally the Manchus. In some respects the Russians fall in this same succession, for they too are from the north and have attempted to absorb part of China.

Of the main outlying territories, only the lands to the south—in the present Burma and Vietnam—have never been a major threat. The dis-

tances from them to the chief centers of Chinese civilization have been too great or the natural barriers too formidable to permit of conquest. These lands, indeed, possibly because of their tropical climate, have been mastered by the Chinese rather than the Chinese from them.

The land boundaries of China have not only influenced climate, given rise to the main rivers of the country, and been the source of repeated invasions, but they have also proved an obstacle (although by no means an insuperable one) to intimate contacts with other civilized portions of the globe. The other leading centers of early cultures—the valleys of northern India, the highlands of Persia, the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, the Nile Valley, and the basin of the Mediterranean—were separated from the valleys of the Huang Ho and the Yangtze by vast distances and barriers of mountains, deserts, and seas. There was some intercourse. Archaeology, indeed, more and more leads us to believe that we formerly underestimated both its quantity and its influence. The further our research proceeds, the more we are impressed with the contributions of the Chinese to the peoples to the west of them, especially in Central Asia, and of these peoples to the Chinese. Trade was maintained overland, most of it by the natural routes across Sinkiang. In the Tarim basin lived peoples who acted as intermediaries between China and the West. Commerce was carried on with lands to the south and west by way of the sea through the ports of South China, but distances proved so great, and until the last century the means of navigation remained so crude, that water-borne foreign trade was not extensive. Through all the centuries, however, while ideas filtered in from the outside world, and occasionally political conditions made possible a somewhat extensive intercourse, the Chinese, compared with most other civilized peoples, have been isolated.

Isolation probably contributed toward the formation of a number of the familiar characteristics of the Chinese. To it may partly be ascribed their intense national pride. All other civilizations with which the Chinese had close contacts were derived from themselves and, they thought, were inferior to theirs. They were the source of the culture of most of their neighbors, but although they repeatedly profited by contributions from abroad, with the exception of Buddhism they thought of themselves as having received but little. Theirs was the Middle Kingdom and all other peoples were barbarous. Even when conquered they gave their culture to their rulers and eventually either absorbed them or drove them out. Their land was large, and during most of their recorded history was under one administration. So far as they knew, except for reports, often vague, of other lands to the west, theirs was the mightiest realm on earth. Their experience with peoples on their borders and especially with other invaders helps to account for the fact that when Western nations forced their way into the country the Chinese long regarded them

as simply a new group of barbarians, and while willing to learn a few details from them, for many years did not dream that the entire structure of Chinese culture would need to be recast. Lack of intimate relations with other great civilized states, too, helped to breed in the Chinese a reluctance to regard themselves as one of a family of nations or to treat with Occidental powers on the basis of equality. This hereditary attitude of superiority was outraged by the encroachments of foreigners in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and may account in part for the intense impatience with which treaties derogatory to Chinese sovereignty were viewed and for the intransigence of the Communist rulers.

So far we have had little to say of the effect of the ocean. However, this has been quite as important as that of the land boundaries. The sea, as we have seen, is the source of the moisture-laden winds that bring China's rains. Until the last century, moreover, the ocean was even more effective in isolating China than were the great land masses to the north and west. To the east the only civilized peoples with whom commerce was possible were the Koreans and Japanese. Culturally both of these borrowed from rather than contributed to the Middle Kingdom. The Pacific coast of North America was too far distant to admit of much intercourse by the small ships of the earlier centuries and until the nineteenth century was sparsely peopled, mostly by savages. In Southeastern Asia were civilized lands, but the nearest had derived much of their culture from China and so had little to give her. India, the closest great cultural center markedly different from China, was almost as far and as difficult of access by sea as by land. No invasions were to be feared from the ocean, except by pirates, who, while often annoying, never seriously threatened a conquest of the country.

The Chinese were not greatly tempted to become a seafaring people. Until the nineteenth century their own vast land engrossed, as we have said, almost all their energies. North of the Yangtze, where were long the chief centers of civilization, the proportion of coast line to area is small, the connections (by way of the silt-laden Yellow River) between the interior and the sea were poor, and until recently there was scanty reward in commerce with neighboring islands and coasts. The South, supplied with much better harbors, was not fully incorporated into the Empire until the seventh and eighth centuries of the Christian Era and even then remained on the periphery of national consciousness. From the South, to be sure, merchants ventured abroad, sometimes to fairly distant parts. At one time extensive voyages were made under official direction, and later, partly because of limited arable land, overseas emigration from that region began. Not until the nineteenth century, however, did these have a marked effect upon the nation as a whole. China faced north and west, and not south and east.

With the nineteenth century began a great change. The sea, instead of being a barrier and a defense, became a highway and a source of danger. The Occident, developing larger and faster ships than had ever been known, arrived in force and insisted upon being admitted. Danger still lurked on the north, for an aggressive Russia now threatened. But the Westerner had penetrated the natural barriers of China, and from a totally unexpected direction. Japan, reorganized on Occidental models, became a major menace. The result was disorganization and revolution. China—accustomed to think of herself as an empire which, although occasionally overrun by barbarians or divided, was as yet without a peer—was now compelled to deal with other nations as equals. Always heretofore the dispenser and seldom the conscious receiver of culture, she now found the structure of her civilization antiquated, and she was faced with the unpleasant necessity of discarding part of it and thoroughly renovating the rest.

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CHAPTER TWO

# THE BEGINNINGS OF CHINESE CIVILIZATION

# (TO 221 B.C.)

## ORIGIN OF THE CHINESE

The beginnings of the Chinese, like those of other ancient peoples, are shrouded in obscurity. Chinese literature, although voluminous during most of the past twenty-three or twenty-four centuries, gives us little incontestable information concerning the origins of the people and their culture. The earliest written documents that have come down to us—contained chiefly in the collection known as the *Shih Ching,* or Classic of Poetry, in portions of the *Shu Ching,* or Classic of History, and the oracle bones unearthed in the present century—show a culture which was far from primitive and was presumably the result of centuries of development. Within the last few years, archaeology has unearthed important information. The Chinese myths akin to those by which other peoples have sought to account for the existence of the universe and of mankind, and for the origin of themselves and of their culture, complicate rather than simplify the confusion.

## CHINESE MYTHS AND LEGENDS OF THE BEGINNINGS OF HISTORY

While the oldest authentic records do not attempt to trace to their beginnings either the Chinese race or mankind as a whole, from time to time popular fancy has essayed to do so, with the result that we possess many tales bristling with mythical heroes. Although quite undependable as history, these stories are of importance—partly because they appear again and again in literature, mythology, and religion, and partly because, by some Chinese and Westerners, the more prominent figures have been seriously taken as actual personages. It is just possible that some of the stories will eventually be found to have a basis in actual fact. They must therefore, be mentioned.

As is natural with myths, particularly when, like these, they have had varying origins, differing accounts and attempts at chronology exist. Only the chief personages that appear in one or more Chinese histories deserve mention. P'an Ku is frequently described as separating the heavens and the earth, and as forming the sun, the moon, and plants and animals. There are, however, several versions of his myth. Following him some

accounts say that there appeared twelve or thirteen Celestial Sovereigns *(T'ien Huang),* all brothers, each of whom reigned 18,000 years; eleven Terrestrial Sovereigns *(Ti Huang),* again brothers, each of whom also ruled 18,000 years; and then nine Human Sovereigns *(Jên Huang),* once more brothers, who reigned a total of 45,600 years. We hear also of Yu Ch'ao, who is reputed to have taught men to build houses; of Sui Jên, who is said to have discovered a way of producing fire by boring one piece of wood with another; of Fu Hsi, who is reported to have taught his people to fish with nets and rear domestic animals, to have made musical instruments, to have devised writing by knots in strings, and to have invented the eight trigrams—*pa kua*—used in divination. To Nü Kua—often associated closely with Fu Hsi—is attributed the regulation of marriage. Shên Nung, the "Divine Husbandman," is reported to have taught the people agriculture and to have been the father of medicine. Huang Ti (The Yellow Emperor) is credited with fighting successfully against the barbarians, with instituting the system of official historiographers, with introducing bricks for building purposes, with erecting an observatory, with correcting the calendar by adding an intercalary month, and with introducing the chronological system of reckoning by cycles of sixty years. He is also reported to have built a temple to Heaven, to have regulated the division of the land according to the "well-field" *(ching t'ien)* system (to be described a few pages below), to have invented carts drawn by oxen, to have devised several musical instruments, and in many other ways to have advanced civilization. His principal spouse is credited with having taught the people sericulture, so important to the later life of China.

After a number of other rulers there is said to have come Yao, a model Emperor, who, in naming his successor, passed over his own son as incompetent and appointed Shun, whom he had selected for his skill and integrity and whom he had tested in various ways. Shun is reported to have performed sacrifices of several kinds, to have introduced uniformity into measures of length, capacity, and weight, to have traveled widely, to have subdued some of the barbarian tribes, to have divided the Empire into twelve provinces, and to have regulated some of the watercourses. Shun, so it is said, like Yao, went outside his family and chose as his successor Yü, who drained the waters of a great flood which had afflicted the country in the days of Yao. Shun and Yü each is reported to have reigned for a time conjointly with his predecessor and then, the latter abdicating, alone.

Yü is said to have made the crown hereditary in his family and to have founded the first dynasty, that of Hsia. This dynasty, the names of whose rulers tradition essays to give, is reported to have come to an end through the excesses of its last ruler, Chieh, who, falling under the spell of a beautiful but depraved woman, engaged in debauchery and cruelty. An outraged country was at last, so the story goes, led in rebellion against him by T'ang,

who, defeating and exiling the tyrant founded the second dynasty, that of Shang or Yin.

It is very uncertain which, if any, of these figures have actual history back of them. Some are probably entirely mythical, the creation of folklore and of uncritical writers in the attempt to account for the origin of the world and the beginnings of civilization. Some may be heroes or gods taken over from other peoples when they were conquered and assimilated by the Chinese. We are made suspicious by the effort to associate five of the pre-Hsia rulers—the Five Sovereigns *(Wu Ti)*—with the five elements of traditional Chinese physics—earth, wood, metal, fire, and water. The fact that these early figures are called rulers seems to indicate that the stories as we now have them date from a time when men, dwelling in an organized monarchy, read back that form of society into primitive times. Some of the monarchs, such as the rulers of the Hsia, may have arisen out of the efforts of noble families of later time to provide themselves with ancestors. Some, like Yao, Shun, and Yü, lauded as ideals by the Confucianists, may be in part the creation of this school in an endeavor to give to its teachings the sanction of antiquity. Of the three only Yü is mentioned in what is probably the earliest literary record, the *Shih Ching* (Classic of Poetry), and the first certainly authentic documents in which the names of Yao and Shun occur are of the sixth or the fifth century B.C. Yü was either later deified or was originally a deity, and seems to have been identified with a god who was lord of the harvest. P'an Ku is also very late (probably not earlier in our records than the third century B.C.). Huang Ti may be to a large extent a pleasant fiction of the early Taoists, devised to give to their contentions the authority of the past. He may have owed his popularity to his association with thunder and lightning, as a god of these phenomena. In the debates on philosophy which were one of the outstanding features of the centuries shortly preceding the Christian Era, several of the rivals sought to reinforce their case by ascribing their tenets to heroic figures of the past, and to assert that in an ancient golden age the practice of their teachings had been attended by prosperity. We are not entirely sure that there ever was such a ruling line as the Hsia. The strong tradition about it, and the fact that some families of historic times claimed descent from it, may indicate that it corresponds with a stage in Chinese history. The dates which some historians attempt to fix are, of course, untrustworthy. Those often given for the Hsia, 2205–1766 B.C., are obviously quite inaccurate.

## THE STORY AS PARTIALLY DISCLOSED BY ARCHAEOLOGY

In the twentieth century much light has been shed by archaeology on the beginnings of the Chinese and their civilization. Archae-

ology had made important discoveries before the Communist conquest of the mainland. In their years of dominance the Communists contributed significant additions.

Archaeology has shown that *Homo* and *Homo sapiens* appeared in China many thousands of years ago, but that what we regard as civilization was later in developing than in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Egypt, the Indus Valley, and perhaps elsewhere.

The earliest traces of *Homo* thus far discovered in China are in what geologists call the Pleistocene epoch of the Cenozoic era, which is said to have begun about a million years ago. In the Pliocene, the epoch which immediately preceded the Pleistocene, the main physical features of the later China were established. The chief river basins existed much as we know them today. That of the Huang Ho had a climate distinct from that of the Yangtze. The Ch'in Ling range of mountains, a spur from the K'un Lun which forms the northern frontier of Tibet, separated the North from the South, as it does today. Although the North was warmer than in recent centuries, the South was more tropical than in the past two thousand years. In the North, conditions began to show that hospitality to the development of civilization which prevailed in historic times. In Sinkiang and Mongolia the deposits of soil by the wind had begun, which on a larger scale and in a wider area formed the loess that has played a prominent part in the life of the North. In the Pleistocene, rainfall varied from semiarid and cool, attended by the drying up of the lakes of Pliocene and earlier times, to warm and moist, with the formation of the red soil which appears in much of China proper. In later Pleistocene came the northwest winds which blanketed much of the North with loess. Glaciers, typical of much of northern Europe and North America during the later Pleistocene, developed in the mountains west of China proper, but did not reach the latter.

Partial remains have been found in the South and Southwest of what was a gigantic hominid. But the most exciting discovery was that of the Peking Man *(Sinanthropos Pekinensis)* near *Chou-k'ou-tien,* southwest of Peking. There, beginning in the 1920's, extensive excavations brought to light remains of a number of individuals who dwelt in caves, who had crude stone tools, who may have had articulate speech, and who are said to have possessed mongoloid features which have been inherited by the modern Chinese. Beginning in 1954, somewhat similar finds were made in several localities in Shansi. Later, while the loess was deepening, but before it attained its eventual dimensions, what was undoubtedly *Homo sapiens* existed. Some of his representatives were cave dwellers, like the Peking Man. Others lived in oases in the Ordos. The cave dwellers hunted and fished, decorated themselves with necklaces, imported luxuries, buried their dead, and probably had clothes. In the 1950's, remains of what

was *Homo sapiens* were found in the South and in Szechwan; these may have dated from about the same period. Bones and implements of early *Homo sapiens* have also been discovered in Manchuria and Mongolia. Paleolithic man left behind him remains in caves in Kwangsi.

In the late Neolithic period the valley of the Huang Ho was teeming with human life. During the present century hundreds of sites have been investigated by archaeologists. Their occupants were farmers with domestic animals, mainly dogs and pigs. They flourished on the fertile loess soil. They produced pottery of various kinds. Some of it was red. Some was gray. Some was polished and black. Some was painted. Because of the place where the initial finds were made, the name Yang-shao is given to the one phase of the culture. Other varieties existed. Houses of various shapes and sizes were constructed. Many of the dwellings were partly below the level of the surrounding plain. Several villages could be described as small cities with walls. Care was shown in the burial of the dead. Some of the interments were in the village and others were in cemeteries. Efforts have been made to classify the several varieties and stages of the neolithic culture. Attempts have been directed toward establishing cultural connections with central and western Asia, but not with unquestionable success. Much of the neolithic culture persisted into historic and metal-using times. Some of the forms of pottery established a tradition for utensils which continued into the twentieth century.

Remains of neolithic cultures have been discovered not only in the basin of the Huang Ho but also in the valley of the Yangtze, in both its lower and upper reaches, and in South China. Some settlements were on mounds, presumably in part to escape floods. Here, as in the North, marked variety was seen.

During neolithic times the North had a more humid and warmer climate than in recent centuries. Much of the land was heavily wooded. Deer, inhabitants of the forests, abounded. Elephants and rhinoceroses were known.

## THE SHANG OR YIN PERIOD

Out of the neolithic culture in the valley of the Huang Ho and the North China alluvial plain a culture developed which was metal-using, chiefly in bronze, and which was associated with a state dominated by a ruling house. Its domains embraced the fertile alluvial plain that stretched from the foot of the Shansi highlands into the mountains of Shantung and the valley of the Huai. Its territory was roughly identical with the modern provinces of Hopei, Honan, Shantung and the northern part of Anhui. It had repercussions in some other parts of what we now regard as China. Archaeology, chiefly of the present century, amply supports

the existence of what the Chinese have regarded as the second dynasty. It had the name of Shang and was later known also as Yin. The traditional dates are 1766–1122 B.C. but are not entirely dependable. The date of the inception of the dynasty is especially uncertain. The Shang had several capitals of which the best known is Anyang, near the northern border of Honan. Numbers of other Shang sites have been discovered. Anyang seems to have been the capital from about 1384 B.C. to the overthrow of the Shang. It contained substantial temples, palaces, and houses. The Shang had a system of writing with characters, of which many were the ancestors of the later characters. They were not a foreign importation but grew out of earlier indigenous forms. Most of the writing that has survived was on tortoise shells or ox scapulae. These "oracle bones" were used for sacrificial ceremonies or were employed to inquire about weather, crops, war, the prospects of military expeditions, hunting trips, travel, sickness, and future well-being. The questions asked were written on the bones, the latter were then heated and allowed to cool, the ensuing cracks were interpreted, and the answers were written on the bones. Many of the latter were preserved as royal archives. Thousands have been brought to light, their inscriptions have been studied, and dictionaries of the characters have been compiled. Usually the bones were inscribed by a brush of animal hair and then incised with a knife. Some official records were on silk and on bamboo and wooden tablets. Bones were used for written records as well as divination. Many bronzes had inscriptions.

Metals and stones were widely utilized. Bronzes were among the great achievements of the Shang. At the height of the period they displayed a skill in technique not surpassed and seldom equalled elsewhere. Like the Shang writing, they seem to have been an indigenous development and not an imported art although this is questioned. Their surviving examples have been highly prized by the Chinese and by foreign collectors. Other metals were worked. Jade, long esteemed by the Chinese as a semiprecious stone, was utilized before and during the Shang. The Shang carved marble, some of it for sacrificial vessels, some for ornaments in the form of birds and animals, and some as foundations for wooden pillars. Pottery was extensively developed, a continuation of that of neolithic times.

The Shang economic life, like that of the Neolithic age, was based on agriculture. Millet was raised and some wheat and barley. Whether rice was grown is not clear, but is entirely possible. Commerce was known and, as in paleolithic times, cowrie shells were employed as a medium of exchange and may have been imported from tropical climes. Specialized industries arose for luxuries as well as necessities. Silkworms were reared and hemp was cultivated. Cloth was woven, and clothing was of both textiles and furs. Interestingly, chopsticks were utilized in eating—a custom which persisted. The domestic animals included pigs, dogs, sheep,

and oxen. Horses were used for war and hunting, and elephants aided transport and war.

Shang society was aristocratic. At the head were the king and the nobility. They hunted for pleasure and as a preparation for war. They engaged in war and for that purpose employed the chariot. Whether the chariot, with its use of the wheel, was an indigenous invention, or came from contact with cultures in western Asia, is not known. Certainly both chariot and wheel were earlier in western Asia and Egypt. By later standards the Shang were cruel. In the elaborate tombs of the powerful, horses and servants were buried—the latter executed, presumably for the purpose of serving the deceased masters in the after life. Human and animal sacrifices accompanied the consecration of buildings. An elaborate organization of government was developed. Underneath the king and appointed by him and owing allegiance to him were rulers of territorial units. These rulers were required to follow the king in his wars, to defend the frontiers of his domains, to provide him with manpower for war and labor, and to pay him tribute. A sharp distinction seems to have existed between the upper classes and the majority who constituted the lower classes.

In between the nobility and the commoners were literate official functionaries who kept the records of the governing class. Some of them were responsible for the oracle bones. Presumably it was they who created and developed the written language. Serving the state as they did, their outlook was that of government. They were an early expression of what became a continuing feature of Chinese history—the prominence of an intellectual class, the custodians of Chinese civilization, shaping its ideals, their approach that of men concerned for the well-being of the collective life of the state.

Religion consisted of the worship of ancestors and of heavenly and earthly gods. Above all the gods in heaven was *Ti* or *Shang-ti,* the Ruler Above, who presided over heaven much as the king governed his realm. The earthly deities included the god of earth *(Shê* or *T'u),* and the gods of hills, rivers, and the four directions. To the Shang people the universe was in three levels: the heavenly world above, the earthly world below, and the world of men between. Worship included music, dancing, and sacrifices. It was usually conducted by priests and might be accompanied by offerings of jade and of human and animal life.

The calculation of the calendar was important for an agricultural people and was a function of the monarch through experts dependent on him. Lunar and solar eclipse and sun spots were observed. A nova, a stellar explosion, was noted. Both the solar year and the lunar month were understood and the former was reckoned with a fair approximation to accuracy.

By the end of the Shang several features of Chinese civilization had been developed which, with modifications, were to persist, some of them

even into the sweeping revolution brought by the impact of the Occident in the twentieth century. The tradition was established that all China should be under one government. Even though the area covered by that government was later to be greatly enlarged, and its structure and the ideals and theories which dominated it were to be drastically altered, the Chinese never surrendered the dream and the purpose of being all under one regime. The Shang also sought to extend their regime over the peoples on their borders. In the present century the Communists held to the dream and also strove to extend their boundaries. From the Shang came the written form of the language which, with modifications, was to prove one of the agencies of achieving and preserving unity and which even the Communists did not discard. The beginnings were seen of the scholarly elite who had so prominent a role in shaping Chinese thought and ideals. Some of the art forms developed by the Shang and the culture out of which they rose persisted. That was true of the bronzes which were one of the striking creations of the Shang, and of some forms of pottery. The Shang economy was based firmly on agriculture. That likewise continued. Millet remained standard. Silk has been a characteristic product. Pigs never failed to be a major source of food. Dogs were an invariable feature of town and rural life.

## THE CHOU ERA

The Shang were followed by the Chou. Chinese historians have called them both dynasties. Some Western scholars, however, declare that the Empire as such began with the Ch'in, the immediate successor of the Chou. Yet the Chou, like the Shang, held together in a degree of cultural unity the region that could be called China. This was in spite of the fact that the area embraced by that culture markedly expanded, and that in the later centuries of the Chou the authority of the central administration all but vanished and China became a congeries of states of varying number, size, and strength. But the dream of unity, instead of disappearing, was strengthened. What was denominated the Chou dynasty lasted longer than any other period in China's history. The traditional dates are 1122–256 B.C., or a little less than nine centuries. Although these can be questioned, in the near millennium which they embraced a creative ferment gave to China the schools of thought and attitudes toward life, the universe, and social and political organization which, with important modifications and the contributions of Buddhism, were to be basic until the irruption of the Occident swept them into the dust bin. Even then some attitudes which they had nourished remained characteristic of the Chinese.

The conventional story told of the downfall of the Shang and the establishment of the Chou dynasty resembles that by which tradition accounts

for the ruin of the Hsia. An infamous ruler, Chou Hsin, a man of ability, aided and incited by a favorite concubine, turned tyrant and profligate. Many cruelties and excesses are ascribed to the ill-omened pair. Chou Hsin came into conflict with Wên Wang, the ruler of Chou. Wang was a designation used by the Chou for their monarchs.

Chou, a principality in the valley of the Wei, on the western frontier of the then China, represented the growth of a new, vigorous state, its prowess strengthened by prolonged warfare with the "barbarians." The Chou people seem to have been related to the Chinese already on the North China plain, but racially and culturally to have been somewhat different from them. Wên Wang was, significantly, called the "Chief of the West."

Later historians glorified Wên Wang, representing his character and administration as ideal. Chou Hsin was at first successful against Wên Wang. The latter was imprisoned and was released only on the payment of a heavy fine. His son, known to later generations under the title of Wu Wang, finally led a revolt which overthrew the tyrant. The traditional account of the overthrow of the Shang bears the earmarks of partisanship, and very possibly arose from the narrative preserved by the victorious Chou in the ceremonies of their ancestral temple.

We have little, if any, certain information about details of events during the initial centuries of the Chou. The ceremonies in honor of the ancestors of the family have transmitted to us names of rulers, but not much else that is dependable. Wu Wang, like Wên Wang, was regarded by posterity as a model. He is reported to have established his capital not far from the later Ch'angan, on the broad lower portion of the valley of the Wei, the westernmost of the large fertile plains of the North and in the region where was the original seat of the Chou power. Wu Wang is represented as having redistributed the principalities which made up the realm, entrusting to the descendants of the Shang portions of their former domains, and to two of his brothers other sections.

Wu Wang was succeeded by a son, then a mere boy, known to posterity as Ch'êng Wang. During Ch'êng Wang's minority the regent was Wu Wang's brother, Chou Kung ("the Duke of Chou"), who had been of great assistance to the state during Wu Wang's lifetime. Chou Kung, esteemed a paragon by later generations, is said to have consolidated the power of the dynasty, and so successfully to have trained the young monarch that the latter was able to reign acceptably after the regent's death. To him, too, is attributed the administrative organization of the realm on a pattern which for generations remained the model. To Chou Kung is ascribed the *Chou Li,* The Ritual of the Chou, a compilation possibly dating actually from the fourth and third centuries B.C., or even later, and much or all of it the attempt of the authors to give the sanction of antiquity to an imaginary utopia of their own creation.

Some of the early monarchs of the Chou apparently extended the ›oundaries both of their domains and of Chinese culture. Chao Wang, the raditional dates of whose rule—according to one chronology—are 1052–001 B.C., and his successor, Mu Wang, with reign dates—by the same hronology—of 1001–946 B.C., are said to have triumphed over the bar-›arians, and among other regions, to have carried the arms of the Chinese nto the valley of the Han, across the Ch'in-ling mountains, which form he southern boundary of the valley of the Wei. Mu Wang especially is :redited with having been an energetic and restless traveler, to have pursued ıis conquests beyond the Yangtze on the south, and to have penetrated to he far northwest, visiting a mysterious Hsi Wang Mu, literally "West Ƹing Mother."

With the ninth and eighth centuries B.C., our knowledge of events, ılthough still meager, increases somewhat, thanks chiefly to some of the ›oems in the *Shih Ching*, which probably were composed to announce o the ancestors the achievements of the monarchs. The power of the Ƹhou Wang had begun to decline. The kingdom had long been divided nto principalities. Some were ruled by collateral branches of the royal ıouse, others by descendants of ministers and generals who had been ·ewarded for service to the state by hereditary holdings, and still others ›y families who claimed to trace their lineage from the rulers of the ›receding dynasties. Probably several of the princes were extending their ›oundaries at the expense of the adjoining non-Chinese peoples and so were enlarging the borders of China. Weak monarchs found difficulty in asserting their authority over powerful vassals, and privileges once con-ceded proved obstacles to the resumption of the power of the central government by the occasional vigorous *Wang*. Hsüan Wang, the tradi-tional dates of whose reign are 827–781 B.C., was apparently abler than some of his immediate predecessors. Certainly he was strong enough to fight successfully against the "barbarians" in the modern Shansi and northern Shensi, carrying the war into the highlands from which these enemies menaced the prosperous plains. He also invaded the valley of the Han.

Hsüan Wang, however, only postponed the decay of his line. His successor, Yu Wang, is declared by tradition to have been hopelessly weak and to have sacrified the state in the attempt to satisfy the whim of a court beauty. He put her in place of his queen and disinherited the latter's son, the heir presumptive. To make her smile, so the story runs, he had the beacon fires kindled which were the signal for his vassals to rally against a raid of barbarians. When the fires were lit in earnest, the lords, fearing another practical joke, failed to respond against a joint attack of the invaders and the outraged father of the deposed queen. Yu Wang was killed and his unpopular mistress taken captive. At the beginning of the next reign, traditional dates of which are 771–720 B.C., the capital was

moved from the valley of the Wei, where it was subject to the forays of the "barbarians," eastward to Loyang, near the present Honanfu, more remote from the dangerous frontier. The change marked the hopeless decline of the Chou, and while the dynasty endured for over five centuries longer, the principalities and not the royal line now become the center of interest. The activities of the feeble *rois fainéants* were more and more restricted to their religious and ceremonial, as contrasted with their political, functions. The dynasty prior to the removal of the capital is known as the Western Chou and after that event as the Eastern Chou. The shift was more than geographic. The Eastern Chou became a distinct era and was marked by striking cultural developments which did much to shape the later China.

From the eighth century B.C. until the middle of the third, China roughly resembled the Europe of the Middle Ages. Like medieval Europe, China was a collection of states with unstable boundaries. What has loosely been called "feudalism" existed, the local princes in theory owing homage, tribute, counsel, and military service to the Chou monarchs, and minor lords having similar obligations to more powerful ones. However, the details of organization, and even the main structure, were quite different from those of Europe. As the power of the Chou declined, some semblance of security was sought, as in Europe, in alliances and leagues, and several individual states successively won a kind of hegemony. Purely Chinese states were supposed not to make war on each other—a principle often honored more in the breach than in the observance. That devastating activity was theoretically employed only against the "barbarians," the peoples of non-Chinese culture.

As in the Europe of the Middle Ages, the boundaries of civilization were steadily extended to embrace new peoples. In Europe the spread was northward—into Germany, Great Britain, Scandinavia, and Russia—while in China it was eastward (through Shantung), westward (into Szechwan), and especially southward (into the Yangtze Valley). As in Europe, too, a community of culture existed, but in China, although marked variations were found, especially in the frontier states which were beginning to enter the pale of Chinese culture, there seems to have been a closer approach to uniformity. As in medieval Europe, so in the China of the Eastern Chou, intellectual activity was marked. Unlike the process in Europe, division was succeeeded suddenly by political union, and this was accompanied and followed by increasing uniformity in culture.

### THE HEGEMONY OF VARIOUS STATES

The China of the Eastern Chou, then, was divided into a large number of states. By the seventh century B.C., five of these had begun

to emerge as somewhat more powerful than the others. In the Northeast was Ch'i, in parts of what are now Shantung and Hopei; in the North, in the modern Shansi, was Chin; in the West, in the modern Shensi, was Ch'in; on the plain, not far from the old centers of culture, Sung; and in the South, centering in the present province of Hupeh, Ch'u. Four of these five, it will be noted, were on the frontier. They could grow by expansion




outward—away from the older centers of culture—and their populations probably included strong infusions of "barbarian" blood. Ch'u, indeed, appears to have been almost entirely non-Chinese in race, originally non-Chinese in speech, and partly so in culture. Some members of its ruling aristocracy possibly came from the North. These frontier states strove to

control the older China, largely the present Honan. Here was the traditional center of culture and of political authority. Here, too, the many small principalities constituted a tempting prey to their larger neighbors. Only one, Sung, was able to make an effective bid for power against the frontier states, and its importance was transitory.

The first of the five strong states to achieve the hegemony was Ch'i. Tradition declares it to have been under an unusually able ruler, Huan, advised by a distinguished minister, Kuan Chung, and that, in the first half of the seventh century B.C., it acquired wealth and prestige. By vigorous administrative, military, and fiscal reorganization, undertaken through the leadership of these two men, the state was transformed. The wealth of the prince was increased by monopolies of staple industries, including especially salt and iron. Commerce was encouraged. When some of the minor states into whch the older centers of Chinese culture were divided had become enfeebled, Ch'u reached out from the South and menaced them with possible absorption. At this juncture the threatened states, in self-defense, for the moment ignoring their enmities, by treaty formed a league against the invader (681 B.C.) and placed themselves under the protection of the prince of Ch'i.

The league thus formed endured for more than two centuries. The authority of its head was confirmed by investiture from the Chou *Wang*. Assemblies of the league were not held at stated intervals, but whenever need arose the heads of the allies were convoked by the president. Some convened for the purpose of undertaking a joint war and were attended by the rulers with all their armed contingents. Others, with peaceful purposes, did not bring together so large a body of men.

Late in the reign of Huan, after Kuan Chung had died (643 B.C.), Ch'i fell into internal confusion and the presidency passed out of his hands. For some years thereafter the very existence of the league was threatened. The head of Sung, one of the other member states, attempted as its president to give it adequate leadership, but in vain. At least one of the members sought safety in an alliance with that very Ch'u whose aggressions had brought the organization into existence.

The league, thus jeopardized, was salvaged and given renewed strength by the presidency of Wên, prince of Chin. Chin, located in the mountains and plateaus of the present Shansi, was not so easily unified as Ch'i, on the adjoining plain, for internal barriers favored the independence of the local clans. Wên, whose personal name was Ch'ung Êrh, was the son of a "barbarian" mother. Before his accession he had learned hardihood and resourcefulness by years of wandering and adventurous exile. In 636 B.C. he succeeded in establishing himself in Chin, and during a brief reign of eight years (he died 628 B.C.) he exercised the rule so ably that for a century and a half thereafter his descendants were usually

the acknowledged heads of the league. By skillful administrative reorganization he welded his principality into an effective fighting unit. Then, allying himself with other states, he attacked and overwhelmingly defeated Ch'u, and was appointed by the Chou ruler as the head of the other princes.

Chin, placed at the forefront of the Chinese states by the prowess of Wên, did not hold its place without many struggles and reverses. Indeed, under weak princes and internal dissensions in spite of temporary revivals it gradually declined. Ch'in, in the territory once held by the early rulers of the Chou and long a rising power, was now the guardian of the western marches. Partly "barbarian" in blood, apparently it acquired prowess by constant fighting, and in the second half of the seventh century, under its great prince Mu, a contemporary of Wên, it made a temporarily successful bid for the hegemony. Ch'u in the South was always to be reckoned with, and at the beginning of the sixth century defeated Chin and seemed to be on the point of replacing it.

With one of the sudden reversals of fortune which make these centuries so confusing, Ch'u on the point of victory, suddenly declined (in the latter half of the sixth century B.C.). Chin, although not particularly strong, found an ally in Wu, a state which first emerged into prominence near the opening of the sixth century B.C. Wu, in the lower part of the Yangtze Valley and commanding the mouth of that river and the fertile plains along its lower courses, occupied most of the territory covered by the present province of Kiangsu and portions of the present Anhui, Chêkiang, and Kiangsi. Its people were possibly allied racially to the Chinese, but were late in acquiring Chinese civilization and were regarded as barbarians by their northern neighbors. During the sixth century B.C., thanks in part to the ability of its rulers, Wu became one of the most powerful states of China and continued so into the fifth century. In 482 B.C., indeed, the prince of Wu seems to have succeeded the now almost impotent princes of Chin as the real head of the league—although the titular presidency may still have remained with Chin.

Within a decade of this triumph, however, Wu collapsed (473 B.C.). The most southerly of the states of China of the later years of the Chou dynasty, Yüeh, in the modern Chêkiang, destroyed it. For a time Yüeh became the oustanding state of East China. However, although it removed its capital to a point on or near the south coast of the present Shantung (379 B.C.), it did not occupy the dominant position over inland China that some other states had had or were later to possess. It remained chiefly a coastal power. Both Wu and Yüeh seem to have depended in part upon boats for their victories, navigating these craft on the sea and on the rivers and lakes in which their possessions abounded. Wu, indeed, appears to have begun the Grand Canal. It is not strange that, relying

so much on their watercraft, neither Wu nor Yüeh succeeded in making its authority effective over the interior.

Chin did not long survive Wu. Most of its territory being in the mountains, plains, and valleys of what is now Shansi, its internal barriers always threatened it with division into warring clans. This tendency was accentuated by the distribution of "fiefs" by the princes of Chin among their favorites and relatives. It is not surprising, therefore, that the authority of the princes declined and that toward the close of the fifth century Chin broke into three fragments (Han, Wei, and Chao). Neither of these was strong enough to occupy the dominant role in national politics formerly held by the united Chin.

## THE PERIOD OF THE CONTENDING STATES AND THE TRIUMPH OF CH'IN

By the middle of the fifth century the old China was beginning to disappear and great changes were in progress. The institutions of the past were disintegrating and new ideas appeared in administration, legislation, philosophy, and religion. As we shall see in a moment, the period was one of creative thought. Warfare among the many states which made up China had long been part of the course of events. Such an outline as we have given probably seems intricate enough to those for the first time introduced to the story, but compared with the complexities of the detailed narratives it is simplicity itself. The scene now becomes even more confused and belligerent. To Chinese historians the era is known as that of the *Chan Kuo,* or Contending States. The Chou rulers became increasingly feeble and the states in the older China dropped more than ever into the background—the prey of the partially Chinese principalities on the border. With the breakup of Chin ended any semblance of that league and that principle of hegemony by which a measure of respect had been paid to the rights of the individual states and some protection given them. Heretofore war between the states had been carried on in large part according to recognized rules. Now the strong ruthlessly overran and absorbed the weak. Some of the members of the old aristocratic houses sank to the level of the common people and many new families rose to power.

The principal combatants were the great principalities on the frontier, Ch'in, Ch'u, Yen (with its capital on the site of the present Peking), the three fragments of Chin, and a revived Ch'i. These were known as the *Ch'i Hsiung,* or Seven Martial (States). Ch'i had not been a major figure in Chinese politics for about two centuries, but it had continued to exist, and under the leadership of a usurping ruling house it rose once more to prominence. However, Ch'in and Ch'u were the chief rivals. Both were expanding at the expense of their neighbors. In the fourth century B.C., Ch'in conquered the state of Shu, in the present province of Szechwan. In

that same century Ch'u overthrew Yüeh and absorbed the northern portions of its dominions—those formerly belonging to Wu. As between Ch'u and Ch'in, the tide of fortune ebbed and flowed. Alliances centering around each were made and dissolved, the lesser states seeking safety or aggrandizement by throwing in their fortunes now with one and now with another of the more formidable combatants.

Ch'in owed much of its strength to Kung-sun Yang, also called Wei Yang of Shang Yang, who, belonging to the ruling family of Wei, in the middle of the fourth century, under Duke Hsiao—who appears to have combined ability with an ambition to control all China—became a minister of Ch'in. Under Shang Yang's direction the laws and administration of his adopted state were reorganized and the foundations laid for the eventual victory of Ch'in over its rivals. Moreover, Ch'in was in a favorable geographic position in the valley of the Wei, protected by mountains and on the periphery of the then China, where, through warfare against the neighboring "barbarians," it had acquired military discipline and organization.

The other six of the seven leading states were, in 333 B.C., brought together in a league to resist the prosperous Ch'in. This period is often known as that of the Six Kingdoms. The alliance was not permanent, partly because its members were too jealous of one another to hold together for long. With this league is associated a famous historical romance, which attributes the enterprise to Su Ch'in, one of the wandering scholar-diplomats of the time, and which assigns the undoing of the alliance to a former fellow-student of Su Ch'in, Chang I, in the service of Ch'in.

Many were the wars and the exploits of these troubled years, and many a story has been handed down of loyalty, of trickery and intrigue, of prowess, and of generals and statesmen successful today and disgraced and banished or executed tomorrow. One of the festivals of a later China, that of the Dragon Boat, is said (probably erroneously) to take its rise from the search for the body of Ch'ü Yüan, a statesman of Ch'u, who is declared to have drowned himself (295 B.C.) in despair over the failure of his prince to take his advice against the schemes of the astute Chang I.

For a time it seemed that China might never be unified, but would be divided permanently among Ch'i, Ch'u, and Ch'in. Gradually, however, and with occasional reverses, Ch'in forged its way to the front. Its military organization seems to have given it an advantage. Instead of depending on chariots, the familiar war vehicle of the older China still relied on by its rivals, it formed an army in which horse and foot soldiers predominated. It may have adopted these from the "barbarians" with whom it fought on its western and northern frontiers. Early in the third century, Ch'i was practically eliminated as a major power. Its prince, in attacking his neighbor (possibly with the purpose of mastering China), brought down on

his head a number of the other states and was disastrously defeated. The ruin of Ch'i strengthened Ch'in. In the first half of the third century Ch'in repeatedly defeated Ch'u and annexed much of its territory.

In the struggle between the great rivals, the prestige and the power of the Chou sank ever lower and lower. The rulers of the more prominent of the states had for some time assumed the title of *Wang,* heretofore the exclusive designation of the Chou monarchs—thereby probably in effect declaring their equality with the house of Chou and possibly indicating their ambition to master all China. In the middle of the third century B.C., Ch'in wrested from Nan Wang, the last of the Chou to wear that title, the western portion of his small remaining territory, and carried off the nine tripods which, alleged to have been handed down from the Emperor Yü, were esteemed as symbols of supreme power. On the death of Nan Wang, in 256 B.C., a relative, under the designation of Eastern Chou Prince *(Tung Chou Chun),* maintained for a short time something of a semblance of authority until, in 249 B.C., he in his turn was defeated by Ch'in and forfeited his territory to the victor.

The extinction of the Chou was, however, by no means the last of the steps necessary to assure Ch'in the Empire. Other and more powerful rivals had to be overcome. The final victory was under the direction of one of the most important and interesting figures in all Chinese history, he who is known to posterity as Shih Huang Ti. To the birth and tutelage of this unifier of China a peculiar story is attached. In the third century B.C. a prince of Ch'in, a not particularly clever fellow, was in exile, and while he was there an unusually able man, Lü Pu-wei, a merchant, who saw in him an opportunity for advancement, attached himself to him. Lü Pu-wei, by skillful management, obtained for his princely patron the appointment to the succession to the throne of Ch'in. Lü Pu-wei had a beautiful and charming concubine, and when the prince became infatuated with her, surrendered her to him. A son of this beauty was Chêng or Ying Chêng (born 259 B.C.), later Shih Huang Ti. Malicious and perhaps ill-founded gossip has it that his father was not the prince, but the clever Lü Pu-wei. When, thanks to his friend, the prince succeeded to the rule in Ch'in, Lü Pu-wei continued as his chief adviser and remained powerful in the earlier years of the reign of Chêng—who, as a minor, followed his reputed father as head of Ch'in (247 B.C.). Lü Pu-wei is said to have been accused of complicity in amorous intrigues of and with his former concubine, now the queen-dowager. Certainly Chêng, not unwilling to be rid of so powerful a mentor, banished him (238 B.C.). Again accused of treasonable designs, Lü was banished a second time, probably to the present Honan. His life seems to have been ended by poison.

Before Lü's fall, Ch'in was well on its way to its final triumph over its rivals. In the second half of the third century it annexed state after

state. Ch'u was erased from the map, and in 221 B.C. the conquest of what was left of Ch'i completed the territorial unification of China under the all-powerful Ch'in. One stage of China's development had come to an end and a new era, that of imperialism, had dawned.

## CULTURAL GROWTH UNDER THE CHOU

These centuries of almost incessant warfare had been accompanied by remarkable developments in civilization and by the wide extension of Chinese culture in regions within and outside its native habitat.

The original China, it will be recalled, was on the plain formed by the Yellow River and its tributaries. At the outset of the Chou much of it was still uncultivated. It contained large fertile areas but also swamps and regions of shifting sands. At the beginning of the dynasty, and for many centuries thereafter, people whom the Chinese regarded as barbarians lived not only on the edges of the plain, but also in the plain itself, and some of them on the seashore.

When they conquered the Shang, the Chou, although probably from the same neolithic stock from which the former were sprung, were far less civilized. Indeed, they appropriated much from the Shang, including the system of writing, art forms, and kinds of pottery and other utensils. Some intermarriages occurred, at least among the upper classes.

As it expanded, Chinese civilization took to itself many elements of the peoples with whom it came in contact. By the close of the Chou, and probably earlier, the culture of the Chinese, like that of many other peoples, was becoming a synthesis of contributions from several regions north, south, and west of the primitive seat of civilization. For instance, in the later centuries of the Chou and down into the Ch'in dynasty there are evidences of so-called "Scythian" influence on weapons, implements, and art objects, including bronzes. From the eighth to the third century B.C. the Scyths were in control in part of what is now Russia, and the effect of their art on that of China argues either direct or indirect contacts of the Chinese with the peoples of the vast plain which stretches across much of Europe and Asia.

## ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

In the early years of the Chou, Chinese culture was already advanced. As before, the basic industry was agriculture. Millet, rice, wheat, and barley were the chief cereals. Some of these were quite possibly of foreign origin. The ox-drawn plow appeared, perhaps of alien provenance. Advances in fertilizers and irrigation were achieved. Fermented liquor was made from both rice and millet. Vegetables were raised and fruits

were cultivated. The mulberry was particularly useful because its leaves nourished the silkworms and so were essential in the production of the most characteristic of Chinese textiles. Several kinds of plants were employed in the production of cloth. The pig and the chicken were, with the dog, the omnipresent live stock, and there were other domestic animals. Irrigation on a large scale was developed in the latter part of the period. Iron came into use sometime during the dynasty. The creation of metallic money must have wrought changes in the economy of the land.

As in the Shang, a sharp distinction seems to have existed between the lower, or peasant, and the upper, or aristocratic, classes. The lower were occupied with cultivating the soil. The upper classes did the governing. The distinction appears to have been accentuated by, or at least to have had some association with, the growth of towns. During the Chou, urban civilization was spreading, centering in capitals of the feudal princes and of the *Wang*. Between city dwellers and the rural population a gulf tended to exist. The town, dominated by the aristocracy, seems to have had a market place, an altar to the earth—a raised mound of beaten soil—and the ancestral temple of the ruling lord. It was surrounded by a wall and a moat.

Tradition asserts that land was divided according to the *ching t'ien* or "well-field" system. While some scholars regard this as an imaginary creation of later utopian philosophers, probably it had an actual basis in fact. On the other hand, presumably it was never systematically carried out on any such large scale as some writers have supposed. By this device the arable land was assigned in sections to eight peasant families each. Every section was plotted in a form resembling the Chinese character for well, *ching*, 井, each of the eight outer plots being cultivated by one of the eight families, and the central plot being cultivated in common to raise the produce which went to the lord. The title was vested in the lord. Permanent individual peasant ownership appears not to have been thought of. New land was cleared as the old was exhausted, and periodical reassignment was the rule. The size of the *ching* varied with the quality of the soil. As irrigation and methods of cultivation improved, residence and boundaries between fields were of longer duration. The poorer soil was allowed periodically to lie fallow. While the peasant did not own the soil, apparently he was permanently attached to certain districts, and so, like the European serf, enjoyed a better status than that of slavery. Probably not until toward the close of the Chou dynasty did peasant proprietorship prevail. Wei Yang is credited—possibly incorrectly—with having made it the rule in Ch'in. The *ching t'ien* system gradually disintegrated, and by the third century B.C. (probably even as early as the sixth century) it was passing away.

Much of the work of bringing waste lands into cultivation, of draining

swamps and constructing canals for irrigation, seems to have been performed by the state. While possibly accelerated under some of the great princes in the closing years of the Chou, it had been in progress for centuries and must have entailed great labor for many generations of peasants and officials.

As towns grew and as the Chinese extended their domains and became more numerous, commerce and industry expanded. The rise to power in Ch'in of a merchant, Lü Pu-wei, may have been symptomatic of the increased importance of his class. The introduction of coined money, about the beginning of the first millennium B.C., probably had a profound effect upon the social and economic organization of the time.

## SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

It was only during the season when the land was cultivated that the peasants lived on it. During the winter they were gathered into villages, where each family had its separate home. Some homes were caves dug in the loess where it rose in sharp cliffs. Others were built of mud. The villages, as we have seen, were usually walled and clustered about the residence of an official, often the overlord's home and ancestral hall. Frequently, too, they were on heights overlooking the fields, out of the way of floods and more easily defended than on the plain. In these villages the life of the community centered around market places and public grounds.

It was in the spring, before the workers went to the fields, that the mating of young couples seems to have taken place. There were community festivals in the spring and in the autumn, when the entire village gave itself over to dancing and ceremonials.

Agriculture and the life of the peasantry were carefully regulated and directed by officials, so that China early possessed a kind of bureaucracy. Irrigation and the attendant construction and maintenance of canals contributed to the centralization of authority.

The aristocracy was chiefly distinguished from the peasants by an elaborate family and hierarchal organization. Each patrician clan professed to trace its descent through the male line to a common ancestor: a god, a hero, or a monarch. Sometimes the original progenitor was supposed to be a bird or an animal. These latter were often purely mythical creatures, such as the unicorn and the dragon. The men were careful not to take wives, or even concubines, of their own clan name. However, two houses often intermarried for many generations, and sons customarily obtained wives from their mother's family. Then, too, children of a brother and sister might marry—being of different clan names. The clan was not a territorial division and did not necessarily hold land as a unit. The effective

tie was not economic but religious—the cult in honor of the ancestors and especially of the putative founder of the clan.

The aristocratic clan in turn was divided into families, each with its male head who officially represented and had authority over its members. Marriage, being the means of perpetuating the family and the clan, was of great importance and by elaborate rites. At the time of the marriage the bride was formally introduced to her husband's parents and ancestors. Secondary wives might be taken. A birth was regarded as lucky or unlucky according to the day on which it occurred. An infant that arrived on an unpropitious day might be abandoned. On reaching man's estate, the youth was inducted into that rank with formal ceremonies, receiving the cap which indicated that he was now recognized as an adult.

The social life and even the recreations of the aristocracy, such as archery and music, were controlled by custom.

From the upper classes came the lords and the great landed proprietors. By no means all those of patrician birth possessed large estates. Many were petty landowners, a kind of sturdy squirearchy from which came numbers of the thinkers and military adventurers of the later centuries of the Chou. Others were employees of the state, scribes, schoolteachers, diviners, or experts on ritual. Still others were merchants, for in time a fairly extensive domestic and interstate commerce arose in such commodities as salt, grain, silk, horses, and cattle.

## POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Political organization had probably developed in complexity since the Shang if for no other reasons than that the extent of territory governed had increased. The head of the state was the *Wang,* or monarch. In theory the *Wang* ruled because of the decree of Heaven *(T'ien Ming)* and the *tê* (originally meaning magical power, but later, by Confucian scholars, given the moral connotation of "virtue") of himself and his ancestors, obtained through obedience to the commands of Heaven. In practice the authority of the *Wang* depended very largely upon his own ability and force of character. Time-distances were great, and the leading territorial magnates were disposed to act very much like independent sovereigns—at least in all except religious matters. After the first few monarchs of the Chou it was a rare *Wang* who was able to become more than a kind of high priest and a source of titles. In the earlier days of the dynasty, the monarchs had much real power. Later they became mere figureheads, retaining some degree of importance chiefly because of the prestige of their line and their religious functions.

The *Wang* was assisted by a chief minister and by six subordinate ministers in charge of different phases of administration—agriculture, the

army, public works, religious rites, the monarch's personal affairs, and punishments. Below these appears to have been an extensive and fairly complicated officialdom of varying ranks. Some of the positions were hereditary. During the many centuries which the dynasty endured, modifications in the system inevitably occurred. As the effective power of the *Wang* declined, this officialdom ceased to have the administrative significance that apparently it once possessed. Accordingly, it became more and more stereotyped and regularized. Together with the *Wang,* however, it was considered to have practical religious importance, for its continued functioning was held essential to that co-operation of Heaven, Earth, and man upon which depended the prosperity and welfare of the realm. Religious ceremonies performed by the proper functionaries were supposed to be quite as requisite to the well-being of society as was the observance of ethical obligations between man and man.

The realm was divided into two main parts, the royal domains, ruled directly by the *Wang* through his officials, and the states of the many princes. During part of the Chou dynasty, the realm appears to have been divided into nine provinces, each with a kind of governor, appointed by the *Wang* from among the local lords. These provinces, however, probably possessed little more than a ceremonial significance, and later writers overstressed their actual importance. The subordinate owed his overlord homage, military service, and tribute. In return he received land. Investiture was marked by solemn ceremonies. Homage was supposed to be performed at periodical intervals, varying with the distance of the principality from the court. Tribute was chiefly in kind—in products of the soil and the loom—for metallic money seems not to have made its appearance until the latter part of the fifth century B.C. Every lord was also bound to perform the proper sacrifices to the spirits of the land and to his ancestors and to maintain justice among his subjects. Each prince had his own officials, graded in a kind of hierarchy.

The structure was held together in part by the observance of an elaborate ritual by which inferiors honored superiors. Theoretically, too, the lords were subordinate to the *Wang* and could be promoted or demoted by him. Before the breakup of the old order toward the latter part of the Chou, there seems for centuries to have been a kind of stability—uneasy and not too secure, to be sure—and a recognized structure. It was overturned by the rise of the great warring states out of which Ch'in emerged triumphant.

The laws were largely penal, covering classes of crimes and certain acts which we in the Occident would call civil. Judged by modern standards, punishments were severe, although no more so than those of many other nations of antiquity. The chief recognized ones were death, castration, amputation of the feet, cutting off the nose, and tatooing the face.

Frequently they could be compounded by the payment of a fine. Contracts were regularly made and legally recognized.

As to war and defense, the Chinese employed chariots and ensconced themselves in walled towns and villages. War was cruel, as it always is. It seems possible that a victory over the "barbarians" was sometimes celebrated by a cannibal feast off the bodies of the vanquished, although wars between Chinese were not so terminated.

The bronzes which have survived from the Chou show a level of culture far from primitive. The sacrificial vessels especially command the admiration of experts everywhere. At the outset they displayed no sharp break with the Shang bronzes. Not far from 900 B.C., new forms, of inferior workmanship, supplanted their predecessors. About three centuries later appeared a revival of old forms, but with more ornamentation than the latter and with inlays. Many samples of jade, too, show artistic taste and skill. Lacquer began to be employed.

In the early Chou centuries, as under the Shang, burials of the more powerful were often accompanied by the decapitation of menials to serve their masters in the spirit world. Later the custom was discontinued.

## LITERARY DEVELOPMENT

Writing by the prototypes of the present characters had been devised, as we have seen, at least as early as the Shang dynasty. The Chou took over the system of writing developed by the Shang, as they did of so much else of that past. The Chou era witnessed an extensive and rich literary development. More characters were formed. Books were inscribed on tablets of wood or bamboo, presumably with ink. The language displayed dialectical differences, but these were not sufficiently marked, at least among the educated, to prevent a community of culture.

The earliest forms of literature appear to have been religious in character: hymns sung at sacrifices, songs to accompany the dances and feasts in honor of the ancestors, and bits of prose to parallel the pantomimes performed in the ancestral temples. Poems were composed for the great ceremonial occasions at court: banquets, archery contests, receptions, and the like. To these were added folk songs: satires, laments of widows, complaints of soldiers whose officers had conducted them to defeat, dances of the young in the spring, love songs, and songs at the birth of a child and for weddings. Many are included in that anthology of ancient verse, the *Shih Ching,* or Classic of Poetry, brought together in Chou times. Still others are to be found in compilations of the period which contain both poetry and prose. While the original text of the *Shih Ching* has suffered in transmission, a large proportion as we have it today is probably authentic.

Prose owned much to the official scribes charged with the preparation

and preservation of official documents and with the arrangements for religious ceremonies and feasts. Ritual purposes required short accounts of the legends concerning the ancestors, which the dancers portrayed in pantomime. The descriptions were necessarily terse, minute, and rather dry. To accompany some of these outlines, speeches were composed and attributed to the chief actors. Here the imagination of the scribes had greater liberty. Records in highly technical language were kept of official transactions. Descriptions began to be written of administrative machinery and of geography—the latter from the viewpoint of the administrator and tax collector. Philosophy—particularly, as was natural, political philosophy—began to emerge.

Many of the ancient prose documents have been preserved in a collection known as the *Shu Ching,* or Classic of History. Fairly early tradition, possibly reliable, declares that Confucius edited it. Much of the text of the *Shu Ching* as we have it today is either corrupt or spurious. It has been demonstrated, for example, that the portions of it which are only in the so-called "ancient text" are a forgery of post-Chou times. Much of that contained in the "modern text," however, is usually regarded by scholars as an authentic record of ancient traditions.

The scribes, too, charged with preserving the archives, began the custom of keeping terse annals of events, especially of official acts, with exact references to dates and persons. One of these, of the state of Lu, was the basis of history which has been preserved, thanks possibly to its association with the great name of Confucius, under the title of the *Ch'un Ch'iu,* or Spring and Autumn (Annals). It has been traditionally represented as written by Confucius, but the accuracy of this view has been boldly challenged and hotly debated. Some others of the annals of local states—of Chin and Wei—were in the *Chu Shu Chi Nien* (discovered in a tomb in the third century A.D.), freely translated as the Bamboo Annals and so denominated because the copy then found was written on tablets of that material. It must be added, however, that the existing work which now bears that title is by no means of indubitable authenticity. Many scholars insist that it is a forgery, a compilation of quotations from other books, and that only fragments of the original survive. The *Tso Chuan,* traditionally a commentary on the *Ch'un Ch'iu,* is really of independent origin or origins, being made up of one or more histories, which through the ages have suffered from interpolations, but which seem at least in part to be as old as the second century B.C. and perhaps older.

Still another form of prose originated with the professional diviners, those whose task it was to give counsel, through their auspices, on important actions. The sort of divination which had been practiced under the Shang—by the application of fire to bones and the shell of the tortoise and the interpretation of the resulting cracks—fell into abeyance under

the Chou, and the very manner of performing it was forgotten. Under the Chou, divination was by a variety of mediums, including the milfoil and the sixty-four hexagrams. The hexagrams, developed out of the lines which composed the simpler eight trigrams, had, like the latter, been devised early. The hexagrams, of six lines each, were made up of combinations of whole and broken lines, as, for example, in the following:

 .

Brief interpretations of these, in technical and, to us, obscure language were made, presumably as guides to the diviners. In commentaries on or appendices to the foregoing, and of later origin, something of a philosophy was elaborated, including principles of government. In them the terms *Yin* and *Yang,* long to loom prominently in speculative thought, make what is possibly their earliest extant appearance. The *Yin* and the *Yang* seem to have been unknown under the Shang and so possibly did not enter Chinese life until sometime in the Chou. The entire collection, comprising documents of various dates, has been transmitted to us as the *I Ching,* or Classic of Change. Tradition attributes the authorship of the older portions to Wên Wang and Chou Kung, and declares that they were composed while the former of these two worthies was a political prisoner and the latter in voluntary exile. It also assigns the appendices to the pen of Confucius. All of this is more than open to question, although at least some of the appendices were written by members of the Confucian school and it is barely possible that the sage himself wrote parts of them.

The *Shih Ching, Shu Ching, Ch'un Ch'iu,* and *I Ching* by no means exhaust the list of the literature of the Chou period. In the later centuries of the dynasty, indeed, books increased in number and in the variety of the subjects treated. The rich and varied development in philosophical thought which will be mentioned in a moment is recorded in works which have been among the most treasured of China's possessions. There were compilations on ritual, the most honored of which are the *Li Chi,* or the Book (more literally, the Record) of Rites, the *I Li,* and the *Chou Li.* The *Li Chi* was not collected into its present form until a later dynasty, and much of its material is of post-Chou composition. The *I Li* is probably the fragment of a larger work, of unknown origin, which presumably appeared in the second century before the Christian Era, or, according to some critics, at a still earlier time. The *Chou Li,* or Rites of Chou, called in early times *Chou Kuan,* or Officials of Chou, was possibly the work of an anonymous writer of the fourth or third century B.C. and may date from at late as the first century A.D., but, as we have seen, it is traditionally—and almost certainly falsely—ascribed to Chou Kung. It is a utopian plan for the organization of government—an idealized picture of the Chou administrative system—which repeatedly had great influence upon political and social reformers. There were histories, among them a general one of

China from 722 to 450 B.C., which was transmitted as a component part of the *Tso Chuan*, seeking to read the moral lessons of the past, probably composed in the fourth and third centuries B.C.; the *Chan Kuo Tsê*, or Documents of the Fighting States (a collection of texts bearing on the last troubled years of the Chou period); and the *Kuo Yü* (perhaps older than the *Tso Chuan*, composed of material related to the latter, and possibly brought together about the fourth or third century B.C. in an endeavor to draw moral lessons from the record). Historical romances were also written, usually clustering around famous individuals and combining both fact and fiction.

Toward the end of the Chou new forms of poetry appeared. The most famous example is traditionally by Ch'ü Yüan (whom we have already mentioned as a statesman of the partially Chinese principality of Chou and as traditionally associated with the Dragon Boat Festival). His poem, the *Li Sao*, in which he pours out his soul in lament and so discloses himself and his ideals to posterity, is one of the most famous in Chinese literature. Some doubt has been cast on the authorship and even on the existence of Ch'ü Yüan, but the composition appears to belong to this period. It certainly registers a high-water mark of literary achievement.

In the last centuries of the Chou, China was coming to have more numerous contacts with the peoples to the west. The empire of the Persians and the succeeding one of Alexander brought the cultures of Iran and the Occident somewhat nearer to her, and her own expanding frontiers were reaching toward Central Asia. It is not surprising, therefore, that the fringes of the two foreign civilizations should somewhere nearly touch hers in what is now Sinkiang, and that along the land routes commercial intercourse should have arisen. This intercourse seems to have enlarged somewhat the Chinese knowledge of geography. It appears also to have brought in more advanced astronomical and mathematical ideas and the elements of the related pseudo science, astrology. The modifications in the calendar and the method of reckoning time that were made more than once under the Chou may have been indebted to what entered from abroad.

## DEVELOPMENT OF SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY

The outstanding intellectual achievement of the Chou was in the realm of philosophy. Philosophy seems to have arisen in the sixth century B.C. Certainly its great development was in that and the following centuries. Why it came to birth when it did must be in part a matter of conjecture. The period roughly corresponds with the rise of Greek philosophy, with some of the most creative years of the Hebrew spirit, with the beginning of Buddhism and Jainism, and possibly with the inception and at least with the spread of Zoroastrianism. Whether we have here

more than a coincidence cannot, at least as yet, be determined. It seems clear that the political and economic organizations had much to do with the intellectual activity of the times. The division of the realm into many principalities encouraged variety and individuality. Professional scholars wandered from state to state, seeking learning or employment. At the capitals of the different princes thinkers gathered and debated. Some of the rulers encouraged this practice, and at least one established a center in which he assembled distinguished representatives of several different schools. It was an age of intellectual ferment and daring.

This flowering of the Chinese philosophical genius was profoundly influenced by early Chinese religion. In a sense it was an outgrowth of it.

What the earliest Chinese religion was we cannot certainly tell. Evidence is as yet too fragmentary to permit of final answers. When we first obtain clear pictures of Chinese religion, during the Shang and early in the Chou, the culture of the nation was already far removed from its primitive stages. The Chinese peopled the world with divine influences, with spirits, and with gods and goddesses of various kinds. In each agricultural village was normally a sacred mound, early the center of life of these communities. There were house gods, for instance, of the hearth, and of the corner where the seed grain was stored. Spirits or gods of the rivers, of the mountains, of the stars, of other natural objects, and of the five elements were honored or propitiated. Some of the divine influences were scarcely personal. On the other hand, there were intensely personal spirits of the great heroes of the past. The ancestors, too, were believed to live on, sometimes for generations; one soul of each of the dead remained with the body and another ascended on high. However, it was held that in the course of time the souls of the deceased disintegrated and were absorbed into the impersonal forces of nature.

By at least the close of the Chou and probably many centuries earlier, religious beliefs and practices differed from state to state. These variations were especially marked in the frontier principalities, such as Ch'in and Ch'u, whose populations and cultures had strong elements not to be found in the older states of the North China plain.

The Chou had beliefs which were partly inherited from the Shang but modified or amplified. Spirits and gods were superior to men in power, but were not almighty. They were of varying degrees of importance and of extent of jurisdiction. For example, there were many earth gods, each with only a local sphere of power, and there was the Sovereign Earth, with a much wider domain. The tendency continued to divide superhuman beings and influences into two groups, terrestial and celestial—those of the earth and those of the air or sky. Supreme over both groups was one great being, variously called *T'ien* (usually translated Heaven) and *Shang Ti* (best translated the Ruler Above). Originally *T'ien* and *Shang Ti* were probably distinct, *T'ien* perhaps meaning the heavenly abode, or city of

the dead, and *Shang Ti* having a nearer approach to a personal theistic significance. If we may trust the oracle bones, *Shang Ti* was the term most used under the Shang for the Supreme Being. Under the Chou, *T'ien* tended to supplant it, possibly because *T'ien* was originally the god of the ruling house. The Chou *Wang* was regarded as the son of *T'ien* and as reigning by the mandate of *T'ien*. Eventually *T'ien* and *Shang Ti* practically coalesced. *T'ien* or *Shang Ti* was sovereign over gods and men.

*Hou T'u,* the Soil or Earth, may at times have been identical with *Ti* (Earth), a female deity, and *Shê* (Ruler of the Soil), a male god.

The co-operation of the spiritual beings was essential to the welfare of men, including that of individuals, groups, and society as a whole. It was to be secured by the proper performance of ritual and sacrifices in honor of these beings, and—at least in the later centuries of the Chou—by right ethical conduct. The ceremonies were often elaborate, with offerings of food, both grain and flesh, and occasionally of human life. In its earlier stages, religion may have had much of dread and of grim shedding of man's blood. Under the Chou, the more repulsive features gradually disappeared. Earlier, too, some phallicism probably existed. Possibly it was prominent. However, it slipped into desuetude, and its conventionalized symbols lost their original significance. Ceremonies to the ancestors were in temples constructed for them, or in special rooms or alcoves reserved for them in the dwellings of their descendants, for the dead were treated as having the needs of the living. Ancestors were represented by tablets. Others of the spirits and gods were worshipped in the open air, and near the capital particularly were altars to the most important of them. Some ceremonies appear to have been held in sacred groves. Much of the communal life of the peasants centered around the sacred place, and this seems largely to have coalesced later with the power and rites of the territorial lord.

Since the proper maintenance of religious ceremonies was essential to the co-operation of spiritual beings with men and to the welfare of society, it was a matter of public concern and one of the chief functions of the state. Each of the territorial magnates had ceremonies at which he must officiate, and some of the most important could be performed only by the *Wang*. No class existed which could strictly be called priestly, for the conduct of religious rites was one of the responsibilities of officials charged with administration. However, experts in ritual, who directed the officials in this phase of their duties, formed a recognized profession and were recruited from the upper classes.

A special class (*Wu*) existed, held in much less respect than the others, whose members claimed to act as spokesmen—or spokeswomen, for they were from both sexes—of the unseen, and who, to this end, on occasion could become possessed by the spirit with which they claimed communication.

The schools of philosophy which arose during the later centuries of the

Chou were all more or less strongly tinged with these religious beliefs, some partly endorsing and partly modifying them, and some rationalizing or repudiating them in whole or in part.

The common interest which ran through most of the schools of thought was social: the creation of an ideal human society. This emphasis was natural among a people accustomed to regard religion as a matter of community utility, and particularly so since the majority of the philosophers were from the governing classes and were themselves officeholders. They were the continuation of the scholar class which we noted as functionaries under the Shang. It cannot be too greatly emphasized that the chief problem to which most of the thinkers of the Chou addressed themselves was: how can society be saved or at least improved? Cosmogony, cosmology, the nature of the gods—if any—and of man were subordinate and ancillary to this question.

From the standpoint of subsequent influence, the chief of the schools was that known to Westerners as Confucianism. The greatest figure in it was Confucius. The traditional dates of the sage, 551–479 B.C., may be in error by several years. The usual story of his life has it that he was born in one of the smaller of the states, Lu, in the present province of Shantung, of aristocratic stock, of an aged father and a young mother. His father died, so the story continues, during his son's infancy, and the sage was reared in poverty by his mother. He early showed a predilection for ceremonies and the learning of the past and achieved such proficiency in them that he attracted students. For years, the traditional accounts say (but these may not be reliable), he held office in his native state, eventually rising to the highest position open to a subject, but in middle age he retired to private life. The reason usually assigned for this step was that he resigned in protest against the unworthy conduct of his prince. During the next several years he traveled from state to state with a group of his disciples, hoping vainly that some ruler would adopt his principles of government and employ him to carry them out. In his old age he returned to Lu and there died after some years of quiet spent in study and teaching. Dignified, courteous, conscientious, high-minded, studious; modest but self-confident; a lover of antiquity, of books, of ceremonial, and of music; thoughtful, affable, but frank in rebuking what he deemed wrong in men in high and low position; calm, serenely trustful in an overruling Providence—all these are terms which immediately come to mind as descriptive of the man pictured in the discourses transmitted by his faithful disciples.

The interests of Confucius were chiefly those of the statesman and the teacher of ethics. The sage concerned himself with the welfare of the common man and the masses. He had at heart the achievement of good government and held that this was to be by a return to the methods of the great sage-rulers of antiquity. Apparently he thought of himself as a trans-

mitter and not a creator, as simply a student and a teacher of the best of China's past. The way of attaining to good government, as he believed it to have been achieved in the past, was the maintenance of the proper ceremonies, including those of a religious nature, and the exhibition by the ruling classes of a good moral example. Society was kept prosperous and at peace, so he held, not primarily by force, but by the influence of high character on the part of the monarchs and the members of the upper classes, and by adherence to customary ritual. He set himself and his followers, then, to the study and observance of the ancient ritual and to the cultivation of uprightness. As a means to saving and improving society, he sought the cultivation of the *chün tzŭ*, or perfect man.

The fullest, although not the only, record of the teachings of Confucius, is in the *Lun Yü*, or *Analects*, which is made up chiefly of what are said to be the sayings of the great master. Some of these are of doubtful authenticity, but the larger part appear to be authentic, although not necessarily the *ipsissima verba* of the sage, recorded by loyal followers.

Before the end of the Chou several schools of thought developed within the stream of what may be called the Confucian tradition. The immediate successors of Confucius seem not to have been men of outstanding ability, and it was not until Mencius that what may be called Confucianism again included a man of first-rate caliber. The traditional dates of Mencius, 371–289 B.C., like those of Confucius, have been questioned. Mencius seems to have owed to a wise mother even more than did Confucius. Like the latter, he was a high-minded scholar who attracted students. Like him, too, he was chiefly interested in government and spent much of his life as a wanderer, seeking to induce princes to adopt his standards. He also followed Confucius in teaching that government should be not by brute force but by the good example of the rulers. This he emphasized even more than did Confucius. He maintained—probably as a necessary corollary to his contention that a state would respond to worthy influence—that man is by nature good. Man's nature must, of course, be educated, but this was to be by an environment made favorable by good will, by music, by art, and by kindly care of rulers. As a further corollary, Mencius would justify rebellion against hopelessly corrupt rulers, declaring that Heaven, hearing and seeing as the people hear and see, would remove its mandate from those against whom the people persistently complained. Even more than Confucius, Mencius was a caustic critic of the princes. He was emphatic in believing that the state must encourage the material welfare of men—by promoting the provision of food and clothing. He made much of *jên*, which may be translated as "kindness," "goodness," or "human-heartedness." His views are preserved to us in a book, *Meng Tzŭ Shu,* or *The Book of Mencius*, which seems to be a fairly authentic record of his teachings.

Another great figure of the Chou period who built upon the basis of

Confucius and is said to have done much to shape Confucianism was Hsün K'uang, or Hsün Tzŭ. He was probably a little more than forty years younger than Mencius, and his working life fell mostly in the third century B.C. Hsün Tzŭ, also concerned for good government, but living in an age when violence was even more marked than in the times of Confucius and Mencius, contended that man is by nature bad. This evil nature, however, he held to be indefinitely improvable. The change is to be wrought largely by educating men through self-effort, through practice, through acquired habit, through the regular and proper observance of ritual, through music, through the social customs come down from the past, through the example of worthy princes, and through laws. He deplored war and would have a prince win the allegiance of his enemy's people by his noble character rather than by arms. He glorified the state, which he would have enforce the right kind of education. The state, too, he wished to see achieve a balance between men's material wants—for food and clothing—which lead to strife, and the supply of these necessities. Like Mencius, he held that the economic basis of society is important. He believed that he found both the principles of ethics and the correct rites in the words and acts of the sage-rulers of the past, as recorded in the classical books. He denied, however, the existence of the spiritual beings whom the ceremonies were supposed to honor. He derided fortune-telling by physiognomy-reading, and while he allowed the traditional forms of divination by the state, he regarded them as undependable. He held that Heaven is not personal, but is unvarying law which automatically and infallibly rewards the good and punishes the evil. In the face of the confusion in existing society, he was an optimist, insisting that the universe is on the side of righteousness and that man's evil nature can be modified for good. He did much to encourage the strain of agnosticism which permeated much of later Chinese thought.

Of the philosophical schools of the Chou period, the next to Confucianism in lasting influence was Taoism. The traditional founder was Lao Tzŭ, reputedly an older contemporary of Confucius and the keeper of the archives of the court of the Chou. He is a very shadowy figure and may never have existed. The little book attributed to him, usually called the *Tao Tê Ching* but also having the title the *Lao Tzŭ,* the most honored treatise of the school, is very possibly of the third century B.C. and is of very uncertain authorship. The most prominent Taoist teacher, Chuang Tzŭ, flourished in the second half of the fourth century B.C. He was master of a vivid literary style, which later exerted a marked influence. In addition to the writings ascribed to him and his early disciples, several fragments of other treatises of the school have come down to us, among them some bearing the name Lieh Tzŭ, and possibly from the Han or Chin dynasty, several centuries later.

Taoism is so named from the *Tao,* an ancient Chinese term which the

school used to represent the great reality back of and infilling the universe. In general the Taoists seem to have meant by it something akin to what Western philosophers call the Absolute. Knowledge of the *Tao*, they insisted, is not to be attained by reason and study, but by the mystic's way of contemplation and inward illumination. Yet the *Tao Tê Ching* insisted that those who know do not speak and that those who speak do not know. The real world, accordingly, is not that perceived by the physical senses. Taoists sought to merge themselves in Nature. Man's conduct, they argued, should conform to the *Tao*, and this was held to be *wu wei*, often roughly translated as "inaction," but better defined as a way of "doing everything by doing nothing."

The Taoists were in opposition to the elaborate ritual, the carefully reasoned codes of ethics, the earnest—and at times pedantic and painful—cultivation of character, and the intellectual approach of Confucianism. They were not exclusively concerned with the salvation of society, but when they did talk about it they maintained that it was to be achieved by abandoning the elaborate ceremonies and organization of current civilization and returning to primitive manners and conforming to the quiet simplicity of the ceaselessly operating *Tao*. People must not be taught nor their desires awakened by learning. The ideal society, so the *Tao Tê Ching* held, was one in which men heard the cocks crowing and the dogs barking in the neighboring states but never visited in those states. The early Taoists may well have represented the protest of rural districts, of thoughtful commoners, and of aristocrats at odds with their own class, against the elaborate civilization of the towns whose growth seems to have been a feature of the middle and later centuries of the Chou, and in opposition to the domination of that official aristocracy of which the Confucian school was a bulwark.

Still another school was that associated with the name and teachings of Mo Ti, or Mo Tzŭ. While his dates are uncertain, Mo Ti seems to have done most of his work in the second and third quarters of the fifth century B.C. He came, therefore, between Confucius and Mencius. His interest, like that of these two, was in the improvement of society. He differed from them in seeking this, not through the observance of ceremonies, but by reason aided by logic. In contrast with a tendency, already observable, to identify Heaven with unvarying, unfeeling law, he believed strongly in its personality, and employed the term *Shang Ti* more frequently than the less personal term *T'ien*. He believed that man finds his highest good in conforming to the will of this Supreme Being, and since Heaven loves men, favoring righteousness and hating iniquity, men ought to love one another and be righteous in life. Men should, indeed, love all their fellows as they would their own blood brothers. By love Mo Ti meant in part enlightened self-interest. Applying the tests of love and of logic to human

institutions, he condemned war as unbrotherly and murderous. It must be noted, however, that it was chiefly offensive war which he felt to be wrong. He stressed defensive measures against aggression. He did not advocate, as some Christians have advocated, opposing aggression by active good will or by passive, unarmed resistance. With his utilitarian outlook, he condemned many of the rites so dear to the Confucianists. While emphatically believing in the existence of spirits, he set himself against extravagant funerals, elaborate ceremonies, and even music, as detracting from and not aiding the welfare of the living. He would have a regulated consumption and would confine production to the necessities. He vigorously denounced determinism and held that men could perfect themselves by their own efforts. His views were, not unnaturally, roundly condemned by the Confucianists, particularly by Mencius. Among other arguments, they contended that Mo Ti's principle of universal love, by denying the duty of special affection for one's kin, would dissolve the family and so destroy society.

Mo Ti's followers remained influential for several centuries after his death and included many brilliant minds. Before long they seem to have divided into at least two sects. One, considered more orthodox, emphasized the religious features of their master's teachings, and the other stressed his dialectics. The former was held together by strict discipline under successive heads who were regarded as sages. Its members were somewhat ascetic, wearing simple clothing and eating plain food, working hard, and condemning music and elaborate burial and mourning ceremonies. The other branch was related to the *Ming Chia* (or School of Names, or the Logicians).

The *Ming Chia* had as its two chief exponents Hui Tzŭ, of the fourth and third century B.C., and Kung-sun Lung, of the third century B.C. The *Ming Chia* had kinship with both the Taoists and the Mohists. With their penchant for argument and their emphasis on terms, its members have not inaptly been called the sophists or dialecticians of China.

The sects arising out of the work of Mo Ti seem to have suffered severely in the disorders that accompanied the end of the Chou. Their principles of universal love and nonaggression were scarcely in keeping with the violence of the age. Adherents of Mo Ti, however, were to be found as late as the first century B.C., and his writings were studied into modern times.

A thinker who seems to have left behind him no cult, and whose teachings are known chiefly through his adversaries, was Yang Chu. Yang Chu, who lived in the fourth century B.C., acknowledged allegiance to none of the schools of the time, but was an individualist and espoused both pessimism and fatalism. He viewed life as full of woe. Any exertion to better human society, such as that made by the Confucianists and Mohists, so he said, is futile, for fate determines all. Such heroes of China's antiquity as

Shun, Yü, and Chou Kung, who spent themselves in the service of the state, he insisted, knew never a day of ease, and those whom the Confucianists branded as villians, like Chieh and Chou Hsin, who were reported to have ended their respective dynasties by their vices, enjoyed lives of pleasure. Dead, both good and bad are equal. Yang Chu advised, accordingly, that each should take life as it comes, enduring and making the most of it for himself, and not bothering about others or the state. He has been regarded as contributing to the development of Taoism. At least some sayings ascribed to him were quoted approvingly by early Taoists.

Another school, only fragments of whose teachings have been preserved, is sometimes known as that of the philosophy of nature or of *yin* and *yang*. On the basis of the *yin* and the *yang* it sought to frame a cosmogony and a cosmology. It held that the eternal *Tao* expresses itself through the *yin* and the *yang*, represented by the whole and the broken lines of the ancient trigrams. The Naturalists made much of the "five elements" or "five powers": wood, metal, fire, water, and earth. Many of the ideas of this school were not their exclusive creation or property but were widely diffused. They were to be very influential and reappeared repeatedly in the history of Chinese thought.

Still another trend was represented by the *Fa Chia,* or Legalists. Along with Confucianism and Taoism, it had a major continuing influence in the life of China. Living in the fourth century, when disorder was increasing, its exponents despaired of saving society and improving human nature by the moral example of the rulers, as the Confucianists would do. One cannot be sure of having a ruler of high character to set such an example, they contended, and even if there were such, men are not sufficiently good by nature to respond. A fixed body of law, impartially and firmly administered, will not fluctuate as does the character of princes. Men, too, with their imperfect natures, can best be restrained and guided by force expressed in law. Laws should be adapted to changing circumstances and should be framed partly on the basis of the study and rectification of terms—of which the school made much. Aristocracy and the state were exalted. One group of the Legalists stressed agriculture and the economic self-sufficiency of each principality. Another sought to encourage commerce as a source of prosperity. It wished to socialize capital and have the state undertake trade and thus prevent private manipulation of prices and inequality of wealth.

Confucianism, Taoism, and Mohism all had their influence on *Fa Chia.* Various Legalists showed evidence of being molded in part by one or the other of them. For example, Han Fei Tzŭ (of the third century B.C.), an outstanding Legalist of whose writings a large proportion have come down to us, was in many respects a Taoist. He is said also to have been a pupil of Hsün Tzŭ, and so to have been subject to some Confucian ideas.

Hsün Tzŭ's conception of human nature as bad but improvable, and of education as something to be enforced by society, seems to have developed logically into Legalist ideas. Han Fei Tzŭ, it may be added, was a redoubtable skeptic who questioned the alleged facts of antiquity concerning Yao and Shun to which so many scholars appealed for authority. He came to his end by suicide (233 B.C.) induced by the animosity of Li Ssŭ, who, as we are to see, had a major share in the organization of the Empire under the Ch'in.

To another notable representative of the *Fa Chia,* Wei Yang (also called Kung-sun Yang or Shang Yang), is, as we have noted, attributed the reorganization of Ch'in, under Duke Hsiao, in the middle of the fourth century B.C., which prepared the way for the ultimate triumph of that state. But the work ascribed to him, *The Book of Lord Shang*, did not have him as its author. Wei Yang is said to have destroyed the decentralization which before his time prevailed in Ch'in as elsewhere in China, substituting for it an absolute ruler governing through a bureaucracy; to have abolished the *ching t'ien* system of landholding, replacing it with individual peasant proprietorship; to have instituted severe laws with exact rewards and punishments; and arranging families in groups, to have made each jointly responsible for the good behavior of its members. He is reported to have decried much of the culture of the old China and to have stressed agriculture and military organization. By discouraging interstate commerce and hoarding the produce of the soil, he is said to have attempted—in a fashion resembling that of the mercantilists of later European times—to make Ch'in self-dependent. Some of this—the encouragement of agriculture and the frowning on commerce—had a distinctly Taoist tinge. By centralization under an absolute ruler governing through a bureaucracy, by severe discipline, and by military and economic organization, he sought to weld Ch'in into an effective fighting unit.

Whether or not Wei Yang was responsible for all these changes, they were distinctly Legalist in their conception and were carried out in Ch'in. Largely because of them, Ch'in attained to the efficiency which enabled her to master her neighbors. It is not strange that, victorious, Ch'in sought to apply them to the entire Empire. While Ch'in's dominance was short-lived, the system then introduced, although not preserved *in toto,* made an indelible impression.

Akin to Legalism, but stressing the organization and operation of bureaucratic government rather than penal law, was a stream of thought which influenced the Ch'in and later imperial administration. Some of its exponents might be called anti-Legalistic.

Finally, according to one early Chinese classification, we have a school of eclectics which in the fourth century B.C. sought to combine the best from all the others, a school of agricultural writers (somewhat anarchistic),

another of diplomacy (whose chief works are lost), and still another whose name may be translated as that of the novelists (dealing in fanciful accounts of history and geography). None, however, compared in importance with the major schools.

These, then, were the main trends of thought which made the later years of the Chou dynasty the great creative period of the Chinese mind. Not until the first half of the twentieth century were the Chinese to exhibit again such freedom in speculation and never again have they displayed so much originality. Of the schools of thoughts which arose during the Chou, three—Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism—were to have major shares in shaping the China of the ensuing centuries.

## SUMMARY

Throughout much of this chapter the note of uncertainty has been sounded. Many of the features and movements of the centuries covered in it, particularly of the earlier ones, are still only vaguely discerned. Others, once accepted by orthodox Chinese historians, are vigorously challenged. Many conclusions must be tentative. It seems clear, however, that during these millenniums later Chinese civilization was largely determined. For the major proportion of their social and ethical ideals and for many of their institutions and customs succeeding generations looked for sanction to the China of the years before the Ch'in.

This culture, so rich and vigorous, had its original seat in the North China plain and in the valley of the Wei. However, it was not confined to those regions but spread to the outlying districts, only partly Chinese in blood, where were those great states in whose hands lay the political destinies of the land. The agents of the spread seem chiefly to have been scholars, statesmen, and aristocratic adventurers from the older China, who, seeking employment at the hands of the powerful but semibarbarous chieftains on the frontier, tutored these rulers in the civilization which they respected and copied while they domineered over its possessors. It was a process which, in its essence, Chinese history was often to see reproduced—the conquerors yielding to the culture of the conquered.

China was expanding, by the migration of both the Chinese and their culture. The way was being prepared for new and startling developments. Divided politically but vigorous intellectually, China was to be united under one strong rule. In doing so, it was to display fresh cultural growth. The formation of the new Empire was to be accompanied not only by marked political changes, but also by extensive alterations in the economic, social, and intellectual life of the people.

Future developments, revolutionary in many ways though they were, did not efface the cultural contributions of the Chou and its predecessors.

The emphases on ceremonial, the forms of ritual, the family system, and the growing regard for certain ethical standards were to persist, some of them studiously unaltered, into the opening decades of the twentieth century. In many respects, before the final downfall of the Chou, Chinese culture had taken on its definitive ideals. Only in the twentieth century and under the impact of the Occident and Russia were sweeping changes seen. Even then, as we are to see, some basic attitudes persisted.

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CHAPTER THREE

# THE FORMATION OF THE EMPIRE: THE CH'IN AND HAN DYNASTIES (221 B.C.–A.D. 220)

By the third century B.C. many of the foundations of the future of China had been laid. From paleolithic and neolithic times had come contributions to the later racial stock, some grains and domestic animals, the beginnings of silk culture, several shapes of pottery, and a number of religious conceptions which were to persist into the twentieth century. The Shang period saw the development and possibly the invention of writing by the characters which were the ancestors of those in use through all succeeding centuries. It witnessed the development of bronzes and the utilization of jade, which were prized by later generations. Some of its religious terminology was transmitted—although with altered interpretations—to the years when the Communists sought to lead the Chinese away from the belief in the supernatural. The Shang saw the inception of the literate elite who were associated with the government and who did much to shape the thought and the ideals of the later Chinese. During the approximately nine centuries spanned by the period which bears the name of Chou, further additions were made which determined most of the main features of Chinese civilization until the cataclysmic irruption of the Occident. They appeared largely in the second half of the period. Among them were what, except for Buddhism, were the schools of thought which, with modifications, formed the future Chinese mind and institutions: the conviction that the culture of China was the highest created by man and that all outside it were "barbarians" and for their own well-being should conform to it; and the assumption that normally all China should be under one government. The Chou centuries saw the continuation and further development of that scholar class which had been a feature of the Shang. Indeed, some attitudes which had appeared before the close of the Chou were to persist into the years inaugurated by the Communists. Among them were the beliefs that philosophy must have as its controlling purpose the promotion of the this-worldly good of mankind; that all the Chinese must be ruled by one regime which would be under the tutelage of an elite minority committed to and disciplined by that philosophy; and that this philosophy (under the Communists, Marxism as interpreted by that elite minority) was the one by which all mankind should be governed and which the Chinese must propagate and maintain.

The Chou period was followed by slightly more than four centuries in which the philosophies created under it were given concrete expression in institutions that, with important modifications and additions, were to prevail until they were swept aside in the effort to preserve the independence and the leadership of China in the world that was being shaped by forces emerging from Western Europe. This was through the Chinese Empire created by what were known as the Ch'in and Han dynasties. The Ch'in dynasty, committed to Legalist ideals, was short-lived. It was succeeded by the Han dynasty, which, with a brief break, continued for approximately four hundred years. In its ideals the Han was governed chiefly by conceptions which were Legalist and Confucian in origin. A mixture of the two in varying proportions was to be influential in the major regimes of indigenous stock which ruled China until the twentieth century, and was adopted in varying degrees by the "barbarians" who from time to time governed part or all of China.

## THE CH'IN DYNASTY: SHIH HUANG TI

The triumph of Ch'in was not the work of one man. Many had had a part—Duke Mu, Duke Hsiao, Shang Yang (Wei Yang), and others whom we have not named. A system rather than an individual was victor. It is not strange, therefore, that the conqueror sought to recognize and rule the newly won Empire by the methods which had been effective in his own state. In doing so, he proved unable to perpetuate the power of his house, but he began a new day for eastern Asia. He outlined an organization which, with many alterations, was that by which the Middle Kingdom was governed until A.D. 1912 and which, with occasional failures of longer or shorter duration, held together with remarkable success the vast region which is China. Moreover, in welding all China into one political unit, the conqueror, possibly quite unconsciously, brought in part to fruition the hopes of many dreamers.

The leader immediately responsible for this revolutionary development was Chêng—better known to history as Shih Huang Ti. His great assistant, chief minister, and a main architect of the new empire was Li Ssŭ. Li Ssŭ, one of those migrant scholar-statesmen for whom the later years of the Chou had been famous, was a native of the state of Ch'u, and had, together with Han Fei Tzŭ, the distinguished Legalist, been a pupil of Hsün Tzŭ. Especially did Hsün Tzŭ's theory of the absolute power of the prince accord with their ideals. In practice Li Ssŭ was a thoroughgoing Legalist and so fitted in with the purposes of Chêng. Li Ssŭ was older than Chêng and became so prominent that he intermarried his children with his master's. Cold, calculating Li Ssŭ was a striking contrast with the impetuous, superstitious and masterful Chêng.

When all China had been subdued, the energies of Chêng and Li Ssŭ

were directed toward consolidating the conquests into an administrative and cultural whole, toward extending the boundaries into non-Chinese territory, and toward safeguarding the frontiers.

Chêng's organization of the Empire bears all the marks of genius—whether his or Li Ssŭ's or a heritage from the earlier rulers and ministers of Ch'in is difficult to say. It was probably due to all three. Indeed, the extinction of the old nobility was already a policy of Ch'in. The principalities which had given the period of the Chou both its variety and its disorder were abolished. This step was presumably made easier by the decimation of the aristocracy in the prolonged wars which preceded the triumph of Ch'in. On the advice of Li Ssŭ, a suggestion that the realm be redivided into satrapies governed by members of the conqueror's family was rejected. Instead of rule through the old aristocracy or through Chêng's kin, an elaborate bureaucracy was created, with diversified functions and carefully graded honorific titles. At the capital was a numerous administrative staff divided into several departments. The Empire was organized into thirty-six *chün,* or provinces (later augmented to forty or forty-one), and each of these in turn into *hsien,* or prefectures of varying sizes. Over every *chün* and *hsien* was placed a member of the bureaucracy. The plan, it must be added, was not entirely new. In name and concept, both *chün* and *hsien* had come down from the Chou, although under the Chou the latter had been larger than the former. Wei Yang, moreover, had created a hierarchy with many titles. Very wisely, Chêng and Li Ssŭ did not depart entirely from the past.

At the head of the whole organization was an autocrat with a new title. To signalize the fact that he was beginning an era, Chêng assumed the designation of Shih Huang Ti (Shih meaning first, and Huang and Ti being titles customarily ascribed to mythical or semimythical rulers of antiquity—the Three Huang and the Five Ti) and thus endeavored to give himself a divine or semidivine significance. Henceforth Huang Ti was a title which we translate as Emperor. Chêng was determined to give fresh prestige to his reign and to distinguish his office from that of the inept Chou. Had he been content with *Wang,* the designation of the Chou monarchs, he might properly have been expected to reproduce their form of government, with its disastrous decentralization. Moreover, *Wang* had been adopted as a title by some rulers of the states of the late Chou. He was not content to be identified with them. He was creating something new.

To insure the pacification of his realm, Shih Huang Ti had the arms of those who were not in his own forces collected and melted into bells and huge statues. Probably further to establish his authority, he ordered the powerful and wealthy of the realm to move to the capital, Hsienyang, not far from an earlier Chou capital and the later Ch'angan. Here, pre-

sumably, they could be more easily kept under surveillance and would lend dignity to the capital and so to the sovereign's power. It may be significant, moreover, that the capital was retained in the ancient territory of Ch'in, nearer to the dangerous northwest frontier than had been the later capital of the Chou. To the south of the River Wei across from Hsienyang, Shih Huang Ti constructed a vast palace by the labor of thousands of men made eunuchs by the state.

Probably with the double purpose of insuring unity and prosperity, Shih Huang Ti attempted to make uniform the weights and measures of his domains. Implements and the gauges of wagons were also standardized.

Under Shih Huang Ti the private ownership of land by the peasants, which since the fourth century had prevailed in Ch'in, was extended to the entire country. True to his Legalist training, the Emperor was trying to encourage agriculture.

Great public works were undertaken. It is said that under the Ch'in the irrigation system that makes fruitful the plain about Chengtu, in Szechwan, was constructed. It is reported that it was Li Ping, a Ch'in official, who distributed the waters of the Min River through a network of canals. Shih Huang Ti attempted to further unity by building an extensive system of roads centering in the capital. He also did much to improve the canals, possibly with a similar motive. Apparently with the same objective, he destroyed some of the walls and other fortifications erected by the local princes.

The Emperor was an indefatigable traveler. Possibly from the innate restlessness and desire to see the country, and perhaps with the purpose of personally supervising his officials and so of insuring order, he spent much of his time traversing his domains. A prodigious worker, he gave many days to reading official reports and other documents.

One of Shih Huang Ti's most famous—or infamous—devices for insuring peace and unity was his attempt to suppress the criticisms of his rule by the adherents of others of the philosophical schools than the one he was following. As we have seen, the state of Ch'in had been organized by Shang Yang according to the principles of the Legalists: by severe laws, absolute autocracy, the encouragement of agriculture, and concomitant measures. To this system Ch'in rulers attributed much of their success, and Shih Huang Ti sought to extend it to the entire Empire. The last centuries of the Chou, however, had been marked by freedom of thought and discussion and, as a corollary, by the vigorous denunciation of one school by another. The schools, moreover, concerned themselves largely with government and political theory. It is not strange, therefore, that Shih Huang Ti looked askance at the prospect of the continuation of these disputations. By them his own theories of administration would be pointedly questioned and the continuation of his rule threatened. Criticism had

apparently already begun—if indeed it had ever ceased—when, in response to a memorial of the influential Li Ssŭ, the opposing schools and the documents on which they based their authority were ordered suppressed. The memorial rehearsed what was almost certainly the fact—that the scholars were condemning the laws of Ch'in and were praising the institutions of the past. The Confucianists, with their emphasis upon the moral influence of an upright ruler rather than upon strict law, and the followers of Mo Ti, with their belief in applying universally the principle of love, were especially opposed to the type of government which Shih Huang Ti was establishing. Moreover, the Confucianists regretted the passing of the old nobility. When, as they were accused of doing, the scholars voiced their views publicly, they probably found ready listeners among those who were groaning under the heavy hand of the Emperor, with his suppression of the old decentralized society, his stringent regulations, and his heavy exactions in taxes and labor. It must be added that some Legalists were averse to any wide use of literature. There are suggestions that Shang Yang had considered a holocaust of books when he was in charge of Ch'in, and that Shih Huang Ti found the idea in the writings of the great Legalist, Han Fei Tzŭ. Moreover, Mencius reports that princes had the custom of burning books which were obnoxious to them.

Shih Huang Ti, at the suggestion of Li Ssŭ and with Legalist severity, decreed that all the literature to which the non-Legalist scholars looked for authority be taken by the local officials and burned, including the official chronicles of the several states, the Classic of Poetry *(Shih Ching),* the Classic of History *(Shu Ching),* and the discourses of the teachers of the philosophical schools. The task was not so difficult as might be supposed, for most of the books seem to have been on slips of bamboo, which were bulky and not easy of concealment, and the copies were probably not numerous. The only books excepted from the proscription were those on divination, on medicine, on agriculture and arboriculture, and the official chronicles of the state of Ch'in. These either fitted in with the Legalist theories, which stressed agriculture, with the predilections of the Emperor, who was very credulous of superstitions, or with the desire to glorify Ch'in and its power. Copies of the prohibited books were to be preserved in the imperial library, but they could not be consulted without the consent of the proper officials. The death penalty was prescribed for those who discussed the *Shih Ching* and the *Shu Ching*—a favorite method of teaching by the members of the various schools—and for those who denounced the present and praised antiquity. Punishments only slightly less drastic were decreed for those who failed to burn their books and for officials who did not enforce the edict. The conduct of the people, so it was ordered, must be regulated entirely by the officials by means of the law, and not by any books in which "the sayings of the ancient kings" were held up as an example.

Just how thoroughly the decree was enforced we do not know. It may be that the literary losses commonly ascribed to it were due more to the wars which immediately preceded the triumph of Ch'in. Many of the cities were burned in these struggles, and the collections of books contained in them must have suffered heavily. From the catalogue of the imperial library of the succeeding dynasty, moreover, it is clear that the sweep was by no means thorough. Some destruction there undoubtedly was—enough to bring down upon the memory of Shih Huang Ti the opprobrium of generations of writers of the school which under later dynasties was made orthodox—that of Confucius. Scholars who violated the command were executed, and even the heir apparent was exiled to the frontier for criticizing the Emperor.

The reign was by no means one of complete suppression of literary advance—or at least not of the tools of scholarship. Li Ssŭ is the reported inventor of a new style of script, the "Lesser Seal." The "Lesser Seal" characters, it must be noted, were already in use in the latter part of the Chou. Li Ssŭ constructed an improved list and made it compulsory throughout the realm, thus further promoting the unity of the Empire and its culture. It embodied the forms, which, with modifications, became standard in later centuries. To the commander-in-chief of the Emperor's armies, Mêng T'ien, is ascribed—incorrectly, for the brush pen had been in use for centuries—the invention of the writing brush of hair. But he may have created the pointed brush. Probably about the same time silk, already employed for such purposes, was further substituted for bamboo slips as a vehicle for the written characters.

As we have suggested, Shih Huang Ti, not content with unifying China, proceeded to extend his boundaries into non-Chinese territory. Much of the coast from the present Chêkiang south into what is now Vietnam was occupied by peoples called the Yüeh. They were partially civilized, tattooing their bodies, using metals, and displaying skill as navigators. They possessed fertile and well-cultivated lands. In 221 B.C. Shih Huang Ti sent five large armies to annex the region. The more northerly territories—those in the present Chêkiang, Fukien, and Kwangtung beyond Canton—were quickly overrun. It was not until about 214 B.C., however, that the more southerly regions were conquered. By the end of that year the Ch'in boundaries seem to have been extended into the delta of the Red River and along the coastal plain beyond the site of the present Hué.

Shih Huang Ti is credited with colonizing the present Kwangtung with the idle and the vagabonds—among them probably those who were kept out of peaceful pursuits by the long wars and now, with the restoration of order, were left restless and without regular employment, and hence became actual or incipient bandits constituting a menace to the community. Some of the colonists are said to have been criminals—those who had fallen afoul of the severe laws of Ch'in. Others very probably were those

thrown out of their usual occupations by the abolition of the old political order.

Some of the main features of the Ch'in administrative organization were extended transiently and perhaps nominally to the later Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Tongking. The Chinese, however, seem to have disturbed but little, if at all, the local political forms, the social institutions, and the culture of the southern portions of their new conquests. The process of assimilating the region was to be deferred until the next dynasty.

In the Center and the central West, Shih Huang Ti's domains extended into the present Hunan, Kweichow, and Szechwan. Szechwan was colonized by enforced emigration from the older China.

In the Northwest, Shih Huang Ti's forces defeated the Hsiung-nu, a pastoral, horse-using people, probably akin to the Tatars and Turks and possibly the same as or related to the Huns of European history. For several centuries we hear much of them in Chinese annals. About the time of Shih Huang Ti, but more immediately after his time than during it, the Hsiung-nu were being welded into an effective confederation. The Emperor only temporarily curbed their power, and when the Ch'in collapsed they again proved a serious menace. Shih Huang Ti's conquests against the Hsiung-nu are said to have reached as far as the present Lanchow in Kansu. Into the Northwest, too, the Emperor extended his administrative organization and settled part of the region with convicts from his older domains.

In what is now Korea a prince recognized the overlordship of the Ch'in. There are hints, too, that Shih Huang Ti sketched out a maritime policy.

On the northern marches, as a protection against the forays of the Hsiung-nu and other truculent, seminomadic tribes, Shih Huang Ti constructed, by forced labor, fortresses and barriers, extensive portions of that Great Wall which, added to and repaired during the centuries, is one of the monumental achievements of men's hands. Long before the time of Shih Huang Ti, the princes of the northern states are said to have built walls along their northern frontiers as a defense against forays and invasions. Shih Huang Ti's wall, which very probably incorporated these, is reported to have extended from somewhere in the present Kansu to Shanhaikuan on the sea. The present wall follows only in part the course of that of Shih Huang Ti.

Much of the work of conquest and of the construction of fortifications was under the supervision of Mêng T'ien, who had assisted in the final subjugation of the Empire.

Such extensive public works required not only forced labor but also heavy taxation. New imposts were devised, among them a poll tax. They did not serve to make the Emperor popular with his subjects.

Shih Huang Ti, conqueror and able organizer and administrator though he seems to have been, shared the religious beliefs and superstitions of his

age. He sacrificed extensively to various divinities, carrying out a well-established custom that the state should thus insure the co-operation of the unseen powers for the welfare of man. Among others, the Ch'in worshiped four gods which had been revered in earlier times. The Emperor was fearful of death and did not like to hear of it or of funerals. He spent much energy in searching for a drug that would confer immortality. As a purchase price for it, at the suggestion of one of his advisers in this quest, he is reported to have sent into the eastern sea a company of youths and maidens of good families. These were never heard from again, and it is asserted, although on no dependable grounds, that the expedition reached and colonized Japan.

The search for the much-desired drug proved vain. Death overtook the Emperor while he was on one of his journeys, away from his capital (210 B.C.). Li Ssŭ, who was with him at the time, feared rebellion if the demise were immediately known. He managed, therefore, to keep the fact a secret until the imperial entourage, bearing with it the body, returned to Hsienyang.

The delay gave time for some of the more powerful of the company to arrange the succession to suit themselves. One of Shih Huang Ti's last acts had been to order a message sent to his eldest son, the heir apparent—still in exile on the northern frontier—to return to the capital with the funeral cortege and conduct the interment. Li Ssŭ, Chao Kao (a powerful eunuch), and Hu Hai, the second son of Shih Huang Ti, substituted for it a letter commanding the eldest son to commit suicide. They also fabricated a decree of the late Emperor appointing Hu Hai to the succession. This cold-blooded plot was entirely successful. The eldest son accepted the spurious missive as genuine and complied with its command. Arrived at the capital, the conspirators met with no important opposition. Hu Hai mounted the throne as Êrh Shih Huang Ti, "The Second Emperor," and had his father's remains placed in a huge tomb that had been long in building.

Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien, writing over a hundred years later, tells marvelous stories of this sepulcher—saying that it was mountainous in size, that in it were the reproduction of the heavens and a map of the Empire, that it was stored with riches, that it was guarded by machines so ingeniously devised that they would discharge arrows on any intruder, and that the workmen who had perfected the final arrangements were sealed alive in the tomb to prevent them from divulging its secrets. How much the story grew with the telling we do not know, but a lofty tumulus is still pointed out as the remains of the grave.

### THE DOWNFALL OF THE CH'IN DYNASTY

The Ch'in dynasty did not long survive the death of its first monarch. The changes introduced by the conqueror had been so drastic,

his laws so severe, and the burden of his public works so heavy, that once his strong hand was removed an upheaval was almost inevitable. The former rivals of Ch'in had not been so thoroughly crushed and welded into the new Empire but that adherents were found who sought to revive at least the strongest of them. Certainly only an extraordinarily able successor could have prevented or even postponed extensive rebellion. The second Emperor (Êhr Shih Huang Ti—"Second Generation Emperor") was far from equal to the task. The eunuch Chao Kao soon completely dominated him. The Second Generation Emperor added to the stringent laws of his father, continued the heavy taxation and the expensive construction of the great palace of his sire, and so severely punished those who criticized him that no official felt safe. The experienced advisers of the last reign were put out of the way, probably through the machinations of Chao Kao. Mêng T'ien, the commander-in-chief of the armies that guarded the frontier, was ordered to commit suicide. Li Ssŭ, after advising moderation and more attention to the marches, was thrown into prison and executed. Revolts soon broke out. Chao Kao had the Second Emperor killed (207 B.C.) after a brief reign of three years and buried him like a commoner. In his place the eunuch put Tzŭ-ying (or Ying Tzŭ-ying), a son of the eldest son of Shih Huang Ti, but simply with the title of the *Wang* of Ch'in. Before long Tzŭ-ying found a means of having the powerful king-maker killed. After a reign of less than two months he in turn was eliminated by the head of a league of rebels, the capital was plundered, the great palace—built at the cost of so much treasure and human suffering—was given to the flames, and the dynasty of Ch'in was at an end. Incidentally the disaster probably entailed even a greater loss of the records of the past than did the burning of the books by Shih Huang Ti, for copies of the works which he had proscribed had been preserved in his archives.

The debacle of the family of Shih Huang Ti was overwhelming, but the work of that monarch was by no means wholly undone. The decentralization of the Chou had been effectively erased, and when, a few years later, a successful general once more united the Empire, he and his house preserved in modified form much of the administrative machinery of the Ch'in. The old states had been so thoroughly disposed of that the attempts to revive them proved few and unsuccessful. The elder China, with its picturesque variety, had disappeared forever. A unified Empire had been formed. Much of the old passed over into the new and left on it an indelible imprint, but the China which Shih Huang Ti helped to bring into existence differed henceforth, both in political organization and in other phases of its civilization, from that of pre-Ch'in times. A new era had dawned.

There is an interesting appropriateness in the origin of the name China. At its inception it appears to have been a designation given the country by peoples in Central Asia and to have been derived from Ch'in, with which,

as the dominant state in the Northwest, the non-Chinese to the west would first come in contact.

### THE FOUNDING OF THE EARLIER OR WESTERN HAN DYNASTY

The rebellions which made a sudden and violent end to the Ch'in dynasty brought an almost entirely new set of families to the fore. Members of one of the princely houses of the later centuries of the Chou appear prominently as actors, but either the vigor of the other lines had run out or most of their able members had been exterminated by Shih Huang Ti and in the wars that preceded his victories. It was largely offspring of relatively undistinguished progenitors who emerged as leaders from the free competition of the fresh period of disorder.

The most prominent of the new men were Hsiang Yü (or Hsiang Chi Yü) and Liu Chi (Liu Pang). Hsiang Yü possessed great height, marked impetuosity and generosity, and superb physical prowess. His father had been a general of Ch'u, whose stronghold, it will be recalled, was in the Yangtze Valley, and had perished when that state was being conquered by the Ch'in. When insurrection broke out against the incompetent successor of Shih Huang Ti, Hsiang Yü took service under his uncle, Hsiang Liang, who was seeking to restore Ch'u. A member of the former ruling house of Ch'u, found living in obscurity as a shepherd, was elevated to the headship of that principality. When, in the vicissitudes of war, Hsiang Liang was defeated and lost his life, Hsiang Yü quickly rose to the supreme command of the armies of Ch'u, and, his prince being very much of a puppet, bade fair to be not only the chief man of Ch'u but also of the Empire. It was he who led the forces which sacked the Ch'in capital and put to death the feeble grandson of Shih Huang Ti, and when this had been done, it was he who proclaimed his titular master Emperor, under the title of I Huang Ti. He parceled out the realm among the leading generals of the victorious rebels and among some of the Ch'in generals who had submitted, giving them the title of *Wang*. This, it will be noted, was a revival of decentralization. The headquarters of the new regime were established not on the plain of the Wei but in the present Kiangsu, from which Hsiang Yü's support seems largely to have been derived. Hsiang Yü soon fell out with the new Emperor and had him exiled and killed. This act precipitated the inevitable struggle between the rival generals.

In the ensuing trial of strength the chief opponent of Hsiang Yü was Liu Chi (Liu Pang). Under the Ch'in, Liu Chi had been a minor official in his native district. He was of humble birth, not of the old aristocracy. He is said to have been of an open and generous disposition, fond of his cups, and with an eye for a pretty face. He could also, as it proved, be

persistent, prudent, shrewd, and cruel. Charged with conducting a group of forced laborers to build the tomb of Shih Huang Ti, he set his prisoners at liberty, and putting himself at the head of a few of the boldest of them, became an outlaw in the mountains and marshes of Central China. In the disorder which succeeded the death of Shih Huang Ti, he was chosen to head his native district and attached himself to Hsiang Liang in the effort to revive the state of Ch'u. He quickly became a leading commander of the forces of that principality and was soon Hsiang Yü's major rival.

In the fighting between these two doughty generals the victory seemed to perch upon the banner first of one and then of the other. At one time Hsiang Yü offered to settle the issue in single combat with Liu Chi, but the latter, more cautious, declined. At the outset Hsiang Yü seemed to be in the lead, for he routed Liu Chi's army and captured the father and wife of his antagonist. Later the rivals made a treaty, dividing the Empire between them. This compact Liu Chi almost immediately broke (202 B.C.) and brought about the downfall of his enemy.

Liu Chi's subordinates—possibly not without prompting—offered the title of Emperor to their commander, now clearly the master of the country. After the ostensible reluctance and triple refusal which etiquette prescribed, Liu Chi accepted (202 B.C.), thus perpetuating the form of unity which Shih Huang Ti had begun. The date from which the new dynasty was reckoned was not 202 B.C., but 206 B.C., when Liu Chi had become *Wang* of Han.

The Han made permanent the work of the Ch'in, and endured, with two marked interruptions, for over four hundred years—centuries which were among the most glorious of China's long history. The Ch'in and the Han together set the pattern of government that continued, with important modifications, to the fore part of the twentieth century.

Liu Chi, whom we had better now call by his dynastic title, Kao Tsu, proved a wise administrator of his conquests. He declared a general amnesty and repealed many of the severe laws of Ch'in. He favored the minimum of state regulation and of formal etiquette. He was a man of the people, with crude language and manners, and owed his position in part to his good judgment of men and his appeal to the commoners. Kao Tsu took steps that later led to the adoption of Confucianism by his house. He recognized in practice the Confucian theory that government must be for the benefit of the governed and as much by example as by force. He had some Confucian scholars around him, notably one of his ministers, Lu Chia. One of Kao Tsu's brothers had Confucian training. It is said that when Kao Tsu contemptuously remarked that he had won the Empire from the back of a horse and had no need for the *Shih Ching* and *Shu Ching* of the scholars, Lu Chia boldly told him that the Empire could not be administered from the back of a horse and that if the Ch'in had sought to

rule by the Confucian virtues it would not so quickly have come to an end. Kao Tsu employed Confucian scholars in drawing up a simple form of etiquette for the court, to eliminate the boorishness that characterized the actions of his entourage in the earlier years of his reign. The adoption of Confucianism was probably further foreshadowed by an order (196 B.C.) that the princes send men of ability to court for the public service, for it was a Confucian principle that government should be by able and upright officials. It must be noted, however, that filling offices with the most fit might also be a corollary of the Legalist program and so may have been in part a heritage from Ch'in.

Religiously, Kao Tsu was tolerant of tribal and local cults. They were represented at his capital by their shrines, priests, and ceremonies. This was, of course, a wise administrative measure.

Kao Tsu fixed his capital in the former domains of Ch'in, on the broad plain of the Wei River, at Ch'angan, a few miles northwest of the capital that Shih Huang Ti had built. He retained, too, much of the governmental machinery of Ch'in. In at least two very important respects, however, he departed from the organization of Shih Huang Ti. In the first place, he divided the realm into principalities, placing over them members of his family and military commanders who had done him marked service. The chief of these had the time-honored title of *Wang*. Direct rule by the Emperor was confined to about a third of the realm, mostly not far from the capital. The domains of the *Wang* did not supplant the administrative divisions of the Ch'in, but the latter were continued and were governed by the hierarchy devised by Shih Huang Ti, modified somewhat, but still appointed by the Emperor. In spite of safeguards, the creation of the *Wang* brought its problems, for it repeatedly threatened the renewed disintegration of the Empire. In the second place, Kao Tsu consulted those about him before taking some of his important measures. He thus adopted a policy, followed by later rulers through the centuries, of acting in response to memorials from his subjects.

With all of Kao Tsu's skill and power, his authority was by no means undisputed and much of his reign was troubled by revolts. These he suppressed, and so successfully did he do his work—steering a middle course between the anarchy of the later years of the Chou and the extreme centralization of the Ch'in—that when he died (195 B.C.) the throne passed on to his family without such a major upheaval as had followed the demise of Shih Huang Ti.

The unity of the Empire and the continuation on the throne of the line of Kao Tsu were both helped and endangered by his widow, the Empress *nee* Lü, who survived him fifteen years. She had been Kao Tsu's wife from the days of his obscurity, and being a woman of masculine mind and indomitable will developed by the hardships which the pair had early under-

gone, she is said to have been in large part responsible for the eventual triumph of her spouse. During the later years of Kao Tsu the two saw less and less of each other, but when the change of reign came she succeeded in having her own son, a mere lad, placed on the throne. Another son, born of Kao Tsu's favorite concubine, she had poisoned, and possibly moved by the hatred and jealousy of a slighted wife, she had his mother horribly mutilated and killed. The Empress Lü's own son, the Emperor Hui (or Hsiao-hui "the Emperor Hui, the filial") proved dissipated and she was practically monarch during his reign. She married him to a granddaughter of hers, and although the union is believed to have been childless, on his death she declared Emperor successively boys whom she said were its fruits. These children were mere puppets and she was the real ruler. The first of them was a son of the Emperor Hui by a concubine. When he showed too much independence she had him imprisoned. She appointed her own relatives to high office and apparently sought permanently to supplant the Liu family. On her death, however, the house of Liu asserted itself, exterminated her kin, and placed on the throne a son of Kao Tsu, known in history as the Emperor Wên, or Wên Ti.

Of the Emperor Wèn and of the succeeding Emperor Ching, or Ching Ti, his son, but little need here be said. The Emperor Wên was an exceptionally able ruler. He favored Confucianism. The surviving prohibitions of Ch'in were still further lightened, that against criticism of the government being entirely abolished. The Ch'in edict proscribing all but certain authorized books, it should be noted, had been rescinded while the Empress *nee* Lü was in power. Capital punishment was comparatively infrequent. Taxes were reduced. The Empire was recuperating from the extreme exhaustion which characterized the earlier years of the Han. Members of the Liu family were again appointed to rule over the great divisions of the Empire, but their power was more and more curtailed. One of the steps taken against them—the annexation to the central government of portions of their estates, a step taken in part at the suggestion of Legalists—led to a concerted revolt of several of these dignitaries. Upon its suppression a further diminution of the importance of the *Wang* was effected. They retained only ceremonial power, and their domains were governed by officials appointed by the Emperor.

### APEX OF THE EARLIER HAN DYNASTY: THE REIGN OF WU TI

The Han dynasty reached its height under the Emperor who is best known to posterity by the title of Wu Ti, the "military Emperor," usually called Han Wu Ti to distinguish him from Wu Ti's of other dynasties. Coming to the throne in 140 B.C. at the age of sixteen, he ruled the Empire until 87 B.C., or for over fifty years. His was by far the longest

reign of the dynasty, and one of the most famous in the history of China. He inherited a realm which had recovered from the exhaustion that preceded and followed the Ch'in and which was now prosperous and ready for expansion and fresh activity. The half-century is noted both for extensive foreign conquests and for marked internal developments in organization and culture.

The territorial expansion during the reign of Wu Ti was to the northwest, the northeast, and the south, and extended the boundaries and the influence of China farther than at any previous time.

In the Northwest the chief enemies of the Chinese were the Hsiung-Nu. As we have seen, this seminomadic people had been held at bay by Shih Huang Ti. They had taken advantage of the internal turmoil in China at the close of the Ch'in to become aggressive once more. Welded into a confederation by an able leader, they had become a formidable foe. During the earlier years of the Han they had been a fairly constant menace and had repeatedly raided Chinese territory. Wu Ti made their subjugation one of his major objectives. In doing so, he established contacts with Central Asia which brought the Chinese into touch with the great civilizations to the West—with important consequences.

Wu Ti sought to conquer the Hsiung-Nu partly by direct military campaigns, partly by establishing military colonies in their territory, and partly by diplomacy. Wu Ti's generals carried on the warfare for years and with much success. The Chinese frontier was pushed out to include most of what is now Kansu, probably beyond where it had been in Shih Huang Ti's time, and colonies, garrisons, and a westward extension of the Great Wall—first to the Jade Gate (Yü Mên) and later farther westward—helped to give the victories permanence. Wu Ti did not entirely break the power of the Hsiung-Nu, but he reduced it greatly.

In the days of their might, the Hsiung-Nu had defeated some neighbors of theirs, the Yüeh-chih, or Tochari, who were then living in what is now, roughly, western Kansu. The Yüeh-chih were probably an Indo-European people, speaking an Iranian dialect, and unrelated racially to the Hsiung-nu. Migrating westward into what is now Ili and later farther westward still and then southward, for some centuries they ruled the territory north of the Oxus, and in Bactria (in the trans-Caspian region, north and east of Persia) overthrew the kingdoms established by Greek adventurers in the wake of the armies of Alexander the Great. Later some of them invaded Northwest India, and in the early part of the Christian Era, under the Kushan dynasty, experienced important cultural developments. It was a mark of statesmanship on the part of Wu Ti that he attempted to form an alliance with them against their common enemy, the Hsiung-nu. The envoy whom he chose to effect this purpose was Chang Ch'ien, who seems, indeed, to have suggested the plan.

Around the name of Chang Ch'ien many legends and fabrications have gathered. Even the standard accounts have been declared by some scholars either to be interpolations or to contain many later additions. Back of them must lie, however, at least a basis of fact. The record as we have it can be summarized as follows. In 138 B.C. Chang Ch'ien left China on his westward journey. The Hsiung-nu captured him and for ten years held him prisoner. Escaping, he reached the Yüeh-chih in Bactria and spent a year among them. The Yüeh-chih declined the proffered alliance, but Chang Ch'ien had brought the Chinese in touch with the West and had reached the outposts of the cultural influences of the Mediterranean world. The intrepid traveler succeeded in making his way back to China (126 B.C.).

While in Bactria, Chang Ch'ien found bamboo and cloth which he believed, possibly incorrectly, to have originated in what are now Szechwan and Yünnan. He learned that these were said to come through India and that they had reached that country by way of what is now the Yünnan-Burmese border. This led him to dream of opening communication between China and the West by that route instead of by the one which the Hsiung-nu had made difficult. However, he found this impracticable.

A few years later Chang Ch'ien went on another embassy to the West. This time he himself did not go as far as on his first journey, but sent subordinates on the more distant missions. Chang Ch'ien, it must also be noted, is said to have introduced into China from the West alfalfa and the cultivated grape. Later tradition was to credit him, falsely, with having brought numbers of other plants from Central Asia.

Wu Ti effectively followed up the expeditions of Chang Ch'ien and succeeded in making Chinese power felt in what is now Sinkiang. Some peoples in the Tarim basin and in Ili were reduced to submission. Horses were even asked from a state in the later Ferghana, in the valley of the Jaxartes, west of the boundaries of the present Sinkiang, and when these were refused and the Chinese envoy killed, the general Li Kuang-li was dispatched to wreak the Emperor's vengeance. At first he was unsuccessful and was beaten back, but Wu Ti kept him and his decimated forces, in disgrace, on the Western frontier. Then, returning over the long desert road to the attack, Li Kuang-li was victorious and placed a Chinese nominee on the throne. More than ten embassies went from the country to China during the reign of Wu Ti. Li's was a noteworthy military feat, worthy of ranking with those which the Romans had been performing, only a few decades before, in the Mediterranean world to the west.

It was not only in the Northwest that Wu Ti was extending his power. In the Northeast he was also gaining victories. In what is now the southern part of Manchuria and the northern part of Korea, a state had arisen during the early years of the Han with its capital at what is now Pyongyang (P'ingyang). Its name, Ch'aohsien, is today, under its Japanese

pronunciation, Chosen, used for all Korea. Ch'aohsien acknowledged somewhat vaguely the suzerainty of China, and when it rebelled, Wu Ti determined to bring it more fully under his sway. The ensuing war led, in the last decade of the second century B.C., to the annexation of Ch'aohsien to the Han domains. The conquest was, naturally, followed by the infiltration of Chinese culture into the peninsula. Into the Northeast, too, in what is now the northeastern part of Hopei and South Manchuria, and even in the present Korea, Chinese settlers were moved to help hold the territory for the Empire. Near the later Pyongyang (P'ingyang), for example, a wealthy Chinese colony was established in 108 B.C. For four centuries or more, until A.D. 313, it flourished and remained an outpost of Chinese imperial power, with governors appointed from China. In the tombs of the colony rich remains of civilization have been found. The effect of this settlement on the life of the adjacent Koreans must have been marked. Something of Chinese culture filtered into Japan by way of Korea. Indeed, the Chinese claim that under part of the Han Japan was a vassal of China.

Wu Ti also extended his territories to the south. The peoples in the present coast provinces to the south of the Yangtze and in Annam, which, under Shih Huang Ti, had been brought within the administrative system of the Ch'in and had been partially colonized by Chinese, had taken advantage of the weakness of the Empire between Shih Huang Ti and Wu Ti to become independent again. Divided under several local rulers, they fell a comparatively easy prey to the vigorous, growing colossus of the North. A kingdom in what is now the southern part of Chêkiang was the first to be annexed—in the earlier years of Wu Ti's reign—and thousands of its people were moved into the valley of the Huai. A state in what is now Fukien was the next to submit, and much of its population is said to have been deported to the north of the Yangtze.

The largest of the southern kingdoms, called Nan-yüeh, had been established by a Chinese, a former officer of Shih Huang Ti. For a time this ruler acknowledged the suzerainty of the Han, but after a few years he deemed himself strong enough to assert his independence. Nan-yüeh had its capital at what is now Canton and seems to have comprised much of the present Kwangsi and Kwangtung and of the northeastern portions of what is now Vietnam. The Han cast especially covetous eyes upon its territories when a Chinese envoy made the discovery that the products of what is now Szechwan—a Han possession—were carried to Canton by way of the West River and its tributaries. Under Wu Ti's direction Nan-yüeh was conquered (108 B.C.), its territories were added to the Han domains, and a canal was built to help connect the basin of the West River with that of the Yangtze. As under the Ch'in, however, Nan-yüeh was governed according to its old customs and through its native chiefs. No

new taxes were placed on it, at least for the time. Colonization of the South—especially of the Canton region—by Chinese proceeded apace, and it and Han control were favored by placing the passes across the hills between the Yangtze and the south coast under administrative districts of the great valley. Petty states in what are now Kweichow and Yünnan also made their submission to Wu Ti.

Before the death of Wu Ti, then, the Han administrative organization had been extended on the south to include much of what is now Chêkiang, Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hainan, the northeastern section of Vietnam, Kweichow, and Yünnan. The Han Empire was now not far from the size of that which the Roman Republic had recently been building in the Mediterranean world. Much of the success on the field of battle was due to modifications in military methods. As under the Ch'in, the old cumbersome war chariot had been discarded except for display, and a more mobile cavalry, supported by infantry, was coming into use.

The long reign, the vigor, and the vast conquests of Wu Ti brought marked internal developments in China. Wu Ti continued the policies of his immediate predecessors and further reduced the power of the local princes and increased that of the bureaucracy which headed up in the Emperor. As had Kao Tsu, he appointed counselors to each *Wang* to watch and report to him the action of these magnates. He continued systematically to divide the great principalities. He called into his service men of ability wherever he found them, disregarding birth and often raising to high power those of base extraction. He was more of an autocrat than the previous Han rulers had been. The former distinction between the aristocracy and the commoners was passing. The manners of the nobility tended more and more to be adopted by the lower classes. New divisions between the rich and the poor were appearing.

Like Shih Huang Ti, Wu Ti strove to exalt the authority of the throne. To this end he developed a system whose rudiments existed before his time, for discovering and choosing men of promise. He commanded local officials to recommend those in their jurisdictions who were the most virtuous, and surrounded himself with men renowned for their wisdom. An early development of competitive examinations for the choice of the worthy for office seems to date from his reign, although Wu Ti and his successors did not utilize them as extensively as did some later dynasties. Nor can he be said to have made them into a system. Wu Ti instituted a higher school at the capital for the training of future officials, and schools were encouraged in the local provinces and districts. This was not an innovation, for schools were to be found in the Chou era and possibly earlier. Here was an expansion of a time-honored system. As a result, the trend was reinforced toward having officialdom recruited from men committed to Confucianism.

This device, extended and elaborated by later rulers and dynasties, was a further stage in the development of that bureaucracy and official hierarchy which was to be one of the outstanding features of the Chinese state —the structure by which China was held together and administered. It cannot be attributed solely to Wu Ti. The Ch'in, and especially Shih Huang Ti, did more to create it than he; the earlier monarchs of the Han employed the principle, and the roots of it go back into Chou and Shang times. For example, some of its basic concepts are to be found in the writings of more than one of the Chou schools and probably were not original with any one man. Wu Ti, however, was astute enough to see the importance of the principle and to add to its practical application.

The court presented a mixture of several of the philosophical schools. In the reaction against the autocracy of the Ch'in, some thinkers advocated the "inaction" *(Wu Wei),* or laissez faire of the *Tao Tê Ching.* Several of the administrative devices of the Emperor smacked strongly of Legalism. However, Legalism had been discredited by Ch'in despotism and had been proscribed. Wu Ti showed favor to the adherents of Confucianism. His principle of appointing to office the ablest, although employed by the Legalistic Ch'in, could be justified by pointing to Confucian precepts. He encouraged the study of the Classics to which the Confucianists looked for authority. He chose at least some of his functionaries from those most skilled in the Classics. He furthered that adoption of Confucianism by the state which was to be one of the outstanding features of later Chinese governments.

This emphasis on Confucianism had the effect of carrying over to the new age the ethics and formal courtesy of the Chou aristocracy. The new ruling classes were thereby encouraged to a certain refinement of life and to the maintenance of a partial continuity with the culture of the past.

Although Legalism had been proscribed, administrative measures supported by it continued, and evēn after Wu Ti's death there was staged at court a debate between an official who supported certain government monopolies inherited from Wu Ti and the Confucian opponents of that policy.

Much of the revival of Confucianism is attributed to two convinced adherents of that school, Kung-sun Hung and Tung Chung-shu. Kung-sun Hung, formerly a swineherd, took a high stand among the scholars examined by Wu Ti, and during years in public office, lived simply and gave freely of his substance to the poor. Tung Chung-shu, an older contemporary of Wu Ti, was a leader of a philosophy which insisted that ideally the Emperor ruled by the decree of Heaven *(T'ien Ming)*—a teaching framed in the Chou period. Heaven, earth, and man, so it was said, constitute a triad, and the Emperor must keep them in harmony. He must do this by setting a good moral example. This philosophy taught that when the Emperor

committed evil and injustice, Heaven would show its displeasure by famines, earthquakes, fires, and floods, and if these were not heeded, would seek to bring him to repentance by such portents as eclipses and comets. If the Emperor were still recalcitrant, final ruin would come. This theory professed to be Confucianist and was very influential under the Han and, indeed, throughout most of later Chinese history. Tung Chung-shu attempted to effect a compromise between the teaching of Mencius that man by nature is good and the contention of Hsün Tzŭ that it is bad.

In some respects the Confucianism of Wu Ti's reign differed decidedly from that of the Chou. It was more positively theistic than was either Confucius or Mencius, stressing the beneficent rule of Heaven in the affairs of men. It made more of a belief in spirits than did either of these two sages, thus finding room for the superstitions of the time. How much, if at all, these modifications were due to the influence of Mo Ti's school it is impossible to say, but one distinguished modern scholar has declared the Confucianism of the Han to be "Mohism" thinly veiled under a Confucian disguise. From this estimate vigorous dissent has been expressed. But in one way and another Mo Ti and his school continued for centuries to have an effect on Confucianism. Tung Chung-shu also wove into his philosophy the *yin* and the *yang* which had been prominent in one of the schools of the Chou. It was at his suggestion that a higher school for studies was set up in the capital. He was the chief shaper of Han Confucianism and continued to be studied for more than a thousand years.

From the economic standpoint, the record of Wu Ti's reign was varied. Commerce appears to have flourished. Domestic peace, the reduction of the power of the local princes, and the increased administrative unity of the Empire probably promoted the growth of internal trade. This seems to have been augmented by the extensive annexations of territory, particularly those in the South. Trade with foreign countries also increased, but, although spectacular and with important cultural consequences, in proportion to that within China's boundaries, presumably it was very small. Wu Ti attempted to regulate commerce and had an official whose function it was to mitigate extreme fluctuations in it—and to make a profit for the state—by buying the great staples when they were cheap and placing them on the market when prices rose. Canals were dug—among them one between the valley of the Wei, on the north, and that of the Han on the south—probably at least in part for the purpose of facilitating communication and promoting economic prosperity as well as political union, and a great road was constructed to the south and the southwest. During a devastating famine in the North, scores of thousands of the sufferers were moved into other territory. Great irrigation works were constructed in arid regions, a dangerous flood of the Yellow River was curbed, and large territories were reclaimed for cultivation.

Wu Ti's many wars and his extensive public works brought with them serious financial problems and, at times, distress. Taxes were increased, new imposts were levied, and fresh sources of revenue were sought. The government monopoly of salt and iron, which appears to have been first attempted under Shih Huang Ti, was now extended and was placed in the hands of those merchants who had operated these industries when they were private enterprises. This seems to have been at least in part because the manufacture of salt and iron was prominent as a source of private wealth. Fortunes had been amassed through it, and the state may therefore have looked with covetous eyes upon a possible large addition to its revenue. A special military nobility was created and the titles in it were sold. A regular plan of reducing the severity of punishments by the payment of a fine came into use. Levies were made on the princes for the ostensible purpose of supporting official sacrifices and then were devoted to military purposes. Either now or soon thereafter an excise was placed on liquor. The currency was debased; surviving coins of the earlier part of the reign are the merest fraction in weight of those of similar denomination of a few years before. Wu Ti made coinage an imperial monopoly—previously it had been minted by various dignitaries—and endeavored to restore it to its avowed value. In the former action—in part a political measure to increase the power of the throne at the expense of the local princes—he seems to have been successful, but in the latter he was only partially so, for the new coins, although far heavier than those they supplanted, as extant specimens show, were still below their nominal worth. There was an unsuccessful attempt, too, at a kind of currency made up of the skins of deer. While farmers were granted special tax exemptions, additional levies were placed on merchants. Freedom from taxes was promised to those who gave slaves for labor on the public works, and additional quantities of slaves were obtained through the prolonged foreign wars.

The trend of these actions was to augment the power of the throne and to further centralization. The new exactions and the heavy cost of war led to much popular discontent. Population seems to have declined by a half. In protest Confucian scholars would have abolished many of the new financial measures of the state and advocated winning the barbarians by benevolent rule rather than by costly armed force.

In literature the reign was chiefly noteworthy for the *Shih-chi* (Historical Records), the great history of Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien. Born *ca.* 145 B.C., the son of Ssŭ-ma Tan, a court historian (also said, misleadingly, to have been the court astrologer), Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien had exceptional preparation for his magnum opus. At an early age he memorized the texts of antiquity which provided him with much of his source material. He traveled extensively through the Empire and for a time was a government inspector in

newly conquered lands in Szechwan and Yünnan. Upon the death of his father, he succeeded to the latter's office. For daring to advocate the cause of a general whom he had recommended and against whom the wrath of the Emperor was directed, he was emasculated, a common punishment of those days. His history was written both before and after this event. How much of it was from the pen of his father there is no sure way of telling. Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien seems to have been at least the chief author. Based largely upon earlier works and documents which it often incorporates with but slight changes, it covers the history of China from the beginning to Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien's own day and includes not only the narrative of political events but biographies of prominent men, accounts of some of the chief principalities of the Chou and of some of the foreign peoples touched by the Han, chronological tables, and treatises on such phases of culture as rites, music, divination, the calendar, the economics. After Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien's death (*ca.* 90 B.C.) additions were made to the *Shih-chi*, and it was revised and possibly rearranged—alterations which provide the scholar with a major textual problem. It was deservedly regarded by later generations as a model and became a prototype of a whole series of Dynastic Histories, which, taken together with the *Shih-chi,* give a voluminous record of China's past—much more extensive and reliable than that possessed by any other people over so long a period.

Wu Ti seems to have attempted to modify religion in a way that would make it ancillary to that unity and emphasis upon imperial power for which he was striving. He celebrated with great pomp two sacrifices—*fêng*, by which prayer was made by the Emperor to Heaven (*T'ien*) from the sacred mountain, T'ai Shan, with the spirit of that peak as the messenger, and *shan*, by which prayer was made to the Sovereign Earth (*Ti*). Both purported to be revivals of earlier ceremonies and are said to have been performed by Shih Huang Ti. Probably both were ostensibly for the purpose of asking the blessing of these divinities upon the Emperor and requesting long life for him. By emphasizing the place of Heaven, however, *fêng* would help to create the idea of a celestial unity and monarchy of which the imperial state could be held to be a counterpart. *Shan* also lent its strength to this by stressing the supremacy of Earth (*Ti*) over the many local gods of the soil and of natural objects. By performing the sacrifice of *fêng* and *shan*, Wu Ti stressed his greatness. Possibly with a similar purpose, Wu Ti recognized the existing hierarchy of the gods of heaven who presided over the four cardinal points and the center and superimposed on it a supreme god called *T'ai I*, or the Great One. The general conception of the spiritual organization of the universe as a counterpart of the political organization appears not to have been new. Indeed, it may have come down from Shang times. But by stressing the idea that both halves of the spirit world are monarchial in form and by emphasizing the position of the Emperor as the

head of the cult, the dignity of the visible ruling house was enhanced.

In spite of his statecraft, Wu Ti was much fascinated by the beliefs of the popular religion of the age. Attempts at the transmutation of metals, the search for an elixir of life, efforts to make contact with the immortals who were said to have achieved that state, and the supposed experts in these fields exercised great influence over him.

### THE DECLINE OF THE EARLIER HAN DYNASTY

Of the immediate successors of Wu Ti not much need here be said. For nearly a hundred years the Empire continued without any major event that should detain us in detail. Two or three of the seven monarchs whom this paragraph covers were able and essentially greater than Wu Ti, whose despotism and wars almost ruined his realm. At least one was a patron of literature and encouraged the editing of the ancient classics. The inevitable court intrigues that have been fairly constant factors in Chinese, as in much other, history help to give bulk to the annals of the time. Rebellions there were, too, sometimes within the older sections of the Empire and sometimes in the newly conquered domains. Part of the South that had been annexed under Wu Ti, especially the island of Hainan, was abandoned, on the ground that it cost more to hold than it was worth. To the west the Chinese continued to extend their power. Their influence seems to have been potent even on the northwestern border of India. The Hsiung-nu were defeated again and again, and their chiefs finally acknowledged Chinese suzerainty. Hsiung-nu, too, entered the military service of China. The hereditary principle of succession, however, brought with it weak and dissipated princes, and early in the first century A.D. a crisis arose by which the dynasty was, for a time, displaced.

### WANG MANG

The new threat to the Han was through a family named Wang. One of the Wang daughters became a concubine of the heir apparent who ascended the throne in 48 B.C. Having the good fortune both to win the favor of her lord and to present him with a son, she was made Empress, and her son heir apparent. Upon the death of her spouse, her son became Emperor and she Empress Dowager. Her brothers and others of her kin were given high office and she and her family dominated the state.

Of the male relatives of the Empress Dowager, the most discreet was a nephew, Wang Mang. In contrast with the other influential members of his family, he was said to have been distinguished for his scholarship, his patronage of learning, his filial piety, and his temperate living. While the others were dissipated and extravagant, he is reported to have lived with

marked frugality and to have distributed nearly all his great income among his poor friends and followers. While still in his thirties he became the most powerful figure in the Empire.

The Empress Dowager's son was on the throne for about a quarter of a century, long enough for the Wang family to establish itself firmly. He, however, left no heir, and the nephew who succeeded him (6 B.C.) brought with him his own mother's relatives, and the Wang family was temporarily eclipsed. The new Emperor proved a debauchee, and when, after a brief reign, he was gathered to his fathers (A.D. 1), the Wang family reasserted itself and Wang Mang was made regent of the new Emperor, a boy of eight years.

Wang Mang now became more popular and powerful than ever. He maintained his simple manner of life, gave the government vast sums for distribution among the poor, founded a national university, and gathered scholars from all over the land. The boy Emperor died A.D. 5, poisoned, so rumor declared, by the Wang family for showing too much independence. An infant was placed on the throne, and Wang Mang was made Acting Emperor. Shortly, A.D. 8, Wang Mang, with great show of reluctance, deposed the puppet and declared himself in name what he had been in fact. He took the title of Huang Ti, "Emperor," and called the dynasty which he believed he was establishing by the name of Hsin.

For more than a century an occasional voice had been raised in high places in protest against some of the obvious injustices of the times. Much of the land was held in great estates, and high rentals were charged the luckless cultivators. These estates tended to be tax-exempt, and that privilege reduced the revenues of the central government. Slaves, too, were cruelly treated. Masters had the power of life or death over them and not infrequently exercised it. Over these and other inequalities some of the educated evinced marked concern. Thus they were true to what had been, at least since the middle of the Chou dynasty, one of the characteristics of much of Chinese scholarship at its best, devotion to the welfare of the populace. Wang Mang, who had long been surrounding himself with scholars among whom were doubtless many social idealists, endeavored to put into operation some of the suggested reforms, and in so doing became one of the most interesting figures in China's history.

In the very first year of his reign, Wang Mang attempted a sweeping agrarian reorganization of the Empire. He reduced in size the huge estates and endeavored to annul their tax exemption which was depriving the central government of needed revenue. He abolished slavery. The purchase and the sale of land and retainers were forbidden. The confiscated land was to be divided and given to the cultivators. By taxing them, he could relieve the financial situation of his regime. To this wholesale and startling revolution he added others. He re-enacted the imperial monopolies of salt,

iron, and coinage—although he had wished to abolish the first two and preserved them only because he needed the revenue—and added to them wine and mines. He reorganized the currency, introducing, in place of a coin of only one value, tokens of several denominations. At least some of these were given archaic forms. By this device he debased the currency. He also attempted to have the state fix prices at equitable figures, thus protecting the farmers against the merchants. By continuing the policy, which appeared before under the Han, of having the state enter the market, buying up surplus stocks of goods in times of plenty and selling them in times of dearth, he further attempted to equalize prices. He provided for state loans, on which no interest was to be charged, to those needing them for funeral and sacrificial purposes, and for the advance of funds, at a moderate rate of interest, to those requiring them for productive enterprises. He sought to revive some of the political institutions and offices of the Chou period.

An interesting accompaniment of the reforms was an emphasis on the study of ancient literature. A distinguished scholar, Liu Hsin (who died A.D. 22), is particularly noted for having sought out and edited ancient texts. Because of his zeal in his chosen task and a famous catalogue of ancient works prepared by him, he is sometimes denominated China's first bibliographer. All later Chinese scholarship owes him an incalculable debt.

Wang Mang's literary entourage has been accused by some Chinese scholars of deliberately forging, in support of his contentions, important books and parts of books commonly ascribed to the Chou dynasty. The *Chou Li*, the *Tso Chuan*, portions of the *Shu Ching*, and one of the commentaries of the *Shih Ching* are among the works said thus to have been falsified. The theory is not proved to the satisfaction of all experts, but it has won many supporters, and some parts of it are usually accepted as substantiated.

Wang Mang stimulated the study of the Confucian canon, even though he may have modified it. He built dormitories for students in the imperial university and encouraged education. He paid marked honors to Confucius—repairing his temple, granting him a posthumous title, and ennobling one of his descendants. All this he may have done to obtain the support of the powerful Confucian scholar class.

So complete a reorganization as that effected by Wang Mang inevitably met serious opposition. The wealthy and the powerful were almost all against it. The law against the purchase and sale of land and slaves had to be repealed at the end of three years, although a later decree penalized slave owners with heavy taxes. Insurrections broke out. The unrest was augmented by disastrous floods caused by a change in the course of the Huang Ho. Many impoverished by the floods turned bandit. Members of the Liu family, taking advantage of the general unrest, raised their

standard against the usurper. Other malcontents gathered into bands of brigands. Some of them, called the Red Eyebrows, became very formidable. Subject peoples on the frontier took the opportunity offered by the weakness of the Empire to throw off the Chinese yoke. Although, in the earlier years of his rule, Wang Mang had vigorously maintained Chinese prestige in the far Northwest, the Hsiung-nu, rebelling against his effort to reduce their ruler from the status of Emperor to that of a subject noble, overran some of the Northern provinces, and Chinese outposts in the Tarim basin had to be abandoned. In the South, what was later Tongking refused to acknowledge his rule and many adherents of the Han took refuge there. Wang Mang was killed in his capital, Ch'angan (A.D. 23), and his dynasty and his innovations crumbled.

## THE LATER OR EASTERN HAN DYNASTY

One of the most vigorous of those bearing the Liu name placed himself on the vacant throne. The name of Han was continued. However, the capital was moved eastward, to Loyang, in the present province of Honan, and from this point the dynasty is denominated by historians the Eastern or Later Han (in Chinese *Tung Han* or *Hou Han*).

The first of the Later Han, known as Kuang Wu Ti, spent much of his reign in restoring internal order to the Empire and in reasserting the authority of the Chinese over the outlying tributary states. The bandits, especially the Red Eyebrows, who had sprung up during the later years of Wang Mang, gave him trouble. However, he proved himself equal to the task. In his reign of more than thirty years he brought back to the Middle Kingdom a measure of domestic peace. Partly because the civil wars had reduced the tax-free estates, he was able to improve the financial situation of the central government. He made the Chinese name once more feared abroad. The former possessions of the Ch'in and the Han in the delta of the Red River and along the coast of what was later Annam were reconquered by the general Ma Yüan. This region, which previously had been permitted to retain its old customs, was now Sinicized. The native mores were gradually but surely eradicated, schools of the Chinese type were founded, and Chinese letters and social and political rites and institutions became dominant. The cultural transformation and administrative unity under the Later Han prepared the way for the future Annamite state and civilization. Under the Later Han, a large proportion of the southeast portions of China proper was assimilated to Chinese culture. In the Northwest and in what is now Sinkiang, Kuang Wu Ti began the process of reestablishing Chinese suzerainty. He retained the administrative organization of the Western Han, and, indeed, this persisted until the later years of the dynasty. Like several others of his line, moreover, Kuang Wu Ti

was not only a warrior, but also a patron of Confucian culture. A man of education, he enjoyed surrounding himself with scholars and founded a higher school at his capital. It was a revivified Empire which he passed on to his successor, Ming Ti.

The political history of the next century and a half need detain us but very briefly. A succession of Emperors, none of them especially noteworthy, perpetuated the Han line. Several of them at their accession were infants and most of the others came to the throne in their teens. The immaturity of the rulers encouraged court intrigues, and the power of the women of the palace and the influence of the eunuchs increased. With such feeble leadership, the house of Liu was obviously nearing its end. Confucian scholars persistently protested against the eunuchs and the abuses in government. At times their efforts were effective, but they could not long retard the decay. Toward the close of the second century the eunuchs were strong enough to take heavy toll from among their adversaries. Great landed estates again mounted and paid only a fraction of the cost of the central government. The burden of taxation on peasants not in these estates proved intolerable. The capital was flooded with refugees living on relief. Insurrections broke out. Bands called the Yellow Turbans made themselves particularly obnoxious. The Yellow Turbans were a Taoist sect, and in a certain sense the downfall of the Han was due to a Taoist revolt against the Confucianism dominant in the bureaucracy.

The army asserted itself at court to control the eunuchs. Toward the close of the second century, a general, Tung Cho, made himself master of the Emperors, supplanting one boy puppet by another. Tung Cho burned the capital, Loyang (A.D. 190), and established himself and the futile monarch at Ch'angan. For two years he ruled with a high hand, ruthlessly crushing all opposition and giving a show of legality to his acts by declaring that they were performed in the name of the Emperor. The country did not accept him quietly. Jealous rivals formed a coalition against him, and he was assassinated (A.D. 192) by one of his own lieutenants, an adopted son.

The struggle for power continued until Ts'ao Ts'ao, the son of the adopted son of a former chief eunuch, and an extraordinarily able but utterly unscrupulous and extremely crafty man, made himself supreme at court. The boy whom Tung Cho had placed on the throne was shorn of more and more of his prerogatives, but was allowed to retain the title of Emperor, until, A.D. 220, on Ts'ao Ts'ao's death, he was persuaded to cede the throne to Ts'ao Ts'ao's son, Ts'ao P'ei. Ts'ao P'ei founded a new dynasty, the Wei. A member of the Liu family professed to carry on the Han dynasty in what is now Szechwan. The main line of the Han, however, had come to an end. The actors in the drama were probably quite unaware of it, but a great period in the development of the Chinese nation had

closed and the Middle Kingdom was entering another era of marked transition.

One phase of the activity of the Later Han must, because of its cultural consequences, be gone into with more detail than the brief summary in the last four paragraphs has permitted. The generals of the Later Han maintained and even strengthened Chinese might on the far western frontiers in what is now Sinkiang, and so kept open the overland routes to the West. The Hsiung-nu, to the immediate north and west, continued to be a menace and could never long be ignored. But they were not united and so were less formidable than earlier. Connections with the Yüeh-chih were kept up, although with at least one rift in the friendship, and the petty states in the later Sinkiang, centering around such oases as the present Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, and Turfan, became tributary to China as a protection against the common enemy, the Hsiung-nu. The fact that at least the ruling classes in most—and possibly all—of these states were Iranian, and the Hsiung-nu of a very different race, may have been an added incentive to seek Chinese assistance.

Under Ming Ti the Hsiung-nu who had invaded what is now Kansu were crushed and the Chinese took possession of the present Hami, west of Kansu. This helped to revive Chinese prestige in the distant West, and some of the states in that region renewed their tributary connection with the Han. Chinese officials were soon appointed to supervise the subordinate principalities.

The most famous of the Chinese agents in the far West was Pan Ch'ao (A.D. 32-102). Although the scion of a family noted for its literary accomplishments, brother of Pan Ku, the great historian, and of Pan Chao, China's most distinguished woman of letters, he was more a man of action than a scholar. Weary of literary employment and petty official appointment at the capital, which barely kept the wolf from the door, he determined to seek adventure and renown on the frontier. There he displayed such daring and ability that before many years he was the leading Chinese official on the Central Asiatic edges of the Empire. He extended the Chinese power in what is now the western portion of Sinkiang. The little states here often proved recalcitrant and Pan Ch'ao's life was one of fairly constant fighting. He made Chinese power feared even farther west, across the mountains, in territories which are now Russian, and one of his diplomatic agents reached the shores of the Persian Gulf. In his late sixties, worn out, Pan Ch'ao sought and obtained the Emperor's permission to retire, but died not long after his arrival at court.

The distant posts held by Pan Ch'ao were not easily retained. A son succeeded him in his command and seems to have had fair success. However, we read of repeated revolts of the subject states, of attacks of Tibetans on Chinese outposts, and of complaints at court at the cost of the military

undertakings involved. Before many years the Han began retrenchment. Retreat was not steady or uninterrupted. At least once again, led by Pan Yung, another son of Pan Ch'ao, the soldiers of the Han were seen in the oases at the foot of the mountains that separate the present Sinkiang from India and Central Asia, and Chinese influence appears to have been strong there until at least the second half of the second century. For years Chinese garrisons held points in what is now western Kansu. Modern archaeology has shown that the frontier wall built west of Tunhuang toward the close of the second century B.C. was held by Chinese garrisons until the middle of the second century A.D. It was only when the increasing impotence of the Han monarchs made it difficult to maintain order even at home that these were withdrawn.

One object of all this costly military activity seems to have been to keep open the trade routes to the West. The present names of the cities and oases for which the Han strove—Hami, Aksu, Kashgar, Turfan, Khotan—indicate to any one at all familiar with the caravan routes that the Chinese were attempting to control and make safe the long roads by which their commerce passed to and from the cultural centers in the other parts of Asia.

## FOREIGN TRADE UNDER THE HAN

Under the Han the natural barriers which tend to separate China from the rest of the world were being overcome by both Chinese and foreigners. The era was one which favored commerce. Not only had the Han brought prosperity and territorial expansion to China, but elsewhere powerful states were an assistance to trade. In what is now Northwest India and Afghanistan some of the Yüeh-chih had established a kingdom under the Kushan dynasty. The Parthian Empire occupied most of what is now Iran and the region immediately north of it, and in its cities Greek merchants were to be found, deposits of that eastern wave of Hellenic culture which had come with the conquests of Alexander and was only slowly subsiding. Since the last century or so of the Chou, states with Greek rulers and with strikingly Greek features had borne witness to those conquests on their Indian and Central Asian frontiers. Still farther west the Romans were unifying the Mediterranean world. In what is now the southern part of European Russia were various divisions of the Sarmatians, and here, too, on the shores of the Black Sea, were Greek cities, centers of trade. Throughout much of Asia commerce was more extensive than it had ever been. Merchants passed across Central Asia into China by routes which skirted the northern and the southern slopes of the Tarim River basin. They also came to the Han Empire by way of the South—by the sea route to the south coast. For a time the main port in the South was in

the future Tongking, then under the control of the Han. It was not until later centuries that it was supplanted by Canton.

China's commercial contacts with the peoples on her far western frontiers were, when the distance is considered, fairly extensive. The Han knew the Yüeh-chih and the Parthians, not only by trade but also by political embassies. It seems probable that merchants from India and Ceylon found their way to China by the south. The Chinese, moreover, were aware of at least the eastern portion of the Roman Empire, calling it Ta Ch'in. With the Mediterranean world they had little, if any, direct contact. Traders from the West were regularly reaching India. When, about the first century B.C. or the first century A.D., they learned to take advantage of the monsoon to make the voyage across the Indian Ocean from the Red Sea, the commerce became extensive and important and was to continue so for several centuries. Few travelers from the Mediterranean world seem to have gone beyond India and Ceylon, although the Romans and Greeks heard vaguely of China. In A.D. 120 jugglers, sent with an embassy of one of the states on China's southern border, arrived at Loyang and professed to come from west of the sea, a region which they declared to be the same as Ta Ch'in. In A.D. 166, merchants from Ta Ch'in reached Loyang and claimed to be an embassy from their king, who is supposed to have been the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Aside from these somewhat dubious instances, we do not hear specifically of any representatives of the Mediterranean world penetrating China, although some may have done so. Moreover, we are not sure that Chinese journeyed as far west as the Roman Empire, even though the Chinese historical records of the time give a description of Ta Ch'in which may have been derived from eyewitnesses. The envoy whom Pan Ch'ao sent—possibly with the hope of opening communication with Ta Ch'in without the intermediation of the Parthians, who, as enemies of the Romans, would not be especially eager to promote direct trade relations between China and Rome—succeeded only, as we have seen, in reaching the Persian Gulf.

The commodities exchanged through this commerce were, naturally, those which combined small bulk and weight with high value. The chief Chinese export appears to have been silk—in its raw form, as thread, and as cloth. We hear repeatedly of it, and specimens of it in the form in which it was shipped have been found, preserved through centuries by the dry desert air, near the western end of the wall which the Han built to protect the overland routes. Skins, furs, rhubarb, and cinnamon are also said to have been among the merchandise which the Chinese sent westward and which eventually reached the Mediterranean world. The Middle Kingdom received in return glass, jade (although most of that used under the Han was of domestic origin), horses, precious stones (including the diamond), ivory, tortoise shell, pearls, asbestos (either now or a little later), and some fine cloths of wool and linen.

### CROSS-FERTILIZATION OF CULTURES THROUGH THE COMMERCE OF THE HAN

Commerce inevitably resulted in reciprocal cultural influences. There was an interchange in art and commerce over a vast area reaching from north of the Black Sea into China. Its full extent we shall probably never know. At best our information is fragmentary. One small example of what must have been taking place over much of this wide region has come to light in excavated tombs in Outer Mongolia. These sepulchers, supposed to date from about the beginning of the Christian Era, contained pottery, several kinds of cloths, and a variety of objects in stone and metal. The artistic designs were derived from Greek, Chinese, Sarmatian, Scytho-Siberian (Yüeh-chih), Persian, Babylonian, and Assyrian sources. If this was true here, quite off the main trade routes, an admixture must have occurred along the chief arteries of commerce. Discoveries in the Tarim basin have revealed the presence of various cultural influences in Han times. Excavations in southern Korea in tombs possibly of a post-Han date have disclosed fragments of Roman glass goblets.

China, we know, had some effect upon the cultures of other peoples. Many Chinese joined themselves to the Hsiung-nu—a migration stimulated by the grim practice of the Chinese Emperors of executing generals and envoys who were unsuccessful against the enemy. These, as well as merchants, must have spread Chinese ideas and manners among the "barbarians." Silk, we have seen, went from China to the countries of central and western Asia and to Rome, and the peach and the apricot, of Chinese origin, reached Rome by the first century A.D. China, too, began to exert a marked influence on Tongking and Korea, and the Japanese had contacts with her.

Very notable was the effect of foreign intercourse upon China. Many of its ramifications are obscure or perhaps entirely hidden, but we are aware of it in the fields of art and religion. Chinese bronzes now add to the rather stiff, symbolic, and predominantly geometrical designs of the Chou, forms radically new to China. The production of bronze objects declined from the high standards set in the Shang and Chou eras, but bronze mirrors were common. Stone sculptures, preserved in tombs, display the tendencies. Figures of men, heretofore rare, appear, scenes of daily life are portrayed, attempts are made to picture the spirit world, and the whole is full of action. The stone sculptures themselves were an innovation. We might believe these novelties a creation of the Chinese genius, stimulated by the vigor of the Han culture—as, indeed, they probably in large part were—but for the appearance of motives which we know to be foreign: some of them Greek, some Sarmatian, and some probably Iranian and Babylonian. Beautiful lacquer objects were produced under

state inspection, as we learn from archaeological finds in a Chinese colony in Korea. Indeed, lacquer appears to have been very popular, for widely scattered examples of it have been found. Whether it was indebted to foreign influences we do not know. It is possible that the Chinese derived some musical ideas from the Greeks and some notions of alchemy—although in the latter case the transfer may (not very probably) have been in the other direction. Other plants than those we have mentioned may have been brought in. It has been conjectured that some ideas of Greek medicine and mathematics entered and that the calendar was affected. Certainly Chinese ideas of geography and of the extent of the world were enlarged.

## THE INTRODUCTION OF BUDDHISM

In religion there was the introduction of what later became one of the major factors in Chinese life, Buddhism. Buddhism had begun that expansion which eventually made it one of the most widespread and potent of faiths. It had originated as an offshoot—a heresy—of older Indian religion, probably in the sixth century B.C. Its founder, of an aristocratic family, had become oppressed by the suffering of life, and abandoning his position and his family, as so many others in India have done through the ages, had sought a solution of the problem of evil. Seeing the pain which appears to be an inevitable concomitant of consciousness, and believing, as his contemporaries did, in the transmigration of souls —that physical death is not an escape from suffering, but simply ushers in a new stage of existence which also is marked by anguish—the salvation which he sought was a way of getting rid of pain, a means of breaking the endless round of rebirths. He tried earnestly the several roads recommended by the philosophers and religious experts of the India of his time, but to no avail. Finally, when all these had failed him, and in despair he was sitting in meditation under a tree, the answer flashed into his mind and he became the Buddha, the "Enlightened." It was one of those revolutionary experiences which change the course of history. Having found for himself the secret of release, of inward peace, and of freedom from pain, the Buddha spent the rest of a long life in teaching it to others.

There is no space here to go into the Buddha's precepts in any detail. He summarized them under the "four truths"—that life and suffering are inseparable, that suffering is due to desire or thirst, that to get rid of suffering one must be emancipated from desire, and that the way to freedom from desire is the "eightfold path." The eightfold path included right views (seeing life as it really is, always changing and with no abiding entity which can be called soul), right aspirations, right meditation, and right actions. He inculcated self-forgetfulness and kindly service, although with

no passionate attachment to any one or any thing. The goal, of course, is the extinction of desire and so the end of pain—*nirvana.*

The Buddha's teaching was alien to Chinese thought; the mental and spiritual world in which he lived differed from that of the Middle Kingdom. His system had as its object escape from existence, which he regarded as evil. Here and there were Chinese pessimists, but the majority of China's thinkers regarded life as worth living. They were optimistic about human nature. They deemed it either good to begin with, or if innately bad, improvable. Some of them sought the indefinite prolongation of life. If they troubled themselves at all about the state of the dead, it was to seek to make the ancestors happy and to obtain their blessing upon their descendants. Most philosophers were absorbed in the problem of bettering existing human society. To be sure, Buddhism had some things in common with such ancient Chinese thinkers as Hsün Tzŭ. The belief in the reign of law in the universe and retribution according to strict justice were akin to the Indian conception of *karma* which Buddhism inherited. The more thoughtful among the Taoists, too, with their sympathy with meditation and their suspicion that the physical world, including the *ego,* might prove an illusion, were somewhat in accord with Buddhist aspirations. Even here the similarity was by no means complete. Yet, as we shall see, Buddhism was to have some of its greatest triumphs in China and was to persist there after it had all but disappeared from the land of its birth.

After the Buddha's death, his teachings continued to spread, although at first rather slowly. In the second century B.C., under Menander, a Greek who hewed out a principality for himself in the wake of the armies of Alexander the Great, and whose domains were in Bactria, northwest of India, and in India itself, Buddhism prospered. In the second century A.D., Kanishka, the powerful (Kushan) monarch of the branch of the Yüeh-chih who ruled in what is now Northwest India and Afghanistan, became a devoted patron of the faith. Thus Buddhism was prominent in some of those countries with which the Chinese were establishing contacts through the westward expansion and commerce of the Han. It is not strange that Buddhism, an enthusiastically missionary faith, now made its appearance in the Middle Kingdom.

In the course of its spread, Buddhism, like all great faiths, developed schools of thought. The chief divisions are known as Mahayana and Hinayana, the "Greater Vehicle" and the "Lesser Vehicle." Mahayana, sometimes called Northern Buddhism, exalts the *bodhisattva,* one who, with *nirvana* within his grasp, postpones entrance into it and is born and reborn until he can make possible the salvation of all living beings. Prayer and worship were absent from the Buddha's teachings, for he believed that each must work out his own salvation unaided by divine beings, who, like

men, are still subject to rebirth and so are unsaved. They crept back into Mahayana, however. Hinayana, sometimes denominated Southern Buddhism, insists that the ideal of the Mahayanist is unattainable and is untrue to the teachings of the Buddha, and emphasizes the *arhat,* the one who has found enlightenment for himself. Both Mahayana and Hinayana were in Northwest India in these centuries, and it was only gradually that the former prevailed in the North and the latter in the South.

Just when and by what route Buddhism first made its way to China remains uncertain. The story often told, that its introduction was associated with a dream of Ming Ti, the second Emperor of the Eastern Han, is an invention of later years. The foreign religion was already in China at the time that Ming Ti is said to have had his dream. The first Buddhists in China seem to have been foreigners who journeyed by the trade routes across the later Sinkiang. Some may have come to the South by the sea. We know that as early as the first century A.D. Buddhist monks and laymen were living in China under the protection of a brother of the Emperor. We hear of the erection of a Buddhist temple in a city in the present Kiangsu, in A.D. 191. We know, too, that from the first half of the second century to the beginning of the third century of the Christian Era Buddhist communities were to be found in Loyang. One of the missionaries was a Parthian prince, known in Chinese as An-shih-kao, who had renounced the succession to become a monk. With a compatriot and a Chinese, he formed a group which translated Buddhist literature into Chinese. By the end of the Later Han, centers of Buddhist activity existed in several places in the North and in the lower valley of the Yangtze.

Early Buddhist missionaries were welcomed by some of the Taoists, and were for a time popularly regarded as Taoists. As such, their faith did not seem so very alien to the Chinese. Han Buddhism was a combination of that faith and Taoism. But not until after the downfall of the Han was Buddhism to experience its phenomenal growth.

## OTHER CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE HAN

The Han dynasty was notable not only for importations from alien civilizations but also for marked developments in the native culture, seemingly independent of stimulus from the outside.

The most noteworthy were in the realm of thought and literature. The dynasty was distinguished for the achievements of its scholars. It was not an age of creative or original philosophic thought. To be sure, the schools of the Chou were remembered and many of their writings were preserved and carefully studied. The followers of Mo Ti were active and retained their separate existence at least as late as the first century B.C. Two of the schools, Taoism and Confucianism, continued to be especially strong throughout the Han.

Taoism was often popular at court. Indeed, one of its greatest exponents was a grandson of Kao Tsu—Liu An, commonly known as Huai-nan Tzŭ—who, like so many of the time, sought for endless life and a means to the transmutation of metals. Perhaps he should not be classed with the Taoists, for he sought to construct a syncretic philosophy made up of elements from all the main schools of thought. Implicated in a political plot, he committed suicide, but popular tradition declared that he discovered the elixir of life, drank of it, and rising to heaven, became an Immortal. In A.D. 163 an Emperor made official offerings at the supposed birthplace of Lao Tzŭ and the following year built a temple to him in the capital and used there in his honor the ritual employed in the imperial sacrifices to Heaven. It was in the Later Han that Chang Tao-ling, or Chang Ling, traditionally the first head of the Taoist organization, is said to have lived. Chang Tao-ling led the sect called "Five-Bushel-Rice Taoists" (from the fact that each convert was taxed that amount). Toward the close of the second century A.D. the Chang family, supported by this sect, rebelled and for some years created an independent state in the present Szechwan and Shensi, governing through a Taoist priesthood. Out of the sect arose much of the later popular Taoism. The so-called Taoist Papacy which persisted into the twentieth century was kept in the Chang family.

Confucianism, in a modified form, was more and more espoused by the state. We have seen that the earliest rulers of the dynasty were somewhat lukewarm toward it but were forced by the exigencies of their position to show it some favor. It will also be remembered that as time passed, the attitude of succeeding monarchs became more encouraging. Confucian writings were made the chief subjects of study in the schools and formed the basis of the examinations through which men of ability were recruited for the civil service. The prominence of Confucianism increased under Wang Mang and the Later Han. Under the Earlier Han the cult of Confucius seems to have been maintained only as were those of other ancestors, by his lineal descendants, although occasional Emperors honored his memory. Under the Later Han (A.D. 59) sacrifices in honor of Confucius and Chou Kung were decreed in all the schools in large cities. In the first century A.D. official texts of the Classics were ordered established. By imperial command (A.D. 175) these were engraved on stone and placed outside the state academy in the capital. By this time the Confucian scholars were very powerful in the state. They attracted many disciples, and their leaders formed a kind of ruling group, which they sought to perpetuate by marriage alliances among their children. Between A.D. 175 and A.D. 179 a violent reaction against them, led by the palace eunuchs, killed many of their number. Although during the brief remaining course of the dynasty they did not regain their former influence, the Confucian tradition was by that time too firmly established to disappear, and whatever the bias of individual rulers—often Taoist or Buddhist—the state was henceforth

built on what were largely (but by no means entirely) Confucian principles. This official Han Confucianism, it will be recalled, was in many respects quite different from that of the Sage and his immediate disciples and was influenced by Taoism, Mo Ti and his followers, and the Legalist School.

Why Confucianism should have been selected from among its rivals for imperial favor must be in part a matter of conjecture. Although his religious views seem to have made a deep impress upon both Confucianism and Taoism, Mo Ti's statecraft was probably held to be impracticable. The Taoist political theories may have been too incompatible with the complex civilization which was developing. The severe reaction against the thoroughgoing application of Legalist principles by Shih Huang Ti discredited that school. Legalist ideas continued to be potent. But in theory it was Confucianism that prevailed. The ritualism advocated by the Confucian school provided the forms for the type of civilized life to which the Chinese were traditionally accustomed. Moreover, they enhanced the prestige of the Emperor, a result that commended itself to the Han monarchs.

At the risk of being wearisome, it must be repeated that the Chinese state system of the Han and succeeding dynasties owed a debt not only to Confucianism but to others of the schools of the Chou. In it were elements traceable to the Legalists, the Taoists, and the Mohists. The Confucianism of the Later Han was in many respects a syncretic product to which all of the major schools of the Chou contributed.

In establishing this composite Confucianism as the leading philosophy of the state, and in making its texts the subject of study in the schools of the Empire and the basis of civil service examinations, the Han monarchs were promoting the cultural unity of their domains. The very syncretism which so characterized the Han—as contrasted with the distinct philosophic divisions of Chou times—both reflected and contributed to the political and cultural imperial structure now achieved. The Han not only welded China into a political Empire. They founded its solidarity upon a more lasting basis, that of one civilization and theory of life. It was this basis of union which China was never completely to lose and which was to hold her together in spirit even in the long periods when administratively she was divided. Even the Communists, while rejecting Confucianism, stoutly held to the principle of union founded on an officially inculcated ideology.

Independent speculation tended to die out. One of the thinkers who stood out prominently in the memory of later generations was Wang Ch'ung, of the first century A.D. An eclectic and a skeptic, influenced by both Taoism and Confucianism and yet not blindly enamored of either, he reacted against much of the current Confucianism. He held that man is not as important as Han Confucianists declared him to be, that natural phenomena and catastrophes are not the result of man's acts, and that such

events as a human birth are accidental and not the purposive deeds of the universe. He criticized Confucius and Mencius, expressed doubts about the reliability of much of the ancient literature, argued against immortality and the existence of any spirit, and made much of the *yin* and the *yang*. He was, moreover, a determinist, contending that man's lot is fixed by blind fate. Even Wang Ch'ung was not as original as were many of the Chou era, and most of his cardinal ideas had been held before him. Yang Hsiung, a contemporary and minister of Wang Mang, held that the nature of man, one of the moot points of Chinese philosophy, is a mixture of good and bad, and that each becomes what instruction and practice make him. He, too, however, was clearly not striking out on particularly new lines and was a devoted Confucianist.

Some reasons for the decline of originality seem fairly clear. One was the stern repressive measures of Shih Huang Ti. Another was probably the encouragement given under the Han by the state, now a unified empire, to Confucianism and Taoism. As time passed, official preferment and social distinction were more and more gained through adherence to one of these other two schools. After the establishment of Confucianism as the official orthodoxy, the study of the members of the educated class was confined chiefly to the works esteemed by that school. The range of reading, and with it of thought, narrowed. Gone were the days of the Chou, when in the variety of principalities, diversities of culture were possible and even encouraged. The Emperors, to insure the political unity for which they strove, were promoting cultural uniformity. The time had passed when wandering and original scholars knew that if they and their theories were rejected at one court they would stand a chance of being accepted at another. Philosophic orthodoxy was the price which China paid for political integrity.

A good many religious developments occurred under the Han. In addition to the introduction of Buddhism and the changes in Confucianism and Taoism, other innovations were made. For instance, the worship of great men of the past was introduced and became part of the state cult. It appears to have begun with Hui Ti, who commanded that a temple be erected to his father, Kao Tsu, in each district and that sacrifices be offered at stated intervals. This was a manifest aid to unifying the Empire and perpetuating the Han rule. By the Later Han it became customary to offer sacrifices to the memory not only of Confucius but also of other distinguished men. Zoroastrianism came in and prospered for a time.

The energy of China's intellectuals, instead of seeking an outlet in formulating novel ideas, went largely into historical and literary studies. The surviving books of the Chou dynasty were carefully collected and edited. Among those having a large part in this work were two scions of the imperial family, Liu Hsiang and Liu Hsin, father and son, of the first

century B.C. and the first century A.D. Liu Hsiang was a writer of note, with a finely polished prose style, who was markedly influenced by Taoism. Liu Hsin has already been noted. In the course of the Han, thirteen of the ancient works were set up as canonical—the *I Ching,* the *Shu Ching,* the *Shih Ching,* three versions of the *Ch'un Ch'iu* with three different commentaries on it, the *Li Chi,* the *Chou Li,* the *I Li,* the *Hsiao Ching,* the *Lün Yü,* the *Êrh Ya,* and the *Mêng Tzŭ Shu.* The *Êrh Ya,* it may be noted, is often called the oldest Chinese dictionary, although considerable parts of it are at least as recent as the third century B.C.

Editorial work was especially needed, for inventions in writing materials and the new forms of the characters encouraged by them were fast making the older script intelligible only to the expert. Wooden and bamboo tablets gave place to silk fabrics, and in the Later Han, to paper. The traditional date for the first manufacture of paper, A.D. 102 or 105, is only approximate, and the new material must have grown out of many tentative experiments. However, examples of true paper dating from the Han and fabricated from the bark of the mulberry tree, from hemp, and from rags, have been discovered and show what was taking place. With the new material, new forms of the characters came into common use and displaced the old. Li Ssŭ, the great minister of Shih Huang Ti, is credited with having developed, as we have seen, probably out of the form current in the state of Ch'in, a script which he and his master tried to make universal. The new styles then developed, it may be noted, were to persist; documents dating from the Han have forms of the characters which differ little from those in use today. In the second century A.D. the classics were engraved on stone slabs. From these slabs they could be reproduced by rubbings on paper, a technique which was in use by this time. It must be added that the invention of so perishable a writing material as paper some centuries before printing, made possible the rapid and cheap multiplication of books. But it was not without its disadvantages, for practically no manuscripts of early date have come down to us.

The preservation of the early literature was complicated by the disasters which civil strife brought upon the libraries of the time. When the capital was sacked at the end of the Ch'in, when more destruction overtook the palaces at the overthrow of Wang Mang, and again in the turmoil that accompanied the end of the Later Han, quantities of books were destroyed —probably, all told, a very much more extensive loss than the "burning of the books" by Shih Huang Ti. The result is that works which now purport to have been handed down through and from the Han undoubtedly contain many mistakes and have suffered alterations.

As we have seen, histories were being written. Pan Piao, the father of Pan Ch'ao, began a continuation of Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien's great work. This was completed by his son, Pan Ku—who was also something of a philosopher—

and by his gifted daughter, Pan Chao, and is known as the *Ch'ien Han Shu,* or Book of the Former Han. Pan Chao, it may be noted, was not only a historian, but a poetess, an essayist, and a novelist. Her advice to young women was to remain a model almost to our own day. The *Ch'ien Han Shu* was based, in part indirectly, upon the official documents of the Earlier Han. However, since many of these had been destroyed in the domestic strife at the end of that period and before the establishment of the Later Han, the authors had to depend chiefly on a later source.

Among dictionaries the *Shuo Wên* was compiled (under the Later Han) and is still a source of information (although now largely superseded by archaeological finds) for early Chinese forms. Many commentaries on the Chou literature were written embodying the views of the Han scholars, some of them at variance with the teachings of the original texts.

A new prose style was developed. It was simple, and while not identical with the vernacular, in grammar and construction largely conformed to it. It is still admired for its vigor and clarity.

Poetry also flourished, although none of its authors attained the distinction of the greatest of their successors of later dynasties. Much of the verse of the Han was influenced by the literary traditions of the state of Ch'u. These differed decidedly from the restrained classicism of the North and had a pronounced romanticism, an exuberant vocabulary, and rather wild fancifulness. Incidentally, the painting of the Han seems also to have been molded in part by Ch'u ideals. Chang Hêng, the first Chinese painter of whom we know much, a contemporary of Wang Ch'ung, was as well an astronomer, a mathematician, and a poet.

Han art and architecture had marked developments. Surviving examples of art are seen in vivid scenes of contemporary life incised on the walls of tombs and in pottery figures buried with the dead. Since buildings made large use of wood, complete examples have not come down to us, but from what is described in poetry and prose and is depicted in tombs and in small clay models prepared to accompany the dead to the spirit world, we learn something of the architecture of the age. The portrayal of men and animals was often with a pulsing vigor, which seems to have characterized much of the age. In ceramics a protoporcelain was seen.

Advances were registered in mechanics and science. Water clocks, gnomons, and sundials were devised. Sun spots were observed and regularly recorded. Instruments were created to observe the ecliptic and to measure its obliquity. The moon's orbit was noted as being elliptical. The solar year was determined with a near approach to accuracy. A seismograph was invented. A calendar was devised which in its main features persisted into the twentieth century.

Mathematics included arithmetic, algebra, mensuration, and such features of geometry as the properties of the right-angled triangle.

Maps were made of the Empire and of various sections of the realm.

Most of the preceding pages have concerned themselves with the achievements of the upper classes—the men and women of power and of education. One would like to know what the masses were doing and thinking. Here and there we catch glimpses of them—as in the agrarian reforms which altered their means of livelihood, in sculptures which hint at sports and games (although these may have been chiefly for the aristocracy) and at popular religious cults, and in the pages of Wang Ch'ung, where popular beliefs are described in the process of holding them up to ridicule. On the whole, however, our knowledge is most fragmentary.

## SUMMARY

It was a rich age, that of the Ch'in and the Han. China was, with Rome, the most powerful state on the planet. Its population was not far from that of the Roman Empire at its peak. A census under the Earlier Han reported 59,594,978, presumably of taxable adults, and another, A.D. 105, put the total of the taxable population at 53,256,229. In a land in which there was a local particularism that might later have developed into the type of divisive nationalism so characteristic of Europe, unity had been accomplished and the separatist tendency had been decisively weakened. This, one of the outstanding political achievements in the history of the race, was the work of both the Ch'in and the Han. The former began it and the latter carried it further. The means employed were partly administrative and partly cultural. The cultural theories by which the Ch'in tried to reinforce their organization—those of the Legalists—proved too drastic. It was owing to the genius of the men of Han that the principles chiefly associated with a different school, that of Confucius, were adopted and made to work. A successful combination of administrative machinery with a unifying, practical philosophy of human society proves the greatest of the Han rulers and their advisers to have possessed extraordinary political capacity. Moreover, the territory of the China thus united and made strong was being greatly extended. The Chinese showed that power of assimilating and molding other peoples which has been one of their outstanding characteristics. Chinese culture was penetrating the Yangtze Valley and the south coast. Civilization, too, was developing and being modified—in part by foreign influences. Cities were burgeoning. Wealth was growing. The rich and powerful were erecting huge palaces.

Like all human inventions, the Ch'in-Han system was not without defects. There was a tendency to crush originality: political unity was achieved through enforced cultural uniformity and this latter would be brought about only by stifling the brilliant individualism so characteristic of the disunited Chou. Freedom and progress were sacrificed to the ideal

of domestic peace. Then, too, the system was dependent on a hereditary imperial house. The keystone of the arch was the Emperor. If he was strong, stability was sure. When, however, as is inevitable in the course of any family, weaklings came to the fore, the entire structure suffered.

The downfall of the Han did not entirely undo the work of that dynasty and its predecessor. To the ideas, the literature, and the institutions of the period later generations recurred again and again. Even in recent times the Chinese have proudly called themselves *Han Jên*, "the men of Han." No radically different political system was seriously tried until the twentieth century. The China of the next two millennia had been born. The Chinese Empire had made its appearance.

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CHAPTER FOUR

# A Striking Change: Divisions, Foreign Invasions, and Cultural Innovations from the Close of the Han to the Beginning of the Sui Dynasty (A.D. 220–589)

## INTRODUCTORY

With the end of the Han began a period of civil strife, internal division, and cultural change which lasted for almost four centuries. Non-Chinese peoples on the northern and western frontiers took advantage of the dissensions among the possessors of the fertile and wealthy valleys to the east and south and invaded the land, sometimes setting up regimes which lasted for long periods. The administrative structure erected by the Ch'in and the Han could not be operated for the entire country, and where preserved, was often much weakened. The cultural unity achieved by them was also threatened. Foreign influences, especially Buddhism, wrought striking modifications in the life of the country. Other domestic developments were important. When, at the close of the sixth and the beginning of the seventh century, the Empire once more was brought under one ruling house, Chinese civilization had been strikingly altered from what it had been under the Han.

In many ways the experience of these years resembles that through which the Occident, and especially the Mediterranean world, was then passing. In both regions were political disunion and foreign invasions. In each, important cultural developments were in progress. Between the two great movements an actual connecting link existed in the vast migrations of peoples which characterized them both; it was from Central Asia that some (although by no means all) of the waves which overwhelmed large portions of the Chinese and Roman Empires seem to have originated. The suggestion has been made that common climatic changes lay back

of them—a prolonged period of scanty rainfall in the great steppes and semideserts of Central Asia, which set the nomadic peoples in motion in search of food.

In China, however, the anarchy was not so marked nor were the changes so revolutionary as in the West, and recovery was more rapid. In both regions a new faith was making rapid strides—Christianity in the West and Buddhism in the Middle Kingdom; but Buddhism was not so thoroughly to transform the civilization of China as was Christianity to mold that of the Occident. As, in the Mediterranean area, the Byzantine Empire in the East perpetuated much of the Graeco-Roman world, even more in China purely Chinese states continued in the South the traditions and institutions of the past, and in no great region of the Middle Kingdom does the retrogression toward barbarism appear to have been so marked or so prolonged as in Western Europe during the Dark Ages. In the Occident, the shock was so profound that the unity which was Rome's greatest achievement was never again fully realized over all the area which had once been included in that empire, while in China complete union was again consummated and the territory governed was fully as extensive as under the Han. When, in the sixth and seventh centuries, the Sui and the T'ang brought the Chinese once more together, the culture which was then theirs, while markedly different from that of the Han, was not as much so as was that of the European Middle Ages or the Renaissance from that of the Roman Empire. The China of the Ch'in and the Han more nearly succeeded in surviving the years of disintegration and in impressing itself upon foreign invaders than did the Graeco-Roman world. In its flood tide the T'ang displayed a much richer and more varied civilization than the Western Europe of the same period. From Italy westward, recuperation from the invasions had begun but was not to be accomplished until several centuries after the T'ang.

## THE THREE KINGDOMS (A.D. 211–265)

Following the collapse of the Later Han, for several decades the Empire was divided into three major fragments, and the period, consequently, is known in Chinese records as that of the Three Kingdoms *(San Kuo)*. In the Northeast, as we have seen, Ts'ao P'ei, the son of the distinguished and able but unscrupulous Ts'ao Ts'ao, persuaded the last of the Later Han to abdicate in his favor. Taking the designation of the power which his father had exercised in fact, he called himself Emperor. His dynasty he denominated Wei, assuming the name of a late Chou state. He had possession of the Han capital and what had been the center and the most prosperous parts of China, but only a minority of the Han domains recognized him. In the South, Sun Ch'üan, son of an official and general

of the declining years of the Later Han, declared himself Emperor and gave to his dynasty the name of Wu, after a Chou state in that area. He and his successors controlled most of the former possessions of the Han in the Yangtze Valley east of the gorges and on the south coast into what is now Annam. Wu established its capital first at what is now Wuchang and later at the present Nanking. In Szechwan a member of the Liu family, Liu Pei by name, a descendant of one of the Han Emperors, assumed the imperial title, and his dynasty is called the Minor or Shu Han, Shu being a former designation of the area over which he ruled.

The half-century or so during which these three states existed is one of the most romantic in the history of China. Around it stories of valor and adventure have collected, which have been the source of many plays and popular narratives and of a widely read historical novel, the *San Kuo Chih Yen I,* or Romance of the Three Kingdoms. The most famous heroes of the period are the trio, Liu Pei, Chang Fei, and Kuan Yü, and the premier of the Shu Han, Chu-ko Liang. The first three are said to have become sworn brothers by the "Peach Garden Oath" and are reputed to have performed prodigious deeds of valor. Kuan Yü and Chang Fei perished in 219 and 220 respectively, before the abdication of the last of the Later Han, the one by assassination and the other executed by Sun Ch'üan. Liu Pei died in 223. Centuries afterward, Kuan Yü was canonized as God of War and as such was widely worshipped as the patron of soldiers. Chu-ko Liang, who survived the other three, was noted for his stratagems and his inventions of military machines.

In spite of the personal bravery of the three heroes and the skill of Chu-ko Liang, Shu Han was the first of the three states to disappear. During the lifetime of Chu-ko Liang it seemed to be successful in its wars with Wei, but some years after the death of that statesman, thanks probably to the incapacity of the successor of Liu Pei, it was conquered by its northeastern rival.

The dynasty of the house of Ts'ao did not long survive the end of Shu Han. As Ts'ao Ts'ao and his son first dominated and then deposed their titular masters, the last of the Later Han, so in turn their descendants fell under the control of and eventually were displaced by the family of their chief minister. In 265 Ssŭ-ma Yen, whose father had been premier of Wei, deposed the last of Ts'ao Ts'ao's descendants to bear the title of Emperor and established himself as the first Emperor of a dynasty which he called by the name of Chin (also romanized Tsin and usually denominated the Western Chin or Tsin to distinguish it from its continuing branch, the Eastern Chin). A few years later, in 280, Ssŭ-ma Yen succeeded in overthrowing the ruler of Wu. China was now nominally once more under one monarch.

### THE CHIN (OR TSIN) DYNASTY

Ssŭ-ma Yen managed to hold most of his domains together during his lifetime, and to his court came envoys—or at least so Chinese historians declare—from Ta Ch'in (the Roman Orient) and from distant portions of Central Asia on the extreme edge and even beyond the widest extension of the Han domains. He is known to posterity as Wu Ti, or to distinguish him from the others under different dynasties who had been given that title, Chin Wu Ti.

Ssŭ-ma Yen died A.D. 290 and his descendants soon fell upon evil days. His immediate successor proved incapable of maintaining peace, but, feeble and mentally incompetent, was largely under the control of a vigorous and unscrupulous wife. Civil strife ensued, chiefly among members of the imperial family. Non-Chinese peoples took advantage of the situation to extend their conquests in Chinese territory. The house of Ssŭ-ma Yen was unable to compose its differences and present a united front against the invaders, and in 316 the grandson of Wu Ti and the fourth Emperor of the line surrendered to one of the barbarian chiefs, abdicated, and shortly afterward was put to death.

### AN ERA OF DIVISION: THE CHINESE STATES OF THE SOUTH

Now came many decades of division. In the Yangtze Valley princes of Chinese blood ruled, and their domains extended along the south coast. Occasionally they pressed their boundaries northward beyond the confines of the basin of the Yangtze. In the North non-Chinese peoples established states. They usually adopted Chinese culture and their leaders often aspired to the title of Emperor. The time was one of great confusion, but the reader may be helped to see its main features by an outline —first, of the chief political events in the South, and then of those in the North. The regional classification is not as artificial as it might seem, for in the course of the centuries the culture of the South became somewhat distinct from that of the North. But the two influenced each other and ultimately merged.

In the South a branch of the Ssŭ-ma family maintained itself somewhat precariously for a little over a century (317–420) with its capital on the Yangtze at a place denominated Chien-yeh or Chien-k'ang (now Nanking) and is known as the Eastern Chin. Much of the course of the dynasty was punctuated by revolts and intrigues—the common lot of all Chinese ruling houses—and also by wars with the states on the north. About the middle of the fourth century the throne was dominated by an unusually able general, Huan Wên, who regained for his master Szechwan (for the preceding third of a century or so largely comprised in a Chinese state in that

region founded in *ca.* 304 by a family who had assumed the imperial title) and for a time extended the frontiers of the Eastern Chin to include much of the North China plain. So powerful was he that he deposed the reigning Emperor and placed his own puppet, still of the Ssŭ-ma family, on the throne. This puppet, it is generally supposed, was to abdicate upon demand in favor of the king-maker. However, he died prematurely and was soon followed to the grave by the ambitious Huan Wên. The Ssŭ-ma line thus obtained a fresh reprieve and reigned for nearly half a century longer.

The end of the Eastern Chin came in 420. It was brought about by another ambitious general, Liu Yü. Liu Yü claimed descent from a brother of the founder of the Han dynasty but had been born and reared in poverty. Not until middle life did he achieve prominence. Then, enlisting as a soldier, he quickly displayed ability, rose rapidly to high command, subdued a number of revolts, and carried the boundaries of the Chin to the Yellow River in successful fighting against the northern states. Liu Yü took advantage of the virtual dictatorship which these victories gave him to have the feeble Emperor killed. He set up another of the Ssŭ-ma line who soon abdicated (by request) and shortly afterward was also killed. Liu Yü, who had been known as prince of Sung, now established a new dynasty by that name. To distinguish it from the later and more renowned dynasty of Sung it is often called the Liu Sung.

The fall of the Eastern Chin (420) is usually said to mark the beginning of the era known to the Chinese as the *Nan Pei Ch'ao,* or the Southern and Northern Dynasties, which lasted until 589. Another classification—inclusive of a longer period—employed by Chinese historians is the Six Dynasties, by which are meant the six kingdoms and dynasties between the downfall of the Han and the reunification of China in 589, which had for their capital what is now Nanking. They were Wu, the Eastern Chin, the Liu Sung, the Southern Ch'i, the Liang, and the Ch'ên. In reality the end of the Eastern Chin marked no especial revolution. China was divided, to be sure, but not much more so than it had been for decades. The confusion became only a little more confounded.

The Liu Sung quickly ran its course. Liu Yü, known to posterity by the familiar title Wu Ti, did not long enjoy the power for which he had murdered his masters, but died in 423. The seven members of his family who successively followed him on the throne were short-lived. Four came to violent ends before reaching their twentieth birthdays, and the oldest, known to posterity as Wên Ti, who reigned for nearly thirty years and under whom the realm experienced a fair degree of prosperity, was put to death by his own son. Family wars and intrigues make the chronicles of the dynasty peculiarly sordid and bloody. By a certain rough justice of fate, the Liu Sung was brought to a close, as it had been begun, by a vigorous

general. Hsiao Tao-ch'êng, its chief commander, slew the last two Emperors of the line and in 479 placed himself on the throne.

Hsiao Tao-ch'êng became the first Emperor of the dynasty known as the Southern Ch'i. This had even shorter shrift than the Liu Sung. The founder died a little less than three years after mounting the throne and of his six descendants who held the imperial title only one reigned for more than two years and four died by violence. Domestic strife and war with one of the states of the North permitted little quiet. Again a general made an end of the dynasty (502) and founded a new one, the Liang.

The first monarch of the Liang, Hsiao Yen, known to posterity as Wu Ti (or, to distinguish him from the many others of the same appellation, Liang Wu Ti), was a distant connection of the rulers of the preceding dynasty. He held the throne until his death in 549, or for nearly half a century. Frugal, an enemy of luxury and excess, and something of a scholar, he appears to have sought conscientiously the welfare of his realm. He reduced taxation, ordered the establishment of schools, and strove for peace. At first an ardent Confucianist, in late middle life he became a devout Buddhist. In his extreme old age (for he lived to be eighty-six) misfortunes overtook him. In the South, Annam revolted (in 541, but it was soon reconquered, the return of Chinese power beginning in 545), and a famous attempt to overwhelm the northern kingdom of Wei through the prolonged siege of the strategic city on the Han, later called Hsiang-yang, failed because of the disastrous collapse of the dam which the attackers were building to drown out the beleaguered. In the North a vassal prince rebelled and crossed the Yangtze, and the new feeble Liang Wu Ti died in penury in what was later to be known as Nanking.

Great confusion marked the next few years. The rebel prince sought to establish a new dynasty, but was speedily slain. Violent struggles for the succession brought several members of the family of Hsiao Yen to the throne, but one after another these were quickly killed. In 557 the Liang dynasty is said officially to have ended, although a branch of the Hsiao family retained a precarious hold upon a section of the country until 589 and is known as the Hou Liang, or Later Liang (not to be confused with a Hou Liang of the tenth century).

The last Emperor of the Liang had been compelled to abdicate by one of his officials, Ch'ên Pa-hsien, a descendant of a renowned statesman of the Han. Ch'ên Pa-hsien established at the present Nanking a dynasty called the Ch'ên, but died about two years after his accession. His descendants held the throne for approximately thirty years. Their rule was terminated by Yang Chien—of whom more below—who once more united all China and founded the Sui Dynasty.

With all the division, it is significant that the title of Emperor and with it the idea of unity were not allowed to lapse. Thanks to the work of the

Ch'in and the Han—and to the traditions of pre-Ch'in times—the Chinese still thought of themselves as part of a cultural whole over which there could be only a single fully legitimate supreme ruler. Civilized human society, even though at times divided, must ultimately, they believed, be politically one.

## AN ERA OF DIVISION: THE NON-CHINESE STATES OF THE NORTH

During these centuries of division, events in the North were even more confused and kaleidoscopic than in the South. The many states, most of them established by invaders, usually had rapidly shifting boundaries, and as a rule, several were in existence at one time. Wars among them and with the dynasties of the South were frequent. Only the chief of the states and a few of the more prominent events need here be mentioned.

We have seen that the Western Chin came to its end largely through the attacks of non-Chinese peoples. These were the Hsiung-nu, so frequently mentioned in the preceding pages. Their power had been broken by the Han, but they had maintained their separate existence under their own chiefs and were numerous in the northern marches. Many of them were in the service of the Emperors. When the Chin began to show weakness they threw off its yoke. Their ruling family claimed descent from the Han through a princess of that house who had been given to one of its ancestors in marriage. Accordingly, it assumed the family name of Liu, began to pay reverence at the graves of the Han, and gave the designation Han to the state which it founded—sometimes called the Pei (Northern) Han. It was obviously making a bid for the mastery of all China and was seeking to give to its aspirations the guise of legitimacy. In 308 one of the line, Liu Yüan, felt himself strong enough to take the title of Emperor. It was his son, Liu Ts'ung, who brought the Western Chin to a violent termination.

Liu Ts'ung changed the name of the Hsiung-nu dynasty from Han to Chao (after an ancient state by the latter name), usually called the Ch'ien (Earlier) Chao. Liu Yüan was succeeded by a kinsman, and he in turn was slain by one of his own generals, also a Hsiung-nu, who took the throne and whose short line is known as Hou Chao, the Later Chao. These Hsiung-nu states, it is well to note, had their strongholds in the Northwest and sometimes their capital was at Ch'angan.

The Later Chao was succeeded in the Northwest by a state established by a Tibetan people. They gave to the brief dynasty they founded the name of Ch'in—the same as that of the state which in the third century B.C. had united China. During its comparatively brief course it was divided into two sections called Ch'ien and Hou—the Earlier and

the Later Ch'in. In the second half of the fourth century the most powerful ruler of the Earlier Ch'in, Fu Chien, extended his boundaries into what is now Sinkiang and Szechwan, and over much of North China. He overran, among other small states, one which had its center in North Shansi and which had been founded by a family—possibly Mongol in stock—early in the fourth century. Fu Chien built up a highly Sinized administration and in his armies combined his cavalry with Chinese infantry. He came to grief in an attempt (A.D. 383) to push his conquests to the south against the Eastern Chin. Defeated, he was killed in a revolt of his own generals. One of the latter founded the Later Ch'in.

In the far Northwest, a Tibetan general whom Fu Chien had dispatched into Central Asia, Lu Kuang, was returning from a successful campaign when he heard of the fall of his sovereign. Pausing in what is now Kansu, he carved out for himself a principality which he ultimately called Liang (Hou Liang, or the Later Liang, to distinguish it from another and slightly earlier northern principality which is called the Ch'ien, or Earlier, Liang). Not long afterward, two of Lu Kuang's own subordinates, taking advantage of a reverse he suffered at the hands of the Later Ch'in, revolted and seized part of his territory, founding petty states which are known as North and South Liang.

While these events were taking place in the Northwest, in the Northeast another people were establishing themselves. The Hsien Pei (often written Hsien Pi), of whose racial connections we are not quite sure but who seem to have been Mongols, were widely spread in what is now North China, Manchuria, and Mongolia. They occupied, among other regions, much of the area formerly held by the Hsiung-nu. During most of the fourth and into the fifth century a portion of the Hsien Pei—whose seat was in what is now southern Manchuria—under the leadership of various branches of the Mu-jung family set up in the Northeast, with its center in the modern Hopei, a state known as Yen. This again, thanks to the vicissitudes of war, had several subdivisions—the Earlier Yen, the Later Yen, the Northern Yen, and the Southern Yen. Several members of the Mu-jung family took the title of Emperor, thus displaying both their political ambition and their desire to be thought of as in the Chinese cultural stream.

During these confusing years of division we hear also, in the first half of the fifth century, of the dynasty of Hsia, with its center in the Ordos, north of what is now Shansi. Its name was derived from the first of the traditional Chinese "dynasties," for its ruler claimed descent from that house.

The longest lived and most powerful of the states of the North was founded by the T'u Pa (or Toba). Their dynasty, the Northern Wei (or

Yüan Wei), lasted from 386 to 534, and two shorter succeeding dynasties, the Western Wei (Hsi Wei) and the Eastern Wei (Tung Wei), also of the T'u Pa, persisted until 557 and 550 respectively. As is the case with so many of these northern peoples, the ethnological connections of the T'u Pa are somewhat uncertain. They are usually said, perhaps wrongly, to be a branch of the Hsien Pei and they may have been either Mongols, "proto-Mongols," or Turks. They seem to have absorbed some of the Hsiung-nu. Their language appears to have been of Turkish origin. In the latter part of the fourth and in the first half of the fifth century, under a succession of able and vigorous leaders, the T'u Pa overran most of the North and united it under one rule, bringing to an end the petty states of Liang and Yen and the other principalities in that area. In the middle of the fifth century they carried their arms into what is now Sinkiang. Several of the leading oases and trading centers of that region, including Turfan and Kashgar, became tributary to them.

The T'u Pa monarchs first fixed their capital at P'ingch'êng (now Tat'ung), in Shansi, but later in the last decade of the fifth century, moved to Loyang in Honan. They strove to adopt and patronize Chinese institutions and culture. Eventually the T'u Pa language and costume were proscribed, conformity to the Chinese in these matters, in family names, and in court ceremonial was ordered, and intermarriage with the Chinese encouraged. The T'u Pa became defenders of Chinese civilization against fresh invasions from the North—building for that purpose at least two frontier walls. For a time theirs was the strongest state in East Asia. As we shall see in a moment, some of the line were especially noted for their advocacy of Buddhism, although others espoused Confucianism, and still others Taoism.

Among the most powerful of the enemies on the north, against which the Northern Wei strove to defend their realm, were a people with Mongol and Turkish elements, perhaps identical with the Avars who appear in European history, known to the Chinese as the Juan Juan, meaning to wriggle, like a worm, possibly a pun on their true name. They gave the northern marches much trouble. About the middle of the sixth century the Juan Juan were in turn defeated by some of their former vassals, the T'u Chüeh, a Turkish people, who thereupon, in the second half of the sixth century, proceeded to build in Mongolia and Central Asia an empire of vast dimensions. They joined in overthrowing the Hephthalites, or "White Huns," possibly related to or identical with the Juan Juan. In the middle of the fifth century the Hephthalites had become a great power centering in the valley of the Oxus and had been successful invaders of India. The T'u Chüeh were not very highly civilized and had derived such culture as they possessed probably not from Chinese but from Iranian and Aramaean sources. They formed a temporary alliance with the Sassanian monarchs of Persia and obtained

the territory in which are now Bokhara and Samarkand, thus controlling in part the caravan routes by which silk was carried from China to the Byzantine Empire. We find these Turks, however, soon turning against their quondam allies. They demanded free passage across the Persian possessions for the commerce between China and Constantinople, seized from the enfeebled Sassanids territory south of the Oxus, and made approaches for concerted action by the Byzantine Empire and themselves against the Persians. The Byzantines attacked from the west and the Turks from the east. These Turks now had the strongest state in Central Asia.

To return to North China and the fate of the Wei. By the middle of the fifth century the vigor of the T'u Pa line was running low. The Northern Wei, as we have seen, in 534 broke into the Western and the Eastern Wei. The Eastern Wei was set up by a powerful general who dominated its puppet prince, and in 550 the son of this general took in name the power which his father had exercised in fact. He founded the Pei Ch'i, or Northern Ch'i dynasty. In like manner, the Western Wei was founded—at Ch'angan—under the direction of a general who kept on the throne a prince of the legitimate line. Similarly also, this *roi fainéant* was made to abdicate (556) and was then killed (557), and a son of the king-maker was placed on the throne as the first monarch of the Pei Chou, or Northern Chou dynasty. In 557 the Northern Chou overran and annexed the Northern Ch'i, so that most of China was divided between two ruling lines, the Ch'en in the South and the Northern Chou in the North.

The time was now ripe for the reunification of China. Neither the Ch'en nor the Northern Chou was especially strong and a vigorous and able leader would meet no insuperable difficulty in overturning them both. He appeared in the person of Yang Chien, an official under the Northern Chou and a descendant of a distinguished scholar and statesman of the Later Han. His daughter was married to his master and when the offspring of that union, his grandson, succeeded to the throne, Yang Chien soon (581) persuaded him to abdicate in his favor and established himself as the first monarch of the Sui dynasty. A few years later his armies overthrew Ch'en and he became head of a reunited China (589). His achievement was aided by the persistent belief—dating from at least the Chou era and furthered by the Ch'in and the Han—that all civilized mankind should be under one rule.

## CULTURAL CHANGES: GENERAL

To those for the first time reading Chinese history, the period which we have just recorded must seem a hopelessly confused mass of names and wars. A detailed account would be even more

perplexing. Not only have many important figures and events of the period not been mentioned, but several of the minor states which arose in these years of disunion—some of them with Chinese and some with non-Chinese rulers—have not been so much as named. A perusal of the annals of the period gives the impression of almost continuous strife, of wave upon wave of barbarian invasion, of an apparently uninterrupted series of rebellions, and of widespread anarchy. A large proportion of the so-called Emperors came to violent ends, and sordid intrigue and selfish betrayal seem to have been the order of the day. In the chronic fighting, and especially in the destruction of the capital cities and their libraries, much of such literature as had survived the Han or had been freshly produced was destroyed.

Fortunately, however, this is only one phase of the story. Disorder and anarchy there were, but the very wars brought about a geographical extension of the Chinese people and their culture. Then, too, over considerable portions of time large sections of the land enjoyed comparative peace and prosperity. The partial breakdown of government and the consequent loosening of the political, social, and intellectual structure that had been developed under the Ch'in and the Han permitted a flexibility in mind and culture which had not been known since the later years of the Chou era. Foreign commerce continued and may have increased. Contacts with non-Chinese peoples and civilizations multiplied. More contributions entered from outside than in any previous period, and since China was comparatively malleable, profound changes followed. To obtain a well-balanced picture of the era, therefore, we must notice the nonpolitical side of the story somewhat in detail.

The wars and the barbarian invasions in the North brought about a southward migration of the Chinese. The movement was partly one of officials and the wealthy, but millions of the country folk also changed their homes. Heretofore the Yangtze Valley had been on the fringes of Chinese civilization and had been occupied only partially by Chinese stock. Now, for the first time, it gradually became a chief center of Chinese culture. The non-Chinese elements were partially assimilated. Indeed, as we have seen, for nearly three centuries the purely Chinese dynasties had the seat of their government there. The growth in the population of the region appears to have been rapid during the fourth and much of the fifth century, and to have slowed down only with the disorders which marked the course of the later southern dynasties. In its new environment, moreover, Chinese culture took on some fresh forms, especially in literature and art. From the South came the drinking of tea. Our first reference to that custom is from the second half of the third century. The use of tea was long confined chiefly to the southern and central parts of the Empire. Not until the eighth or ninth

century did it become common in the North. In moving to the South, the immigrants were forced to adjust themselves and their agriculture to the climate and soil of the region, including the wet cultivation of rice.

In the meanwhile, Chinese civilization did not permanently lose ground in the North. Many of the non-Chinese conquerors bowed to the civilization of their subjects, and in time adopted it. Intermarriages wrought modifications of racial stock, and presumably there were changes in the spoken language. However, in spite of all the innovations brought by the wide acceptance of Buddhism (of which more in a moment), in the North, as in the Yangtze Valley, Chinese culture inherited from the Han was cherished by scholars and leading families, persisted, and toward the end of the period was partly revived. The dream of an empire embracing all civilized mankind was cherished.

Some of the Chinese attempted to keep themselves free from the taint both of alien and of plebeian blood. Great aristocratic families arose, especially in the South, who monopolized a large portion of the chief offices and possessed extensive landed estates. They intermarried among themselves in spite of the efforts of some of the rulers to prohibit the practice. In time their ways were aped and their lineages appropriated by commoners. Their failure to conserve exclusiveness was accompanied by the spread of their culture and the preservation of many of the older Chinese ideas and customs.

The periods of peace and prosperity which large portions of the land enjoyed permitted the carrying on of the institutions of the past and the perpetuation of the arts of civilization. Many of the rulers, both Chinese and non-Chinese, were patrons of learning as interpreted by the Confucian school. In the third century, the Wei dynasty—established by the Ts'ao—had some of the classical books of antiquity engraved on stone at the capital, Loyang. Repeatedly we read of monarchs founding schools, and at times Confucius appears to have been fully as honored as under the Later Han. We hear of a Confucian temple built in 505, with an image of the Sage in it. Some rulers favored Taoism, and Buddhism was often, and in the main, increasingly popular with the rulers, Confucian scholarship seems to have made no great gains, and to have displayed no especial creativeness, but Confucian philosophy persisted as the theory on which the state and society were supposedly chiefly grounded.

The names of some eminent men of letters have come down to us. Wang Pi, of the first half of the third century, composed commentaries on the *I Ching* and the *Tao Tê Ching*, trying to find in the former wisdom rather than divination and to make of the latter a consistent philosophic whole. The "Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove" of the third century were freethinking philosophers and poets who took a Taoist outlook on life,

kept largely aloof from conventional society, and lived simply—albeit bibulously. It may be that some of the Taoist texts usually ascribed to great figures of the Chou dynasty are their work. They helped, moreover, to develop the verbose, superficial, and highly artificial prose style, which during the centuries of disunion and into the succeeding period largely supplanted the concise, semirhythmical style of antiquity. A poet (still famous) was T'ao Ch'ien (365–427), a native of the modern Kiangsi province. Several times he had been in official life, but he longed for quiet and retirement. Interestingly enough, late in life he made the acquaintance of Hui Yüan, who, as we shall see presently, more than any other appears to have been responsible for the early stages of the growth of the Pure Land School of Buddhism.

Poetry seems to have been stimulated to fresh life by the new southern environment of Chinese culture under the Six Dynasties, as well as by contact with Buddhism. Taoism, as we have suggested, had its influence. Many a man, weary and disillusioned by the disorders of the time, withdrew from public life to solitude or to his estates and sought to bring himself into harmony with nature, partly by the methods advocated by Taoism. Some of these recluses endeavored to express themselves in verse.

Wang Hsi-chih (321–379), one of China's most distinguished calligraphists, a Taoist by belief, belongs to these centuries.

Taoism flourished and underwent marked developments. It continued to cultivate practices which it believed would lead to physical immortality. Those who had attained that state were known as *hsien*. Part of the technique was sexual acts, both individual and group, which the Buddhists, who esteemed asceticism and continence, and the Confucianists deemed highly immoral. The sexual element flourished in these centuries but later, because of criticism, either disappeared or became less public. In the search for an elixir of life, contributions were made by Taoists to medicine. Partly under the influence of Buddhism a Taoist pantheon was created and Taoist communities arose. But unlike Buddhism, Taoism encouraged marriage. Taoist temples were erected with deities and with depictions of heavens and hells—again a reflection of Buddhist influence. On the philosophical side some of the Taoist intellectuals were moved to fresh interpretations. A kind of mysticism was nurtured. In painting, Taoism, with its glorification of nature, contributed to the emphasis on landscape.

Forerunners of a voluminous class of Chinese literature, local gazetteers, appeared, modeled on the *Ch'un Ch'iu*. Histories were written, some of them in the style of Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien's great work. Cartography developed. Works on botany began to be written.

A form of writing was developed, the *p'ien t'i*, or parallel style, by which sentences were so arranged that the meanings and sounds of words were balanced in pairs.

Great libraries were collected under state supervision. Many of them were scattered or burned in the political upheavals of the times, but the love of books never died out and numbers of the writings of the past survived. Some ancient literature, moreover, was conserved in anthologies of prose and poetry collected during these years.

Modifications were made in the bureaucracy developed under the Ch'in and the Han. More than once, however, a strong ruler attempted to enforce his authority through some form of organization which showed the influence of the models of the past.

Innovations were made in other phases of life. The wheelbarrow and the water mill appeared. For the first time we hear of sedan chairs and dice. Coal began to be used. Improvements were seen in the calendar. A form of compass was invented. The mathematical $\pi$ was determined with a close approximation to accuracy.

## FOREIGN COMMERCE

Foreign commerce continued, both by the overland routes and by way of the ports on the south coast. Trade by the overland routes was probably often interrupted or hampered by war, but we have already noted that the Northern Wei extended its power to the extreme west of what is now Sinkiang. The silk trade appears to have been maintained. Of the southern ports, those in Tongking, on the delta of the Red River, were earlier of chief importance, but Canton was growing as a rival.

Chinese merchants seem not to have ventured very far afield and to have left chiefly to strangers the initiative in foreign trade, but outsiders found China a profitable country with which to deal.

Now and again we obtain glimpses of this foreign commerce or its concomitants that show us something of its extent. In 226 a merchant from the Graeco-Roman Orient—Ta Ch'in, as the Chinese called it—arrived via Tongking at the court of the state of Wu. Other merchants from Western Asia are reported to have come in fairly large numbers to what is now Vietnam and even to Canton. Sun Ch'üan, the first Wu Emperor, made at least two attempts to get in touch with the outer world, the initial one through an official whom he started back with the merchant from Ta Ch'in, but who died on the way, and the other through representatives whom he sent to the countries to the south. In 433 an embassy reached China from a state in the South—either from Java or from the Malay Peninsula. Beginning with the latter part of the third century, the kings of Champa, just to the south of the Chinese domains, began sending envoys. Some of these rulers, indeed, recognized Chinese suzerainty, although others did not scruple to invade the adjoining imperial domains. Embassies, too, are said to have arrived from Ceylon and India to the Liu Sung court to congratu-

late it on the progress of Buddhism in its domains. The large number of Buddhist missionaries in China who came by sea probably indicates a fairly extensive ocean shipping. Sericulture reached Khotan from China early in the fifth century. The cultivated walnut seems to have been introduced into the northwest of China, possibly from Tibet, by the fourth century, and the pomegranate, which was probably of Iranian origin, in about the third century. Methods of manufacturing glass appear to have been brought by Syrian or Indian artisans in the first half of the fifth century, brocades came from Persia as early as 520, and commerce in walrus ivory and other northern products trickled through from the far North and perhaps even from across the Bering Straits.

It must not be thought that the bulk of this trade was very large, compared with present-day international commerce. Measured by that standard, it was a mere trifle. Possibly it was small even when contrasted with the foreign commerce of the T'ang, the great dynasty which followed. For the times, however, especially when we recall the disasters which were overtaking the Mediterranean world during the fifth and sixth centuries, it was not insignificant.

It may be noted here, although it does not bear directly on commerce, that the music of Kucha, a highly cultivated center in what is now Sinkiang, had an influence on that of China, for an orchestra was brought back from there by Liu Kuang's forces.

It must also be added that Japan was feeling the influence of Chinese civilization. In the third and fourth centuries, a strong state with Chinese rulers was established in what is now the southern portion of Manchuria and northern Korea, and Chinese culture was potent in the Korean peninsula. In the fourth century, after the collapse of this state, the stream dwindled but by no means disappeared. Under Chinese influence and with Chinese art forms, Buddhism reached even southern Korea in the fifth century. While the Chinese were in Korea, Japan and the peninsula were very closely in touch with each other, partly through Japanese invasions, and Chinese culture flowed into the islands. Japanese envoys visited northern China, and Chinese penetrated to Japan. Chinese and Korean immigrants helped to provide that country—then very rude—with scribes, and the Chinese characters were introduced, although possibly not for the first time. As the years passed, direct connections between Japan and the China of the Yangtze Valley were made. Industries, especially weaving, were introduced to Japan. Numbers of Chinese immigrants settled in the country and some of them built Buddhist temples. During part of the time, Japan was regarded by the Chinese as a vassal, and honorary titles were said to have been conferred on its rulers. Japan was being brought into the Chinese cultural area.

THE CONTINUED INTRODUCTION AND GROWTH OF BUDDHISM

One of the clearest evidences of Chinese contact with the outer world, and at the same time the greatest foreign contribution to the China of the period, was the rapid growth of Buddhism.

There is something surprising in the firm establishment, great popularity, and wide acceptance of Buddhism in China. Usually a religion spreads to another land through one or more of five agencies: (1) conquest by adherents of the faith, with the subsequent conversion of the vanquished either by force or by the advantages which accrue to conformity with the religion of the rulers; (2) intimate commercial contacts by which merchants or professional missionaries propagate the faith; (3) the bringing together of peoples of different cultural strata, those of lower civilizations being ashamed of their "barbarism" and taking over the religion along with the other features of the higher civilization; (4) a large body of earnest missionaries; and (5) a deep sense of religious need, which the native faiths leave unsatisfied and which the new religion gives promise of meeting. Of these five agencies the first three in this case were almost entirely lacking. There was little or no conquest of China by peoples previously Buddhist; commercial contacts, as we have seen, were comparatively slight; and Chinese culture in many respects was equal and even superior to that of the peoples of India and Central Asia from whom the Chinese received Buddhism.

It will be remembered that Buddhism had arisen in a civilization whose dominant interests were seemingly quite different from those of China. Indian culture, as represented by its intellectuals, was other-worldly, deeply concerned about the fate of the individual after death, firmly convinced of the reality of the transmigration of souls, and given to mysticism. Except for Taoism, Chinese thought was chiefly absorbed in successfully ordering human society and in such related problems as the quality of human nature. It upheld the traditional honors to ancestors, but for long it had been influenced by an undercurrent of skepticism about the reality of life after death. It had no inkling of metempsychosis. Mysticism, if present at all, was there only in rudimentary form. Why should Buddhism, which arose out of specifically Indian needs and problems, meet with such successes in a cultural atmosphere as alien to it as that of China?

Moreover, Buddhism ran counter to much that was fundamental in Chinese life. It advocated celibacy, a practice destructive to the family, that social institution by which Confucian thought and Chinese tradition set such store. In its monastic communities it tended to create *imperia in imperio*, which an autocratic state, such as was China in its centuries of power, must regard with suspicion and certainly must insist upon controlling. Its premium on mendicancy was obnoxious to statesmen who

must have regarded sturdy beggars as parasites on society. Its asceticism was contrary to Confucian moderation and humanism.

Then again, no other foreign faith, not even Islam or Christianity, has ever obtained anything like the hold in China which Buddhism achieved, and that notwithstanding the fact that Islam has been continuously represented in the Middle Kingdom for eleven or twelve centuries—approximately two-thirds of the time that Buddhism has been there—and Christianity has been in the Middle Kingdom intermittently as long as Islam and continuously for as many centuries as were required to give Buddhism wide acceptance.

On further consideration, however, at least some of the reasons for Buddhism's success become apparent. Although limited, commercial contacts between China and Buddhist peoples did exist. In some respects—as in some phases of art, letters, and philosophy—the adherents of Buddhism could teach the Chinese. Zealous and scholarly Buddhist missionaries came in large numbers.

Moreover, Buddhism seemed to meet some basic demands of the human spirit for which the then existing Chinese religions offered no satisfaction. Mahayana Buddhism—the type which ultimately predominated in China—presented a more definite picture of the future life and could promise to all who followed its precepts the assurance of bliss beyond the grave—an ample and happy existence of which it gave glowing and specific portrayal. It also terrified the timid and warned the wicked with its hells. To be sure, the conception of *nirvana* was too abstruse for most Chinese, and the problem—of escape from rebirth and suffering—for which it was the solution and which gave it an appeal to the Indian mind, was alien to Chinese thought. For most Chinese Buddhists, however, *nirvana* faded into the background.

Buddhism may also have been a welcome relief from the rigid determinism of some forms of Confucianism. Its doctrine of *karma*, by which an individual's present lot is fixed by his deeds in all his previous existences, seems hopelessly fatalistic. But a man by his deeds in this life could modify his *karma* and so affect his lot in a future existence.

Then, too, Buddhism, with its philosophies, its pantheon and saints, its images, its stately worship, its music, its voluminous religious literature, its cosmology, and its elaborate forms of the religious life, greatly enlarged the spiritual horizons of the Chinese and made a powerful aesthetic and intellectual appeal. To some, moreover, the celibacy, the asceticism, and the authoritarian community life must have proved attractive.

Buddhism, again, in practice exalted the individual as the native philosophies did not. Confucianism and Taoism were aristocratic, and Taoist immortality was only for the few. Buddhism was for all: any one, no matter how humble, might share in its salvation for himself, or more

popularly, through an easy reliance on monk, ceremony, saint, or savior.

Moreover, Buddhism proved adaptable and its interpreters accommodated it in large part—although never entirely—to previous Chinese prejudices and conceptions, including the traditional honors to ancestors.

Finally, the time was eminently favorable for the growth of Buddhism in China. The faith was still in its heyday in the land of its birth, and Buddhist missionaries were enthusiastically propagating it in new lands. Mahayana Buddhism especially was strong (although Hinayana was not unrepresented) in what is now Northwest India (Gandhara and Kashmir) and in some of the regions to the north (Kashgar, Yarkand, and other centers) across which ran the trade routes between China, Persia, and the Roman Orient. Here, then, was a great spiritual movement in the full flood of missionary enthusiasm and expansion, and in lands with which China had commercial contacts.

Just when this was true, in China the structure of society had been enfeebled by disorder. The state was not in a position to offer the effective resistance to Buddhism—even when it wished to do so—that it could under the great monarchs of the Han. Confucian orthodoxy suffered from the irregularities and partial collapse of the educational and bureaucratic structure which were its bulwarks, and from the civil strife which must have taken heavy toll of its leaders. Moreover, Confucianism was burdensome, and its debility may have been greeted with a feeling of relief. To be sure, Taoism was often popular, as under the Eastern Chin, when it was dominant in court circles. However, a few Taoists, distressed by the degradation of their faith, greeted Buddhism as akin to the reform which they were seeking. Then, too, Chinese, disheartened by the chaos in society, welcomed the refuge from the world which Buddhist monasteries and Buddhist philosophy seemed to afford. In the North, finally, were non-Chinese peoples, some of whom had contacts with that Central Asia where Buddhism was now so strong, and upon most of whom the esteem for native Chinese culture rested more lightly than upon the pure Chinese. It is not surprising, therefore, that these centuries saw Buddhism become an integral and influential part of Chinese life.

Buddhism was brought to China through numerous foreign missionaries. From the names that have come down to us we know that some were from Cambodia, some from Ceylon, and some from India, including South India, and that others, perhaps the larger proportion, were from what are now Northwest India and Afghanistan (where, it will be recalled, the Kushan kings, a Yüeh-chih dynasty, had espoused it), and from regions in Central Asia to which the faith had spread from that center—Parthia, for example, and what is now Sinkiang. Some came to the South by way of the sea, and others to the North by the overland trade routes.

Among the many names that we have is that of Dharmaraksha, a native

of Tunhuang—near what is now the extreme western border of Kansu, and so a center where many influences were to be found coming over the trade routes. He is said to have known thirty-six languages or dialects. Arriving at Loyang in 266, in the next half-century he is reported to have made translations of more than one hundred and seventy-five Buddhist works. We hear also of Kumarajiva (344–413), the son of an Indian father and of a princess of Kucha, a famous Buddhist center in the later Sinkiang. He was educated in part in Kashmir, was brought back a captive from Kucha by the expedition of Lü Kuang at the close of the fourth century, and labored with marked success in Ch'angan. Sometimes called the greatest translator of Buddhist texts, during nine years at Ch'angan he organized a bureau, which had in it hundreds of monks and which, under his supervision, put ninety-four works into Chinese. He and others helped to emancipate Buddhist from Taoist ideas.

Much of the work of the missionaries, as these examples attest, consisted in the translation of Buddhist books into Chinese—a labor in which Chinese shared. To no small degree, the success of Buddhism in the Middle Kingdom appears to have been due to these literary labors. Long lists of the works put into Chinese, from the Han dynasty onward, have been preserved. This voluminous literature won the respect of a people who have traditionally held the written page in high esteem.

Buddhism was further encouraged in the Middle Kingdom by the journeys to India of ardent Chinese monks who sought in the home of their religion not only inspiration but also sacred books and relics as tangible aids to the faith in China. These travelers seem to have been fairly numerous. The most famous of the period covered by this chapter was he whose religious name was Fa-hsien. Fa-hsien set out in 399 with the purpose of obtaining in India more nearly perfect copies of Buddhist sacred books than were to be found in his native land. He went by one of the caravan routes across the Tarim basin, in India visited important Buddhist centers and collected copies of the works for which he was in search, and, returning by way of Ceylon and the ocean route, landed on the north coast after an absence of fifteen years. Somewhat less distinguished was Sung-yün, who, sent in 518 with a companion by an Empress Dowager of the Northern Wei to acquire Buddhist books, reached India by the overland route and arrived home in 521.

Chinese monks were not content simply with translations of the Indian scriptures of their faith, but began the production of an independent native literature on Buddhism.

Through the labors of the missionaries and their converts Buddhism became extremely popular. It spread in the South among the aristocracy, partly through men who gave it prestige in court circles. In the North it was aided by many of the non-Chinese rulers. Buddhism did not always

have smooth sailing. On several occasions monarchs of Confucian or Taoist convictions instituted persecutions, destroying monasteries and ordering the monks back into secular life. The old order was not so moribund that it could offer no resistance. In the North a method was developed for a state control of Buddhism through an inclusive structure which persisted for centuries. At times Taoism was sufficiently powerful at one or another of the courts to bring about a temporary proscription of Buddhism. On occasion the elimination of both Buddhism and Taoism was ordered. Often Buddhism was espoused by the rulers, an act which could not fail to augment the popular following. Devotees of Buddhism were found both among the Chinese monarchs of the South and the non-Chinese princes of the North. Probably the most famous of the southern imperial converts was Liang Wu Ti who, as we have seen, after being an earnest Confucianist, in middle life embraced Buddhism. He publicly expounded Buddhist sutras, collected a Chinese edition of the Tripitaka, issued edicts against animal sacrifices, was a strict vegetarian, and three times retired to a monastery. Several monarchs of the Northern Wei, of the T'u Pa line, stand out as patrons of the faith. At least two of them opposed it, but the majority endorsed it. Some even took part in Buddhist ordinations and preached Buddhist sermons. We read of thousands of monasteries and of hundreds of thousands of monks, and have a report that in 381 nine-tenths of the inhabitants of northwestern China were Buddhists. Accurate statistics are, of course, lacking, and these numbers are probably exaggerations, but taking as a whole the centuries between the Han and the Sui, Buddhism undoubtedly grew in popularity. By the advent of the Sui it had become an integral and powerful part of Chinese life.

Both Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism were found in China, but, as we have suggested, Mahayana predominated and became standard.

Buddhism had a manifold influence upon the life of the period. Religiously it introduced new conceptions, among them many gods, the transmigration of souls, and much clearer convictions about life after death. Ethically it reinforced some features of traditional Chinese morality, including kindness and regard for human life, and it also carried these particular virtues further, insisting on regard for all animate existence. In time many of its concepts crept into folklore and popular festivals, and so all, whether avowed Buddhists or not, more or less unconsciously were affected by it.

In literature and language, Buddhism not only introduced many new terms, but, in their study of Chinese, Buddhist missionaries, coming with the perspective of foreigners, originated a phonetic analysis—by means of what are called initials and finals—which entered into later Chinese philology and literature.

In art especially, Buddhism brought fresh contributions. It was in

Northwest India, particularly in Gandhara, that statues of the Buddha were first made. Here Greek influence was still strong, so the earliest Buddhist iconography was distinctly Hellenic in form. It was through Gandhara that the easiest—although not the shortest—of the trade routes passed by which communication was had between what is now Sinkiang and India. Hence this Graeco-Buddhist art spread into Central Asia and eastward into the Tarim basin and on to China. In the oases of the later Sinkiang and in China, statues large and small were carved or cast in metal, frescoes were painted on the walls of rock temples, stone carvings were made, and stelae were set up, a large proportion of them showing Graeco-Buddhist features. Other, more purely Indian art came in by the shorter but more difficult route across the Pamirs. In Sinkiang surviving examples of this period and of the centuries immediately succeeding show a mixture of many strains—Graeco-Roman, Persian, Byzantine, Indian of the Gupta period (fourth and fifth centuries), Graeco-Buddhist (of Gandhara), and others of as yet unknown provenance. Given the trade routes, this art could not fail to have its effect in the Middle Kingdom. Impressive survivals of Gandhara Graeco-Buddhist influences in China are in Tat'ung, in a gorge called Lungmên, near Loyang, and in many monuments and images which have been brought to museums in the Occident. The Buddhist art associated with the name of the Northern Wei is noted for its Gandhara characteristics, its beauty, and its relative simplicity. In the Yangtze Valley a current from Southern India seems to have entered. Here, too, as possibly in North China, the Buddhist stream merged in part with Taoist impulses. Probably the greatest painter was Ku K'ai-chih, of the fourth and fifth centuries, a native of Kiangsu, who often employed Buddhist themes but who was influenced by Taoism. One of the stories told of him is that he paid a large subscription to a Buddhist temple by painting a picture on the temple wall and having the monks charge a fee of the throngs who flocked to see it. It must be noted that Ku K'ai-chih also painted landscapes, portraits, and scenes from daily life. He was a well-known figure of his generation, a sort of "inspired eccentric" who, in addition to his achievements in art, held office for much of his life.

## BUDDHIST SCHOOLS (OR SECTS)

Not only did Buddhism make its impress on Chinese civilization: China wrought changes in Buddhism. Buddhists took over much of Taoist terminology, studied Taoist literature, and even wrote commentaries on the *Tao Tê Ching*. As a result, Taoism had its effect on the foreign faith, although exactly to what extent is difficult to trace. As any vital religion will do, Buddhism developed schools (or sects). Some were imported from India, but those most influential in China were largely of indigenous growth.

The Chinese, indeed, eventually made of Buddhism something quite different from that which had come to them. Much of the intellectual and religious activity of the years of political disunion and of the immediately succeeding centuries was both stimulated by and expended upon Buddhism. The energy which under the Chou had found an outlet in the creation of the many schools of thought of that dynasty and which under the Han had gone into Taoism and into establishing Confucianism was now largely absorbed by Buddhism. Often the new developments in Buddhism professed to find their authority in Indian texts or founders; as in the case of most religions, sanctions were sought in the past. In fact, however, they showed distinctly the marks of the Chinese genius.

Eventually ten principal schools were recognized—three of them Hinayana and the others Mahayana. Several were short-lived. In general the Buddhist schools were between two poles. One pole, gradualism, was the approach to ultimate reality by long study, and was akin to Confucianism with its slow accumulation of knowledge and wisdom. The other, subitism, held that apprehension of reality was by sudden enlightenment, and had likenesses to Taoism. Another division might be described as between Being and Not-being: on the one hand the conviction that the elements of existence and the ego are real, and on the other that they are unreal.

One of the most prominent of the Chinese schools—the Ch'an, or to give it its better known Japanese name, Zen—declared that salvation was to be achieved by inward enlightenment. Enlightenment came, so it said, in an instant, as it had to the Buddha. Good works, asceticism, ceremonial, the study of books, and meditation were held to be at least secondary and perhaps in vain. To make contact with reality and to understand it one must look within. Knowledge, in other words, was purely subjective. The sect is reported to have been introduced into China by Bodhidharma. Tradition has it that Bodhidharma spent nine years at Loyang, silently gazing at a wall in meditation. As a matter of fact, we know very little about him, for most of our accounts of him are pure legend. He appears to have arrived in the fifth century, and after about fifty years in China, to have died in 479. He was only one of many contributors to the formation of Ch'an. The sect was really the result of a long evolution. It did not come to its fullest form until the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. It began at least as far back as the fifth century, with Chu Tao-shêng (died in 434), a disciple of Kumarajiva and Hui Yüan. Chu Tao-shêng attacked the Indian idea of merit and enunciated the principle that Buddahood is reached by sudden enlightenment and not by the long and arduous practices of regulated and disciplined meditation. Ch'an appears to have been indebted at least in part for its popularity, and perhaps for some of its basic ideas, to Taoism, which had long prepared the

ground by its emphasis upon quietism and simplicity. It represented, too, a reaction against the complicated ritual and philosophy by which some of the current Buddhist teaching had hedged about the road to salvation.

The T'ien T'ai sect had as its founders two Chinese known as Chih I (or Chih K'ai, 531–597) and Hui Ssŭ, who died in 577. Chih I, a pupil of Hui Ssŭ, had once been a teacher of Ch'an Buddhism but came to see what he believed to be its weaknesses. He declared that salvation is to be achieved not by Ch'an processes alone but by a combination of meditation, concentration, the study of books, ritual, moral discipline, and insight. He stressed particularly one of the Buddhist writings known as the Lotus Sutra, and tended to a theistic explanation of the Buddha nature. To him reality was not purely subjective, as in the Ch'an, but an objective activity exerting itself for the good of all beings. The school took its name from a mountain in Chêkiang called T'ien T'ai, to which Chih I retired to teach and to practice his doctrine. Its moderation and its systematization and simplification of Buddhism appealed to many of the cultivated classes, trained by the Confucian tradition to distrust extremes and to shun intricate metaphysics. It made for tolerance and produced many scholars.

A third sect, and the most widely popular among the laity, was the Pure Land (Ch'ing T'u) or Lotus school. It is said to have been founded by Hui Yüan (334–416) of Shansi, who later established a Buddhist center in the present Kiangsi, in hills not far from Kiukang. Its distinctive teaching, however, was much older and went back to non-Chinese roots. It declared that salvation is by simple faith in Amitabha, or Amida (in the colloquial, O-mi-t'o-fo), one of the many Buddhas with which Mahayana peoples the spiritual universe. This faith, expressed in calling upon the name of Amida, it held, is all that is necessary to secure admission after death into the Western Paradise. The Pure Land way freed the humble believer, who must needs go about the daily occupation of making his living, from the study of books, the elaborate meditation, and the ritual which could be followed only by the professionally religious. It is interesting, and possibly significant, that before his conversion Hui Yüan had been an earnest Taoist and that at least one other of the early leaders of the sect had also been a Taoist. It may be that the longing for immortality which had possessed these men, and which they had sought to satisfy through Taoism, led them to welcome and to propagate the Pure Land, which offered a future life of bliss, not to the few and at the price of long practice, as did Taoism, but to the many, and by the much easier road of faith. Certainly some of the more earnest Taoists of the period found in Amida the answer to their highest aspirations, and Taoism influenced the terminology of the school. It seems possible, moreover, that the disorders of these centuries bred in many a weariness of the world and caused them to seek to escape from it to a future life of bliss by a simpler method,

more possible for the layman, than the difficult road of Ch'an or T'ien T'ai.

Other schools were to follow in the next century or two—upon the narrative of which we are shortly to enter. The end of the sixth century and the reunification of the Empire saw Chinese Buddhism in its heyday, prepared to take a prominent part of the brilliant era then dawning. That era was to owe much of the distinctiveness of its culture to the contributions brought by the foreign religion.

## SUMMARY

The three and a half centuries of comparative internal weakness, civil strife, and foreign invasion which followed the downfall of the Han dynasty had at last come to an end. They had been marked by almost incessant warfare. Ambitious rulers, Chinese and non-Chinese, many of them taking the title of Emperor, had sought to annihilate their rivals. The sufferings of the masses had often been intense, and for long periods extensive sections of the country had been given over to what was little better than anarchy. However, civilization had by no means collapsed, the non-Chinese peoples were being assimilated, and in some directions advance was registered. Buddhism was winning a large place for itself, bringing with it important contributions from other lands. The breaking of the hard and fast molds of the Han and the entrance of fresh ideas may have been necessary if there was to be a new period of cultural development. However, the China of the seventh and succeeding centuries, while displaying many new features, was still basically unaltered from that of the Han. The revolution was not nearly so thoroughgoing or so prolonged as in the Occident. Possibly as a consequence, the Europe of the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries differed much more from the Graeco-Roman world than did the China of the seventh to the twentieth century from that of the Ch'in and the Han. Yet it was a somewhat altered China which emerged from the years of distress.

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*Liang Shu* and the *Ch'ên Shu,* or the Book of Liang and the Book of Ch'ên, were both written by Yao Chien (died 643) at imperial order, largely on the basis of material collected and partially compiled by his father, Yao Ch'a, an official under the Ch'ên. The *Wei Shu* was written by Wei Shou (506–572), was twice revised in the next two decades, and in its present form was revised and added to from other sources under the Sung (960–1279). It is unique among the dynastic histories in having an essay on Buddhism and Taoism, for the writers of most of these histories, being orthodox Confucianists, tended to ignore the rival faiths. The *Pei Ch'i Shu,* or book of the Northern Ch'i, in rather different literary style, was written by Li Po-yao (565–648) from sources assembled by his father, Li Tê-lin, an official under the Northern Ch'i and the Northern Chou. The *Chou Shu* was compiled early in the T'ang dynasty, by imperial order, from contemporary, or nearly contemporary, material. The *Nan Shih,* or Southern History, an abbreviated account of the Sung, Southern Ch'i, Liang, and Ch'ên, was compiled by Li Yen-shou of the seventh century and revised by a contemporary, Ling-hu Tê-fên. From the literary standpoint it is inferior, but it contains some information not found in the separate histories of these dynasties. The *Pei Shih,* or Northern History, an abbreviated account of the Northern Wei, the Northern Ch'i, the Northern Chou, and the Sui, also by Li Yen-shou, is much better done than the *Nan Shih* and fills many of the *lacunae* in the separate histories of these dynasties. In both works the author made use of his father's notes.

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CHAPTER FIVE

# Reunion and Renewed Advance: The Sui (A.D. 589–618) and T'ang (A.D. 618–907) Dynasties

## INTRODUCTORY

The prolonged disunion and internal and external weakness had at last come to an end. We do not know all the reasons why unity was achieved. Some were attributable to monarchs under whom it was accomplished. Leading ministers who served as advisers to the emperors had a share. But there may have been additional factors, cultural and economic, of which we are not fully aware. A major factor was the centuries-long conviction cherished in China that all truly civilized mankind—as the Chinese understood civilization—must be under one ruler. Whatever the reasons, there now followed one of the most brilliant periods in the entire history of China. United politically, the Middle Kingdom entered upon renewed prosperity and expanded her borders farther even than under the Han. In the seventh and eighth centuries China was one of the most extensive and powerful states on the planet.

During the centuries of division cultural differences had developed between the North and the South. In the North life tended to be more austere than in the South, with monogamy and simpler food, clothing, and manners. Northerners regarded the Southerners as effete and lacking in martial virtue. In the South life was easier, concubinage more common, and the educated regarded the literary style of the North as crude and harsh. Under the political unity brought by the Sui and T'ang these differences, although not fully disappearing, became less marked. In her prosperity China's population increased and with it her commerce. Peoples all over East Asia were dazzled by her might and her culture and attempted to learn from her. Compared with China of the Sui and T'ang, contemporary Europe was divided into small, semibarbarous states.

Under the Sui and the T'ang, moreover, China registered fresh advances in civilization. Originality in political thought, although by no means absent, was not so marked as in the later years of the Chou, and the dynasties produced no innovating administrative genius equal to those

of the Ch'in and the Han. Yet creative statesmanship was not lacking. While in political theory and governmental organization the Sui and the T'ang were content to build upon foundations laid in the past, they showed skill in utilizing and modifying the principles and framework which had precedents from the Chou, the Ch'in, and the Han. Never after the Sui and the T'ang was China to have such prolonged disunion and near anarchy as preceded them, and it may well be—although it cannot certainly be demonstrated—that this was due to the effectiveness with which their statesmen did their work. In the realm of the aesthetic, moreover, especially in art and in poetry, the China of the T'ang attained a level previously never approached. In the last years of the period of disunion, under the Sui, and during the most prosperous years of the T'ang, Buddhism in China reached its acme and joined with other forces in stimulating a new outburst of the Chinese spirit—this time in an expression of the emotions in art and poetry. Buddhism also continued to stir the Chinese mind to grapple with problems of philosophy.

To the traditional Chinese historians, committed to the dynastic cycles as the determinative framework of China's past, the nearly three centuries constituted an era. But in them were subdivisions. The rebellion of An Lu-shan (A.D. 755–757) was notably a dividing point. Cultural developments in the decades which followed that event saw the inception or growth of movements which were a prelude to those which were seen in the tenth and eleventh centuries.

## THE SUI DYNASTY

As the Ch'in preceded the Han but had only a brief life as compared with the latter, so the Sui enjoyed only a short tenure of power. The Sui, however, although responsible for many important developments, did not make so notable a contribution to the permanent heritage of the nation as had the Ch'in.

Yang Chien, the founder of the Sui, and known to posterity under the title of Kao Tsu or Wên Ti (known to posterity as Sui Wên Ti to distinguish him from the Wên Ti's of other dynasties) was a strong ruler. Of Chinese descent, as we have said, he married an able woman of non-Chinese stock. She was strong-minded, a devout Buddhist, and insisted, successfully, that he abstain from the extra-marital relations customary among men of his rank. Until the age of thirteen he had been reared by a Buddhist nun. He was therefore amenable to his Empress's wish of having nightly readings of the Buddhist scriptures to the court. He was suspicious and given to violent outbursts of rage, but was loyal to friends when he gave them his confidence. His most trusted minister advocated strict autocratic centralized rule. Wên Ti's policy was a combination

of Legalism modified by Confucianism, and Taoism underlain by Buddhist piety. Wên Ti followed an austere manner of life, was hard working, a superb administrator, a shrewd judge of the abilities and weaknesses of those about him, and was decisive in action. In 589 he conquered the South. To replenish the North, he moved into it peoples from the more prosperous South. Under him the administration of the Empire was reorganized, and modifications were made in the territorial divisions over which members of the bureaucracy were placed. Even more systematically than had the Han, he developed the examination system and the centralization of power by appointment from the capital. He stressed a succession of canals to connect the Yellow River with the Yangtze—advantageous in unifying the North and the South. Whether these were begun *de novo,* or were a renovation and enlargement of a series which can be traced to Chou times, is not clear. They were also devised to ship to the North the grain from the prosperous South, for it was on grain that the land tax was largely levied. He created central granaries for the storing of the surplus products of the soil. During his reign the Chinese reconquered what is now Tongking and part of Annam, which, on the southern edge of the Empire, had been in revolt since at least 590—in the years when Wên Ti was attempting to consolidate his rule. Under Wên Ti the Chinese again took a hand in the politics of Central Asia. In the second half of the sixth century, the T'u Chüeh, or Turks, it will be recalled, had established a federation extending over a vast area in Mongolia and Central Asia. Like so many of these ephemeral empires, theirs soon broke apart: the Eastern (also called the Northern) Turks separated from those of the West (582). The Chinese sought to deepen the divisions among the Turks, as a preliminary to increasing their influence in the region and possibly also as a means of defense.

A major achievement of Sui Wên Ti was the creation of a new capital. Like the capital of the Former Han and of some of the dynasties between the Han and the Sui, it was called Ch'angan and was in the valley of the Wei. But the Ch'angan begun by Wên Ti was entirely new. It was near the former Ch'angan, but much larger. The old Ch'angan was troubled by brackish water. Moreover, it was regarded as being haunted by ghosts of its earlier inhabitants. Wên Ti's Ch'angan was a rectangle, nearly six miles from east to west and more than five miles from north to south. It is said to have been the first planned city in history. It was laid out by engineers and with buildings designed by architects. The main outlines of streets and walls were completed within a year. Some of the ideas were from Loyang, which, it will be recalled, had been the capital of the Later Han, but that city was not slavishly copied. To feed the population, Wên Ti's successor completed the Grand Canal—from Hangchow to Ch'angan—and so insured a supply of food. Water continued

to be a problem. At its height, under the T'ang dynasty, Ch'angan seems to have had about a million people within its walls and another million outside them. It was clearly the most populous city which the world had seen up to that time—with the possible exception of Bagdad—and in that respect outstripped Rome and Constantinople at the height of the Roman Empire.

Wên Ti died suddenly in 604, perhaps killed by his son, the heir apparent, who succeeded him. This son, Yang Kuang, better known to posterity as Yang Ti, is an enigma. He fared badly at the hands of orthodox Chinese historians, for they saw in him the stereotype of the evil ruler whose wickedness was responsible for the loss of the Mandate of Heaven and exaggerated his foibles, vices, and weaknesses. He was obviously a man of abounding energy, vaulting ambition, and creative imagination. While retaining the center of administration at Ch'angan, he made Loyang a second capital and established a third on the Yangtze at the modern Yangchow. He completed, by means of a vast army of laborers, the chain of canals developed by his father to connect Ch'angan and the Yellow River with the Yangtze. He built, at heavy cost, two walls, portions of that bulwark of frontier fortifications which, from at least the time of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, intermittently played so large a part in the defense program of the Empire along its northern borders—a boundary which nature has left unusually vulnerable. He also erected vast palaces. He made changes in the administrative machinery of the Empire: he restored a type of territorial division that had been abolished earlier in the dynasty and created a new set of officers—traveling inspectors whose charge it was to report on the conduct of other members of the bureaucracy, thus, presumably, to insure efficiency and prevent sedition. In contrast with his father, who had recruited his bureaucracy largely from Northerners, many of non-Chinese blood, he depended mainly on Southerners. Also unlike his father, while still utilizing Buddhism, he stressed Confucianism. He encouraged schools. He modified the examinations for the civil service. He is credited with the introduction of what became the examination in the capital leading to the degree of *chin shih*—which persisted into the twentieth century. He augmented the imperial library, partly by adding to it existing works and partly by commanding scholars to come to court and each to write on his specialty.

Yang Ti continued the vigorous foreign policy of his father. In the South, in 605, a punitive expedition was dispatched against the Chams (in the present Vietnam), who had been raiding the Chinese domains. Chinese arms were possibly carried as far as the Gulf of Siam. Yang Ti further extended Chinese influence in what is now Sinkiang, aiding one Turkish prince against another and establishing Chinese sovereignty over some of the oases along the trade routes, among them Turfan. Yet the

Turks remained strong. Prince Shotoku, who led in the introduction of Chinese culture to Japan, sent embassies to the court of Yang Ti.

Failures in foreign policy were the immediate cause of the dynasty's downfall. Yang Ti put forth great efforts, costly to his realm, in successive expeditions against a state in what is now the southern portion of Manchuria and the northern portion of Korea. The first met with disaster, a second with failure, and while, after a third, the Korean ruler offered a qualified submission, tthe Emperor had suffered greatly in prestige. These misfortunes were followed by a further loss of kudos when Yang Ti was trapped in a fortress (in Northern Shansi) by the Turks and was saved only through the strategy of a young officer, Li Shih-min—of whom more in a moment. These reverses fanned into flame the discontent which the vigorous measures and costly public works of the Emperor had fomented. Revolts broke out in several sections. Yang Ti shut himself up in one of his palaces in Yangchow and gave himself over to pleasure. Some of the rebels forced their way in and killed him (618). Of the two puppets of the imperial family who were set up in the course of the revolt, one was killed and the other abdicated, both in 619.

## THE FOUNDING OF THE T'ANG DYNASTY: KAO TSU (REIGNED A.D. 618–626) AND T'AI TSUNG (REIGNED A.D. 627–649)

Several of the rebels against the Sui attempted to set themselves up as its successor. One, however, Li Yüan, partly because of the ability of his second son, Li Shih-min, eliminated the others. Li Yüan was of aristocratic lineage, a native of the North, and related to the imperial house. His mother was of non-Chinese extraction. The dynasty of which he was first monarch, the T'ang, is dated from 618. The capital was established at the Ch'angan begun by Sui Wên Ti, so that again, as so often before, the center of Chinese power was on the fertile plain of the Wei. The position was one from which commerce could be carried on across the overland trade routes and military expeditions be dispatched to the Northwest, that dangerous highway of invasions. During most of his reign, Li Yüan, or, as he is better known to posterity, Kao Tsu, was largely engrossed in suppressing his rivals and in making his position secure. In 627, in his early sixties, he abdicated in favor of Li Shih-min.

Li Shih-min, or, to give him the title by which he is best known, T'ai Tsung (to make clear his dynasty, T'ang T'ai Tsung), was one of the ablest monarchs and had one of the most brilliant reigns in China's long history. Still only twenty-one years of age when his father ascended the throne (618), he contributed markedly to the latter's triumph, and although he opened his own way to the succession by killing two of his brothers, he proved to be, for an autocrat, fairly magnanimous, frugal in

his private life, usually affectionate to his family, and one who could attract and hold the loyalty of subordinates. During the nearly quarter of a century of his reign (he died in 649) he succeeded in thoroughly unifying the country, in stimulating its culture and increasing its prosperity, and in placing it on a new pinacle of power.

T'ang T'ai Tsung addressed himself to the administration of his realms. The districts inhabited by non-Chinese peoples were ruled through their own princes, but the latter were given Chinese titles. For China proper, he and his father perpetuated most of the essential features of the governmental machinery of the Sui. Over such of the Empire as was predominantly Chinese in population was a bureaucracy recruited largely—at least in theory—through civil service examinations. The Emperor could and did go outside the successful candidates at these examinations for some of his officials. Men who were reliably recommended to him as promising or whose ability he himself remarked, were appointed, even when they were not holders of literary degrees. The examination system helped in part to break the power of the old aristocratic families, but they still had prestige, and naturally could give their scions an education which was of advantage in preparation for the tests. In some other ways they maintained a privileged position.

Several modifications of detail were made. The Empire was redivided into ten *tao,* or provinces, and these in turn into *chou,* or prefectures—of which 639 there were 358—and the *chou* into *hsien,* or subprefectures. In addition to members of the official hierarchy assigned to each of these divisions, there were imperial commissioners who were sent directly by the Emperor to handle emergencies, such as droughts, floods, or rebellions.

All officials were appointed directly from the capital, so that centralization characterized the system. The civil officials were charged, in true Confucian manner, with looking after the welfare and encouraging the morals of the people. Agriculture was fostered. The system of public granaries was re-established in which stores were accumulated in years of plenty to be distributed to the poor for food and for seed in times of dearth. The "equal field" system, begun before the Sui and elaborated by Sui Wên Ti, was further developed. Under it land holdings were in theory equalized and a basis was laid for taxation.

As a foundation for this bureaucracy, T'ai Tsung maintained and reinforced the state schools and the public examinations. Although his family professed descent from Lao Tzŭ (for the latter's reputed patronymic was likewise Li) and had Taoist leanings, he strengthened the Confucian cult by decreeing that in all the colleges of the Empire Confucius and Confucius's favorite disciple should be venerated. T'ai Tsung commanded a temple to be erected to Confucius in each of the *chou* and *hsien,* and later (647) honors were ordered paid in these not only to

Confucius but to twenty-two noteworthy scholars as well, mostly of the Han.

It must be noted, however, that examinations and degrees were not confined to the Confucian Classics narrowly interpreted, nor even to the literature of the Confucian school. They were also given, among other subjects, in history, law, mathematics, poetry, calligraphy, and Taoist philosophy.

As a warrior, T'ai Tsung continued to deserve the reputation which he had earned in the campaigns that brought his family to the throne. He reorganized the army, placing it on a more regular and efficient basis, and improved its weapons. He laid emphasis on the cavalry—important because of the use of the horse by his non-Chinese opponents on the north and west. He gave China a very good fighting machine.

It was not strange that under T'ai Tsung the Empire again entered on a career of foreign conquest. Especially in the West he extended its power. He pushed the Chinese frontiers farther into Central Asia than they had been at any time since the Han. Toward the close of his father's and at the outset of his own reign, the Eastern Turks, taking advantage of the still imperfect pacification of the Empire, made raids up to the very walls of Ch'angan, and the city was saved largely by the personal bravery and energy of T'ai Tsung. Before long, however, T'ai Tsung was able to turn the tide. He was not content with building ramparts on the north against the invader—he is said, indeed, to have declined to repair the Great Wall—but insisted on carrying the war into the enemies' territory and rendering the marches safe from attack by subduing the would-be invaders in their native haunts. As Sui Wên Ti had before him, he sowed dissension among the Turkish peoples. When this had done its work, his armies conquered the Eastern (or Northern) Turks (630) and brought their territories within his Empire. He took the title "Heavenly Khan," thus designating himself as their ruler. A little later the Western Turks, although then at the height of their power, were badly defeated, and the Uighurs, a Turkish tribe, were detached from them and became sturdy supporters of the T'ang in the Gobi. The Khitan, Mongols in Eastern Mongolia and Southern Manchuria, made their submission (630). In the Tarim basin and along the overland trade routes were several small states of Tochari and other peoples who seem to have been of Indo-European stock and whose language was certainly Indo-European. Some of them, including one in Turfan, were reduced to vassalage. Kashgar and Yarkand accepted Chinese garrisons, and across the mountains Samarkand and Bokhara acknowledged Chinese suzerainty. The vast Chinese domains in these regions were grouped into two administrative protectorates. At its greatest extent—after T'ai Tsung's death—they included much of what more recently have been called Sinkiang, Russian Turkestan, and Afghanistan

—although on much of this, Chinese rule sat fairly lightly. The great land routes were now more firmly under Chinese control than at any time since the Han. T'ai Tsung received and sent envoys from and into India, and it is said that in 643 an embassy arrived from the ruler of Fulin—probably from somewhere in what we now call the Near East and identical with Ta Ch'in. The Tibetans, recently (607) become a unified power, proved a formidable enemy, but T'ai Tsung, after his armies had beaten off an attack by them, gave to their prince a Chinese princess in marriage, and she is said to have had much to do with introducing among her new subjects Chinese customs and the Buddhist faith.

Having reduced the barbarians by force and diplomacy, T'ai Tsung was eager to assimilate them. Although they were usually placed under the administration of their own princes and governed according to their own customs, numbers of them were brought to Ch'angan in the military service of the Empire, and many sons of barbarian princes were educated in the schools of the capital.

In only one of his major foreign enterprises did T'ai Tsung fail. He, like Yang Ti, attempted to reduce the Kingdom in northern Korea, and like Yang Ti, was unsuccessful. However, the reverse was not followed by any upheaval such as overthrew Yang Ti. T'ai Tsung passed on his power, unquestioned, to his son.

### KAO TSUNG

So effectively had T'ai Tsung done his work that under his successor the boundaries and the prestige of China for a time continued to expand. This successor, known to posterity as Kao Tsung, was on the throne even longer than his father—from 649 until 683. Under him, two of the three states which made up Korea were at last conquered, together with part of Manchuria, and the third accepted the suzerainty of China. For years T'ang control was vigorously maintained in the far West. By the aid of the Uighurs, the Western Turks were crushed (657–659) and their territories were claimed by the Chinese, thus carrying Chinese authority into the valley of the Oxus and to the borders of India. The Arabs, recently started on their phenomenal career of conquest under the impulse of Islam, were now beginning to make themselves felt in Persia and Central Asia. The Sassanids, weakened by their struggle against the Byzantine Empire and the Turks, collapsed before them. A Sassanid aspirant to the throne of Persia is said to have sought the aid of China against them. Some of the Sassanian line are reputed to have taken refuge in Ch'angan and there to have entered the imperial service. Owing in part to dissensions among the Arabs, which temporarily halted the onward march of the Moslem arms, the Chinese for a time retained and even

strengthened their influence in the valleys of the Oxus and the Jaxartes.

Kao Tsung, moreover, did what there had been much talk of doing during his father's reign, and renewed the sacrifices of *fêng* and *shan,* which had been celebrated by Han Wu Ti. The revival seems to have been, in part, to show the glory of the imperial house and to secure for it something of the prestige and divine assistance that were supposed to have accrued to the Han. The ceremonies certainly involved elaborate preparation and great expense. Kao Tsung was a devout Buddhist and under him many monasteries were erected. He built, too, a famous palace at Ch'angan. It was immediately outside the north wall of the city and became the center of imperial administration.

Kao Tsung was not the warrior that his father had been and disasters eventually overtook him. The Tibetans, now become more powerful, wrested from the Chinese some of the most important cities in the Tarim basin. It became impossible for the Chinese to intervene in Transoxiana. Turks in Ili and Mongolia took advantage of the situation to throw off the Chinese yoke. Most of Korea, so recently subdued, again slipped out of Chinese hands. It was during Kao Tsung's reign that, strengthened by an alliance with the T'ang, the Korean kingdom of Silla (or Shilla, Sin-ra —Japanese Shiragi) in Southern Korea conquered and united the peninsula—the first time that such a feat had been accomplished.

### WU HOU

Kao Tsung eventually fell largely under the control of an able and ambitious woman, most frequently known to posterity as Wu Hou, or, at times, as Wu Tsê T'ien. She had been one of T'ai Tsung's concubines and on that monarch's death had retired to a Buddhist nunnery. Kao Tsung's Empress recalled her from seclusion to win the Emperor's affections from a concubine of whom the Empress was jealous. Wu Hou not only succeeded in displacing this concubine but also supplanted the Empress herself and had her killed. She achieved such an ascendancy over Kao Tsung that during the later years of his life she was virtually the ruler. On his death, she quickly disposed of his successor when the latter showed too great independence, and placed another puppet on the throne. Before long she deposed this next *roi fainéant* and openly assumed control of the government. She officiated at the imperial sacrifices, declared the inauguration of a new dynasty under the name of Chou, and ruthlessly exiled or executed such members of the imperial family and their supporters as dared oppose her. She had her favorites, a Buddhist monk and later two handsome brothers, and scandalous stories were inevitably whispered about her relations with them. Whatever her private life may have been, she proved a competent and energetic monarch. She partly re-established the

prestige of the Empire abroad (the Tarim basin, for example, was recovered in 692), and at home governed with an iron hand. She showed Buddhism great favor. In Chinese political history only two women rank with her, the Empress Lü of the Han and the Empress Dowager Tz'ŭ Hsi of the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty. All three had much in common, especially in masterfulness. At length, in 705, when Wu Hou was about eighty years of age and ill, a successful conspiracy deposed her and restored the first of the puppet Emperors whom she had dethroned.

This spineless creature continued to be a figurehead. He was dominated by his wife, a woman who had none of the ability of the great Wu Hou but was vicious enough and before many years had her husband poisoned. An insurrection soon made way with her and placed on the throne the second of the shadow Emperors whom Wu Hou had set up. After about two years he abdicated in favor of his third son, Li Lung-chi, who is best known as Hsüan Tsung or Ming Huang.

## THE T'ANG REACHES ITS HEIGHT: HSÜAN TSUNG (MING HUANG)

Hsüan Tsung held the throne from 712 until 756, the longest reign of the dynasty. He began with great promise. It was largely because of his initiative that his father had been restored to the throne, and he was successful in crushing court intrigues which threatened him. Under him the T'ang reached the pinnacle of its glory. The Empire was wealthier and more populous than the Han had ever been. That was partly because the fertile Yangtze Valley had been extensively developed by the Chinese.

Chinese authority again expanded in the west. The power of one of the most notable Turkish enemies of the Chinese collapsed, and two peoples allied with the Chinese (one of them the Uighurs) controlled Mongolia and much of the later Sinkiang. The Tibetans, formidable during much of the T'ang, after one outbreak were forced to agree to a truce, and a Turkish people in alliance with the Tibetans were reduced to submission. On the far west, the Chinese were feeling again the pressure of the young Moslem Empire. About 670 the Arabs, having adjusted their differences of a few years before, were beginning to menace Tokharistan, on the middle Oxus, and between 705 and 715 the Moslem arms were carried into Sogdiana, between the Oxus and the Jaxartes, and even farther. Some of the little states west of and across the mountains from the Tarim basin, in Transoxiana, which during T'ai Tsung's reign had acknowledged Chinese suzerainty, now sought the protection of the Middle Kingdom against the renewed Arab advance. The princes of Samarkand, Bokhara, Tashkend, and Tokharistan repeatedly asked assistance. Armed aid was not accorded to the most distant of the vassals, but after the death of a noted Arab general, Chinese diplomacy seems to have contributed to a temporary

expulsion of the Arabs from a part of the region. The actual fighting was done by Turks and the local inhabitants. To the states in the Pamirs and in Kashmir Hsüan Tsung gave more substantial support, and in 747 Kao Hsien-chih, a general of Korean extraction in the service of the Chinese and head of the garrisons in the four most important Western outposts, successfully led an expedition from Kashgar across the high and difficult passes in the Pamirs and the Hindukush to the upper Oxus and parts of the higher portions of the valley of the Indus, with the object of breaking the junction which (about 741) the Tibetans had formed with the Arabs. Kao Hsien-chih's expedition was a most remarkable feat and greatly enhanced Chinese prestige in the West. Indian princes in the Indus Valley accepted Chinese suzerainty.

At home Hsüan Tsung's reign was marked by a burst of cultural achievement. In Ch'angan the Emperor founded an institution known as the Hanlin Yüan. While under the T'ang it included court favorites, jugglers, and musicians, as well as scholars, in later centuries membership in it became one of the most highly prized of literary honors. Hsüan Tsung inaugurated a school for the teaching of music. Although he was personally attached to Taoism, encouraged the study of its literature, and gave the *Tao Tê Ching* the status of *Ching*, or Classic, placing it on equality with the Confucian texts with that designation, he accorded Confucius additional honors. At his court were some of the most distinguished poets and painters whom China has known—Li Po and Tu Fu among the former, and Wu Tao-Tzŭ, Han Kan, and Wang Wei among the latter—all of them names to conjure with and of all of whom we shall have occasion to say more in a moment.

In spite of its brilliance, the glory of Hsüan Tsung's reign was partly illusory. Even before his accession, at the collapse of Wu Hou's regime, changes looking toward decentralization had been made in the bureaucracy. In place of direct control from Ch'angan over all members of the hierarchy, a resident commissioner or governor was appointed for each province with the duty of overseeing the officials within his jurisdiction. At the time the innovation probably seemed a wise method of supervising the Empire, but it proved a step toward disintegration, for it tended toward the re-establishment of local states.

Hsüan Tsung, too, was to live to witness the decline of the prestige of Chinese arms abroad. In 751 Kao Hsien-chih was badly defeated by the Arabs north of Ferghana. Its weakness thus vividly demonstrated, in much of the West Chinese rule toppled like a house of cards, and the region passed largely into the hands of two Turkish peoples. To the Northeast the Khitan (Ch'i-tan) moved from the southern portion of Manchuria into the North China plain. In the Southwest the Chinese suffered disastrous reverses (751) in what is now Yünnan. Here a native principality called

Nan Chao had submitted to the T'ang, and there had followed the most nearly effective control which the Chinese had yet exerted in the area. Now Chinese armies were defeated.

In China proper, revolt arose against Hsüan Tsung. His wars and his court extravagances impoverished the people, and complaint against him was widespread. Even in the days of his prosperity, his most influential minister, Li Lin-fu, a member of the imperial clan, although a very able administrator, had been a sinister influence, and among other acts, had encouraged him to slay the heir apparent without trial. The Emperor, too, fell largely under the control of one of the most famous of Chinese beauties, Yang Kuei-fei. Yang Kuei-fei had been the wife of one of the sons of Hsüan Tsung, but in 738 she was taken by the Emperor into his own household as his chief favorite. She encouraged her infatuated imperial master, now in his fifties, in a life of extravagance and gaiety. Members of her family were given high rank, but neither she nor they appear to have had political ability to match her feminine charms. In his old age Hsüan Tsung was unable or unwilling to throw off her baleful influence, and power began slipping from his weakening hands.

The rebellion which proved the final undoing of Hsüan Tsung was led by An Lu-shan, an able fellow of non-Chinese stock who had first acquired distinction in the Chinese service by aiding in repressing some of the raids of the Khitan, and had risen high in the favor of the Emperor and of Yang Kuei-fei. In 755 An Lu-shan unfurled the standard of revolt in the Northeast, was soon master of most of the territory north of the Yellow River, and proclaimed himself Emperor. Hsüan Tsung fled from Ch'angan to Szechwan. On the way, the imperial troops either themselves put to death or obtained the execution of Yang Kuei-fei and some of her family. Hsüan Tsung, now seventy years of age and thoroughly discredited, abdicated (756) in favor of one of his sons. He lived on, in seclusion, until 762, long enough to see the rebellion crushed. An Lu-shan was killed by his own son (757), and the murderer in his turn perished at the hands of another rebel of non-Chinese stock, Shih Ssŭ-ming. Aided by contingents from Central Asia, including some Arabs, the T'ang forces retook Ch'angan (757). Shih Ssŭ-ming proclaimed himself Emperor, but within a few years was destroyed by his own eldest son, and shortly afterward the latter was overthrown and put to death by the T'ang forces.

The An Lu-shan rebellion became a major dividing point in Chinese history. That is because it proved to be a climax of several preceding developments. These were in part economic, arising from the previous migrations to the Yangtze Valley and changes in the land and tax structure. They were in part political—the growing importance of officials emerging from the civil service examinations encouraged by the Empress Wu in an effort to curb the landed aristocracy. To some degree they were ideological,

with fresh emphasis on Confucianism. Scholars who took refuge in the South from the disorders which centered in the North contributed to a ferment of thought which flowered in the Neo-Confucianism of the succeeding centuries. From the military standpoint, the militia, recruited by levies, were more and more replaced by professional soldiers.

## THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE T'ANG DYNASTY

The rebellion of An Lu-shan marked the beginning of the end of the T'ang. The Li family held the throne for nearly a century and a half longer, and the brilliance of the era, although waning, displayed occasional temporary revivals. From the reign of Hsüan Tsung, however, the course of the house of Li Yüan was downward.

An Lu-shan's defection and the accompanying disorder unleashed other forces. From the northern and western frontiers came raiding barbarians, ever ready to pounce on the fertile and wealthy plains and valleys to the south. The Tibetans especially were persistent, and at one time took Ch'angan (763). In stemming invasions and reducing internal revolts, the T'ang summoned non-Chinese peoples to their assistance. This was quite different from the Han, when the commanders and the conquering armies appear to have been entirely or chiefly Chinese.

Did this mean a decline in the vigor of the Chinese race? We do not know. The Chinese were certainly to increase in numbers and to occupy, as farmers and merchants, more territory, but it may be significant that during somewhat more than half the time that has elapsed from then to now at least part of the territory inhabited by the Chinese was under foreign control, that during a third or a fourth of it, all the Chinese were subject to foreigners, and that never since the T'ang, with the possible exception of the Communists after 1949, has China under purely native rule attained to the total area in square miles that it reached under the T'ang. The explanation may in part be in the growing commitment to Confucianism in the period to which the rebellion of An Lu-shan was the transition and the associated conviction that the use of military force is uncivilized. It is well to remember, however, that even in the nineteenth century there were notable Chinese generals and that the exploits of at least one of them, Tso Tsung-t'ang, rivaled the greatest of those of the Han and the T'ang. It must also be recalled that the Chinese have never been a pure race. It is one evidence of their strength that they have been willing to utilize and able to absorb peoples of many different stocks. Their unity has been cultural rather than racial. The large numbers of men of prominence under the T'ang who were partly or entirely of foreign descent may mean in part that the assimilation was in process.

The T'ang did not collapse all at once. When, in the middle of the

ninth century, one of the princes of Nan Chao assumed the title of Emperor and invaded Annam ("the Peaceful South"—a name which the Chinese had given to the extreme southern portions of their possessions in the present Vietnam—balanced by Anhsi, "the Peaceful West"—the designation of an administrative district that covered their holdings in the far West; Anpei, "the Peaceful North"; and Antung, "the Peaceful East"), a Chinese general, Kao P'ien, succeeded in driving him back into his own territory and later on expelled him from Szechwan. Chinese authority, too, was preserved on the western marches in the region of Tunhuang, and the northern portion of Korea was under Chinese control. Early in the ninth century the Tibetans, now weakened, made their peace with the Chinese and ceased to be a serious menace. Until nearly the middle of the ninth century, the Uighurs, long allies and supporters of the T'ang, dominated Mongolia and much of what is now Sinkiang. Even when they lost most of their territory to the Kirghiz, for a time they remained powerful in much of the Gobi and the Tarim basin. They were often called in to help the T'ang suppress internal rebellion and regarded themselves as at least the equals of the Chinese. A ninth century travel diary of a Japanese monk gives a picture of centralized control with serious attention to instructions from higher ranks of the bureaucracy.

However, while outwardly the T'ang was still imposing, and Ch'angan, in spite of the damage it had suffered in civil wars and foreign invasions, was impressive and prosperous, the family of Li was declining. Eunuchs, long employed in the court, by their intrigues gained much influence. Spasmodic attempts at reform brought no lasting improvement. The tax system devised early in the dynasty was breaking down, with resulting embarrassment to the central government.

Toward the end of the ninth century ineptitude and luxury at the capital and misgovernment were paralleled by widespread discontent and revolt. The growth of population during the early reigns of the dynasty contributed to the unrest. Pirates ravaged the coasts. A popular uprising laid waste vast sections, including some of the port cities, and in the general disorder many of the foreign merchants living in the latter were massacred. A leader of the rebels, Huang Ch'ao by name, captured Ch'angan in 880 and proclaimed himself Emperor. The T'ang sent against him Li K'o-yung, a general of Turkish stock, with a force of Turks who had been in Chinese service, and the would-be Emperor was slain. Li K'o-yung was rewarded with a principality in Shansi and before many years was practically an independent monarch.

The end of the T'ang soon followed. Chu Wên, a lieutenant of Huang Ch'ao, transferred his allegiance to the T'ang and was rewarded with a principality in Honan. In 904 Chu Wên deposed and killed his imperial master and placed a boy on the throne. In 907 he compelled this puppet

to abdicate in his favor and proclaimed himself the first of a new dynasty, the Later Liang. The T'ang had at last lost the Mandate of Heaven. In the mounting disorders Ch'angan was pillaged and all but abandoned. The Hsianfu of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries occupied only one corner of its former vast area.

## CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE T'ANG: COMMERCE

As we have several times said, the nearly three centuries of the T'ang were, with the exception of some of the later years of weakness and turmoil, among the most prosperous and culturally brilliant in the history of China. During the years of disunion before the Sui and the T'ang, foundations were being laid for a new flowering of civilization. The Sui had encouraged the revival of culture. The internal order that characterized most of the first century and a quarter of T'ang rule made for prosperity. Although the census figures are probably highly inaccurate, the population seems to have been fairly large. A conjecture for 618, possibly excessive, speaks of a total of nearly one hundred thirty millions. When every allowance is made for obvious errors, that figure discloses a state which must have been one of the two most populous of its time—rivaled only by the Arab empire. So large a body of people could not fail to attract merchants from other lands.

Foreign trade appears to have reached greater proportions under the T'ang than at any previous time. As in the earlier periods, it was due chiefly to the initiative of aliens.

As in earlier dynasties, it was both by land and by sea that foreigners came to China. The routes through the basin of the Tarim to the Northwest were traversed, especially during the first century and a quarter or more of the T'ang, when the authority of the Empire was usually strong in Central Asia. From the middle of the eighth century, when Chinese dominion in that region crumbled and disorders in China increased, trade by these roads probably was of lesser dimensions. Even then it continued—in spite of tolls and exactions from local rulers, which must have pressed heavily upon it, and of raids and wars, which must have interrupted it. Ch'angan, the seat of empire and a gateway to the populous regions of China, was naturally an important terminus of the trade, and its streets and inns must have presented a lively and cosmopolitan appearance, with merchants from many a city and land in the distant West.

The sea routes to the south coast grew in popularity. Even as early as the seventh century they were much employed. Canton won from the ports of Tongking the primacy in overseas trade. By the eighth century, Persians, Arabs, and merchants from India were coming to Canton in large vessels, and a special office was created in the city for the registry of ships, the

control of exports, and the collection of duties. With the rise of their power under the first flush of Islam, Arabs began to have an important part in this sea-borne traffic and continued to hold it for many years. Chinese goods were to be had in the bazaars of Bagdad, the capital of the Abbasid caliphate. In 758, Arabs and Persians were sufficiently strong in Canton to loot the city—perhaps in retaliation for Chinese exactions. In the ninth century we hear of Nestorian Christians, Jews, Moslems, and Persians in Canton—all of them obviously from the West. In that century the Canton trade was still closely controlled by the state, and a Moslem was appointed to administer the law of Islam among his co-religionists and so to maintain order. By at least that time others of the ports of South China, notably what is now Ch'üanchow, near the present Amoy, entered into competition with Canton. Yangchow also had foreign merchants and a share in sea-borne trade. Koreans controlled much of the coastwise shipping.

As under previous dynasties, the leading commodities of this commerce combined small bulk with large value. Silk was still a major article of export, and spices and porcelain, some of the latter from Fukien, were also carried abroad. To China came such goods as ivory, incense, copper, tortoise shell, and rhinoceros horn. It seems probable, too, that Negro slaves were brought by the Arabs to China and sold there.

Whether many Chinese merchants journeyed to foreign lands is doubtful. We know that for at least a time under T'ai Tsung an imperial rescript forbade Chinese going abroad—from which it may be fair to assume that some were in the habit of doing so. Chinese knowledge of the geography of neighboring lands was increasing, but with the one exception to be noted in a moment, the accounts that have come down to us in any complete form appear not to have been derived through first-hand observation but from the kind of information which might seep through from aliens.

## CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE T'ANG: BUDDHIST PILGRIMS AND MISSIONARIES

This one exception is important. The journeys continued, which, as we have seen, had been made to India by Chinese Buddhists from at least the close of the fourth century. The best known of the Buddhist pilgrims of the T'ang was he whose religious name was Hsüan-tsang. Hsüan-tsang was born in Honan in the first decade of the seventh century, the son of a learned official. Reared in the Confucian tradition, in his youth he was converted to Buddhism and became distinguished as a teacher of the faith. Dissatisfied with his knowledge, he wished to elucidate to his own satisfaction debated points of doctrine by inquiry and study in the land where Buddhism had had its birth. In spite of the imperial prohibition of foreign travel, in the year 629 he left for India, going by the

overland route through the Tarim basin. In India he visited many of the sites made sacred by the life, teachings, and death of the Buddha, studied with experts, and collected sacred books. After an absence of about sixteen years, he returned to China, also overland, and spent the nearly twenty remaining years of his life in teaching and in translating some of the books which he had brought back with him. The amount of literature whose translation is ascribed to him is stupendous—about twenty-five times as voluminous as the Christian Bible. He gave a great impetus to the popularity and spread of Buddhism in China. In such esteem was he held that two of the Emperors wrote prefaces for his translations, and at his death the state honored him with an official funeral. The record of his travels is so full and accurate that in recent times it has proved of assistance to archaeologists in India and Sinkiang.

A few years after Hsüan-tsang's death, another Chinese, I-ching, left for India on a similar mission (about 671 or 672). He made the journey by sea, from South China, and returning in 695 via Canton, he also brought books to be translated. We have accounts of more than fifty other pilgrims of the second half of the seventh century, several of them from Korea and other countries bordering on China, and some from China. Some went by land and others by sea. Many of whom we have no record must have made the journey.

Although Buddhism was beginning to decay in India, missionaries still came to China—but apparently did not have quite as large a place in Chinese Buddhism as in the earlier centuries. Still, at least one sect, Chên-yen (Japanese Shingon) claims as its first patriarch an Indian who arrived in the first quarter of the eighth century.

Through Buddhism and its culture contacts, mathematics, astronomy, and medicine were stimulated.

There was an extraordinary amount of movement, then, throughout the Buddhist world: Chinese monks going to and from India, Indian monks arriving in China, and monks from countries adjacent to China traversing the Middle Kingdom. Monks came to China from Japan. To one of them we owe a detailed and intimate account of life in China in the ninth century. Buddhism was helping to give a certain amount of cultural unity to Central, Eastern, and Southern Asia.

## CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE T'ANG: FOREIGN INFLUENCES, ESPECIALLY THE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN FAITHS

The contacts between the Chinese and other peoples brought foreign influences into the Middle Kingdom. The presence of Turks and others of non-Chinese stock in North China, commerce, with its foreign merchants and products in both North and South, and Buddhist pilgrims

and missionaries, could not fail to have their effect upon the life of the land. The natural obstacles between China and the other chief centers of civilization were formidable, but the isolation which they tended to produce was by no means complete. The empire of the Turks, followed by the westward expansion of Chinese power, helped to overcome the barriers and to facilitate trade and the exchange of ideas. Currents of life in other parts of Asia made themselves felt in the T'ang dominions.

Many foreign influences are difficult or impossible to trace. Ideas, inventions, and institutions do not always bear the labels of their origin, and the dates of the introduction of plants and animals of alien antecedents are seldom easily determined. It was under the T'ang that the art of making wine from grapes seems first to have come to China, that something was learned—from India—of manufacturing sugar from the cane, and that spinach, one species of garlic, and one of the several kinds of mustard were brought in. The garden pea was cultivated in China at least as early as the T'ang. Chinese knowledge of optical lenses, seemingly derived from India, is first authentically reported in the T'ang.

The introduction of foreign religions is more easily traced, although even here exact dates often elude us. Usually the T'ang Emperors were tolerant of foreign faiths and at times encouraged them. Occasionally, however, they proscribed and persecuted them.

It was apparently under the T'ang that Christianity first entered China. Certainly our earliest evidences of its existence there date from that time. What came was at least chiefly Nestorianism. This, the prevailing form of Christianity in Mesopotamia, was actively missionary for hundreds of years—until, in the fourteenth century, the later Mongol invasions dealt it all but fatal blows. It had numerous communities in cities in Central Asia with which the Chinese were in touch under the T'ang. It is not strange, therefore, that Nestorianism made its way to China. Our fullest account of it is engraved on a famous monument erected at Ch'angan in 781 and discovered in the first half of the seventeenth century. Other traces are in documents uncovered in the grottoes of Tunhuang in the far Northwest, in three imperial edicts of the T'ang, and in several other contemporary records. In the Ch'angan inscription, the introduction of the faith is ascribed to A-lo-pên of Ta-ch'in (Ta-Ch'in being the name, it will be recalled, by which for several centuries the Chinese referred to the region which we, with equal inexactness, term the Near East). A-lo-pên is reported to have arrived in Ch'angan in 635, during the reign of T'ai Tsung, and to have been received with honor by the Emperor. T'ai Tsung is said to have ordered translations made of Nestorian sacred books and to have encouraged the dissemination of the faith. A monastery was built in the capital. The faith persisted in China proper until at least the middle of the ninth century, and from time to time new missionaries came. A metro-

politan for China was appointed sometime before 823, and churches were erected in several cities. Nestorianism seems never to have had many Chinese adherents but to have depended largely upon foreigners for initiative and leadership. About the middle of the ninth century a severe persecution practically wiped it out.

Some of the documentary remains of Christianity under the T'ang indicate at least the possibility of the presence not only of Nestorians but also of Jacobite Christians. We know that there were thousands of Jacobites in the Sassanid Empire, and it is possible that some of them penetrated to China.

Another foreign faith under the T'ang was Manichaeism. Originated by Mani in the third century and showing both Persian and Christian influences, by the time of the T'ang it had spread westward into Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean world and eastward into Persia and Transoxiana. Its first appearance in China seems to have been in the last decade of the seventh century, through Iranians. The use of the seven-day week in China appears to have accompanied it. In the latter half of the eighth century, Manichaeism was introduced among the Uighurs and won many adherents from them. Since the Uighurs were then prominent in Central Asia and often gave their support to the T'ang, it made some headway in China. Manichaean temples were erected in Ch'angan, Loyang, and several other centers. Manichaeism was never popular in the Middle Kingdom and it suffered from the collapse of the Uighur power in the ninth century. Until the thirteenth century it persisted, greatly weakened, in what is now Sinkiang. In China it took the form of a sect with political-magical-religious activities—one of the many such in the history of the country—with certain outward resemblances to Taoism and Buddhism. It lived on in Fukien, subject to persecutions, until at least the beginning of the seventeenth century.

The early history of Islam in China is shrouded in obscurity and uncertainty. We know that Moslems were in the Middle Kingdom during the T'ang, some of them as merchants in the ports on the south coast and some of them as soldiers of fortune—notably the Arabs who assisted in suppressing the rebellion of An Lu-shan. We know, too, that several embassies came to the T'ang court from Moslem Arab officials in Transoxiana. Whether any converts were made from among the Chinese we do not know. Certainly it was not until several centuries later that large Moslem bodies appeared in China.

Mazdaism had entered China before the T'ang. We hear of it, too, in T'ang times, but like Islam, as the faith of foreign residents—Persian merchants and refugees from the Arab invasions. We know that there were Mazdean priests and that Mazdean temples existed in Ch'angan. We are not certain, however, that any converts were sought from among the Chinese.

Jews were in the China of the T'ang, but probably few in number and all merchants. The Jewish community in Honan, which disintegrated only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was probably of later origin.

## CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE T'ANG: BUDDHISM REACHES ITS APEX

From what has been repeatedly said in the preceding pages, it can readily be inferred that under the T'ang Buddhism prospered. It will be recalled that in the centuries immediately preceding the advent of the T'ang it had been increasing in influence. During the earlier years of the T'ang its growth continued and throughout the T'ang it was very prominent. The T'ang may be called the Buddhist age of China. Buddhist temples and shrines dotted the landscape and were conspicuous in the cities. Buddhist ceremonies were a normal part of daily life. Buddhism encouraged works of mercy—the creation and maintenance of hospitals, dispensaries, and low cost or free hostels for travelers. Indian Buddhist teachers inspired advances in astronomy and mathematics.

This does not mean that Buddhism was without enemies in high places. Scholars of the Confucian school often opposed it. To their mind it was superstitious, destructive to the family, derogatory to the authority of the Emperor, and in general antagonistic to that social and political structure which Confucianism cherished and upon which it depended. With the emphasis by the T'ang upon recruiting the civil bureaucracy from those trained in the Classics and with the granting of fresh honors to Confucius, Confucianism partly regained the prominence which it had won under the Han. From time to time one or another of its exponents denounced Buddhism to the Emperor. More than once an Emperor took vigorous action against it. Under Kao Tsu a minister of state raised his voice in criticism of it. In 626 Buddhism and Taoism were ordered abolished. Early in the eighth century a vigorous anti-Buddhist memorial was presented. The most noted of the protests was that of the famous Han Yü, the outstanding exponent of Confucianism during the T'ang. In 819 he took the occasion of an official reception accorded to a bone of the Buddha to condemn that act and the Buddhist faith. His temerity cost him his position at court, but that was because he had chosen an unfortunate time for his tirade. Kao Tsung, T'ai Tsung, and Hsüan Tsung, the strongest monarchs of the dynasty, all sought to restrict the number of monks and nuns and to keep the religion under control. In 835 an imperial decree forbade the further ordinations of Buddhist monks. In 845 an Emperor who was a devoted Taoist issued an anti-Buddhist decree which is said to have led to the destruction of more than forty thousand temples, the confiscation of temple lands, and the return to secular life

of more than a quarter of a million monks and nuns. While these figures are quite probably an exaggeration, Buddhism undoubtedly was dealt a severe blow at a time when it had already entered on a slow decline. The motives back of the decree were partly religious, but seem as well to have been fear of the power of the Buddhist monks, the diversion of much of the wealth of the country into Buddhist channels, the economic unproductiveness of the inmates of Buddhist monasteries at a time of labor shortage, and the charge that the growing weakness of the Empire arose from the corruption of the country by the foreign faith.

On the other hand, none of the persecutions appears to have lasted any length of time, nor was any of them so severe as those which the early Christian church met in the Roman Empire, or as some which Christians have inflicted on each other, or Moslems on unbelievers. Probably the anti-Buddhist edicts were usually allowed quickly to become dead letters. Several rulers of the dynasty were ardent Buddhists, among them the great Wu Hou, who for a time had been in a nunnery and under whose rule Buddhist monks were very influential. Hsüan Tsung in later years was more favorable to Buddhism than an earlier decree of his against the faith would indicate, and his successor was a devout believer.

Buddhist literature continued to be produced. Not only were foreign authors translated but original works were produced in Chinese as well. The larger proportion of the T'ang activity in the realm of philosophy was in Buddhism.

Buddhism showed its vigor, too, by continuing to give birth to new schools. Ch'an was further developed late in the seventh century by Hui-nêng, who professed to hark back to Bodhidharma but really differed from him in experiencing and teaching sudden enlightenment as the way to salvation. In the latter half of the eighth century an imperial commission made Ch'an, in the form which it had been developed by Hui-nêng and his successors, the orthodox school of Buddhism. Hsüan-tsang is largely responsible for the Fa-hsiang, or Tzŭ-ên-tsung, also known as the Wei-shih-hsiang-chiao. Its founder was an Indian teacher, but to Hsüan-tsang are due the standard translations of its chief works. Fa-hsiang taught that the visible world is only an expression of thought. It advocated Yoga practices as a way to religious realization. Closely related to the Fa-hsiang was the Hua-yen school. The Lü-tsung or Vinaya school frankly had a Chinese origin. Is was founded by Tao-hsüan in the seventh century. Perhaps partly because of the Confucian background in China which emphasizes virtue, it stressed moral discipline and asceticism as the way to salvation.

The last Chinese Buddhist school to appear was Chên-yen ("True Word," in Japanese Shingon) or Mi-chiao ("Secret Religion"), in the eighth century. Although, like so many of its predecessors, it claimed for

itself an Indian origin and for its first head in China an Indian missionary, and although it was a development of India Tantrism, a late and somewhat degenerate form of Buddhism, like the others it could not have survived and prospered if it had not fitted into the Chinese environment. In its more intellectual expressions pantheistic, rejoicing in symbolism, declaring that the one spirit manifests itself in many emanations and forms, and claiming that it had an esoteric—"true word"—doctrine revealed to initiates only after a long and grueling novitiate, in practice it stressed magic formulae and ceremonies and thus provided a short cut to salvation.

Thus Buddhism became naturalized in China. Its major schools, especially Ch'an, T'ien T'ai, Ch'ing T'u, and Chên-yen, were adaptations to the Chinese environment and Chinese needs. It is interesting to find a Buddhist monk of the eighth and ninth centuries attempting to prove the accord of Buddhist and Confucian morality and of Taoist and Buddhist metaphysics.

In no dynasty after the T'ang did Buddhism develop a new school. While Buddhism was to go on as an outstanding feature of Chinese culture, by the end of the T'ang its vitality had begun to ebb.

The cause of this decline must be in part a matter of conjecture. One was probably the decay of Buddhism in India and the consequent paucity of fresh currents flowing from there to China. Another was the recruiting of so many members of the bureaucracy from those trained in the Confucian texts. With short interruptions, state examinations based upon non-Buddhist literature were to continue into the first decade of the twentieth century. Since through them lay the chief road to social and political distinction, they tended to absorb the best brains of the country. Buddhism was weak in that it was other-worldly and had no political program. Chinese rulers, seeking a system which would help them govern the Empire, found in Confucianism what Buddhism lacked. Whatever the cause, with the later years of the T'ang, Buddhism began slowly to decay.

## CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE T'ANG: CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM

As we have hinted, Confucianism experienced a marked growth under the T'ang. In their personal practices and beliefs, the majority of the Emperors were more inclined toward Taoism or Buddhism than toward this "cult of the learned." Taoism, indeed, seems to have reached the apex of its influence at court. Hsüan Tsung gave much attention to it. We hear, too, of a later ruler of the dynasty who seriously impaired his health by taking potions supposed to be the elixir of life. With such advocacy in high quarters, Taoism was popular in the nation

at large. One of the celebrated eight "Immortals" *(Hsien)* of Taoism, Lü Yen, lived in the eighth century, and to him is traditionally attributed a famous Taoist treatise on ethics. Political expediency, however, demanded that the monarchs give official support to Confucianism. Here was a system on which government and society could be based far more effectively than upon Taoism or Buddhism. Taoism in its primitive documents would do away with much of government and social organization as the Chinese knew them, and with important exceptions—as in the Yellow Turbans of the Han—was individualistic and stressed the devotion of one's energies to the achievement of personal immortality through unsocial practices. Buddhism, other-worldly, with its eyes centered on life beyond the grave, demanded of those who followed it completely the renunciation of family and of participation in ordinary political and economic life. Confucianism, however, was essentially this-worldly, emphasized the family and political theories, and was in accord with the traditional structure of Chinese society. It is not strange, therefore, that the T'ang reinforced Confucianism and further developed the administrative and educational machinery which perpetuated it.

As we have noted, T'ai Tsung ordered (630) that in every *chou* and *hsien* a temple should be erected to Confucius. He also commanded that sacrifices be offered there by scholars and government officials. To the twenty-two names of distinguished exponents of the cult which he ordered placed in the temples, others were added later in the dynasty. The Confucian temple, indeed, became in time a kind of national hall of fame.

In schools which the T'ang ordered maintained in the capital and the provinces, the subjects of study were the Confucian Classics of the Chou period, the histories of Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien and of the Han dynasties, and —for the legal experts—the law.

The tests by which admission was had to the bureaucracy were not of the kind to encourage any great originality of thought. The state examinations were elaborated under the T'ang and included a large variety of degrees and something of a choice of topics. Those which admitted to the degree of *chin shih,* for instance, might be either in the Classics, law, calligraphy, or mathematics. One set of examinations was in Taoist studies, and for the army, tests were given largely in skill in martial exercises. However, degrees taken in the Confucian Classics appear to have been the most highly esteemed. Any radical departure from established theories would scarcely commend itself to the bureaucrats who read the papers. Except in Buddhism, creative philosophic effort seems to have been largely lacking.

Still, the literary output was immense. Owing to the examination system and the training it presupposed, many an official was also an author. Essays, poetry, and the writing of histories of the preceding dynasties,

all had their devotees. Tu Yu produced the *T'ung Tien*, a treatise on the constitution, a masterly work which helped to set the precedent for a new type of history. Liu Chih-chi wrote the *Shih T'ung,* or Comprehensive Study of History, notable for its critical acumen. Some well-known dictionaries were compiled. Literary form was at a premium.

The greatest master of prose style of the dynasty was Han Yü (768–824)—later canonized as Han Wên Kung. A native of the North and an eager student from his boyhood, he rose to the presidency of the Board of Rites. His official career was somewhat checkered, especially since on at least two occasions he did not hesitate to incur imperial displeasure with frank-spoken memorials. Han Yü's work was long considered a model. He contributed to a new era in prose writing. His style was more supple than that of the Han and less ornate, simpler, and more direct than that of most of the scholars of the period of disunion, of the Sui, and of the earlier years of the T'ang. In part it was modeled on the Classics of the Chou and was a reaction against the artificial "parallel" form of the centuries which immediately preceded him. The reaction took the form of the *ku wên,* or "ancient literary style." It was associated with fresh approaches to the Confucian Classics of the Chou, notably the commentaries on the *Ch'un Ch'iu.* But, as with many other vital movements, it had varied expressions.

Han Yü, it will be noted, was a champion of Chinese conservatism —or what today might be called nationalism. Along with other Confucianists, he vigorously opposed those who would seek alliance with the Uighurs and who would admit Manichaeism and tolerate Buddhism and other contributions from without. In the end, as we shall repeatedly see, it was this nationalistic tendency which triumphed, although its victory was tempered with concessions to importations from without. It was significant that Han Yü lived after the An Lu-shan rebellion. He was a pioneer and a leading representative of the new age that dawned in the later centuries of the T'ang.

## CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE T'ANG: POETRY

The T'ang saw the greatest Chinese poetry and some of the best Chinese painting. Such tides of the spirit are always difficult to account for. In this case they almost certainly had some connection with Taoism and Buddhism, for both these faiths encouraged the man of insight to look below surface appearances—held to be illusory—to the reality beneath. Buddhism, too, with its many Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, with its conceptions of heaven and hell, and with the art forms that came with it, both stimulated the imagination and provided it with subjects. Buddhism was impressed with the impermanence of life—a note of sadness which

runs through much of the T'ang poetry. On the other hand, the fact must be included that some of the greatest of the poets were of the orthodox Confucian school and were scornful of both Buddhism and Taoism. Unquestionably, also, the order and the prosperity which the T'ang gave the country afforded opportunity for the arts of civilization.

A technical discussion of Chinese verse would presuppose a knowledge of the Chinese language and would be both confusing and boring to the average Occidental reader. It need not, therefore, be entered upon here. This much must be said, however. To rhyme and length of line, which the older poetry had stressed, the T'ang added emphasis on tone, a practice begun in the centuries of disunion. As in prose, form and style were highly prized, and it was in the originality and perfection of these that the T'ang poetic genius best expressed itself. In the ninth century, moreover, the songs of popular entertainers and of dancing girls led to a new type of verse, which was to flourish for four centuries or so. The songs were written to go with popular tunes, had irregular lines, and so displayed more melody and greater variety than the older, orthodox, poetry. The subjects and sentiments of T'ang poems often harked back to those of preceding dynasties, but there was also a widening of the range of themes. Among the favorite topics were battle, a deserted concubine, the emotions aroused by a landscape, friendship, the meeting and parting of friends, a ruin, the song of birds, the moonlight, and wine. Translations of Buddhist poetry exerted a marked influence.

The two most famous poets of the dynasty, and usually deemed the greatest in all Chinese literature, were Li Po and Tu Fu. Li Po was probably, although not certainly, born in the far West. The year seems to have been between 699 and 705. Most of his life he was a wanderer. In his youth he was something of a swashbuckler, and always he was fond of wine. At one period he retired to a mountain as a member of a gay group dubbed the "Six Idlers of the Bamboo Brook." His matrimonial ventures were many. He was never successful in attaining to high public office—the conventional road to distinction—nor was he long far removed from poverty. He was too much of a Bohemian for that. For a time in early middle life he was in Ch'angan, where he was a favorite with Hsüan Tsung and was one of the brilliant and gay group who made the court of that Emperor famous. In company with others of the "Eight Immortals of the Wine-cup" he frequented the taverns of the city, and on at least one occasion is said to have been brought drunk into the imperial presence. After three years he fell into disgrace—why is not known. Again he went on his travels. In his later years his wanderings were troubled by the confusion attending the uprising of An Lu-shan, and he narrowly escaped execution for having attached himself to the fortunes of another unsuccessful rebel of those stormy years. A popular

tradition has it that he finally came to his end by drowning when, drunk and out boating, he attempted to embrace the reflection of the moon in the water. Unfortunately for romance, he seems to have died, in most prosaic fashion, in 762, while living with a kinsman in the present Anhui. He was fond not only of the town and of gay and loose living, but of the mountain and the stream, and in him ran a strong Taoist strain. His poems appear to have been largely spontaneous, dashed off rapidly, not labored, and are noted for their lyric beauty, their mastery of the use of words, their originality of style, and both for their skill in handling the older poetic forms and for their successful variations of and departures from literary conventions. He knew anxiety and disappointment, but sought escape from them—and helped his readers to do so—into a dream world, lifted there in an ecstasy of form and rhythm.

Tu Fu (712–770), also for a time at the court of Hsüan Tsung and one of the "Eight Immortals of the Wine-cup," led a life marked by suffering. Although precocious as a youth, he failed to attain distinction in the imperial examinations. After much waiting and disappointment, in middle life he won favor, through his writing, with Hsüan Tsung. He was separated from his family for long periods during the years of civil strife at the end of that reign, and some of his children starved to death. Appointed in 759 to an official charge which irked him, he left it, thoroughly disillusioned. In the capacity of censor, he fell into disgrace for dealing faithfully with Hsüan Tsung's successor. In contrast with Li Po, he took great pains with his composition; his work lacks a certain daring and lyrical quality found in the other. The iron had entered deeply into his soul and he was a stark realist, portraying suffering in very moving fashion.

Later than Li Po and Tu Fu was Po Chü-i (772–846). The son of a minor official, he himself early passed the state examinations and entered upon an official career. Most of his life was spent in public office in the capital and the provinces, sometimes in and sometimes out of imperial favor, and accordingly, occasionally in virtual banishment to an obscure and distant local post. Trained in the Confucian Classics, he valued content above form and sought to make his verses the medium for moral instruction. In this he was not always successful, for the poet in him often broke the bonds of his Confucianism. It was the romantic lines which he composed while in this mood that were the most popular. He could use either the classical or the newer poetic forms and was careful to make his work simple—testing it, so we hear, by its intelligibility to an old peasant woman. For years many of his poems were enormously popular and were on the lips of high and low.

Many another poet of the T'ang might be mentioned—the soldier Ch'ên Tzŭ-ang, the military counselor Sung Chih-wên, Wang Wei the

painter, the Taoists Ch'ang Chien and T'ao Han, and Liu Tsung-yüan, the earnestly Buddhist friend of Han Yü. One collection includes nearly fifty thousand poems of the period.

### FICTION

It must also be noted that there was prose fiction, written in the vernacular and made up mostly of short stories and rudimentary novels. It arose from the professional storytellers who entertained their hearers with tales, sometimes in verse, sometimes in a mixture of verse and prose, and sometimes in prose. Beginning with about the eighth century, the storytellers began to put their tales into writing, much as they narrated them to their public. This helped to give rise to a vernacular literature.

### CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE T'ANG: ART

The T'ang is only a little less famous for its painters than for its poets. There was, indeed, a flowering of several kinds of art. In this, Buddhism had a large part. The religious enthusiasm aroused by it stimulated the imagination, it was the vehicle for many new forms, and its temples were ornate with statues and paintings, most of them the work of Chinese. It will be recalled that in what is now Sinkiang many non-Chinese artistic influences were found—Greek as mediated through Gandhara, Sassanid, Graeco-Roman, and Indian of the Gupta period (fourth and fifth centuries)—utilized by that great variety of peoples, Indo-European, Turk, and Mongol, who were found there. They could scarcely fail to have effects in the Middle Kingdom. Their blending with older Chinese styles and ideals can be vividly seen in the Buddhist rock temples in the grottoes of Tunhuang, near the far western edge of Kansu.

In China itself many forms of sculpture were developed. Chinese sculpture, indeed, reached its apex in the first century of the T'ang. In some places the Han tradition survived, with its portrayals of animals and of scenes from human life. In Buddhist shrines the predominant motifs showed either the effects of Graeco-Buddhist Gandhara or of the somewhat later Gupta period, with its more sinuous lines. Buddhist art of the T'ang possessed greater elegance than that of the Northern Wei, but less vigor. It was, however, of a very high order, and some of the most beautiful statues ever produced by man were the work of this period—as may be seen from surviving examples in China and Korea. In secular art much of the Han tradition, modified, was represented in huge monoliths and in wall carvings. The best of the sculpture had mostly been done before the downfall of Wu Hou. As the dynasty progressed, sculpture

tended to be less produced. In such as was created, secular influences increased at the expense of Buddhism, and there was more naturalism and less adherence to convention.

There have come down to us many earthenware figurines which display unusual vigor, grace, and lifelikeness—mounted horsemen, animals, foreigners, men, and women—showing artistic freshness and marked skill.

It was probably in the sixth and seventh centuries, after a long preliminary development, that one of the most characteristic of Chinese artistic mediums, true white porcelain, first appeared. Not until later dynasties, however, was it to be put to its most extensive uses.

Painting now attained a high pinnacle—in the judgment of some, the highest in Chinese history. Buddhism and Taoism seem to have been chiefly responsible. The principles of calligraphy, a fine art in China, were also now fully applied to painting, with resulting improvement in skill and emphasis upon line. The greatest painter of the T'ang—possibly of all Chinese history—was Wu Tao-hsüan (also known as Wu Tao Tzŭ and Wu Tao-yüan), who was one of the glories of the brilliant court of Hsüan Tsung. A master of landscapes, in which field he was said to have initiated a new school, he was also, and especially, devoted to Buddhist and Taoist themes. It is about him that there grew up the interesting story of a landscape with which he had decorated a wall for the Emperor. As the two, the artist and the monarch, stood before it, the artist clapped his hands, a door opened, and he passed within it. Before his astonished patron could accept his invitation to follow, the door closed, and the painter was never again seen. Wu's greatest work, it is said, was on the walls of temples at Ch'angan and Loyang. He was an extreme realist but did not depart from the classical canons of his art. He also possessed both fertility of imagination and technical skill.

A friend of Wu Tao-hsüan was the poet, official, physician, and painter Wang Wei. An earnest Buddhist, he spent much time in quiet retirement in the country. His last years were greatly disturbed by the rebellion of An Lu-shan, for he accepted office under that upstart and was imprisoned for a time after the collapse of the revolt. His monochrome landscapes are especially famous, and later critics thought of him as belonging to the Southern, as opposed to the Northern, School. This distinction had only partial geographical significance and went back to a classical allusion. The Southern School was supposed to be dreamy and to deal in subdued tones, and the Northern to use strong colors and to be characterized by force and precision. The classification is, however, artificial when applied to the T'ang.

A friend and protégé of Wang Wei was Han Kan, a noted painter of horses. His subjects were usually the steeds sent as tribute to the

imperial court by the peoples of the North and West. A distinguished landscape painter, later regarded as outstanding in the so-called Northern School, was Li Ssŭ-hsün, a great-grandson of the founder of the dynasty. He was followed and perhaps excelled by his son, Li Chao-tao. Yen Li-tê, of the seventh century, and his younger brother, Yen Li-pên, were both in high official position and both employed Taoist and Buddhist subjects and historical scenes. We hear, too, of painters of flowers and birds, of plants and insects—but to give the names of all the artists of distinction would be confusing.

It is possible that in many of the paintings were earlier Chinese influences—from the ceremonial processions seen in the tombs of the Han, and from the formal observances in connection with the ancestral rites. Certainly there was more than one strain—Taoism, different schools of Buddhism, impulses and models from the seminomadic peoples with whom the Chinese were in touch on the northern frontiers and in the northern provinces, traditional Chinese forms, and the contributions from other lands and cultures which we have noted above. These were all present, acting either singly or in various mixtures on different men and localities.

Calligraphy, in the Chinese mind closely related to painting, had many devotees, and the works of earlier masters were sought out and reproduced by imperial order. The dynasty could not, however, boast of calligraphers as great as could some others.

## CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE T'ANG: PRINTING

It is from T'ang times that we have our earliest examples of that revolutionary art, printing. From Japan, then recasting its life under Buddhist and Chinese influence, come charms of the latter part of the eighth century, in Sanscrit and Chinese, printed by wood blocks. From the grottoes of Tunhuang we have the earliest known extant printed book, a Buddhist sutra, struck off in 868, also from wooden blocks, for free distribution—presumably as an act of piety. How many years before these specimens the art originated we do not know—possibly as early as the Sui. Apparently it was an evolution, conceivably—although by no means certainly—from the use of seals. It was to have a noteworthy development in China, and as late as the close of the eighteenth century the Empire may have contained more printed books than all the rest of the world.

## ECONOMIC LIFE

One would like to know something of the life of the toiling masses of the Sui and T'ang—the way in which they made a livelihood,

and their agricultural and industrial organizations. Some fragments of information are accessible to us, but we still lack adequate monographs on the subject. As we have seen, both Sui Wên Ti and T'ang T'ai Tsung espoused the "equal field" system with an attempt to equalize the land holdings. We know, too, that efforts were made again and again to prevent the sale of these holdings, and so to forestall the growth of large landed estates. That was partly to maintain revenues through preventing the growth of tax-exempt property. The system inevitably broke down and complaints were repeatedly registered of landless poor against wealthy landowners. However, peasant proprietorship seems to have been fairly general. We hear of governmental promotion of irrigation canals. We read of movements to disband part of the army and to move the soldiers back to the land. We have records of famines—even before the declining years of the T'ang—and often the government sought to give relief by distributing food and remitting taxes. Taxes were of many kinds, some of them based on the land and some on trade and commodities. At times they were very heavy. Standard forms in use during the initial centuries of the T'ang were levies on individual land owners, a levy in kind on each family (chiefly for town-dwellers), and required labor—which might be compounded by the payment of silk. Toward the close of the eighth century a statesman, Yang Yen, substituted for all these a single tax on the land, payable twice a year, a practice continued under later dynasties. There were currency troubles, with debased coinage and attempts to improve it. Copper coins and silk were used as currency, and negotiable certificates were tried out. Nowhere in T'ang times, however, do we have any such thoroughgoing radical social and economic experiments as under Wang Mang, or as were to be made under the Sung.

After the suppression of the An Lu-shan revolt, changes in landowning proceeded rapidly which had begun before that uprising. The "equal field" system, with its peasant proprietorship, was passing. Great landed estates arose under absentee owners and administered by resident agents. These states were augmented by the suppression of monasteries and the acquisition of many of their properties by the landed proprietors. All this meant the rise of a new aristocracy. At the same time cities multiplied and grew in size with a mounting urban population and a growth in trade and industries.

## INFLUENCE OF CHINA ON SURROUNDING COUNTRIES

One last outstanding feature of the T'ang must be noted—the influence of China upon her neighbors. So extensive, so prosperous, and so brilliant an Empire could not fail to have a profound effect upon surrounding peoples. Even when they beat back the arms of the T'ang,

they could not, or at least did not, resist her culture. Already under the Sui, Buddhism and with it Chinese civilization—which had been trickling in for centuries—were pouring into Japan. Japanese came in numbers to China. Some of them were students, largely monks, and lived in the Middle Kingdom for many years before returning home. Others were official envoys. Chinese embassies were also sent to Japan, and intercourse between the governments of the two countries was maintained. The Japanese copied the plan of Ch'angan in their capitals, first in Nara and then in Heian (Kyoto), and in art, literature, religion, and administrative organization sought to imitate their great neighbor. The result was a Sinicized Japan—although the islanders proved to be skillful adapters and not blind copyists. Korea, too, took over much of the culture of China, as indeed she had long been doing, even in those sections which had been politically independent. Much of what is now Vietnam was within the circle of T'ang cultural influence. Tibet seems to have derived some of its Buddhism from China. In the present Sinkiang the influence of Chinese art was felt, and Chinese Buddhism appears to have had some converts. It seems also to have been during the T'ang that the use of paper, in its origin a Chinese invention, spread to Samarkand—through Chinese captured by the Arabs after the defeat of Kao Hsien-chih in 751—and to Western Asia, whence, in due time, it made its way to Europe. A Chinese, made prisoner at the time of the fall of the T'ang power in the far West, journeyed to Mesopotamia and reported that at Kufa, one of the Abbasid capitals, some of his fellow countrymen had inaugurated—a possible exaggeration—painting, the manufacture of silk, and work in gold and silver. China was a giver as well as a receiver of civilization.

## SUMMARY

Under the T'ang, China was for centuries a unified, prosperous, and highly civilized empire. During the first century and a half of the T'ang its territories surpassed in extent those of the Han, and even during the latter half of the dynasty it retained control of most of what is now China proper. If the T'ang rulers showed no striking originality in administrative devices, they had the good judgment to avail themselves of the machinery which had come down to them from earlier centuries and to develop it further. Their code of laws became basic for the codes of later dynasties.

The culture of the Sui and the T'ang exhibited features markedly different from that of preceding dynasties. Contrasted with the Han, the Sui and the T'ang achieved a further and notable development of that examination system and bureaucracy which has been the most distinctive

political achievement of the Chinese and which led to the firm establishment of the Confucian school. The art and poetry of the T'ang were in many respects dissimilar to those of the Han and even of the period of disunion. In poetry and sculpture the T'ang was never to be surpassed. Buddhism reached its heyday, and in its philosophy, partly imported but partly rethought by Chinese monks, it displayed profound and painstaking intellectual activity and religious insight, As against the dynasties of the centuries of division, the Sui and the T'ang re-established union and determined that China was not to be permanently divided nor to be always subject to aliens. Chinese civilization became more firmly established south of the Yangtze than ever before. The cultural differences which had developed in the centuries of division were partly overcome. It is significant that the Chinese of the far South later denominated themselves the "men of T'ang," much as those of the Yangtze Valley and the North called themselves the "men of Han." The Sui and the T'ang gave a fresh impetus to Confucianism and did much to insure that that cult rather than Buddhism should be dominant. While they witnessed the years of the greatest prosperity of Chinese Buddhism, they were also partly responsible for its slow decline. The Confucianism of the T'ang and the literary style of the T'ang showed modifications in what had been handed down from preceding periods.

The Sui and the T'ang were not only a brilliant age to which the Chinese rightly look back with pride. They also witnessed distinctive changes. In the later years of the T'ang, movements began which introduced a new era and were largely to shape the future China.

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CHAPTER SIX

# Political Weakness but Cultural Brilliance: The Five Dynasties and the Ten Kingdoms (A.D. 907–960): The Sung Dynasty (A.D. 960–1279)

## INTRODUCTORY

The collapse of the T'ang was followed by internal division and civil strife. For more than half a century the Empire was divided among several states, some of them dominated by rulers of alien extraction. When, in the latter half of the tenth century, a family of the older native stock once more united most of China proper, the political recovery was not complete: part of the Empire which had been traditionally Chinese and whose population was predominantly so remained in the hands of foreigners. Eventually most of the earlier seats of Chinese culture passed into the control of invaders from the North, and only the Yangtze Valley and the South continued to be under Chinese princes. In the latter part of the thirteenth century all China became part of the great Mongol Empire. Not until the second half of the fourteenth century did a native dynasty succeed in effectively asserting its authority over all of the country that, because of its population and culture, could rightly be called Chinese. Even then, its rule did not extend over all the territory formerly under the Han and the T'ang. As before the Sui and the T'ang, so now after the T'ang, the Empire was again—and this time for nearly five centuries, rather than a little less than four—partly or entirely under the heel of conquering outsiders.

This long period of partial or complete subjection to foreigners was not, however, marked by as much political weakness as the earlier one had been. The Sung dynasty, which held the throne from 960 to 1279, was stronger than any of the dynasties, Chinese or foreign, between the Han and the Sui. The years, moreover, registered much greater achievements in civilization than did those of the preceding long period of disunion. In political theory, in philosophy, and in literature and art, they were distinguished by out-

standing genius. Movements that arose in the later years of the T'ang continued and grew. Indeed, the latter portion of the T'ang, the ensuing period of disunion, and the Sung constituted a distinct era in which much of the later China was shaped. Here was a time of profound and enduring change. Although governed in part by invaders, China made great strides toward regaining her cultural independence. The foreign faith, Buddhism, which had engrossed most of the best intellectual energy of the Chinese for the seven centuries between the downfall of the Han and the later years of the T'ang, had now been largely assimilated to Chinese life. It remained an integral part of that life, but under the Sung, vigorous thought of a very high order was once more to be found in that chief of the native schools, Confucianism. The forms in which orthodox Chinese intellectual life was to be set until the close of the nineteenth century were then molded.

## THE FIVE DYNASTIES

The years between the final disappearance of the T'ang, in 907, and the inauguration, in 960, of the Sung, are conventionally designated by Chinese historians as the Five Dynasties and the Ten Kingdoms. During these years five successive states arose in the North, in which the imperial succession is supposed to have been preserved. The Ten Kingdoms were mostly in the South. Although the center of their power was in the region in which the imperial capitals had been through much of China's history and in the traditional home of Chinese culture, the Five Dynasties usually controlled only parts of the present Shensi, Shansi, Honan, Hopei, and Shantung, and their authority was disputed by families who carved out the Ten Kingdoms in other sections of China.

On the north and northeast, moreover, was a newly emerging barbarian state, the latest successor to the many which had troubled the fertile valleys to the south. Toward the close of the ninth and at the beginning of the tenth century, a people known to the Chinese as the Khitan or Ch'i-tan, were establishing an empire in the later Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. Their rulers later (A.D. 937) called their dynasty Liao. Until early in the twelfth century they menaced the northern frontiers and much of the time occupied part of China proper. It is from Khitan that Cathay is derived, the name by which medieval Europe knew North China, and it is from the same source that Khitai, the Russian designation for China, came. The Khitan rulers were cattle breeders and endeavored to preserve their culture uncontaminated by Chinese ways. Indeed, their nobles were punished if they studied Chinese or took the civil service examinations. The commoners kept their old ways and intermarried little with the Chinese. The Chinese were taxed heavily but retained their old customs.

Chu Wên, as we have seen, made an end to the enfeebled T'ang and

set himself up (907) as the first monarch of the Hou Liang, or Later Liang. He was troubled both by external foes and by dissensions in his family and in 914 was murdered by his eldest son, who feared for his own succession to the throne.

In 923 the Later Liang was overthrown by Li Tsun-hsü, a general of Turkish stock, whose father, Lo K'o-yung, had served under the T'ang and had been granted their family name, Li. On the downfall of the T'ang, Li K'o-yung set up a state in what is now Shansi and waged war on Chu Wèn. The dynasty inaugurated by Li Tsun-hsü had its capital at Loyang and was called, because of the imperial surname Li, the Hou T'ang, or Later T'ang.

The Later T'ang was terminated, in its turn, in 936, by one of its own generals, Shih Ching-t'ang, also of Turkish stock. Shih Ching-t'ang, although son-in-law of the next to the last Emperor of the Later T'ang, plotted against the line and called to his aid the Khitan. When, by their assistance, he overthrew his master and founded a new dynasty, the Hou Chin, or Later Chin, he paid them tribute. Shih Ching-t'ang's son and successor attempted to cast off the suzerainty of the Khitan, but instead was carried into captivity.

The throne thus left vacant was occupied (947) by a general of the late dynasty, Liu Chih-yüan, also of Turkish descent, who forced the Khitan to retreat. His dynasty, the Hou Han, or Later Han, was even more short-lived than those of its three predecessors, for in 950 his son and successor was killed by the latter's own generals.

In 951 the commander of a victorious expedition against the Khitan was raised by his own soldiers to the throne and gave to his dynasty the name of Hou Chou, or Later Chou. An able general and administrator, he died (954) before he could bring peace to the distraught Empire. His successor, his adopted son, although an efficient ruler who added to the territory which he had inherited, did not conquer all China, and the minor who followed was powerless to do so.

Politically fragmented though the first half of the tenth century was, the normal processes of peaceful life were by no means entirely suspended and some advance was registered. Much of the administrative machinery appears to have gone on but little disturbed by the rapid change of ruling houses. One statesman, for example, Fêng Tao, who described himself as the "ever gay old man," held high office under all but the first of the Five Dynasties. The intellectual currents, which had begun in the T'ang after the rebellion of An Lu-shan, persisted. Printing by wooden blocks was further developed and gave a fresh impetus to scholarship. In the East, under the aegis of several of the changing central dynasties, and under the inspiration of Fêng Tao, an imperial commission prepared a revised text of the Classics, and the completed edition, printed, was presented to the

Emperor in 953. The way was further prepared for the remarkable painting of landscapes that characterized the succeeding Sung dynasty.

## THE TEN KINGDOMS

Some of the Ten Kingdoms were longer lived than any of the Five Dynasties. The Ten Kingdoms were Wu, with its capital at Yangchow; Wu Yüeh, mainly in the later Chêkiang; the Nan (Southern) T'ang, with its capital at what is now called Nanking; Ch'u, chiefly in what we know as Hunan; the Ch'ien (Earlier) Shu, followed by the Hou (Later) Shu, both centering in the Chengtu plain; the Nan (Southern) P'ing, a small state, spanning the Yangtze north and west of the T'ung-t'ing Lake; Nan (Southern) Han, embracing the mouth and much of the valley of the West River; Min, with Foochow as its capital; and Pei (Northern) Han in northern Shansi. Some of the rulers of the Ten Kingdoms took the title of *Wang* (king) and others of Ti (Emperor).

## THE FOUNDING OF THE SUNG DYNASTY

The welter of disorder was at last brought to an end by Chao K'uang-yin. Chao K'uang-yin traced his descent through a line of T'ang officials and had risen to be the chief general of the Later Chou. He was proclaimed Emperor by his soldiers and proved able enough both to retain the title, and having pacified the Empire, to pass it on to his family. The dynasty was called Sung, and Chao K'uang-yin was known to later generations as T'ai Tsu. With military skill T'ai Tsu combined magnanimity and political astuteness. He expanded his rule southward rather than northward, where he was confronted by the formidable Khitan. Before his death, with the aid of some subordinates, he had annexed several of the Ten Kingdoms. T'ai Tsu set up, as had other strong dynasties, a hierarchy of civil officials, substituting it for the military rule and semi-independent principalities which had been increasing since the rebellion of An Lu-shan. Once more the Empire was highly centralized under an autocrat ruling through a bureaucracy. The power of the Emperor was extended and consolidated. T'ai Tsu showed favors to Confucianism, the school through which the members of the civil service were trained. Education was fostered, presumably with something of the same purpose. The country appears to have welcomed a hand strong enough to suppress the predatory armies and restore order.

Chao K'uang-yin's accomplishments during the thirteen years that he wore the imperial title were noteworthy, but when he died in 976 the area that had owed allegiance to the T'ang, even within what is now China proper, did not all own his sway. In the Northeast the Khitan still held

territory—in the present Hopei and Shansi—that was traditionally Chinese. In the present Shansi, with its capital at T'aiyüan, was the Northern Han. On the south coast Wu Yüeh held out, and in the modern Yünnan, Nan Chao maintained its autonomy. It became, therefore, the chief task of Chao K'uang-yin's successor, a younger brother, known to history as T'ai Tsung, to complete the unification of the Empire. This he only partially achieved. Wu Yüeh was annexed and the Northern Han eliminated. Attempts to oust the Khitan, however, failed. Some gains against them were registered, but reverses were also suffered. The two powers, the Sung and the Khitan, seemed about evenly matched. Nan Chao was not subdued and for many years was independent.

## THE EXTERNAL POLITICS OF THE SUNG TO 1127

The successors of T'ai Tsu and T'ai Tsung fell even further short of clearing the Empire of alien rulers than had the founders of the dynasty. None of the line appears to have shown marked political ability. Several were dissipated weaklings, and the best were interested in literature and art, but did not provide the type of leadership needed by an empire confronted with vigorous enemies. Divided counsels at court gave rise to vacillation in foreign policy. Sometimes offering effective military resistance under able generals, sometimes buying peace at humiliating terms, at others seeking to play off one enemy against another, the Sung Emperors often presented a sorry spectacle. Step by step their territories were wrested from them and eventually they lost their throne to foreign invaders.

For years the Khitan plagued the Sung. In the Northwest a new menace arose. In the later years of the T'ang, a Tangut people, speaking a Tibeto-Burman language, had established a state called Hsi Hsia. They reached the acme of their power in the eleventh century, when one of the most vigorous of their rulers assumed the title of Emperor. Their territories eventually included much of the Ordos country and of the present Kansu and some of the modern Shensi. Occasionally the Sung were aided against the Hsi Hsia by the Uighurs, still something of a power in the west, and at times, too, the Hsi Hsia and the Khitan were at war.

Although the fortunes of battle were not always against them, the Sung slowly lost ground. From time to time they were forced to sign agreements with the Khitan, promising them tribute and yielding them territory.

Early in the twelfth century relief seemed at hand. A Tungusic people, called by the Chinese Juchên (also Nüchên), first heard of in Manchuria, in the basin of the Sungari, and vassals of the Khitan, overthrew the latter (1123) and occupied their territory, including part of China proper, and their chief assumed the imperial title, calling his dynasty Chin, meaning Gold. At first the Sung welcomed the Juchên as allies and sent armies

against the Khitan. They were speedily undeceived, however, for the new invaders proceeded to make humiliating demands of them. The Emperor Hui Tsung was a painter of note and a patron of the arts, but not a fit leader for his people in an emergency of this kind. Much of the control of the state and especially of the army centered in the hands of an ambitious eunuch. The nation was heavily taxed to maintain wars and an expensive and luxurious court. Discontent in the provinces and party struggles at court added to the general weakness.

Hui Tsung, discouraged by his impotence before the Juchên, abdicated in favor of a son (1125), and on the approach of the Juchên, abandoned the capital (Pienliang, the later K'aifêng) and fled southward. The new Emperor bought off the invaders by a huge indemnity and the cession of territory. Soon, however, he violated the treaty, and the Juchên, returning to the attack, captured Pienliang, and carrying into exile the reigning monarch and Hui Tsung and their families, appointed as Emperor Chang Pang-ch'ang, a Chinese who had advocated submission to the invaders.

## THE SOUTHERN SUNG DYNASTY (1127–1279)

The Chinese were not prepared to submit tamely to the dictates of foreigners. A son of Hui Tsung, usually known to historians under his posthumous title Kao Tsung, escaped capture by the Juchên and was raised to the throne. This was done partly with the assistance of Chang Pang-ch'ang, who, deserting his Juchên masters, threw his support to the Sung and accepted office under the new regime. The Sung capital, after being moved from place to place, was eventually fixed at Linan, the present Hangchow. The dynasty after the break is known as the Southern Sung, in distinction from the Northern Sung, its designation before the southern migration. Linan was made over into a beautiful and wealthy metropolis. Marco Polo, who saw it after the fall of the Sung, described it as "beyond dispute, the finest and noblest [city] in the world."

The change of capitals did not mean peace with the Juchên. The Sung were unwilling to relinquish the territory north of the Yangtze, and for a time the Juchên seemed bent on annexing the whole of the Empire. The result was prolonged war. Moreover, rebellion broke out in various parts of the Sung domains, and in the North, with the permission of the Juchên, Liu Yü, who had been an official under the Sung, set himself up as Emperor.

Kao Tsung reigned for about thirty-five years, but he interested himself more in the pleasures of his court than in the camp. The struggle against the Juchên, however, was manfully carried on by his generals, the most famous of whom was the brave and loyal Yo Fei. Early in the reign of Kao Tsung the Juchên crossed the Yangtze and took several cities. They

found it impossible to maintain themselves south of the great river and soon recrossed it. They were pressed from two sides—by the Sung armies from the South and by enemies in their rear on the north. For a time they even lost part of the North China plain. Liu Yü, failing of support by the Juchên and badly defeated, was forced to abandon his imperial aspirations.

Even had the Sung pursued their apparent advantage, the North could probably not have been permanently rewon. The Chin (Juchên) were too strongly entrenched to be driven out and from the military standpoint usually had the superiority. It may have been from recognition of this fact that peace policies prevailed at the Sung court. The minister Ch'in Kuei—ever since regarded with scorn by patriotic Chinese—obtained the imprisonment and execution of Yo Fei, who had been markedly successful and would have pushed the battle against the invaders. Kao Tsung agreed to cede to the Juchên a large part of the former Sung domains in the North, making the Huai River the boundary between the two states, and promised the Chin an annual tribute.

The second quarter of the twelfth century saw the Chin (Juchên) at the pinnacle of their power. They were the acknowledged masters of North China and Manchuria, they had subdued the Hsi Hsia, and they had received the submission of the Uighurs. Their dominions stretched from the borders of the present Korea into and perhaps beyond what is now the western part of Kansu. About 1153 they moved their capital from the present Manchuria to Yenching (later Peking).

The peace between the Chin and the Sung proved unstable. In 1161, for example, the Chin (Juchên) attempted, although in vain, to force their way across the Yangtze, and in 1206 the Sung essayed, but also failed, to reduce the North. The two monarchies seemed about equally matched, and neither appeared likely to alter greatly the boundary between them. However, the Sung Emperors had to accept a kind of subordination to the Chin rulers and gave the latter a large annual "present."

Although the Sung abandoned the North, the Chinese people and their culture did not do so. Some infusion of non-Chinese blood in this region undoubtedly occurred, but again, as so often in the past, the vigorous but rude conquerors were being assimilated. The Chin rulers attempted to preserve the distinctive customs of their people, but they had the Chinese Classics translated into the Juchên language and maintained sacrifices to Confucius, and the Hsi Hsia rulers were also adopting Confucianism. The cultural reconquest of the North had quietly begun.

### THE MONGOL INVASION AND THE END OF THE CHIN AND THE SUNG

About the time that relations between the Sung and the Chin had settled down to an uneasy stalemate, the scene was completely changed

by a fresh invasion from the North. A new power arose which overthrew both the Chin and the Sung and set up the most extensive empire yet created by man.

The authors of this new realm were the Mongols. The Mongols were related linguistically, and possibly racially, to the Turkish and the Tungusic peoples of whom we have seen so much in the preceding pages. At the beginning of the twelfth century most of them were living, divided into many tribes, to the south and east of Lake Baikal. Originally of little consequence politically, they were welded into a formidable fighting force by Temuchin. Temuchin was born about 1155 or 1156, the son of a chief of a kind of confederation of some of the Mongol tribes. After his father's death, Temuchin had to fight his way to the headship of the confederation. This he did with ruthlessness and success.

Under Temuchin's vigorous leadership, the confederation was extended to include more of the Mongol tribes. In his late forties, Temuchin felt himself strong enough to attack his overlords, the Keraïts, a Turkish people who had recently become Nestorian Christians and were the outstanding power in Mongolia. The conquest of the Naiman, in what at present is the northeastern part of Mongolia, followed the defeat of the Keraïts. Temuchin was now master of Mongolia and in 1206 was greeted by his people as Jenghiz Kahn, the "Universal Emperor" of the Turko-Mongol peoples. The capital of the new empire was at Karakorum, in the general region of the modern Ulan Bator (Urga). Jenghiz Khan's domains were soon augmented by the voluntary recognition of his suzerainty by the Uighurs and by the Karluks, both in what is now Sinkiang.

Having brought together the peoples of Mongolia and, in part, of Sinkiang, Jenghiz Khan turned his attention to the populous and prosperous land to the south. He first attacked Hsi Hsia, and after several campaigns (1205, 1207, and 1209) obtained its submission. The Chin (Juchên) were also attacked. The present Shansi and Hopei were invaded in 1211, and Yenching, the Chin capital, fell in 1215. The Chin offered stubborn resistance and moved their capital to the present K'aifêng. In 1219 Korea became vassal to the Mongols, and by 1223 the Chin had lost nearly all of their former domains except approximately those south of the Yellow River. Pressed on the one side by the Sung and on the other by the Mongols, they were in a sad plight.

The Chin (Juchên) gained an uneasy reprieve by the diversion of the conqueror's attention elsewhere. Through developments the details of which need not here concern us, even before 1223 Jenghiz Khan left the campaign against the Chin to be pressed by his lieutenants and directed his own energies against states in the West. Within a short time the remainder of what is now Sinkiang was annexed and the victorious Mongol arms were carried into the valleys of the Oxus and Jaxartes, to the banks of the Indus,

into Persia, and even into the southeastern portions of Europe. Jenghiz Khan did not forget China, however, and died (1227) while directing the campaign which wiped Hsi Hsia from the map.

The onward sweep of the Mongol armies was not halted by the death of the "Universal Emperor." The vast domains of Jenghiz Khan were divided among his four heirs: the son of his deceased eldest son, and his three other sons. This did not mean the breakup of the empire, however, for in 1229 an assemblage of Mongol chiefs chose Ogodai, Jenghiz Khan's third son, for the head of the whole (Grand Khan). Ogodai pressed the Mongol advance into China against the Chin. The Chin fought with desperation, but the Mongol armies closed in on them. The Sung, lured by the promise of some of the Chin territory, accepted the Mongol offer of an alliance and joined, probably not unwillingly, in the attack against their old enemies. What is now K'aifêng fell after a long siege (1233), and in 1234 the Chin line of rulers came to an end with the suicide of one and the killing of another.

The victorious Mongols could scarcely be expected to keep the peace with the Sung. The latter were not given all the portion of the former Chin possessions which they alleged had been promised them. They proceeded to seize some of the land which they claimed. This gave the Mongols the excuse for the inevitable attack. The Sung domains, however, were not easily taken. The Mongols made gains, especially in the present Szechwan, but the bulk of the Sung territory, south of the barrier offered by the Yangtze, long remained inviolate.

The Mongols meanwhile extended their power in other directions. Korea was further reduced to subjection, and the Mongol arms carried terror into the West, as far as Mesopotamia, Georgia, and Armenia in southwestern Asia, and into Hungary and Poland in Europe.

Following the death of Ogodai (1241), for ten years a weak or divided leadership gave pause to the Mongol advance. With the accession of Mangu, a grandson of Jenghiz Khan, to the Grand Khanate (1251), the boundaries of the empire again expanded. In the West, Mangu's brother Hulagu captured Bagdad and administered the death blow to the Abbasid Caliphate, and Aleppo and Damascus were taken. In China, from the vantage point of Szechwan an attack was launched by Mangu and another of his brothers, Khubilai, against Nan Chao. Nan Chao was defeated and annexed (1253). From it a Mongol army penetrated to Tongking and thence northward into Kwangsi and Hunan. Its purpose was to join forces with another army, which, under Khubilai, had crossed the Yangtze and was besieging Wuchang. The death of Mangu, in Szechwan in 1259, halted the campaign, and confronted with the probability of a struggle for the succession to the Khanate, Khubilai hastily arranged a treaty with the Sung—by which the latter agreed to acknowledge the Mongols as their overlords and

to pay them tribute—and repaired north to press his claims to the throne.

Khubilai was soon declared Grand Khan by his army in North China, but one of his brothers was also given the title by a faction, and at the old Mongol capital, Karakorum. Not until 1264 was this brother defeated and made captive, and only later was Khubilai ready to resume with vigor the conquest of China.

Meanwhile the Sung authorities had treated with contumely the Mongol representative sent to announce the accession of Khubilai and so had given ample provocation for the renewal of hostilities. The Sung court was under the domination of the minister Chia Ssŭ-tao. He it was who had arranged the humiliating peace with the Mongols in 1259.

In spite of the feebleness of the Sung, the Mongol conquest was not quickly completed. The most famous episode was the five-year seige (1268–1273) of the cities of Hsiangyang and Fanch'êng, on opposite sides of the Han River, in the present Hupeh. Commanding the water approach to Central China, they occupied a strategic site which at least once before had figured prominently in struggles for the mastery of China. After a gallant resistance the two cities were reduced, the Mongol forces penetrated to the Yangtze, and slowly making their victorious way eastward, closed in on the Sung capital. This was taken in 1276, and the infant Emperor was captured and sent north. Some of the Sung statesmen and generals, refusing to acknowledge the inevitable, declared Emperor another infant scion of the house of Sung, took refuge in the fleet, and fleeing south, made Canton their headquarters. Canton fell in 1277 and the luckless boy ruler, a fugitive, died the following year. A remnant continued to hold out, and placing another child on the phantom throne, defended themselves in the fleet off the coast of Kwangtung. Here, in 1279, they were overwhelmed by the Mongols, and the Sung commander, bidding his wife and children throw themselves into the sea, took the young Emperor on his back and did likewise. The Sung had come to its end. For the first time in recorded history, all China was in the hands of non-Chinese conquerors. The Mongol Khubilai, from Cambaluc (Khanbaligh)—the present Peking—which he had set up on and near the site of Yenching, was Emperor of a new dynasty, the Yüan.

The question naturally arises as to the reasons for the Mongol success. How did it happen that this people, at the outset barbarous and divided, conquered in less than a hundred years most of what is now China, much of southwestern and central Asia, and part of Europe, and established the most extensive empire that the world had yet seen?

One reason was the weakness of some of their opponents. In spite of the support of a few brave and able generals, the Sung Emperors were incompetent. Both the Sung and the Chin suffered from their long and indecisive wars with each other. In the West the Abbasid Caliphs were a decaying power.

The lack of vigor on the part of opponents does not account for all the Mongols' success, for some of the conquerors' victims put up a very able resistance. Thoroughgoing ruthlessness was also in part responsible for the victories. The Mongols slaughtered almost the entire populations of whole cities and provinces. This was not, apparently, simply from the lust of killing but from deliberate policy, perhaps to inspire terror, possibly as a simple but effective means of preventing insurrection. In the later stages of the conquest of China, the Mongols showed more clemency. Also important was able leadership. Jenghiz Khan was an excellent tactician and a severe disciplinarian. He chose many of his generals from a comparatively small corps, which underwent an exacting training. He seems to have been an excellent judge of men. The Mongols owed much to their cavalry: they equipped their horsemen with plenty of mounts and were able to move swiftly and to strike with surprising quickness. Jenghiz Khan and his successors were eager to take advantage of all the latest techniques and machinery in military operations, learning wherever and from whomever they could. For example, Moslems and even a German engineer were employed in constructing siege machinery in the beleaguerment of Hsiang-yang.

Then, too, the Mongols appear to have shown some skill in managing subject races. Religiously they were tolerant. They availed themselves of the services of other peoples and were willing to learn from them. Some of their foremost ministers were foreigners. For instance, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, a Sinicized Khitan, who had held offices under the Chin, served prominently under both Jenghiz Khan and Ogodai, and Uighurs were given high positions. Under the guidance of non-Mongol counselors, the Mongols made advances in civilization and administration. They took over, with modifications, the Uighur alphabet. Some of their youth were put to school to study the Confucian classics, and the beginnings of a civil administrative system showed Chinese influence.

It was an enormously difficult and, as it proved, an impossible task to hold together for long the vast empire which had been so quickly acquired, but in conquering it the Mongols displayed marked ability and energy, and the greatest of them were not without astuteness in governing it.

## CULTURE UNDER THE SUNG: THE SOUTHWARD MIGRATION OF THE CHINESE

As was said at the outset of this chapter, in spite of its political divisions, and, as compared with the Han or the T'ang dynasties, its political weakness, the China of the Five Dynasties, the Ten Kingdoms, and the Sung witnessed striking prosperity and marked activity in thought and art.

The barbarian invasions of the North and the southward migration of

the Sung were far from meaning that either the Chinese people or their institutions were overwhelmed. Some infiltration of non-Chinese blood undoubtedly took place, for many of the conquerors, in addition to forming much of the ruling class, settled on the land, and in spite of the efforts of some of the foreign rulers, the inevitable intermarriage modified the character of the population. How large the alien element was we do not know, but the older Chinese stock probably still predominated, and numbers of the newcomers tended to take on Chinese civilization.

The frequent fighting in the North between the Sung and the invaders also gave a decided impetus to the southward movement of the Chinese and made the Yangtze Valley and the south coast loom more prominently than heretofore in all phases of the Empire's activities. It is significant that some of the greatest figures of the dynasty, notably Wang An-shih and Chu Hsi, were born south of the great river. Never before had so much of the leadership of the Empire come from natives of that region.

## FOREIGN COMMERCE UNDER THE SUNG

With so much of the North in the hands of aliens and with the southward shift of the center of Chinese population and culture, it is not strange that there was much foreign commerce from the ports on the south coast. It had suffered in the disorders at the close of the T'ang. Under the Sung it revived and seems to have attained larger proportions than ever before. Navigation was aided by the employment of the mariner's compass, sea charts, and improvements in shipbuilding. Some of the vessels had staterooms and Negro stewards and had several hundred persons as passengers and crew. The Chinese now, for the first time, controlled the sea routes to the Southeast and India. What is now Ch'üanchow (known to Medieval Europe as Zaitun) in Fukien, and Canton (known in some foreign writings of the time as Khanfu, although the identification of Khanfu with Canton is not universally accepted by Sinologists) were usually the chief centers of this trade. Canton at first had most of it, but Ch'üanchow presently became a formidable rival and eventually was predominant. Commerce in some commodities was a government monopoly, open only to licensed vendors, who obtained their goods at state warehouses. The state derived a valuable revenue from an ad valorem tax on the trade. Early in the Sung an imperial embassy was sent abroad to encourage foreign merchants to come to China, and special licenses were promised them. For the first time China became a naval power. A navy was established on a permanent basis. In 1237 it was said to have twenty squadrons and a personnel of 52,000.

The Sung was comparatively mild in its treatment of foreign merchants in its ports. Not only did it continue the T'ang custom of allowing them

to settle many of their disputes among themselves, but it also permitted them to decide according to their own laws all but the more serious offenses of foreigners against Chinese. The foreign merchants seem mostly to have been Moslem Arabs. Many of them married Chinese women. A colony of Jews, which was finally absorbed into the surrounding population only in our own day, built a synagogue at the later K'aifêng.

Trade with Japan flourished. Japanese Buddhist monks, principally of the Zen (Ch'an), journeyed to China to visit the strongholds of their school. Chinese monks, coming to Japan, were often given high positions in monasteries and were transmitters, not only of Buddhism, but also of Chinese civilization in general, including the Confucian Classics and secular literature. Sung Neo-Confucianism was to have marked effects in the islands.

The Chinese records assert that tribute-bearing embassies arrived in the Sung court from Champa in the present Vietnam, from states in such distant regions as Java and Sumatra, and even from India. Whether these embassies indicate the recognition of China's suzerainty is highly doubtful, but they probably show that these principalities deemed commercial relations profitable. Before the dynasty was driven south, two embassies came from Fulin, what we now call the Near East.

The Chinese knowledge of geography was expanding, and a work of the time shows that some information concerning such distant countries as Egypt and Sicily had reached the Middle Kingdom. This was brought not only by foreign merchants but also by Chinese who went abroad and returned with news of distant lands.

The articles of trade included, as heretofore, only those which combined small bulk with large value—among them piece-goods, lead, gold, silver, porcelainware, incense and scented woods, drugs, ivory, coral, rhinoceros horns, amber, ebony, pearls, tortoise shell, rare woods, and rock crystal.

The Sung faced an adverse balance of trade. Gold, silver, and especially Chinese copper coins were exported in such quantities that the government, although without success, tried to stop the precious metals from disappearing by forbidding the use of the luxuries to which the drainage was attributed. The extent of this outward flow of specie is shown by the fact that Sung coins have been unearthed in Java, Singapore, and even in Zanzibar and on the Somali coast in Africa, and that their circulation in Japan proved an embarrassment to the government of that country. To the resulting dearth of coin in China is ascribed, possibly in part correctly, the resort to paper money which was one of the outstanding features of the fiscal policy of the Sung. The evils attendant upon inflation constituted a recurring problem, but the temptation to use the device proved too strong to be resisted.

Whether because of this contact with aliens or for other reasons,

innovations were seen. The use of chairs became general. Tea was a common drink in both South and North. Sedan chairs were widely employed. The binding of women's feet was begun—why is not clear—and gradually spread.

### THE GROWTH OF CITIES AND ACCOMPANYING CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A feature of the Sung and its commerce was the growth of cities. Previously the centers of political power had constituted the chief cities. The capitals continued to be important, but during the Sung, from a development which had begun earlier, additional urban communities grew. They were chiefly in the Yangtze Valley and on the south coast. Some of them had populations of several hundred thousand. One or two were said to have over a million inhabitants and were probably larger than any cities elsewhere on the globe of that day.

The growth of cities was accompanied by a marked increase in wealth. Rich merchants were prominent. Some were admitted to the society of the ruling classes, and numbers of officials engaged in trade. Merchants were organized into guilds, apparently an innovation since the T'ang. Merchants and the state collaborated. Through that co-operation some merchant groups acquired monopolies—local or wider—notably in tea and porcelain.

In the cities culture flourished, scholars multiplied, literacy spread, and through printing, books became numerous.

### MODIFICATIONS IN THE ECONOMY

The mounting urban life was paralleled by changes in the economy. Internal trade grew. With it went greater regional specialization in crops and industry, for a given area could exchange with other areas the distinctive products which each produced. Farmers became less self-sufficient. Devices were created for the transfer of funds from one city to another and increased provision was made for credit for merchants, handicrafts, and farmers. Money was more important, first in the South. Copper coinage reached new dimensions. Silver was widely employed, but, as later, in the form of small cast ingots.

Landed estates multiplied. The ownership of land was the chief mark of success and social position. This was chiefly in the Yangtze Valley and on the south coast. The support of the landowning interests is said to have been at least in part responsible for the success of Ch'in Kuei in obtaining the execution of Yo Fei. In the North peasant proprietorship was more common than in the South.

In the South earlier ripening varieties of rice were introduced from Champa by imperial command. They were brought in about A.D. 1100. Their wide use contributed to a large increase in population—a total which is said to have reached about 100,000,000.

Before the Juchên conquest of the North, the output of iron in that region was said to have multiplied twelvefold. Iron was used for plowshares, hoes, spades, sickles, and weapons.

As forests were cut off and wood and charcoal became scarce, coal was extensively employed in industry and to heat houses.

Mounting wealth led to speculation and to combinations of individuals who sought to take advantage of the expanding economy.

## PROGRESS OF THE INTELLECTUAL REVIVAL

Marked though foreign commerce was, we have no indication that ideas coming through it from abroad profoundly influenced either Chinese thought or life. Nor did the occupation of much of the North by non-Chinese peoples seem to work any great transformation in Chinese culture. Chinese Buddhist pilgrims still went to India by the overland routes and continued to do so until, about the middle of the eleventh century, the spread of Islam closed the roads to them. However, they had no such marked effect on Chinese life as did their predecessors of pre-T'ang and T'ang times. While the Mongol conquests were in progress, and before they finally overwhelmed the Sung, Chinese and more or less Sinicized non-Chinese of North China traveled westward, sometimes as officials or envoys for the Mongols. They reached the valley of the Oxus and saw such cities as Samarkand and Balkh. At least one of them brought back reports of Bagdad and Egypt. It seems improbable, however, that the new ideas with which they came into contact made a pronounced impression upon the Chinese at home. Such innovations as they brought probably affected chiefly the China of the North, and the North was so distinct from the Yangtze Valley, where centered so much of the cultural life under the Sung, that European travelers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries regarded it as a separate country.

The Sung period marks the flowering of a new intellectual era. The era which opened in the later years of the T'ang now reached major proportions. The general level of education was rising.

The intellectual ferment was associated with the further development of the examinations conducted by the government. As we have seen, these examinations, as a means of recruiting officials, had their inception under the Han and were augmented under the T'ang. The Sung witnessed their striking increase. Elaborate techniques were devised to make them more objective. Through them a mounting proportion of the bureaucracy

emerged. They afforded avenues of advancement for elements in the population which had heretofore been represented but little if at all. Through them the power monopoly of the small circle of northern aristocratic families was broken. A large proportion of the successful candidates were from the Southeast, where urbanization had reached the largest dimensions. Many of them came from the new families with great landed estates in the Southeast, the beginning of whose growth in the later years of the T'ang we have noted. We must also remark that the growth of the bureaucracy recruited by the examinations enhanced the power of the throne. Many of the scholars who were most active in shaping the thought of the era came from the lower Yangtze Valley and the south coast. They were from social strata which were emerging into prominence and were less bound by tradition than were the scholars of the North—where were the older centers of culture.

The enhancement of recruitment to public office through successful candidates in the highly competitive state examinations was paralleled by the development of a system of recommendation to office by responsible people. This was not new, but under the Sung it was elaborated and safeguards were devised for the selection of sponsors and for taking the latter to account for the conduct of their protégés. The procedure became characteristic of much of later Chinese practice, both in the government and in private employment.

Under the Sung the thought-forms were shaped to which most of the educated class assented down to the opening of the twentieth century. These patterns achieved their pre-eminence out of controversy. The debates that marked the course of the dynasty, especially before the transfer of the Sung capital to Linan (Hangchow), probably stirred the thinking portion of the nation as profoundly as any that China had ever known, certainly more than at any time since the Chou.

## WANG AN-SHIH AND HIS REFORMS

The most acrimonious of the controversies, the one that influenced most of the others, centered around the political, economic, and educational program instituted by Wang An-shih. The program was known collectively as the *hsin fa,* or New Laws. Wang was born in 1021 and died in 1086, and his lifetime therefore spanned some of the most vigorous years of the dynasty. His reforms contemplated a thoroughgoing reorganization of the fiscal and military policy of the state and were accompanied by important modifications in agriculture and internal commerce. The purpose back of them seems to have been to increase the prosperity of the masses and to strengthen the Empire in its struggle against the northern invaders.

Wang An-shih was a native of what is now Kiangsi and so was from the newer families who were emerging in the South. He passed successfully through the examination system and was a scholar of no mean attainments. His first offices were in the South, not the North. He made no attempt to revolt against the authority of the Confucian Classics, but professed to find in these revered works and the practices ascribed to the model rulers the sanction for his proposals. The main features of his system included (1) the appointment of a commission to draft a budget for the state, proposed as a means of effecting a large annual saving in expenses; (2) a state monopoly of commerce, by which Wang would have the produce of each district used first for the payment of taxes and then for the needs of the district, the surplus to be purchased by the government and held either against future local needs or to be transported elsewhere and sold, and depots to be set up for the exchange of goods and for advancing loans on merchandise and property (by this means Wang hoped to insure to the cultivators a more certain market for their produce and to increase the revenue of the government); (3) loans by the state at two per cent a month to farmers in the planting season on the security of growing crops; (4) the division of the land into equal sections and the annual reappraisal of it for purposes of taxation, thus to avoid the exemption of some of the cultivated soil from taxation and to insure a more equitable distribution of the land tax; (5) the taxation of all a man's property, both real estate and movable; (6) the abolition of the conscription of labor by the state and the substitution for it of a graduated tax based upon the division of property-holders into five groups according to their wealth; (7) akin to this step, a reorganization of local administration by what was called the hired service system; (8) military reorganization, by which unnecessary troops were to be returned to civilian and productive life, and external defense and internal order were to be maintained by a system of compulsory military service, families being organized into groups of tens and fifties, each family with more than one male providing one for the frontier forces and one for the local police (this was called the *pao chia* plan and was for the purpose of obtaining local order and was also used for military conscription); (9) a method of supporting the cavalry needed in the wars against the northern invaders by requiring each family in certain areas to keep a horse, which, with its food, was to be supplied by the state; (10) a cash assessment on the guilds as a substitute for contributing supplies to the court; and (11) shifting emphasis in the state examinations from literary style to the application of the principles of the Classics to current problems—a change designed to fit the successful competitors more directly for the fulfillment of official duties.

Few if any of these policies were entirely new. In principle they were

not unlike the programs of the Legalists and they resembled the reforms of Wang Mang and his assistants. Proposals similar to some of Wang An-shih's had been put forward under the T'ang. Wang An-shih professed to base his plan upon the teachings of ancient sages honored by the Confucian school, notably Mencius, and prepared commentaries on some of the classical books which attempted to show that the latter sanctioned it. He made much of the *Chou Li,* that utopian political program which dated from the late Chou or the Han.

However, in their totality and at the time Wang's schemes were revolutionary. They involved an enhanced paternalism on the part of the state, the assumption by the government of much larger responsibilities than under the earlier years of the Sung, and deprivations for the wealthy. They were sufficiently radical to bring down on the heads of their proponents the vigorous denunciation of conservative scholars and statesmen. Many of the conservatives were from the North. They stressed the *Ch'un Ch'iu,* finding precedents in its historical narrative. They advocated the cultivation of morals rather than dependence on political institutions and laws and argued for the Confucian theory of the rule of the prince by good example rather than by force.

In proposing his reforms, Wang An-shih seems to have been entirely sincere and public-spirited. Frugal in his private life even to the neglect of care for his own person, having the welfare of the common people passionately at heart, serenely confident in the righteousness of his cause and in the wisdom of his program, and an ardent advocate by word and pen, he belongs to a type familiar in many ages and countries.

Wang rose to high office, and for a time the Emperor gave him free rein. He had a few loyal and intelligent lieutenants, but the majority of the bureaucracy were time-servers, intent on their own advancement, and some who followed Wang An-shih were corrupt. The opposition was divided into several factions. The debate continued through most of the last four reigns of the Northern Sung, and echoes of it were heard after the southward migration of the dynasty. Emperors gave their support first to one and then to the other group. The program of Wang An-shih was adopted in whole or in part for a few months or years, only to be abandoned and then, in turn, to be tried again. It had imperial support from 1069 to 1085, was rejected from 1085 to 1093, and was revived in part in 1093–1125.

Eventually Wang's program was abandoned, but some of its less novel features, in modified form, were adopted for longer or shorter periods down almost to our own day. The failure of the plan to win permanent acceptance was probably due to the absence of a sufficient body of intelligent, enthusiastic, and unselfish officials to make it effective, to the venality and self-seeking of some of its advocates, and to the opposition of many

of the scholar class. The dissension accompanying Wang's program contributed to the weakness of the Northern Sung, and to it must therefore be assigned a part of the responsibility for the misfortunes of the dynasty.

What the twentieth century Occident called "state socialism" and "the welfare state" did not end with the defeat of the program of Wang An-shih. The government undertook the care of aged people, gave free burial to the poor, assumed responsibility for orphanages, and maintained medicine shops. To obtain revenue it operated restaurants and taverns.

Under the Southern Sung, Chia Ssŭ-tao (died 1276) headed a movement for land reform. The opposition of the landlords is reported to have weakened the dynasty in its final struggle with the Mongols.

## CULTURE UNDER THE SUNG: THE NEO-CONFUCIAN SCHOOL

Wang An-shih and the debate over his proposals formed only one feature of that intellectual ferment which gave to the Sung one of its most distinctive characteristics.

Another outstanding phase of intellectual activity was a fresh interpretation of Confucianism, which for more than six centuries constituted the orthodox philosophy of the scholar class and which during most of that time had the support of the state through the established system of education and examinations.

The Neo-Confucianism developed under the Sung claimed, like the reforms of Wang An-shih, to be based upon the Classics of the Confucian school but displayed some features which would not have been recognized by the authors of these documents. Although its formulators professed to be guided by the Confucian Classics, Neo-Confucianism was really a synthesis of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism, in which Confucianism predominated. Buddhism as a separate cult was declining: there was not nearly such intellectual activity within its monasteries as in the T'ang and the centuries immediately before the T'ang. It was still sufficiently strong, however, to make itself felt in the reviving Confucianism.

Sung Neo-Confucianism was an attempt to put into orderly form what the educated believed about the universe—to integrate into a consistent whole the philosophies of the age. As, not far from the same time, the schoolmen of Europe were formulating a cosmogony and a cosmology which claimed to be Christian but which were indebted to the Aristotelian tradition, and as out of them came the work of Thomas Aquinas (1225?–1274), which gave to the theology of the Roman Catholic Church what proved to be its official expression, so Sung thinkers, stimulated by Buddhist and Taoist thought, remolded Confucianism into

the form which was long to remain standard. The recognized master was to be Chu Hsi.

The stream of thought that culminated in Chu Hsi had its springs in scholars of the T'ang, especially after the An Lu-shan rebellion. Its formulators were deeply indebted to Han Yü (786–824). Among the principles vigorously advocated by Han Yü were the rejection of Taoism and Buddhism as destructive of public morality; emphasis on Confucian ethics as essential to civilized society; the rejection of some ideas of foreign origin; establishing the authentic texts of Confucianism; and the defense of what he regarded as Confucian orthodoxy.

Many Sung thinkers contributed to Neo-Confucianism. To give the names of all would overburden these pages. However, a few must be mentioned. Hu Yüan (993–1059), through a private academy which he maintained, sought to instill in his pupils a respect for the Confucian Classics as containing eternal truth. Sun Fu (922–1057) founded a school near T'ai Shan in Shantung, in which he taught an appreciation of the Classics. Ou-yang Hsiu (1007–1070) declared that China's ills were due to the abandonment of Confucian teachings for Buddhism. An older contemporary, Fan Chung-yen (989–1052), born in the later Kiangsu and so, like many of the Neo-Confucianists, from the South, graduated *chin shih* in his early twenties, vigorously opposed Buddhism and had no use for the supernatural. He stressed the understanding of the Confucian Classics, advocated the establishment of a state system of education through which men of worthy character could be recruited and trained for the civil service, and anticipated in his recommendations measures akin to some in Wang An-shih's program. For a time he was in high office. His Neo-Confucian orthodoxy was eventually recognized by the placing of his tablet (1715) in the Confucian temples. Shao Yung (1011–1077), born in later Hopei, based his philosophy on the principle of numbers. He persistently declined to accept public office, preferring to live in poverty and have leisure for thought. However, many sought his counsel, among them some of the most prominent leaders of the anti–Wang An-shih group, and his writings had a marked influence. He made a special study of the *I Ching*. He was a mystic and much of his thinking had a Taoist origin. Chou Tun-i (1017–1073), a native of the present Hunan, through most of his mature life held office. Usually his literary pursuits were in intervals snatched from administrative and judicial duties. Although reckoned as in the stream of Confucian tradition, he was influenced by both Taoism and Buddhism. Chou Tun-i was for a time the teacher of Ch'êng Hao (1032–1085), also known as Ch'êng Ming-tao, and his brother Ch'êng I (1033–1107), known also as Ch'êng I-ch'uan, and for him they had the greatest respect. The sons of an official of sturdy, independent character, an opponent of Wang An-shih, the Ch'êng brothers shared their father's political views. Both continued the family

tradition by holding office, but the younger spent much of his time in retirement and study. They wrote voluminously, chiefly essays and letters, and Ch'êng I, with his longer life and greater freedom from official cares, thought through a philosophy more fully than did his brother. An uncle of the two Ch'êngs, Chang Tsai (1020–1076), by his teaching and writings reinforced the trend represented by them.

Chu Hsi (1130–1200) was younger than any of the preceding, and in consequence, was able to take advantage of their labors. He was the son of an official; the service of the state claimed most of his adult years; and he seems to have performed his duties with fidelity and ability. By disposition, however, he was more the scholar than the administrator and had intervals of retirement, some of them voluntary and with sinecure positions which gave him leisure for study, but at least one of them due to the opposition of enemies at court. During a period of his life he was greatly impressed with Taoism and Buddhism, and while he later turned to what he deemed the classical Confucian tradition, he never escaped their influence. His was an intellect which delighted in synthesis and he was gifted both with clarity of thought and with an admirable literary style. Through his mind passed the ideas of the predecessors of the school to which he eventually gave himself, and adding to them and giving to the whole the interpretation and integration which were the fruits of his own genius, he left behind him that system of thought which for centuries was to dominate the majority of the scholars of the Empire.

To summarize accurately and in a few words the tenets to which Chu Hsi gave their standard form is a difficult undertaking, particularly since to the Occidental mind many of his concepts seem strange.

As we have said, the school was partly shaped by Buddhism, and especially by Ch'an. Taoism, too, contributed markedly. Chu Hsi's writings contain much of Taoist metaphysics.

Many of the Sung Confucianists showed the effects of their Buddhist environment by practicing meditation. This they did from ethical and spiritual motives—to cultivate the nobler and to eliminate the baser side of their natures. The better to succeed, they often retired to quiet and beautiful spots, sometimes alone, at other times collectively. As we have suggested, groups of students around their teachers, somewhat apart from the world, were numerous, and the stimulus given by them in part accounted for the intellectual activity of the time. The Neo-Confucianists could, if they chose, plead precedent in the example of their Confucian predecessors, for one of the most important of the immediate disciples of Confucius had declared that he daily examined his actions and his thoughts to see whether they were correct and upright, and Confucius and some of his successors were surrounded by admiring pupils in a more or less informal fellowship.

Negatively, many of the Sung thinkers revealed their Ch'an back-

ground by reacting against it. The Ch'an Buddhist held knowledge to be intuitive, derived by purely subjective processes. He offered no way of verifying the information obtained in this fashion and could not tell whether it corresponded with outward reality. He believed that the only reality is mind. Neo-Confucianists opposed to this a Taoist conception of a universal reason, of which both external nature and ourselves are a part. This would exalt reason, and although numbers of Sung Neo-Confucianists held to the sudden enlightenment of the Ch'an, many had a philosophy arrived at by rational rather than intuitive processes. They believed that by looking within we understand the rest of the universe, and that we can correct the information so obtained by an investigation of the world ouside ourselves. This investigation of the external world was justified in part by reference to a passage in the *Ta Hsüeh* ("Great—or Higher—Learning"), a small treatise of the Confucian school of the Chou dynasty which had been imbedded in the *Li Chi* and to which the Neo-Confucianists gave especial study and honor. This passage declared that the ancients had discovered that all ordered government, proper social organization, and ideal human conduct depend ultimately on the extension of knowledge, and that this, in turn, is to be achieved by the "investigation of things." Chu Hsi especially made much of the "investigation of things." He did not completely discard the sudden enlightenment of the Ch'an, but he held that to be effective as the road to truth it must be preceded by long and profound study of all things under heaven. It should be noted that this "investigation of things," which on the surface seems closely akin to the modern scientific methods of the West, was in practice largely confined by the Sung scholars and their successors to things of the mind and to the ethics found in the Classics of the Confucian school.

Associated with this process of arriving at knowledge were a cosmology and cosmogony. For their ultimate formulation, Chu Hsi, by temperament peculiarly fitted for synthesis and clarity of statement, was chiefly responsible.

Chu Hsi regarded the universe as a dualism, as having in it two elements or principles, but these, he believed, are so inseparably associated as to make a unity, a "universe." The two are *li* and *ch'i,* which can roughly, but by no means exactly, be translated as "law" and "material force." *Li* contains the ethical phases of the universe. In contrast with *li, ch'i* is the material element in all its myriad forms. Chronologically speaking, neither *li* nor *ch'i* is prior to the other, although when pressed, Chu Hsi seemed, guardedly, to give *li* a kind of precedence.

Chu Hsi was true to Confucius in that he made much of a high standard of morals. He held that morality in man is the expression of the *li* which is basic in the universe—that it is of the very warp and woof of reality.

Chu Hsi spoke of the *t'ai chi,* translated as the "great ultimate" or "great extreme," and also as the absolute, or the infinite. This term is found in one passage in the *I Ching*. The *t'ai chi* in turn produced the *yin* and the *yang*, terms which, since the Chou, had been familiar to Chinese thinkers as expressing a kind of dualism: inertia and energy, darkness and light, female and male. Through the interaction of the *yin* and the *yang* spring the five elements: fire, water, earth, wood, and metal.

In spite of his power of synthesis and his beauty of literary style, Chu Hsia's conceptions present great difficulty to Western students, and marked differences of opinion exist as to their meaning. Western and Chinese categories differ so greatly that it is next to impossible to transfer the one into the other, and easy-going parallelisms are misleading. Occidental scholars have been divided over the significance of Chu Hsi's philosophy for theistic belief. Some maintain that he tended toward materialism, or at least toward a depersonalizing of the ancient Chinese conception of *T'ien.* Others declare that Chu Hsi gave to *li* the moral views of personality, and that, while eliminating all physical anthropomorphism from his portrayal of *T'ien,* he held views which leaned essentially toward theism. Whatever may have been Chu Hsi's personal beliefs, his teaching strengthened the agnostic tendencies in Confucianism. If he ascribed to *T'ien* personal qualities, it was in such abstract terms that for the rank and file it became little better than impersonal law.

Neo-Confucianism was in several respects a departure from the views of the sage whose memory it professed to revere. Its views about sudden enlightenment, and its attempts to tell how the world came to be, were alien to the teachings of Confucius as found in the ancient records. At best they could legitimately claim only to be implicit in the sage's sayings. Yet members of the school seem sincerely to have believed that they were true to the spirit of Confucius, and their emphasis upon the *Lun Yü* (Analects), the *Ta Hsüeh* (Great Learning), the *Chung Yung* (Doctrine of the Mean), and the Book of Mencius was not mere lip service, but sprang from a conviction of the authority and permanent value of these documents.

The views of Chu Hsi did not immediately win the unqualified acceptance of the majority of the scholar class. The followers of Wang Anshih opposed them. Among the conservatives who denounced Wang Anshih and who may be classed as Neo-Confucianists were many who could not agree with them. Chu Hsi entered into controversy with several rival interpreters of Confucianism whom he deemed heterodox. One famous opponent was Lu Chiu-yüan (1140–1192), also known as Lu Hsiangshan, who emphasized personal, subjective education and meditation and opposed any study beginning with the external world. His two elder brothers, less distinguished as scholars, joined in his opposition to Chu Hsi.

Extended conferences with Chu Hsi only intensified the reciprocal dissent. Lu Chiu-yüan incorporated a marked strain of Ch'an Buddhism, while Chu Hsi emphasized study and speculation and carried the impress of Taoist metaphysics. There was also a utilitarian school which gave itself to the study of political, economic, and military problems. Still another was the so-called Shu school, whose greatest scholar was Su Shih (1036–1101). Su Shih sought truth in Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, and did not commit himself to any one philosophy, although for many years his tablet was in the Confucian temple. His writings were long widely influential.

When, in later dynasties, Chu Hsi became dominant, there were still, as we shall see, dissenting thinkers, some of whom claimed that he had done violence to true Confucianism. In the main, however, for nearly seven centuries his interpretations were regarded as final and authoritative.

## CULTURE UNDER THE SUNG: DEVELOPMENTS IN BUDDHISM AND TAOISM

The surge of Neo-Confucianism did not mean that Buddhism and Taoism had been completely smothered. Both were still vigorous. In Buddhism, Ch'an was particularly influential. Many laymen became expert in it. Among the populace the Pure Land (Ch'ing T'u) sect was prominent, stressing faith in Amitabha as a means to salvation.

## CULTURE UNDER THE SUNG: OTHER LITERARY DEVELOPMENTS

The literary energy of the Sung was not confined to the discussion of political science provoked by the proposals of Wang An-shih and to the philosophical works of the Neo-Confucianists and their rivals. It also expressed itself in poetry, essays, and history—particularly history. Both Wang An-shih and his critics sought in the Classics justification for their schemes. Sung scholars showed a greatly quickened interest in the writing of history. In addition to the compilation of dynastic histories of the T'ang and of the Five Dynasties, they prepared accounts which covered the entire sweep of China's past. The most famous and widely used of these works was, fittingly (when one recalls the *Shih-chi* of Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien of the Han), by a Ssŭ-ma—Ssŭ-ma Kuang (1019–1086). This was the *Tzŭ Chih T'ung Chien* and covered the period from near the end of the fifth century B.C. to the close of the Five Dynasties. The author was an outstanding leader in the opposition to Wang An-shih, and part of the necessary leisure for his *magnum opus* was obtained during the long intervals when he and his associates were out of power and Wang was in the ascendant. Ssŭ-ma Kuang supplemented his larger history with a number of smaller compilations such as tables and the discussion of doubtful points. The *Tzŭ Chih T'ung Chien* became the basis of several

other works, notably a reconstruction and condensation of it, the *T'ung Chien Kang Mu,* made under the direction of Chu Hsi. Another, prepared by Yüan Ch'u, was a rearrangement by topics of the material in the *Tzŭ Chih T'ung Chien.* It was called the *T'ung Chien Chi Shih Pên Mo* and served as a precedent for a new type of history. Judged by the standards of modern Occidental scholarship, Chêng Ch'iao probably deserves the first rank among Sung historians. His *T'ung Chih* covered Chinese history from Fu Hsi to the T'ang.

In addition to the general histories of China were many studies of special periods, persons, and phases of the past. Antiquarians and their publications were numerous. Some of the earliest of the local topographies and histories were compiled—eventually a voluminous section of Chinese literature. Collections of extracts from the literature of the past were made, many critical essays were written on the works of earlier authors, records were prepared of the rites and customs of the court, and facts supplementary to the official historical records were gathered. To the close of the Sung and the opening years of the Mongol dynasty belongs Ma Tuan-lin. Taking as a basis a work of the T'ang dynasty, Tu Yu's *T'ung Tien,* he collected the *Wên Hsien T'ung K'ao,* a compilation which contained a vast amount of information on government and related subjects. With true historic sense, Sung scholars also wrote many essays on contemporary events, valuable source material for later devotees of Clio.

The Sung dynasty witnessed an expansion in the *lei shu*—collections of extracts from earlier works and often translated, although not with entire accuracy, as encyclopedias. Their beginnings date from hundreds of years before the Sung, but with their penchant for the past, the Sung scholars compiled a number of them, some relatively short and on restricted groups of topics, and others longer than any which had yet appeared. The most famous was the *T'ai P'ing Yü Lan,* prepared under imperial direction, comprising more than a thousand books and quoting from nearly seventeen hundred works.

To this zeal of Sung scholars for the past, later generations have owed the preservation of much material which otherwise would have been lost. The Sung savants were not without serious defects and their inaccuracies often misled their successors in subsequent dynasties. Yet they were not uncritical of their historical source material. Some doubted the authenticity of the *Chou Li,* others accepted only three of the Five Classics, another regarded the appendices to the *I Ching* as late interpolations, and Chu Hsi rejected the prefaces to the *Shih Ching* and threw doubt on the so-called "ancient text" of the *Shu Ching,* in later centuries conclusively proved to be a forgery.

Even poetry showed the effect of regard for the past, and much of it was more closely bound to convention than that of the T'ang. It did not,

accordingly—at least in the judgment of many—rise to the heights attained during the T'ang. As a rule it was not the work of professional poets, as had been much of the best verse of the T'ang, but scholars whose chief interests were elsewhere: in other literary pursuits, in the duties of public office, or in religion. One of the most famous of the Sung poets, Su Shih, or Su Tung-p'o (1036–1101), was a brilliant scholar, a distinguished philosopher, who, as we have noted, came up through the ordinary channels of the state examination and spent much of his life in the employment of the government, was an art critic and the builder of a causeway in the West Lake (adjoining Linan), and wrote essays as well as poetry. Another was primarily a recluse who gave much time to Taoist studies, and still another finished his life as a Buddhist monk.

## OTHER CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS

With all this interest in the past, under the Sung the Chinese mind was not so closely bound by it as the preceding pages may have appeared to indicate. Works on astronomy, medicine, botany, and mathematics showed concern for other than humanistic, historical, and political studies. For example, several treatises on flowers and fruits have come down to us, among them what is probably the most ancient scientific account of the varieties of citrus fruits known in any language. In 1054 the appearance was noted of a supernova, the stellar explosion which gave birth to the Crab nebula in Taurus. Chinese mechanical inventiveness, too, was displaying itself. It was probably under the Sung that gunpowder, previously employed for fireworks, was first applied to warfare —in explosive hand-grenades. As we have seen, the compass came into use as an aid to navigation. Remarkably accurate maps of the Empire were made and engraved on stone. Near the close of the dynasty occurs the earliest known reference to the abacus, that now familiar device for reckoning. Whether it was an importation or of native origin we do not know. Fiction was written, and in the vernacular.

## CULTURE UNDER THE SUNG: THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF PRINTING

Inventiveness and mechanical skill showed themselves in printing. As we have said, as far as our records show us, that art was first developed under the T'ang, and under the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms had been employed, among other purposes, to print the Classics. It now reached its flowering. Voluminous dynastic histories were published as a governmental enterprise, and private firms issued many works. The calligrapher, whose skill has been highly esteemed in China, could express himself through the block method of printing, the form chiefly in use; and

his name, together with that of the author and printer, appeared on the finished works. Examples of the Sung editions still survive, and for quality of workmanship have never been surpassed. Movable type was invented, made first of earthenware. This device, however, was not so extensively employed as was the carved wood-block, nor did it yield such artistic results.

The rapid development of printing had a close connection with the literary and intellectual activity of the dynasty. It both stimulated it and was stimulated by it. The rapid multiplication of books made possible by printing encouraged authors to write, and augmented the number of libraries and the places where study could be pursued; it put the tools of literary work and of scholarship at the disposal of more people.

## CULTURE UNDER THE SUNG: PORCELAIN AND PAINTING

It was not only in the realm of political science, philosophy, literature, science, and mechanical invention that the Sung genius expressed itself. It also appeared in art. For this the court was partly responsible. Hui Tsung, the unfortunate Emperor who shared in the collapse of the Northern Sung, was, as we have noted, a painter of some distinction and a devoted patron of the arts. He founded an institute of calligraphy and painting, and government examinations in painting were begun. The Emperors of the Southern Sung continued the tradition, greatly beautifying their capital, appointing official painters, and maintaining the institute of art. The very surroundings of Linan (Hangchow) provided incentive. The West Lake, which the city eventually enclosed, the proximity of inspiring scenes of mountain, river, and sea, and the rich southern flora and fauna—all proved a stimulus to the aesthetic.

Porcelain loomed prominently as a medium for aesthetic expression. In beauty and craftsmanship, cups, bowls, and other objects made from it could bear comparison with the bronzes and jades of the ancients. It was covered with thick glazes. Often, although by no means always, only one color was used on one object. Sung glazes were in many colors, some of them delicate and of rare beauty. Before the application of the glaze, figures were often placed on the clay, either by incision or in relief. Many objects were covered by crackle-glaze. Porcelain was made at a number of centers, including the imperial factories located at the present K'aifêng and at Ching-tê-chên, in the present Kiangsi. The latter, to be long the most famous source of the ware, took its name from a Sung reign period (Ching Tê, 1004–1008). The overseas commerce gave wide distribution to the ware and many highly prized examples survive.

Sculpture did not occupy the place under the Sung that it had under the T'ang, perhaps because of the waning of Buddhism. The sculpture was

influenced by painting and tended to overrefinement, especially after the southward migration of the dynasty, The manufacture of earthenware figurines, so characteristic of the T'ang, largely fell into abeyance.

Landscape painting now came to the fore and reached heights of perfection never again attained in China. It was stimulated by the movement of the center of culture to the South—where were mountains, mists, lakes, rivers, and lush verdure. Much of the popularity of landscape in painting may have come as a reaction against the growing urbanization of life. No landscape painting equal to the Sung had ever appeared anywhere in the world, or was to appear, except possibly in a Japan inspired by it, and in recent times in Europe and America. Landscape was not the exclusive subject of the Sung painters. Flowers, birds, animals, and Buddhas and Bodhisattvas were portrayed. Even in painting, the love for the old, powerful in philosophy and literature, asserted itself, and some of the artists spent much time in copying the masterpieces of the past. Calligraphy, in Chinese practice so closely allied to painting that it profoundly modified it, received attention.

The prominence of landscape appears to have been due in part to Ch'an Buddhism. At least the spirit in which it was done was indebted to it. Ch'an looked below the surface of nature and saw through it to another and ideal world, subjective in character. This vision the painters sought to portray. Taoism reinforced the tendency, for, as we have seen, in some respects, notably in its attitude toward the visible universe, it was closely akin to the Ch'an.

In painting, one color rather than several was the rule: under the Sung monochrome reached its highest point. Both the Northern and Southern Schools, mentioned in the last chapter, were represented.

Some of the outstanding painters are worthy of special mention, even in so abbreviated an account as this. Kuo Chung-shu, whose life spanned the latter part of the Five Dynasties and the Ten Kingdoms and the earlier years of the Sung, held office, but was much of a wanderer and addicted to wine. He was noted for his pictures of buildings set among the hills. Kuo Hsi, born *ca.* 1020, did much of his work on the walls of temples and palaces. He achieved fame as a painter of distances and of winter landscapes and as a writer of a treatise on painting. Li Lung-mien (born *ca.* 1040) belonged to the party of Wang An-shih but was also a friend of Ou-yang Hsiu and Su Tung-p'o. He was a versatile and brilliant genius, a poet and a prose-writer of parts, a master of calligraphy, and as a painter won distinction by his horses, his Buddhist subjects, and his landscapes. The memory of Mi Fei (1051–1107), a native of the present Kiangsu, an eccentric court painter who held both civil and military offices, has been preserved by his landscapes and figures of men and animals, his calligraphy, and his writing. He and his son initiated a school, which enjoyed a great vogue in Korea. Hsia Kuei loved, among

other subjects, to portray the rugged seacoast and the tides. Attached to the court at the present Hangchow, he was much influenced by the scenery of the neighborhood. Another court painter of the Southern Sung was Ma Yüan, the greatest of a distinguished family of artists. His pictures include views of the West Lake and the villas of the great men of the capital. A school of Ch'an monks, not connected with the court or its imperial academy of painting, delighting in landscapes and living in monasteries in beautiful natural surroundings, had as its leading name Mu Ch'i, about whom personally we know very little.

## SUMMARY

The Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms constituted an important transition from one to another great epoch in China's history. Behind them lay the T'ang with its territorial conquests, the golden age of Buddhism, and the best period of Chinese poetry. After them came the three centuries and more of the Sung. Yet they registered no sharp break. In some respects the closing century and a half of the T'ang witnessed the beginnings of a new cultural era, which embraced as well the half-century of the Five Dynasties and the Ten Kingdoms and the Sung. Although harassed on the north by enemies which it was never able to expel and before whom it finally succumbed, the Sung proved that from the cultural standpoint the creativeness of Chinese genius had by no means been exhausted. Some of its thinkers wrestled with political and economic theory with a boldness and originality not displayed in these fields since the Chou and the Han. Others worked through afresh the heritage of Confucianism in the light of the impulses that had come from Taoism and Buddhism and created a cosmogony and a cosmology which, with all their professed devotion to the past, show a breadth of conception and a profundity of thought that place them among the outstanding intellectual achievements of the race. Something of the same comprehensiveness of view and adherence to the past found expression in the writing of histories. Printing was perfected and widely used. Striking advances were made in the sciences. Commerce, internal and external, flourished. Cities multiplied and a growing urban life wrought changes in the social structure of the nation. A China was emerging which had continuity with the past, yet was strikingly different from what preceded it. A migration of population to the lower Yangtze Valley and the South Coast made that region the chief center of wealth, cities, and culture. Art—both ceramics and painting—registered memorable activity. Whatever may have been their failures in the political realm, the Chinese mind and spirit had never, in any one period, except in the philosophic schools of the Chou, broken out in as many fresh ways and with such lasting results. Just as the T'ang differed in culture from the Han, so the Sung was quite distinctive as compared

with both the Han and the earlier years of the T'ang. Yet the Chinese spirit under the Sung was becoming ingrowing and was being confined to the national heritage. Not nearly so many new ideas were coming in from abroad as under the T'ang. It is doubtful, indeed, whether the Chinese would have welcomed them. China, on the defensive politically, tended to draw within itself culturally.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

# China Under the Rule of the Mongols (A.D. 1279–1368)

## INTRODUCTORY

When the commander of the remnant of the Sung forces, in defiant despair, terminated the hopeless struggle against the Mongols by throwing himself and the boy Emperor into the sea, it was not only a dynasty but an era which had come to an end. China was now a part of the Mongol Empire and was ruled by foreigners. It was too huge to be absorbed into any alien civilization, and the Mongols, far from forcing their own crude culture on the Middle Kingdom, adopted much of that of their subjects. Gone, however, was the Sung court, which, with all its political weaknesses and mistakes, had done much to foster literature and art. Immigrants of many different races and cultures shared in the administration of the country. The rich flowering of culture under the Sung faded.

Contacts with foreigners under the Mongols did not stimulate the Chinese genius to new life at all comparable with that which had followed the introduction of Buddhism. Some few significant and widely influential developments there were—in the drama and in the writing of novels, for instance—and Moslems now became a factor in Chinese life with which the realm had henceforth to reckon. However, no intellectual, social, or religious movements that profoundly affected the entire life of the people entered from the outside world. When the Mongols were at last expelled and the Empire was once more under a native dynasty, culturally the Chinese tended to fall back upon the heritage of their pre-Mongol past. While in some respects they elaborated it, they discouraged departure from it. The Mongol conquest, in other words, was the beginning of that period of comparative cultural sterility, of sturdy and largely undeviating adherence to traditional models, from which the Chinese were not to be shaken until their revolutionary contacts with the Occident at the close of the nineteenth and in the twentieth century. Critics of this complacent orthodoxy were not wanting, but they were in the minority. Some significant innovations and noteworthy cultural achievements were registered. Compared with earlier periods, however, the tempo of change was slow.

Why this comparative stagnation should have prevailed is not clear.

We can only offer conjectures. One is that Islam, the single spiritual importation of importance which under the Mongols was so strengthened as to win a permanent place in Chinese life, made less of an impression than had the Indian faith: the type of Islam which reached China was not the bearer of a particularly varied or rich culture. Another possible reason is that the antiforeign reaction accompanying the expulsion of the Mongols sought to restore and conserve the national heritage and discouraged originality. Then, too, as we have seen, the Sung, with all its brilliance, stressed the indigenous heritage. It is clear also that to the triumph of the examination system must be assigned at least some of the responsibility for the unprogressive conservatism. Whatever the cause or causes, the Mongol conquest marks the end of a period of creativity and the beginning of a long era of relative lack of originality.

## THE REIGN OF KHUBILAI: EXTERNAL POLITICS: MONGOL RULE AT ITS HEIGHT

The domination of the Mongols, from which dates this transition in Chinese culture, was of relatively brief duration. Less than a century after the extinction of the Sung it had come to an end. The reign of Khubilai, during which the conquest of China was completed, saw the Mongol Empire at its apex. From the vantage of several centuries, it is today clear that in spite of the splendor of his reign Khubilai saw the tide of Mongol conquest reach its flood and begin to ebb.

Theoretically, Khubilai's rule extended over all the vast domains in Asia and Europe occupied by the members of his family. Practically, however, in the sections more remote from China, that suzerainty was little better than nominal and in wide regions it was disputed. Khubilai was the Grand Khan, but time-distances in the huge Empire were so great that the subordinate khans who possessed the actual rule on the periphery, especially in central and western Asia and eastern Europe, were in practice almost, if not entirely, autonomous. During much of the life of Khubilai, moreover, a relative, Kaidu, effectively disputed his rule in much of what is now Sinkiang and the southern part of Siberia, and for a time invaded Mongolia and threatened Karakorum. Another Mongol ruler, Nayan, a Nestorian Christian, whose domains were in Manchuria and Korea, joined Kaidu in defying Khubilai's power. Khubilai's forces defeated Nayan and put him to death, but Kaidu successfully continued his resistance until after Khubilai's death.

In several of his attempts to extend his domains Khubilai notably failed. He succeeded in putting down revolts in Korea and in bringing that peninsula more effectively under the sway of the Mongols. When, however, he assayed to conquer Japan he encountered signal defeat. Beginning with

1266 several embassies sought to induce the Japanese to submit without fighting. That effort failed, and in 1274 Khubilai launched against the island realm an expedition of Mongols and Koreans. This effected a landing on Kyushu, but the Japanese, although unable to cope in the open field with Mongol tactics and equipment, put up a stubborn fight and the invaders withdrew. A storm came up and the Mongol fleet suffered heavy losses. After Khubilai had conquered the Southern Sung, he renewed the attack on Japan with a much larger force. The extensive maritime resources of the South of China were now at his disposal. In the summer of 1281 a huge armada of Mongols, Chinese, and Koreans was dispatched against the recalcitrants. Again a landing was made; again the Japanese offered stout opposition, this time by both land and sea; again the elements came to the rescue of the attacked, and a storm destroyed a large proportion of the invading ships. The Chinese contingents were especially heavy sufferers. Khubilai did not at once give up hope of renewing the attempt, but the Mongols and the Koreans had no more stomach for the project, the heavy demands on the Chinese brought restlessness, and when the revolt of Nayan absorbed Khubilai's attention the idea of another invasion seems to have passed into oblivion. Later in the Yüan amicable relations between the Mongol regime and Japan were renewed.

In the South Khubilai's forces either encountered disaster or won relatively sterile victories. While the Sung rule was collapsing and the sweep of the Mongol arms seemed irresistible, the ruler of Champa, in what later was Vietnam, accepted the suzerainty of Khubilai and dispatched envoys to the court of the Grand Khan. When, however, Khubilai demanded, as a more substantial recognition of his authority, a visit of the ruler in person to his court, he met with a refusal. To make his power effective, Khubilai thereupon sent an army (1282), by sea from Canton, to reduce Champa to a more obedient frame of mind. The expedition took the citadel of the Chams (1283), but the quarry escaped to the hills and eluded capture.

The efforts of the Mongols to control Annam proved as futile as those in the neighboring Champa. Some of the adherents of the Sung fled to Annam to escape the Mongol advance. This helped to attract the attention of Khubilai to that state. Like the ruler of Champa, the Annamese monarch was willing to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Mongols through formal embassies to Khubilai's court, but persistently declined to come in person to make his submission. Khubilai sent army after army to bring the region to a more humble attitude and to place a creature of his own on the throne. In 1280, 1285, and 1287, Mongol armies penetrated Annam. On the open field they were usually victorious, but the tropical climate proved their undoing. Twice, shattered by dis-

ease, they were forced to retire, and the third time, enfeebled by the same enemy, they were overwhelmed by the Annamese with the loss of their fleet. Khubilai wished to continue the attack but had to be content with threats on his part and—to him—unsatisfactory present-bearing embassies from Annam.

Mongol experience in Burma was less disastrous but led to no continuing conquest. Beginning with 1277 and ending in 1301, five separate expeditions sought to establish the rule of the Grand Khan. The invading armies were usually fairly successful in battle. Three of them penetrated the valley of the Irrawaddy, at least two of them to the south of the present Mandalay. But they failed to establish any lasting foothold.

A Mongol-Chinese armada was sent to Java to punish a prince in the eastern part of the island who had treated with contumely an envoy sent by Khubilai to demand the recognition of Mongol suzerainty. With the aid of a local magnate, the force achieved initial successes, but after a few months the great distance from its base, heavy losses of life, and continuing resistance led the army to re-embark.

Tribute was received from a state in the present Thailand, but no troops seem to have been ordered there.

An attempt to subdue the Liu Ch'iu (Ryu Kyu) Islands ended in failure, apparently because of the untimely death of the Chinese pilot of the invading fleet.

From the vantage of the centuries, it is evident that the miscarriage of these attempts to extend the Mongol possessions across the seas and to the south was an indication that the tide had reached its flood and was about to recede. Other factors than lack of vigor entered into the failures of Khubilai's forces. The Mongols had been eminent as strategists on the land, but it is not strange that, coming from the desert and the steppes, they should not be at home on the sea. In the South, moreover, the tropical climate proved uncongenial and was a handicap which they could not fully overcome.

It must not be forgotten that Khubilai greatly widened the Mongol borders. He completed the conquest of the Sung (no light task), and his generals permanently added Yünnan to the Chinese Empire. They brought to an end the independent, or semi-independent, state which had existed there for centuries, although the native line was continued for a time as Mongol officials.

Then, too, Khubilai's envoys went farther than official envoys of China had ever gone before. Embassies were dispatched to Ceylon and South India and even to Madagascar—or at least so Marco Polo declares—but these appear to have been for the purpose not of political conquest but of encouraging trade.

THE REIGN OF KHUBILAI: INTERNAL POLITICS

The spectacular and rapid rise of the Mongol Empire had been a tribute to the genius and energy of the men responsible for it. A greater test of capacity, however, was the task of welding together into some sort of permanent whole the vast area and the great diversity of races and cultures that had been conquered. If in this the Mongols signally failed, it was probably quite as much because of the difficulty of the problem as because of their lack of ability. At the outset of their conquest—that of the North—the Mongols allotted to their leading men large land holdings and taxed the peasants heavily, both with the traditional levies and with new ones. They farmed out the taxes. They used merchants to assist in the exploitation of their new possessions.

Under Khubilai striking changes were effected. A much more highly centralized administration was introduced. After the acquisition of the South, the landowners of that region were utilized to aid the government. As we have seen, these land holdings had developed under the Sung. At the outset of the conquest the landed class was won to the support of the Mongol regime. For the first time in China's history a nation-wide paper currency was created and substituted for local currencies.

Khubilai's policy seems to have been in part one of conciliation of the conquered, in part an attempt at a cosmopolitan blending of races in the government, and in part the promotion of prosperity. He maintained traveling inspectors to report on the economic status of his subjects. He had public granaries in which the surplus grain of good seasons was stored for distribution in years of dearth. He made provision for the public care of aged scholars, orphans, and the infirm, and for the distribution of food among the poor. He encouraged education. In general, these policies had precedent under the Sung.

Religiously, Khubilai was tolerant. For himself, he seems to have held to some of the primitive shamanistic practices of his fathers and to have inclined toward Buddhism of the Tibetan type. He had a new Mongol alphabet devised on the basis of the Tibetan script, the old having been taken from that of the Uighurs. Officially he gave support, financial and otherwise, to several faiths. Like Ogodai and Mangu, he exempted Taoist and Buddhist monks, Nestorian priests, and Moslem teachers from taxation, with the condition that they offer prayers in his behalf. As had his immediate predecessors, Khubilai used the clergy of these faiths to aid in the local administration. His only religious animosity appears to have been against the Taoists, but these seem to have been discouraged and their books ordered burned more because their violent antagonism to the Buddhists threatened the peace of the realm than from any dislike for their teachings. Even toward the Taoists Khubilai was by no means implacable. He called into his presence the head of the cult and officially confirmed the title of

*T'ien Shih*, or "Heavenly Teacher," which the latter had previously borne. Khubilai honored Confucianism and summoned to court the representatives of the family of the sage. Confucianism regained much of the ground which it had lost in the North under the Khitan and the Juchên.

In political administration, Khubilai enlisted Chinese scholars. Even under Jenghiz Khan Chinese political ideas had begun to mold Mongol policy. Chinese scholars naturally favored an organization modeled on those of preceding dynasties. Khubilai became a Chinese Emperor somewhat of the traditional type. He employed Chinese in the government of the country.

However, some modifications were introduced. Especially marked was the use of non-Chinese. Relatively few Chinese were placed in the higher offices. Foreign contingents were in the Mongol armies and garrisons, and many aliens were appointed to administrative posts—as governors of provinces and in leading positions in the cities. Foreign merchants were favored as against the Chinese. Of the foreign commerce, to Chinese merchants was assigned only the trade with the lands to the south. Khubilai forbade the Chinese to carry arms and took away those which they already possessed.

Khubilai's capital, as we have seen, was at Cambaluc, the later Peking, on and near the site on which had often been a capital of one of the states of China. Here he built an entirely new city, on a grand scale. As the administrative center of the Mongol Empire it attracted a large population and was the marvel of European travelers. By moving his capital from the old Mongol headquarters, Karakorum, he was better able to govern that most populous and wealthy portion of his domains, the Middle Kingdom.

To improve communications and so to facilitate the administration of China and the shipment of grain from the fertile South to Cambaluc, Khubilai reconstructed the Grand Canal, which connected the Yangtze Valley with the North. This waterway, as we have seen, had been begun many centuries before, and much labor had been expended on it to make it a means of through traffic between the North and the South. Khubilai put it again into good working order, extended it to Cambaluc, and partly altered its route. Some of the tribute grain from the South was brought by sea around the Shantung promontory. Khubilai improved several of the main highways and provided for rapid posts, as a means of holding his domains together.

### THE SUCCESSORS OF KHUBILAI

Khubilai died in 1294, at the ripe age of eighty. None of his successors approached him in ability, but Mongols held the throne of China for nearly three-quarters of a century longer. The Yüan Emperors were

still recognized as Grand Khans—the overlords of the vast Mongol domains—and when, after Khubilai's death, the revolt of Kaidu came to an end, there were no important areas in the Mongol Empire where nominally that suzerainty did not prevail.

However, the huge structure was falling apart. Distances, difficulties of communication, and cultural differences were proving too formidable to permit permanent union. The Mongols were taking over the customs of their subjects, and so were losing their own unity of culture. In Persia and Transoxiana, for example, they were becoming Moslems. In China they were more and more conforming to the ancient ways of the Middle Kingdom. Like Khubilai, they here favored Buddhism, particularly of the Tibetan type, and continued to exempt Buddhist, Taoist, Nestorian, and Moslem teachers and monks from taxation. Even more than he, they supported Confucianism. In the fourteenth century the civil service examinations and the Hanlin Academy were restored, and fresh honors were decreed for Confucius, for Mencius, and for Confucius's disciple Yen Hui. The temples to Confucius were maintained and never had the ceremonies in them been more ornate or elaborate.

The ruling line at Cambulac lost in vigor. In the forty years or so between the death of Khubilai and the accession of the last Mongol Emperor in 1333 there were eight monarchs, none of them of outstanding merit, and the majority with too short a tenure of office to achieve distinction. Khubilai's grandson and successor, to be sure, ruled for about thirteen years and labored diligently to reform abuses, reduce corruption, achieve a more equitable system of taxation, and in other ways to improve the administration. Most of the others, however, were less energetic.

The last of the line to hold China came to the throne when he was little more than a boy and proved weak and pleasure-loving. During the thirty-five years that he reigned from Cambaluc the power of the Mongols almost steadily declined. The exploitation of the peasants and Chinese merchants was enhanced. Rebellious secret organizations flourished, among them the *Pai Lien Hui*, or White Lotus Society, which was to have a long and stormy career. Revolts broke out in several different parts of the country. Attempts of the Mongols to suppress sedition, such as the renewal of the interdiction of arms to the Chinese and the rumored proposal to slay all Chinese bearing certain common surnames, increased the unrest. Famine in the North and trouble with the ever-treacherous Yellow River added to the problems of the alien rulers. The financial straits to which the Mongols were reduced led to an increase in the issue of paper money inadequately supported by metallic reserves, until the currency became worthless and the people were reduced to barter. Heavy taxation added to the dissatisfaction. The Mongols were divided among themselves and could not present a united front to their enemies.

Had the leaders of the various revolts been able to agree among themselves, the Mongols would probably have been expelled more quickly than they were. As it was, each was ambitious for his own interests and some were almost as incompetent as the rulers against whom they rebelled. A little effort was made to restore the Sung, but victory finally rested with a man of humble birth, Chu Yüan-chang; in the rough-and-tumble struggles of the time, native ability and not heredity was the best guarantee of success.

Chu Yüan-chang was born in the present province of Anhui in the year 1328. His family was poor, and in his middle teens his parents and elder brother died in one of the famines that scourged these unhappy years. For a while he sought a livelihood in a Buddhist monastery. When, in the disorders of the time, this refuge was burned and the monks scattered, he entered military service under the leader of a force of rebels in the neighborhood. Here he displayed signal ability and rose rapidly. He made himself master of a large area in the lower part of the Yangtze Valley, and in 1364 assumed the title of Prince of Wu. Chu's energy, discretion, and clemency quickly extended his domains in the South, and in 1367 he felt strong enough to press northward. In 1368 Cambaluc fell before one of his generals (Hsü Ta) and in that year he was proclaimed Emperor of a new dynasty, the Ming. The incompetent Mongol ruler fled northward and died before two years were out. For decades thereafter the Mongols sought to re-establish themselves south of the Great Wall, and invasions by them were a fairly constant menace, but their day of power had passed. In China proper their dominion was only a memory.

## FOREIGN CONTACTS UNDER THE MONGOLS: MIGRATIONS AND COMMERCE

One of the marked features of the Mongol period was extensive contacts with other peoples and cultures. As we have seen, it was a deliberate policy of the Yüan to appoint non-Chinese to a fairly large proportion of the official positions in China. Not only Mongols but members of other non-Chinese races were also given office. Moreover, bodies of foreign troops were brought in. For example, we hear of a contingent of Alans, Christians from the Caucasus, in Cambaluc.

Mongol rule made for a degree of security for travel in a vast area which had never before been brought together under one sway. China's foreign commerce flourished accordingly. It probably reached dimensions not previously attained. Merchants from many countries frequented the chief marts. Arabs, Persians, and representatives of races of Central Asia entered in large numbers. Chinese merchants ventured abroad, and Chinese junks made their way to Java, India, and Ceylon. Chinese engineers were utilized in the irrigation of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. There were Chinese colonies in Moscow, Novgorod, and Tabriz. The Yüan Emperors had

commercial agreements with the princes of at least two of the states of South India.

Foreign trade was carried on both by sea and by the ancient overland tracks across the present Sinkiang. Many of the cities of China, both on the coast and on the internal trade routes, shared in the prosperity which it brought. As under the Sung, a major emporium was the present Ch'üanchow (known to European medieval travelers as Zaitun), in Fukien.

Commerce was not without its problems. The drain of copper coinage embarrassed the Mongol rulers as it had the Sung. Silver flowed out of the realm. The Mongols, too, found it difficult to maintain a state monopoly over foreign trade or to enforce the regulations which they desired.

As heretofore, commerce was chiefly in those commodities which combined small bulk and weight with large value. The leading export appears still to have been silk in various forms—several varieties of silken fabrics being mentioned in the lists of merchandise—but porcelains and other wares helped to swell the total. Imports included, among other items, spices, pearls, precious stones, and fine cloths.

From the standpoint of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, one of the most interesting features of this foreign trade was the earliest known direct contact of China with the peoples of western Europe. Mongol armies penetrated far into Europe and brought alarm to the sovereigns of the western part of that continent. Travelers from the Mongol possessions reached that region. We know of a Uighur (or possibly an Ongut) Nestorian monk, Rabban Cauma (or Sauma), who had been born in Cambaluc and who in 1287 and 1288 visited Rome, Bordeaux, and Paris on a diplomatic mission from the Mongols.

Compared with some of the states of the time, the kingdoms of western Europe were then small in area and population and were by no means so important for their contemporaries as were several other realms. Nor were they as populous or prosperous. A European traveler in China in the fourteenth century, for instance, declared that the former Sung domains contained "two hundred cities all greater than Venice." In the thirteenth century, however, western Europe was displaying some of that remarkable growth which was to make it dominant in the world's life and which six and seven centuries later was to work the greatest revolution in China in that Empire's history. Even before the birth of Jenghiz Khan and the Mongol advance, the Crusades had carried the arms of western European peoples into the Levant, and Italian cities had made commercial contacts there. The thirteenth century saw extensive trade between Italy and the Near East. It also witnessed the rise of the Franciscans and the Dominicans and with it a new burst of Christian missionary endeavor, both inside and outside Europe. Given the facility of travel in Asia which the Mongols had created, it would, therefore, have been strange if Europeans had not reached China.

How many merchants from western Europe made the journey to China we do not know. Judging from those of whom our comparatively scanty records tell us, the number must have been considerable. We hear of Genoese and Venetians in China, and of many in Venice who had made the round trip. Travelers went either by the land roads—of which the most frequently traversed was one by way of the Black Sea, the Volga, Ili, and Kansu, and one through Persia, the Tarim River basin, and Kansu—or by sea via India to the ports on the south coast of China.

Due to the fact that he left behind him a record of his travels, the most famous of these medieval adventurers was a Venetian, Marco Polo. Several years before the Mongols had made an end of the Sung rule in South China, Nicolo and Maffeo Polo, the father and uncle of Marco, had come to Cambaluc. Khubilai was much interested in them and dispatched them to the West with letters to the Pope asking for a hundred teachers of science and religion. Because of a papal interregnum the answer to the request was delayed. When at last the Polos started on their return journey, they were accompanied by only two of the hundred missionaries asked for, and these, frightened by the dangers in the way, turned back before going very far. The two brothers, however, were undeterred and in due course, together with Marco, whom they had taken with them, reached China. Khubilai received the Polos with cordiality (1275) and seems to have treated with especial kindness Marco, then about twenty-one years of age. Marco entered his employ and held various positions, among them some which carried the young Venetian over much of China.

After a little more than a decade and a half in China, in 1292 the Polos left it as members of a large company appointed to escort a princess to Persia, where she was to become the wife of the reigning Mongol khan. After seeing their charge safely to her destination, the Polos returned to Venice. It was probably while a prisoner of war in Genoa that Marco dictated an account of his travels and observations to a fellow captive. The result was to have a large influence upon European knowledge of geography and geographic discoveries. Few works of travel have had so wide a circulation or such far-reaching effects. Columbus, for example, owed much to it. Even today, it is one of our best sources of information about China and the countries of central and southern Asia in the days of the Mongols.

## FOREIGN CONTACTS UNDER THE MONGOLS: FOREIGN RELIGIONS IN CHINA

Among the many influences from the outside which the presence of so many aliens brought to the Middle Kingdom, some of the most interesting were religious.

The timidity of the two Dominicans who began the journey with the Polos by no means characterized all their fellow friars. During the thirteenth

and fourteenth centuries Dominicans and Franciscans, taking advantage of the comparative ease of travel under the Mongols, covered much of Central Asia and went to India and China.

Some friars were sent on political errands by European rulers; more of them went on purely religious missions. Notable among the diplomatic envoys were two Franciscans, John of Plano Carpini, who (1245–1247) accomplished the round trip to Karakorum, and William of Rubruck, who made the journey to the same Mongol capital and back a few years later (1253–1255).

The first friar of whom we hear as reaching China proper was one who went with a purely religious objective, a Franciscan, John of Montecorvino. John arrived in Cambaluc in 1294. He gained the favor of the Emperor, and by 1305 had baptized about six thousand converts and had built a church. When, shortly after 1305, the news of his success reached Europe, the Pope appointed him Archbishop of Cambaluc and sent him reinforcements, three of whom, all Franciscans, reached China. Other Friars Minor went to China during the next few years, and we learn of houses of the order at Zaitun (Ch'üanchow), the present Hangchow, and Yangchow—all three, it will be noted, important commercial cities—as well as at Cambaluc. So far as we know, the last Roman Catholic missionary to penetrate to China in the Middle Ages was a papal legate, John of Marignolli. Following the overland route, he reached Cambaluc in 1342, remained there three or four years, and returning by the sea route, arrived at Avignon in 1353. Within two decades the Mongols were expelled from China, their empire had collapsed, and communications with western Europe were cut off. Such Roman Catholic communities as existed—relatively small at best—disappeared, partly because they were either foreign in membership or were associated in the public mind with the now unpopular alien, and nothing remained of them but a few memories (mostly in Europe) and still fewer physical relics.

Nestorians, too, were in China under the Mongols. Nestorian Christianity was at that time widely spread in Central Asia and on the borders of China proper, and numbers of the foreigners who came from these regions into China under Yüan were of that faith. A Turkish tribe, the Keraïts, which was closely affiliated with the Mongols, and from which many high officials and the mother of Mangu, Hulagu, and Khubilai were drawn, were Nestorians. So, too, were the Onguts, who lived near the northern bend of the Yellow River, and some of the Uighurs, whom the Mongols employed extensively. We hear of a Nestorian—probably from Syria—who under Khubilai was placed in charge of the astronomical bureau in Cambaluc and later became a member of the Hanlin Academy and a minister of state; of a Nestorian physician from Samarkand who was governor of Chinkiang; of a Nestorian archbishopric in Cambaluc; of a Nestorian Uighur (or possibly an Ongut)

born in North China, who went to Bagdad and in 1280 became patriarch of the entire Nestorian communion; of an office established by Khubilai to supervise the Christians; and of Nestorians in such widely separated cities and portions of China as Yangchow, Hangchow, Chinkiang, Kansu, Yünnan, and Hochienfu (in the present Hopei). The collapse of the Mongol rule was followed by the extinction of Nestorianism in China. Most of the foreigners who professed the faith probably either left the country or were killed. On the edges of China and in Central Asia, Nestorianism was superseded by Islam and Buddhism, and no centers remained from which missionaries might again propagate the faith in the Middle Kingdom.

We know that Armenian Christians resided in China under the Mongols, and that the contingent of Alans who were a portion of the Mongol armed forces in Cathay belonged to one of the eastern Christian communions before their conversion to Roman Catholicism by John of Montecorvino. These had no more permanent influence than did Roman Catholicism and Nestorianism.

Islam fared better than Christianity. Moslems from abroad appear to have been much more numerous in China under the Mongols than were Christians. Merchant communities of Moslem Arabs were found in several of the chief commercial cities. Much of the present Yünnan was governed by a Moslem official who had rendered notable service during the conquest of China. His son succeeded to his power, and descendants, still Moslem by faith, were prominent in China after the expulsion of the Mongols. It is not surprising that a large Moslem community arose in that region, for not only is it probable that Moslem troops were serving there under the banner of their coreligionist, but many of the inhabitants as well would be likely, from motives of expediency, to accept the faith of their governors. Nor is it strange that in North China, and particularly in what is now Kansu, where the overland trade routes from the West debouched, many Moslem immigrants were found. Neither is it remarkable that Moslem communities survived the downfall of the Mongols. They were more numerous than the Christians, and the growth of Islam in Central Asia maintained a constant Moslem influence in China's Northwest. The Arab control of much of the sea-borne commerce between western, southern, and eastern Asia in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries aided the persistence of Islam on the south coast. Moslems had been in China before the Yüan, but from this dynasty dates their prominence in Chinese life.

## CULTURE UNDER THE MONGOLS

As we suggested at the beginning of this chapter, contact with foreigners and foreign civilizations under the Mongols was not followed by any such burst of cultural creativity as succeeded the intro-

duction of Buddhism. Through the coming of scholars from the South to Cambaluc, the teachings of Chu Hsi made headway in intellectual circles in the North. But many Confucian scholars, taught loyalty to their rulers by Neo-Confucianism, refused to hold office after the Sung had been displaced. They despised the Mongols as crude and—from the standpoint of Chinese culture—uncivilized barbarians. They retired from public life. Later, as the Mongol rule waned, corruption in the government mounted and high-minded Confucian scholars increasingly found official position irksome or impossible.

Some effect the extensive contacts with alien cultures had, however: the Mongol period is different from the Sung and marked developments took place. In mathematics and medicine innovations were made, due chiefly, apparently, to foreign contacts. Chaulmoogra oil became known and was used in the treatment of leprosy. Spectacles were introduced—a foreign invention.

In painting, the Sung traditions, especially those which had arisen under the influence of Ch'an Buddhism, were continued in monasteries in the Yangtze Valley and the adjoining coast. Some secular artists among the scholars, in their disdain of things Mongol, attempted to maintain the Sung forms. There was also a reversion to T'ang styles. The Mongol conquest had a decided effect, however. Thanks to fairly close contact with the West, Persian art here and there left its mark. Because of their Buddhist proclivities, the Mongol rulers favored religious paintings of that faith. Especially noteworthy were the reintroduction of movement and color and the portrayal of scenes of everyday secular life. Horses provided favorite subjects, as did the festivities and diversions of the rich and the powerful. The so-called Northern School, with its more vigorous style, came to the fore. One of the greatest artists of the dynasty was Chao Mêng-fu, a descendant of the founder of the Sung. He held high office at court and was noted as a painter of landscapes and of horses, men, and historical scenes.

Not only in painting but also in ceramics changes were registered. Persian influences made themselves felt in the forms of vases and in ornamentation. Cloisonné, of Byzantine origin, now seems to have appeared for the first time. New Indian impulses were present in Buddhist iconography.

In literature the outstanding developments were in the drama and the novel. Acting was not new in China but had a long history in connection with worship, in the pantomimes and historical recitals associated with the ancestral rites of antiquity, and in acrobatic performances stressing the use of weapons. There were jugglers, dancers, and simple plays as early as the Han, and the drama in several forms—comedies among them—was found in succeeding dynasties. The drama was also encouraged in the T'ang, notably under that great imperial patron of

the arts, Ming Huang, and scores of titles of plays have come down from the Sung. Now, however, the stage came to sudden flowering, and henceforth occupied a prominent place in Chinese life. The novel became popular. One of the most famous of the historical romances of China, the *San Kuo Chih Yen I,* or "Romance of the Three Kingdoms," portraying some of the stirring events of the period that succeeded the downfall of the Han, seems to date from the Yüan—although it is very probable that only the crude original was written in that period and that it underwent many revisions before it appeared in the sixteenth century in its finished form. Both the drama and the novel were usually written in a style which approached the vernacular and helped toward a popularization of literature.

Why the drama and the novel should now first have flourished is not entirely certain. One conjecture has it that it was because of outside influences. Another surmise is that scholars, cut off from holding office, and through the suspension of civil service examinations denied the usual method of promotion, turned their energies into these channels. Whatever the causes, the fact is clear.

## CHINESE INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN PEOPLES

While, thanks to the partial unity brought to so much of Asia by Mongol rule, foreigners were having some influence upon Chinese culture, China, in turn, was not without its effect upon other peoples. Numbers of the foreigners in the Mongol employ in China conformed to Chinese culture. Some became distinguished exponents of Confucianism and a few were converted to Taoism. At first the Mongol conquerors despised the Chinese, treated the Confucian scholars with contumely, and forced them into servile employment. But eventually some Mongols adopted much of Chinese civilization. Khubilai, great statesman that he was, sought to rule as a Chinese Emperor, and more than he, some of his successors fitted into that pattern. Commerce spread the use of Chinese silks and porcelains, and these left their stamp upon the fabrics and the designs of Central and Western Asia. The Chinese impress is seen upon the painting of miniatures in Central Asia. It is just possible, moreover, that knowledge of that art of printing which had reached so high a stage of development in China under the Sung penetrated to the West in Mongol times and had some share in the preparation for the revolutionary growth of the press in Europe a century or so after the downfall of the Yüan.

## SUMMARY

The Mongol period was marked by distinct changes in Chinese life and was the break—or the transition—between the brilliant

culture of the Sung and the prosperous but somewhat commonplace and uninspired centuries which began with the Ming and were to continue nearly to our own day. It witnessed the coming of many aliens, but saw the introduction of very few foreign contributions which were long to have a prominent place. It is distinguished for the rapid development of the drama and the novel. By inducing a reaction from foreign control, it contributed to the dominance of stereotyped and uncreative Confucianism in the dynasties which followed.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

# China Again Under Chinese Rule: The Ming Dynasty (A.D. 1368–1644)

## INTRODUCTORY

The dynasty that Chu Yüan-chang founded was denominated Ming, which may best be translated "brilliant" or "glorious." To a certain degree it lived up to the implied promise. The genius of the period lay largely in being practical and efficient. From the military standpoint, the Ming was stronger than any native Chinese ruling house since the T'ang. It became the master of all of what we call China proper, as the Sung had never done. It interfered in Mongolian affairs and for a time held portions of what is now Sinkiang. It made its power felt as far south as Ceylon. Its form of government was, with slight changes, taken over by its successor, and was to last into the twentieth century. In culture, leading achievements were in the applied arts. In the earlier years of the Ming the Empire was prosperous. There was much building. The manufacture of cotton cloth greatly increased. From time to time vigorous intellectual movements appeared.

However, the Ming only partly deserved its title. It was never able to extend its boundaries to those occupied by the Han and the T'ang. Possibly as a reaction against domination of the Mongols, it tended to be ethnocentric, resistant to foreign influences, and culturally conservative. In government it was content to perpetuate, with modifications, the machinery of its predecessors. Under it the Empire was elegant, wealthy, and populous, but only here and there had a tendency to break out creatively into new channels. Neither in intellectual nor in artistic achievement did the China of the Ming display the originality of that of the T'ang and the Sung.

## POLITICAL HISTORY: THE HUNG WU EMPEROR

Chu Yüan-chang spent most of his reign in completing the conquest of China, in seeking to extend his power to neighboring lands, and in putting the machinery of government into working order. His dynastic title was T'ai Tsu, but he is usually best known as the Hung Wu

Emperor. Hung Wu is the name (or *nien hao*) by which the period of his reign is designated.

The expulsion of the Mongols from Cambaluc and the proclamation of the new dynasty were soon followed by the acknowledgment of the authority of the Ming by the remainder of China. Hsü Ta, the general who had taken Cambaluc for Chu Yüan-chang, reduced Shansi, Shensi, and Kansu. Szechwan, where an independent principality had been set up by an adventurer, was brought under the control of the Ming. By the end of 1382 Yünnan had succumbed.

Several outlying territories were also induced to recognize the Ming. The southern portion of what is now Manchuria made its submission. Under the Hung Wu Emperor's successors, it may be added, most of Manchuria was for a time to a greater or less extent within the Chinese domains. Korea and the Liu Ch'iu (Ryu Kyu) islands recognized the suzerainty of the Ming, and embassies were received from Burma and Nepal. Not content with expelling the Mongols from south of the Great Wall, the Hung Wu Emperor carried the war into their own territory. Twice during his reign a Chinese army reached the ancient Mongol capital, Karakorum. He appears to have considered himself the legitimate successor of the Mongol Grand Khans who had ruled from Cambaluc, and as such he sought to extend his sway over their former possessions in the West. His forces took at least one of the oases in that region, Hami, and his envoys obtained the acceptance of his suzerainty by several other centers in what is now Sinkiang.

When, however, Ming emissaries crossed the mountains to Samarkand, they met with a far different reception. In this region they found the truculent and energetic Tamerlane building a new empire out of some of the fragments of Mongol power and were imprisoned. In the course of time they were released, and Tamerlane and the Ming exchanged several embassies. The Chinese regarded those which came to them as bearers of tribute. Far from acknowledging the overlordship of the Ming, however, Tamerlane was planning the invasion of China when (1405) death terminated his career.

In another direction the Hung Wu Emperor met with moderate success. Japanese pirates were ravaging the coasts of China, and the Ming dispatched an envoy to Japan to request that they be restrained. Japan was then nearing the end of a long period of civil war, during which there had been much anarchy, and some of the local magnates had become practically independent of the central authority. One of these latter, a scion of the Japanese imperial line, prevented the envoy from reaching Kyoto, the capital. A few years later, this same prince, possibly hoping for Chinese aid in the domestic strife, sent an embassy to the Ming court. The Chinese appear to have accepted it as coming from the Japanese Government, thus opening the way for an official intercourse

between the two countries, which continued intermittently for years, although not without friction. The Chinese regarded the Japanese embassies as bearers of tribute from a subordinate prince. The pirates were never completely suppressed, partly, at least, because the Japanese authorities were unable to cope with them.

In internal administration the Hung Wu Emperor displayed great vigor, and the country appears to have settled down fairly promptly to its ordinary pursuits. He was confronted with occasional revolts, but none of them was of unusual consequence. His capital he established at what was later known as Nanking. There he began the construction of an enlarged city on magnificent lines. He promulgated a code of laws modeled on those of the T'ang. He adopted the traditional bureaucratic organization of the Empire. Although he modified this by dividing the country into principalities over each of which he put one of his sons as *Wang,* these were in addition to and not a substitute for the usual administrative subdivision and the regular official hierarchy. He abolished the premiership and replaced it with what was eventually the *Nei Ko,* or Grand Secretariat, directly dependent on himself. His autocratic power was thereby enhanced. After some hesitation—first inaugurating them and then for a decade or so restricting them— the Hung Wu Emperor firmly re-established the civil service examinations and the principle of filling government offices from the successful candidates. Under the Ming, indeed, the examinations acquired an inflexibility—stressing a minute knowledge of the classical books and an artificial literary style—which may have had much to do with discouraging originality among the educated.

Mindful of his early background, the Hung Wu Emperor showed favor to the Buddhist monks. He organized them nationally into a hierarchy, but this may well have been for the purpose of facilitating state control of the monasteries.

In spite of his friendliness to the Buddhists, the Hung Wu Emperor strengthened Confucianism. He showed marked deference to Confucian scholarship; he ordered the establishment of an Empire-wide system of schools in which the basis of instruction was the Confucian Classics; he honored the Hanlin Academy; he preserved the traditional system of state religious observances which were closely associated with Confucianism; he abolished all the state-awarded titles of the gods except those of Confucius. It is not strange that a conservatism was nourished which made later change difficult.

### POLITICAL HISTORY: THE YUNG LO PERIOD

The Hung Wu Emperor was gathered to his fathers in 1398. He had held the throne for thirty years and had established his family so firmly upon it that they retained it for another two and a half centuries.

His death was followed almost immediately by a struggle over the succession, which for about four years plunged the country into civil war. He had named as his heir a grandson, Chu Yün-wên, the son of his deceased oldest son. Only in his teens when the death of his grandfather placed him on the throne, Chu Yün-wên soon found himself in an impossible situation. He antagonized his uncles, including Chu Ti, the fourth son of the Hung Wu Emperor. Chu Ti had been given by his father the control of a large district in the Northeast, and he came to be known as the Prince of Yen. A man of marked energy and ability, he speedily found occasion to raise the standard of revolt. The young Emperor had many loyal supporters who fought valiantly for him, and it was not until 1403 that Chu Ti, after a war which laid waste much of the territory on the plain between the Yellow River and the Yangtze, succeeded in taking Nanking. In the fall of his capital, Chu Yün-wên disappeared, and it was often asserted that he was not killed but escaped in the garb of a Buddhist monk, lived in hiding in a monastery, and had his identity disclosed many years later. Whatever his fate, he had permanently lost the Empire.

Chu Ti, in spite of the bloodshed by which he had made his way to supreme power, proved an able monarch. While more correctly called by his dynastic title, Ch'êng Tsu, he is best known to us by the name of his reign period, Yung Lo (1403–1424). Under him the Ming dynasty reached the apex of its power. He vigorously maintained and extended Chinese prestige abroad and gave the Empire an energetic domestic administration.

In his foreign policy the Yung Lo Emperor was aggressive. He interfered actively in Mongolia and waged several campaigns there. He welcomed diplomatic relations with Yoshimitsu, the Shogun who controlled most of Japan. Yoshimitsu was eager for friendly intercourse with China. He promised to restrain the Japanese pirates who troubled the coasts of China and even acknowledged the Ming Emperor as his suzerain. In Annam the Yung Lo Emperor took advantage of internal dissensions to occupy much of the land and to divide it into Chinese administrative districts. Under him the petty chiefs of Upper Burma submitted more or less to Chinese authority.

The Yung Lo Emperor sent several naval expeditions to the lands to the south. They visited Cochin China, Java, Sumatra, Cambodia, Siam, India, and Ceylon. In Ceylon, a ruler who treated a Chinese envoy with contumely was taken prisoner and transported to China, and at least part of the island is said to have paid tribute to the Ming for the next half-century. In several others of the lands visited the local princes were induced, either peaceably or by force, to recognize Chinese overlordship. The leading commander in these southern exploits was a eunuch, Chêng-ho, who

had first distinguished himself in the suppression of a rebellion in Yünnan. Under his captaincy seven expeditions sailed to the southern seas, the last of them after the Yung Lo Emperor's death. He visited Annam, Cambodia, Malacca, Siam, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Cochin, Ceylon, Bengal, Arabia, the Somali Coast (in eastern Africa), and Ormuz (on the Persian Gulf). Tribute was received from Java, the Yung Lo Emperor was sent presents from one or more rulers in South India and conferred the title of king upon one, and even from the distant Somali Coast four missions were dispatched to China before his death. During no other dynasty was Chinese authority so far extended overseas.

In domestic administration, the Yung Lo period saw notable achievements. The Emperor moved the seat of imperial government to the North, to what he called Peking, or the Northern Capital, in contrast to his father's choice, Nanking, or the Southern Capital. The reason for the change may have been that Peking, so much nearer the northern marches, was a better location for the defense of the Empire against its traditional enemies. It may also have been because the North had been the center of the Yung Lo Emperor's power and was more friendly than the South. Peking, occupying part of the site of the Cambaluc of the Mongols, was largely rebuilt. The grandeur of the conception of the architects can be discerned in the walls and imperial palaces and temples as they existed in the fore part of the twentieth century, for, repaired and altered from time to time, in their main features they dated from the Yung Lo period. Peking was long unrivaled in the entire world for the formal and stately expression in buildings of its position as the seat of administration of a vast empire.

The Yung Lo Emperor sought to promote the prosperity of his realm. He encouraged the migration of settlers into the regions laid waste in the wars that had brought him to the throne. For the purpose of facilitating the transportation of rice to Peking and of avoiding the dangerous sea passage around the Shantung promontory, he had the Grand Canal improved. Although his personal inclination was toward Buddhism, especially of the Tibetan type, officially he pursued his father's policy of strengthening the Confucian cult: by showing favor to the Hanlin Academy, by encouraging the study of the Confucian Classics, by honoring Confucius, and by maintaining the civil service examinations. He endeavored to restrict the numbers of Buddhist monks by ordering some of them to return to secular life. It was at his command that one of the most gigantic compilations ever made, the *Yung Lo Ta Tien,* was accomplished—a vast collection of excerpts and entire works from the mass of Chinese literature. So huge was it that the cost of printing appalled even the imperial treasury, and except for some sections, it remained in manuscript only.

POLITICAL HISTORY: THE SUCCESSORS OF THE YUNG LO EMPEROR

During the remaining years that it retained the Mandate of Heaven, the family of Chu Yüan-chang produced no monarchs of the vigor and ability of the Hung Wu and Yung Lo Emperors. Much of the time the Empire was fairly prosperous—although often we hear of agricultural distress and even famine—but for the more than two centuries which elapsed between the death of the Yung Lo Emperor and the overthrow of the dynasty, no ruler emerged who was at all comparable with the chief rulers of preceding lines. No noteworthy effort was made to extend the frontiers: in area the Empire shrank rather than expanded. Before the fifteenth century was half gone, Annam had regained its independence. Tribute from the states across the seas gradually lapsed. Fighting with the Mongols was frequent, and the tide of battle did not always flow in favor of the Chinese. About the middle of the fifteenth century a Mongol army defeated and captured a Ming Emperor, and in the ensuing peace the Chinese renounced all claim to intervention in Mongolian affairs. It seems to have been more because of the weakness of her neighbors than because of her own strength that in the last several decades of the dynasty China was not more frequently invaded.

Friction with the Japanese marked many of the later years of the Ming. In spite of the friendly relations earlier established with the Ashikaga Shoguns—the most powerful magnates in the Japan of the day—Japanese pirates persisted in ravaging the coasts of China, for the control of the Ashikaga was not effective over all the island realm. The raiders sacked even such important cities as Ningpo and Yangchow. Estrangement between China and Japan followed (*ca.* 1531) and commerce dwindled. The difficulties culminated in a determined Japanese attempt to invade and conquer China. The initiating and guiding mind in this venture was Hideyoshi, an able and vigorous soldier of lowly birth. In the period of internal turmoil which accompanied and followed the downfall of the Ashikaga, he had made himself master of the land. Japan pacified, he turned to the continent for further exploits. He asked the Koreans to allow his forces to pass through their territories, but was rebuffed. His armies thereupon invaded the peninsula (1592) and within a year had taken several of its principal centers. The Chinese dispatched troops to aid the Koreans. Their first contingent was small and was quickly repulsed, but a second, much larger, drove the Japanese southward, and Hideyoshsi withdrew from the Peninsula all but a few thousand men. Negotiations followed, but Hideyoshi angrily terminated them when the Ming envoys, in what seemed to him an insultingly patronizing fashion, offered him investiture as a vassal prince. In 1597 he renewed the invasion of Korea.

The following year a Chinese army in the peninsula was decisively defeated. Hideyoshi's death (1598) led to the Japanese withdrawal from the Korean adventure, and that particular threat to the Ming disappeared.

### THE RISE OF THE MANCHUS AND THE END OF THE MING

The reign under which the Japanese invasion occurred—usually known by its year title, Wan Li (1573–1620)—was the longest of the dynasty. Thanks to the vigor of an able minister, its first days were auspicious, but when this leadership was removed by death, the realm fell upon evil days. The monarch was incompetent, the court was torn by factions, taxes were oppressive, agricultural distress was frequent, misgovernment was rife, great landed estates were assigned to imperial favorites and the politically powerful, and brigandage and insurrections multiplied.

At this juncture, a new power arose in the Northeast, and by the middle of the seventeenth century it had conquered the Empire. The latest of those invasions from the north which were so frequent and important a factor in China's history, it proved to be the most successful of them all: the Manchus governed the whole of China—something which no foreign conqueror except the Mongols had ever done—and held it for more than two and a half centuries, approximately three times as long as had the Mongols.

The Manchus were a Tungusic people, related to the Juchên, or Chin, who had been prominent opponents of the Sung. At the dawn of the sixteenth century they were dwelling in the valley of the Sungari, in parts of the later provinces of Kirin and Heilungchiang. About the beginning of the seventeenth century they were welded into a powerful organization by Nurhachu (*ca.* 1559–1626). By the time of his death Nurhachu had extended his frontiers to the sea on the east and to the Amur on the north, and had moved his capital to Mukden, captured from the Ming. Under Nurhachu and his successor a large number of Mongols were subdued, and others voluntarily accepted the Manchu rule. Many Mongols were incorporated into the Manchu armies and acknowledged the house of Nurhachu as the imperial line of China. The name Ch'ing was assumed, the title by which the dynasty was to be known in Chinese history. The Manchus also launched repeated attacks against Korea and eventually succeeded in bringing it to accept their suzerainty.

The Ch'ing often broke through the Great Wall and raided parts of the North China plain. However, they did not succeed in obtaining a permanent foothold south of the Wall until internal rebellion had fatally weakened their opponents. The last of the Ming to rule in Peking made desperate but vain efforts to retrieve the declining fortunes of his house.

Resistance against the repeated attacks of the Manchus impoverished an already depleted treasury. The death blow was a rebellion led by Li Tzŭ-chêng, son of a village headman in Shensi. Famine and taxation had driven Li, as they have many another Chinese, to turn brigand. He proved an able general and disciplinarian, in 1642 captured K'aifêng and made himself master of Shensi, and in 1644 proclaimed himself Emperor of a new dynasty. In the latter year he marched upon Peking and took it. The Ming Emperor, in despair, hung himself as the city fell.

On the northeastern frontier, holding it against the Manchus, was a Chinese general, Wu San-kuei. When Peking passed out of Ming hands, goaded on by the murder of his father by Li and by Li's seizure of a favorite concubine, he joined forces with the Ch'ing. The combined armies defeated Li in the open field and took the capital (1644). Li Tzŭ-ch'êng retreated westward and southward, his armies melted away, and he was soon eliminated.

The Manchus, although safely ensconced in Peking and supported by the powerful Wu San-kuei, found the conquest of the remainder of China no easy task. The adherents of the Ming made a determined resistance and might conceivably have held part of the country for an indefinite period had it not been for unfortunate weaknesses at the top. The Ming aspirants to the throne were inept and dissensions unnerved their supporters. The Ch'ing took Yangchow with great slaughter, and not long thereafter Nanking fell to them (1645). One of the Ming claimants set up his headquarters in Chêkiang, but soon fled, took refuge in a fleet, lived a semipiratical life, and died in 1662. Another, who attempted to establish himself in Fukien, perished when the enemy carried their victorious arms through the province. Still another was put forward at Canton, but in 1647 that city passed into the possession of the Manchus. Serious resistance was encountered by the Ch'ing in Shensi and Shansi. In Szechwan, Chang Hsien-chung, who had headed a rebellion against the Ming and who called himself the King of the West, was subdued. During his rule the population of Szechwan was drastically reduced.

The last of the descendants of Chu Yüan-chang to claim the throne, a prince who is usually known by his title, Kuei Wang, held out for some years in Kwangsi and Yünnan. In 1648, indeed, it looked as though he might regain the Empire. Chinese officers in Szechwan, Shansi, and south of the Yangtze, who had assisted the Manchus in the conquest, disgruntled with their new masters, turned to Kuei Wang. For a short time there was held in the name of that prince much of Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Hunan, Szechwan, Shensi, and Shansi, as well as Kwangsi, Kweichow, and Yünnan. By the end of 1650, however, the Manchus had regained most of the lost territory and only Kweichow and Yünnan remained to Kuei Wang. Al-

though he then ceased to be a serious menace to the conquerors, Kuei Wang lived on in mountain fastnesses in the Southwest for a number of years and did not come to his end until 1662.

In that same year, 1662, there died a picturesque and vigorous opponent of the Manchus, the pirate Chêng Ch'êng-kung, who is usually known to Europeans as Koxinga. A son, by a Japanese mother, of a famous naval freebooter who had made loyalty to the Ming the excuse for ravaging the southern coasts, he was his father's chief lieutenant. His name became a terror in the ports of China, and he took possession of part of the island of Formosa. When his father and two of his brothers were treacherously executed by the Manchus, he vowed to avenge their death. Through the control of commerce which the possession of Formosa gave him, he gained the sinews of war. So serious a menace did he prove that the Manchus, to combat him and other Ming loyalists who were still strong on the sea, ordered the population removed from the coast from Shantung through Kwangtung. The measure was not fully carried out, but was most nearly completed in Fukien. Chêng Ch'êng-kung's possessions in Formosa passed to his son, and only after the death of the latter were the Manchus able to annex the island and so bring opposition to an end. It was not until 1683 that an imperial order allowed the Chinese once more to dwell on the coasts of Fukien.

Even before their final victory, the Ch'ing were adopting Chinese civilization. The conquest was not, strictly speaking, by foreigners, but by a people largely Chinese in culture and not unrelated to some of the Northern Chinese in blood. Although to the very end of their power—in 1912—they endeavored to keep themselves aloof from the Chinese as a race and to a certain extent in manners and customs, the Manchus zealously supported Chinese institutions. They perpetuated the administrative system and laws of the Ming with but little alteration. The fifteen provinces of the Ming were increased to eighteen by the subdivision of some of the larger ones. Manchu garrisons were placed in strategic cities in a number of the provinces and were supported at public expense. Manchus were appointed, along with Chinese, on the boards at Peking and were admitted to competition in the civil service examinations. The male Chinese were forced to shave part of their heads and wear the queue—the Manchu form of headdress—as a sign of loyalty to the dynasty. With these and a few other exceptions, however, government went on as it had under Chinese rule. The great majority of the positions in the bureaucracy, including some of the very highest, were held by Chinese, Confucius was honored, the civil service examinations were conducted with practically the same requirements and machinery as under the Ming, and many of the Manchus became expert in Chinese lore.

## FOREIGN INTERCOURSE: EXTENSIVE COMMERCE WITH VARIOUS SECTIONS OF THE ASIATIC WORLD AND RENEWED CONTACTS WITH EUROPEANS

It may be an indication of the practical-mindedness of the Ming age that during much of its history foreign trade flourished and the Chinese often went actively forth to encourage it. This was particularly true in the early, vigorous years of the dynasty. We have seen how, under the Yung Lo Emperor, naval expeditions were sent to lands to the south. Chinese carried on trade with Java, Sumatra, India, Siam, Ceylon, parts of what is now Vietnam, and with lands even farther to the southwest. However, Chinese ships were later restricted, by imperial command, to coastal waters. With the Land of the Rising Sun, too, there was active trade. It was the means of bringing many Chinese products and much Chinese thought to Japan. For example, during part of the Ming the chief circulating medium in Japan was Chinese copper coins, Japanese Buddhist monks visited Chinese monasteries, and Chinese philosophy continued to be influential.

Before the dynasty ended, those contacts with the Occident had begun which eventually were to work the greatest cultural revolution in China's history—infinitely greater than that wrought by the Mongols and Manchus and more thoroughgoing even than that which followed the coming of Buddhism. Commerce with Europe, it must be noted, was due to the initiative of Westerners and not to Chinese enterprise. At the time, this fresh touch with the Occident did not appear nearly so significant as did some other events, and the Manchu rule was more than two-thirds over before it had resulted in any very important changes in Chinese civilization. Because of its outcome in our own day, however, it must here be chronicled.

After the fall of the Mongols, no western Europeans appear to have come to China, and the little Christian communities which might have perpetuated their influence seem entirely to have disappeared. However, in the latter part of the fifteenth century, the expansion of European peoples of which the merchants and missionaries of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were a foreshadowing, began afresh. It was in the last decade of that century that daring European voyagers discovered, to them, a new world in the Western Hemisphere and an all-sea route around Africa to India. Only a few years later their successors were knocking at the doors of China. It was, indeed, the lure of the land Marco Polo's famous story had portrayed to successive generations of Europeans that drew some of the explorers. This was true of Columbus, who sailed westward in the belief that the world was smaller than it proved to be and that the east coast of Asia was about where America was found.

The first Europeans to arrive in China in this new day were the Portuguese. It was they who first rounded the Cape of Good Hope and gained a foothold in India. Malacca fell to their arms in 1511. There they found Chinese ships. A few years later, probably in 1514, they reached China. Before long they established themselves off the coast of Kwangtung and in ports in Fukien and Chêkiang. Their early career in China was stormy. The Moslem ruler of Malacca, whom they had dispossessed, complained of them to the Chinese authorities. A Portuguese envoy, Pires, who reached Peking in 1520 was treated as a spy, was conveyed by imperial order to Canton, was there confined with several of his companions, and died in prison. A settlement which the Portuguese established near Ningpo was wiped out by a massacre (1545), and a similar fate overtook a trading colony in Fukien (1549). For a time the Portuguese retained a precarious tenure only on islands south of Canton.

For this ill fortune the Portuguese had chiefly themselves to thank. Truculent and lawless, regarding all Eastern peoples as legitimate prey, they were little if any better than the contemporary Japanese pirates who pillaged the Chinese coasts. The Ming authorities can scarcely be censured for treating them as freebooters.

Within a few years after these events—the exact date is not quite certain—the Portuguese succeeded in making a permanent settlement in China, at Macao, on a peninsula which commanded a harbor on an island south of Canton. Here they have remained to this day, although the harbor is too shallow for the great oceangoing steamers of recent years, and the sleepy little town, a bit of Portugal set down in East Asia, long subsisted largely on dubious gains from gambling and opium.

While the Portuguese were journeying eastward, the Spaniards were coming westward. The Spanish expedition led by the Portuguese Magellan circumnavigated the globe in the first quarter of the sixteenth century. Before the hazardous voyage was completed Magellan lost his life in the Philippines (1521). The Spaniards soon firmly established themselves in the islands with Manila (founded 1571) as their capital. For a few years in the first half of the seventeenth century the Spaniards had posts in Formosa, but from these they were driven by the Dutch (1642).

In their occupation of the Philippines the Spaniards found the Chinese a chronic problem. Soon after the beginning of their conquest they were attacked by a Chinese pirate, seconded by a Japanese. Chinese migrated to the islands and much of the business of Manila passed into their hands. The Spaniards, alarmed, met the problem by the simple but cruel expedient of wholesale massacres. In 1603 and again in 1639, insurrections of Chinese were suppressed by putting thousands to the sword. In spite of these disasters, the Chinese persisted in coming.

Before the downfall of the Ming the Dutch had arrived in China. In 1622 they made an unsuccessful attack on Macao, and then obtained

a foothold in the Pescadores and a little later in Formosa. From the latter they were driven by Koxinga.

Not far from the end of the Ming, a fourth European people, the English, destined two centuries later to have a leading part in the foreign affairs of the Empire, made their first effort to open trade with the Middle Kingdom. In 1637 a squadron of five vessels arrived at Macao, proceeded to Canton, silenced the batteries which attempted to oppose their passage to that city, and disposed of their cargo. This troubled opening of relations was a grim augury of the future.

From the north the Russians began to make their appearance. Adventurers who were pushing the frontiers of the Czar eastward crossed the borders of China, and before the Manchu conquest some had visited Peking.

Under the Ming the merchants from Europe had no success in penetrating far inland. It was with great difficulty that they obtained even a temporary entrance into the coast cities. Before the Manchu conquest, however, European missionaries had not only traveled in the interior but had as well effected a settled residence in several of the most important centers, including Peking itself.

The great wave of European exploration and discovery of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was accompanied by a fresh burst of missionary enthusiasm in the Roman Catholic Church. In the sixteenth century that Church experienced a striking quickening of its life. The Society of Jesus came into existence and older orders were stimulated into fresh activity. Wherever the Portuguese and Spanish explorers and conquerors made their way—and often in advance of them—went also the missionaries. In India, Africa, both Americas, the West Indies, Japan, and the Philippines were to be found the hardy and courageous representatives of the Roman Catholic faith.

The first missionary to seek to penetrate China in this new era was the heroic Jesuit, Francis Xavier. In 1552 he spent some weeks south of Canton, on the island of Shang-ch'uan, at that time the chief headquarters of Portuguese traders. Thence he made futile attempts to reach the mainland, and there, near the close of 1552, he died.

Xavier was followed shortly by other missionaries, some of his own Society, under Portuguese auspices, and some, of other orders, from the Philippines. In time Macao became the seat of a bishop and of several churches and religious houses and the center from which many missionaries sought to enter the regions beyond.

The first successful mission outside Macao was established by the Jesuits. Its leading figure was an Italian, Matthew Ricci. Ricci arrived in China in 1582 and died in Peking in 1610. In the intervening twenty-eight

years he did more than any other one man to win a hearing for his faith and to develop the methods which were to be employed by his colleagues and successors. He won the respect of many of the dominant scholar-officials by dressing as they did, by applying himself diligently to the study of the Classics which they held in esteem, by conforming to their practices as far as he conscientiously could, and especially by his knowledge of mathematics and astronomy, branches of learning in which Europe then excelled China. He and his confreres saw that only through the friendship of members of the ruling class could they hope to gain access to the masses of China. It was by this means that Ricci made his way to Peking, and he had the satisfaction of seeing two of the Hanlin Academy and an imperial prince won to the faith.

Before the end of the Ming, Jesuits were to be found in several centers, and Dominicans and Franciscans from the Philippines had entered Fukien. Occasionally persecutions had broken out, some of them fairly severe, but the faith was making headway. In Peking the Jesuits had gained further recognition by being assigned to the Imperial Bureau of Astronomy to reform the calendar.

The collapse of the Ming strengthened the position of the missionaries. In Peking, the Manchus gave Schall, a German Jesuit, official rank and entrusted him with the preparation of the calendar. Jesuits, too, were to be found in the court of the last Ming aspirant, the unfortunate Kuei Wang. That prince's heir, his mother, and his heir's mother were baptized, and his chief general and leading eunuch were also professing Christians.

## CULTURE UNDER THE MING: FOREIGN INFLUENCES

Under the Ming, the contact with aliens, destined to be revolutionary in the future, had little marked effect on Chinese culture. Through the Europeans came a few plants from the New World. Late in the sixteenth or early in the seventeenth century tobacco was introduced from the Philippines. Then or later were brought in the sweet potato, maize, and the peanut—all of them of American origin, and all of them to become important sources of food, eventually with striking effects on the agriculture and population growth of China. The pineapple, also of American provenance, reached China at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Syphilis, originally from America, entered. The Spanish peso appeared and eventually had an important impact on the money economy of the Empire. Through the missionaries there entered Christian influences, and new conceptions of mathematics, astronomy, geography, and mechanics. As yet, however, none of these importations worked any very great modification in Chinese life as a whole.

CULTURE UNDER THE MING: RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

In religion and philosophy the nearly three centuries of the Ming, when compared with some preceding dynasties that had enjoyed a long tenure, were relatively sterile. Buddhism and Taoism continued, but no new currents of life eventuating in important sects disturbed them. They were, indeed, suffering from slow inward decay. To be sure, they seemed securely fixed as permanent features of Chinese life. However, most of such activity in philosophy as existed was to be found not in them, but in the Confucian school.

Confucianism was the dominant philosophy of the scholar-officials through whom the Empire was ruled, and was kept so by the civil service examinations by which the members of that class were recruited. In official Confucianism the school of Chu Hsi was orthodox. An eminent authority declared that "ever since the time of the philosopher Chu, the truth has been made manifest to the world: no more writing is necessary: what is left to us is practice." The Confucian cult was reorganized. In the sixteenth century tablets were ordered substituted in the Confucian temples for images, the designation of the temple was changed from *miao* ("temple") to *tien* ("hall")—alterations which tended to minimize the religious element—and some lesser modifications were made.

Why there should have been less originality than in some other dynasties must be a matter of conjecture. It may have been the absence of sufficient stimulus from the outside. No tides were flooding in from abroad as powerfully as had Buddhism in the centuries preceding and during the T'ang: neither Islam nor Christianity as yet attracted as great a following as had this other foreign faith. It may have been that, after freeing itself from its conquest by the Mongols, China was seeking to restore and preserve its cultural independence. It may have been the stereotyping of Chinese thought through the agency of the civil service examinations. A majority of the best minds sought official promotion and social recognition through these tests, and in so doing were shaped by the conventional mold. The autocracy of the Emperors was intolerant of dangerous deviation from the established Confucianism.

However, much intellectual interest was seen. Many groups existed for the discussion and study of philosophy and literature. They often engaged in debates and not infrequently were active in politics.

Some individuals became restive under orthodoxy and wished to think for themselves. The most distinguished, Wang Yang-ming (*ca.* 1472–1528), had the courage and originality to work out a philosophy which differed from that of his class. Coming from a family of scholars and officials, he passed through the normal routine of study and examinations and spent much of his life in the service of the state, holding important offices.

He was unwilling, however, merely to work for degrees. He wished to arrive at knowledge for himself, and not to repeat, parrotlike, the findings of preceding thinkers. The quest led him into opposition to Chu Hsi and his followers. That school, it will be recalled, had professed to advocate the search for truth, moral and otherwise, through the "investigation of things." Wang Yang-ming, on the other hand, by an experience of sudden illumination after a long period of attempting to arrive at knowledge through the method advocated by Chu Hsi, came to believe that truth must be sought by looking within and that his own nature was a sufficient source of wisdom. Like some critics who were contemporary with Chu Hsi, he emphasized intuition—conscience—as the channel of information concerning the moral law. As a corollary, he advocated self-discipline and action. In part Wang Yang-ming displayed a resemblance to both Taoism and Ch'an Buddhism. Probably, either consciously or unconsciously, he had been influenced by both. He was, however, neither Taoist nor Buddhist, but must be reckoned as in the Confucian line. His teachings proved not nearly as potent in China as in Japan. In the latter country (under the Japanese pronunciation of his name, Oyomei) he was to have a great vogue, and the controversy between his followers and those of Chu Hsi often became acute. In China those who followed him branched into several schools. One of the latter sought a syncretism of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism and was called "the Wildcat Ch'an School."

In the latter part of the Ming a number of scholars, known as the Tunglin Group, from a private academy in the modern Kiangsu, vigorously dissented from the direction taken by this syncretism and sought a revival of Confucianism. They endeavored to bring about the moral reform of a government which was progressively corrupt. Eventually they ran afoul of the notorious eunuch, Wei Chung-hsien, who dominated the Emperor and the Empire. Wei Chung-hsien had numbers of them imprisoned and several of them died under torture. Wei Chung-hsien was dismissed by the next Emperor and committed suicide (1627). Many of his henchmen were punished. But the Tunglin movement was not revived.

## CULTURE UNDER THE MING: LITERATURE

In literature the Ming displayed little marked originality. No new types of works of outstanding significance appeared. There was, however, much literary activity. In quantity the output was large and the quality by no means always mediocre. Great libraries were collected, both under imperial auspices and by private individuals.

Printing, now for many years a commonplace, made the circulation of books comparatively easy and inexpensive, and so continued to encourage authorship. Both wooden blocks and movable type were employed. Gov-

ernment presses at Nanking and Peking had a monopoly of the publication of the Classics and of other works issued by imperial authorization. Frequently books so printed were distributed among the various educational institutions. Private presses, some of them kept in the same families for generations, printed many other works, including those which fall within the classification of belles-lettres.

The drama was popular, and although the plays of former dynasties continued to be produced, at least one new type with the accompanying music was originated, simpler than the classical style.

The period made major contributions through the novel. This type of literature was, as we have seen, not an invention of Ming scholars, but had first risen into prominence under the Mongols. During the Ming, however, it was a vehicle for much literary expression, and possibly because it was less stereotyped than some of the traditional forms of literature, at times gave indication of real genius. Most of the greatest fiction had circulated for centuries in the form of collections of incidents pieced together by popular professional storytellers and handed down by word of mouth. Some of these cycles had wide popular currency, were familiar to a large proportion of the population, and were retold again and again with many variations. Then some of them were put into writing, at first crudely. Eventually authors of outstanding ability took a few of them in hand, often anonymously (for composition of such tales, especially in the vernacular, was supposed to be beneath the dignity of a scholar), and lasting masterpieces came into existence.

It must be noted, moreover, that one of the greatest of Chinese travel diaries, that by Hsü Hsia-k'o, dates from the Ming. Hsü, who lived toward the close of the dynasty, traveled extensively through the Empire and wrote detailed and vivid descriptions of rivers, mountains, buildings, and local customs. Particularly he explored the Southwest, determined the source of the West River, showed that the Mekong and Salween are separate streams, and demonstrated that the Chin Sha Kiang, or River of the Golden Sand, is the upper reaches of the Yangtze.

The activities of the Ming writers were molded in part by the dominance of the civil service examinations. Since through them lay the road to official preferment and social recognition, and since they emphasized a knowledge of the Classics and of the orthodox commentators and form rather than content, their tendency was to restrict the minds subjected to them to pedestrian, laborious, and voluminous, but quite uninspired, effort in the fields of history, government, and related subjects. Certainly the energies of Ming scholars were expended very largely on sober writings and compilations—among them local geographies and histories, works of reference, collections of inscriptions, descriptions of government, biographies, a long study of Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien's *Shih Chi,* treatises on military train-

ing and strategy, a great work on agriculture by the most eminent Christian of the time, Hsü Kuang-ch'i, many treatises on law (which influenced Korea, Japan, and Annam), books on medicine, including a huge *materia medica* (the *Pên ts'ao kang mu*, by Li Shih-chên, and based in part on earlier works of the same kind), many encyclopedias, critiques of art, and collections of Buddhist and Taoist works. All these required diligence, but in imaginative power few if any rose above mediocrity. There were, to be sure, poets, some of whom became famous—such as Li Tung-yang—but none achieved the place in Chinese literature that those of the T'ang had won. Late in the Ming the beginning of a new scientific study of philology came into being. In a work published in 1543, Mei Tzŭ questioned the "ancient text" of the *Shu Ching*—the portions of that venerable work which in the next dynasty were conclusively proved to be spurious. Ming thought, however, was largely confined to familiar channels. Scholar after scholar was executed for departure from what was deemed proper. European missionaries brought in new ideas in mathematics, astronomy, and theology, and wrote extensively on them, but down to the close of the Ming these did little to stir the Chinese mind from its accustomed grooves.

## CULTURE UNDER THE MING: ART

In art, the Ming period is sometimes described as decadent. For some forms the generalization holds true, but it is by no means entirely accurate.

Buddhist sculptured figures, while produced in large quantities, for vigor and religious feeling did not begin to approach those of earlier dynasties. It is in secular subjects from everyday life, and in the carving of jade, ivory, columns, and balustrades, that Ming sculpture is seen at its best.

In painting it is questionable whether Ming artists attained the levels reached by their predecessors of the T'ang and the Sung. The Hung Wu Emperor established at Nanking an academy of painting. For some years the Sung traditions in style and subject matter were continued. The dynasty's roster of painters is a long one. The subjects included landscapes, birds, flowers, and portraits of court ladies. The elegance, delicacy, and careful finish of many of the paintings were praiseworthy. On the whole, however, the work was inferior and appears to have become more so as the dynasty progressed, especially after the capital was moved to Peking. Ornateness was exaggerated, and in landscapes there was less intimacy with nature than under the Sung. Expert criticism of painting flourished and a well-known encyclopedia of painting was compiled.

In architecture, not only was the quantity produced prodigious, but much of the quality was high. The Ming builders and engineers displayed

an ability which often rose to the level of genius. Many of the bridges, city walls, temples, and pagodas that were still seen at the outset of the twentieth century, before the revolutionary age swept them aside, dated from the Ming. The Great Wall was largely rebuilt: most of it as we see it today dates from the Ming.

In some other fields of art the Ming registered marked advance. Magnificent pieces of cloisonné were produced. Rugs and carpets appear to have surpassed those of preceding centuries—perhaps because of contacts with that industry in Persia and the Near East. In the casting of bronze the Ming craftsmen attained great skill, particularly in the Hsüan Tê period (1426–1436).

It was especially in ceramics that the Ming excelled. The output was enormous and both in form and style showed a marked and diversified departure from the Sung. Under the Sung, monochrome prevailed. Under the Ming, polychrome decoration was the rule, and monochrome products, while continuing, were in the minority. White porcelain was decorated with pictorial designs in colors—by glazes, enamels, and underglaze blues and reds. A beautiful cobalt blue came in, for this could stand the high temperature required to fuse the glaze. Later another blue, imported originally from Persia, became popular. Still other colors appeared: green, yellow, purple, reds of various shades, black, and more blues, put on in varying combinations. Many, too, were the figures, scenes, and designs portrayed.

Production was at many centers. The chief place of manufacture was still at Ching-tê Chên, in Kiangsi. Here vast natural deposits of the minerals needed for manufacture of porcelain facilitated the industry. The finest specimens are from the early reigns of the dynasty, before the best of the clays were exhausted. The Ching-tê Chên works either drove out of competition or overshadowed the other centers and were to retain their supremacy until the middle of the nineteenth century.

Porcelain wares were largely exported and reached not only the Near East but also Europe, and eventually were thought of, with silk and tea, as the characteristic products of China.

## ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

In the earlier centuries of the Ming the Empire prospered. Shifts of population replenished areas devastated by war and made the Chinese dominant in areas where they had been minorities. At the command of the Hung Wu Emperor, thousands of landless tenants were moved into the Huai Valley and the North China plain, areas which had suffered severely under the wars that had expelled the Mongols. Military colonies were established in Manchuria and Yünnan. Voluntary migrants from Kiangsi poured into Hunan.

A money economy grew. That was partly because of the influx of silver from the Americas through the Spaniards.

In the domestic peace given by the Hung Wu and Yung Lo Emperors, population mounted. In 1393 it seems to have been at least 65,000,000 and probably was in excess of that total. Presumably it was much larger a half century later.

Taxation was simplified by what was called the "single-whip" system.

SUMMARY

The Ming, while in political might inferior to the Han and the T'ang and in brilliance and originality not equal to the T'ang and the Sung, spanned one of the noteworthy periods of China's history. It ruled all of what we now think of as China proper, for a time it was master of Annam and South Manchuria, and for shorter or longer periods Korea, Japan, and lands to the south as far distant as Ceylon acknowledged its suzerainty. In contrast to the earlier dynasties, instead of looking landward toward the north and west as the natural direction in which to extend its power, it faced seaward and south. Increasingly, commercial contacts were not by the overland trade routes but by the ocean. In this was a foreshadowing of those intimate contacts with the West which later were to work the greatest revolution that the Empire had known. The realm was prosperous. More abundant supplies of silver and copper became available and both metals were widely used as mediums of exchange. In culture the China of the Ming dynasty displayed practicality, elegance, diligence, and in a few directions originality, and influenced some of its neighbors, including especially Korea and Japan.

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CHAPTER NINE

# THE CH'ING (MANCHU) DYNASTY: ITS HEYDAY AND THE BEGINNING OF ITS DECLINE (A.D. 1644–1838)

## INTRODUCTORY

The Ta Ch'ing dynasty—usually called simply the Ch'ing (as a rule, translated "pure" or "unsullied")—which the Manchus established was to be one of the longest-lived in the history of China. During the nearly three centuries of its rule (1644–1912) the Chinese experienced some of the most remarkable developments of their entire career. Under the Ch'ing the Empire reached its greatest territorial extent—not counting the Yüan period, for China was then only the chief unit of the Mongol domains. At its height the dynasty ruled over China proper, Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet, and received tribute—in recognition of a more or less shadowy suzerainty—from Nepal, Burma, Laos, Siam, Annam, the Liu Ch'iu Islands, and Korea. Under the Ch'ing, too, the Chinese were more numerous than at any previous time. Moreover, during the heyday of the dynasty China attained a fresh level of material prosperity, probably higher than ever before. In the latter part of the seventeenth and through most of the eighteenth century, indeed, it was the most populous and possibly the most prosperous realm on the planet. In numbers of people it outstripped all the other great contemporary empires—the British, the Spanish, the French, the Russian, the Ottoman, and the Mogul. From the standpoint of order and justice it was probably as far advanced as any state of the time, for that was before the humanitarian movement had ameliorated the laws, the courts, and the prisons of the West. In total wealth, too, it very possibly surpassed every other nation of the period.

During these years, to be sure, culture underwent no especially great changes: the country was content to shape its life according to the patterns fixed in previous dynasties. This may have been in part because the Manchus, wishing, for reasons of political expediency, to prove themselves supporters of Chinese civilization, maintained orthodoxy with all the zeal of conscious converts. It may also have been because the Ch'ing Emperors, in their eagerness to prevent sedition and to root out any threat to their

rule, endeavored to suppress cultural heterodoxy. Their emphasis, too, on the civil service examinations—through which lay the paths to social prestige, power, and wealth—induced most ambitious youths to confine themselves to the well-defined curriculum which led to the coveted degrees. The system first foreshadowed by the Han was being carried to its logical conclusion. Originality and experimentation were inconsistent with its perfect operation. Prosperity was accompanied by adherence to past conventions. Even so, however, a few of the intellectuals were active in movements of marked boldness and critical acumen which were to have important consequences.

In the last three-quarters of a century that the Manchus were on the throne, when their vigor was declining and the power slipping from their hands, came the greatest cultural revolution that the Chinese have known. It was then that the Occident at last surmounted the natural barriers which had prevented it from establishing intimate intercourse with the Middle Kingdom. In the closing years of the dynasty, under the impact of the West, the familiar structure of Chinese life began to crumble. The traditional political, intellectual, and to a certain extent economic, social, and religious institutions either disappeared or were profoundly modified. The changes into which the country was hurried proved even more thoroughgoing than after the disappearance of the Chou, when the Ch'in and the Han rulers established the Empire, or than in the centuries after the Han, when Buddhism was being established. After the dynasty came to an end the changes were rapidly accelerated. They seem, indeed, even yet only to have begun.

The history of the dynasty naturally falls into two parts, one before the coming of the Westerner in force, and the other after that event. The dividing years are 1839–1842, when, in a successful war on China, Great Britain led what proved to be the vanguard of the great invasion. The first of these periods forms the subject of this chapter. More than half of it is included in the reigns of two of the ablest monarchs that China has ever had, most familiar to Westerners under the reign names by which chronology is indicated, K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung. The K'ang Hsi Emperor ascended the throne in 1661 and died in 1722. Then, after a comparatively brief reign, not especially noteworthy, of about thirteen years, came the Ch'ien Lung Emperor, from 1736 to 1796. For nearly a century and a half, therefore, with a short interruption, China's government was in the hands successively of two extraordinarily strong men. It was probably due largely to this coincidence of longevity and competence that the dynasty became so firmly established and lasted so long.

## THE K'ANG HSI EMPEROR

The first Manchu to rule in Peking, usually known by the name of his reign period, Shun Chih, was placed on the throne as a boy

of nine the year before his troops came into possession of the Ming capital. During his childhood he was under the tutelage of a very able uncle, and did not assume the full management of the government until 1651, after the regent's death. He himself died in his twenties, in 1661, and so scarcely had time to make a marked impression on the Empire.

The Shun Chih Emperor was in turn succeeded by a minor son who is, as we have said, commonly known as K'ang Hsi. The K'ang Hsi Emperor was not quite seven when his father's death elevated him to the throne, and he was to hold the imperial title for a little short of sixty-two years. In 1667, when he was thirteen, he took control, although it was not until 1669 that he was able completely to break the power of the regents. For more than half a century, therefore, he ruled the destinies of the Chinese. A contemporary of such notable monarchs as Louis XIV of France, Peter the Great of Russia, William III of England, and the fanatical warrior-conqueror Aurangzeb of the Mogul dynasty in India, in personal ability he was probably the equal and perhaps the superior of them all. He was characterized by great physical energy, an active and inquiring mind, an excellent memory, vivacity, and the will and the ability to lead and dominate men. Fond of vigorous outdoor life, he spent many of his days in the chase. He traveled extensively through his domains and gave much personal attention to his official duties, priding himself on his concern for the welfare of his subjects and on his frugality in his personal and court expenses. Although originating nothing of great importance in governmental machinery, he gave to China as vigorous an administration as the Empire had ever known, and fostered not only order and material prosperity but also cultural activity.

When he was still in his teens, the K'ang Hsi Emperor faced successfully the most serious menace that had yet threatened his line. After their conquest of China, the Manchus had placed over much of the region south of the Yangtze four of the Chinese generals who had been of most assistance to them. One of these died without leaving male issue, but his son-in-law was given a position of trust in Kwangsi. Another was in Kwangtung and a third in Fukien. The most powerful was Wu San-kuei, who had had so large a part in introducing the Ch'ing to Peking. He had conquered for his new masters Shensi, Szechwan, and Yünnan, and had hounded the last of the Ming, the luckless Kuei Wang, to his death on the Yünnan border. He had been loaded with honors, one of his sons had been given in marriage a sister of the Shun Chih Emperor, and in Yünnanfu, his headquarters, he maintained a court which in splendor rivaled that of Peking. In the South as they were, remote from Peking, these Chinese dignitaries, with high titles and great authority, constituted a potential danger; it was the kind of division among semi-independent magnates which more than once had threatened the unity of the Empire.

There seems to be some uncertainty as to the exact steps by which

the revolt came about. The occasion appears to have been the determination of the Emperor to bring to an end the anomalous power of these satraps. The K'ang Hsi Emperor ordered Wu San-kuei to report to Peking to pay homage to the throne, but that worthy, warned by his son—a hostage in Peking—of a plot against him, twice refused. When one of the dignitaries, Shang K'o-hsi, in Canton, because of age and the desire to escape from the control of a son, asked leave to retire to Manchuria, the K'ang Hsi Emperor promptly granted his request. Then when two others, as a matter of policy, or following the requirements of Chinese custom, made similar offers, the K'ang Hsi Emperor brought to a head the entire issue by taking them at their word and ordering them to disband their troops. Thereupon Wu San-kuei revolted (1673). Kêng Ching-chung in Fukien, grandson of the original supporter of the Manchu power, and Shang Chih-hsin in Kwangtung, son of Shang K'o-hsi, also appealed to arms, the one fairly promptly, the other more tardily. Hence the rebellion is known as that of the San Fan, or the Three Feudatories.

The outlook for the Ch'ing was dark. Many Chinese joined in the uprising. On the coast, the son and successor of Koxinga, still strong on the sea and ensconced in Formosa, took the opportunity to attack his father's old enemies. Most of the South—Hunan, Kweichow, Yünnan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Fukien—was in control of the rebels, and for a time Szechwan, Kansu, and much of Shensi seemed lost. Wu San-kuei proclaimed himself the first of a new dynasty. The Manchus, with only a boy at their head, and with more than half of the area of China proper in the hands of their foes, were in desperate straits. It looked as though they might do wisely to accept the compromise suggested by Wu San-kuei and leave to him, as the price of peace, the territory south of the Yangtze.

However, the boy ruler showed himself fully equal to the emergency. He was aided by dissensions among his opponents. The rebels could agree only on enmity to the Manchus and some of them fell to quarreling among themselves. Numbers of influential Chinese remained true to the Ch'ing. Before long the armies of the K'ang Hsi Emperor began to regain the lost territories. The fate of the revolt was sealed by the death, in 1678, of the formidable Wu San-kuei. In the ensuing months others of the chief rebels were eliminated. So stubborn was the resistance, however, that not until 1681 did it come to an end—when the grandson of Wu San-kuei, beseiged in his last stronghold, committed suicide.

Thanks largely to the ability of the K'ang Hsi Emperor in suppressing it, the uprising resulted in establishing the Manchu rule more firmly than ever. The system of semiautonomous regions was abolished, and the control of Peking over the provinces was strengthened by requiring officials to report to the capital at periodical intervals and by dividing functions among the head provincial officers and virtually setting them to watch each

other. Moreover, in 1683, for the first time in the history of China, Formosa, after the death of the son of Koxinga (1682), was brought into the Empire.

Not only did the K'ang Hsi Emperor succeed in confirming his family in their control of China: he extended his authority beyond his inherited frontiers. From time immemorial, as we have repeatedly seen, the fertile plains and valleys of North China had been subject to invasion from the less favored lands on the north, west, and northeast. Some of the rulers of China had sought protection from the menace by constructing or maintaining the Great Wall. However, the greatest monarchs of the Han and the T'ang, it will be recalled, had not been content with remaining on the defensive, but had sought to dominate the regions from which the threats issued. It was this bold policy which the K'ang Hsi Emperor adopted, and in it he was followed by his two immediate successors. As a consequence, by the end of the eighteenth century the territory controlled by the Ch'ing—as we have suggested—was more extensive than that which had acknowledged the suzerainty of any line that had reigned in China except that of Jenghiz Khan.

The K'ang Hsi Emperor was led to embark upon a program of expansion, by a threat to his frontiers. At the accession of the Ch'ing, the Mongols, as heretofore, were divided into many tribes. They were chiefly in two groups, the Eastern and the Western. The Eastern Mongols, in turn, were subdivided into the Northern, or Khalkhas, and the Southern, on the northern edge of China proper. Before the Manchu conquest of China proper, many of the Southern tribes had submitted to the Ch'ing. One of the khans, or chiefs, of this region seized the opportunity given by the rebellion of Wu San-kuei to revolt. The K'ang Hsi Emperor subdued him and followed up the victory by claiming suzerainty over the entire Mongol confederation. This presaged the extension of the power of the Ch'ing over the Khalkhas.

The K'ang Hsi Emperor's authority over the Khalkhas did not become effective until after a further development. The Western Mongols, or Kalmuks, had among them a tribe called the Eleuths (or Oelots). A leader of the Eleuths was then building one of those many, more or less ephemeral states of Central Asia which have risen, flourished, and disappeared, usually all within a few decades This chief not only became strong in the Gobi, but intervened in Tibet, posing as the protector of the Dalai Lama. His son, Galdan, was even more powerful. From his capital at Kuldja, he maintained the influence built up by his father in Tibet and Mongolia, and established his suzerainty over Kashgar, the rest of Eastern Turkestan, Turfan, and Hami. Before long Galdan found an occasion to interfere in the affairs of the Khalkhas and attempted to extend his sway over them. A new Mongol empire appeared to be arising, with a threat to the Chinese

frontiers. This the K'ang Hsi Emperor would not tolerate. He gave the Khalkhas protection and in the last decade of the seventeenth century dispatched armies to clear their territories of Galdan and the Eleuths. Galdan was repeatedly defeated and his death (1697) was probably by his own hand. The Khalkhas, however, had only exchanged the threat of one master for the reality of another. The K'ang Hsi Emperor had saved them from the Eleuths, but their chiefs now acknowledged the suzerainty of the Ch'ing, imperial residents were placed among them, and a garrison was installed in Urga. The K'ang Hsi Emperor did not complete the conquest of the Eleuths' territory, but he put contingents of troops in Hami and other strategic centers on the western frontier.

After the K'ang Hsi Emperor had ventured into the West, he was led, apparently by the logic of events, to extend his control over Tibet. At the close of the fourteenth and early in the fifteenth century a reform had been made—chiefly by a great religious leader, Tsung K'apa—in the prevailing Buddhist cult in that region, the "Red Sect," and a new type of Buddhism had arisen called the "Yellow Sect" (from the color of its vestments), with insistence, among other emphases, upon the celibacy of the clergy and a more elaborate ritual. The heads of the new cult, and consequently of Tibet, in time came to be the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. The holder of each title was supposedly a reincarnation of his predecessor, and the successions theoretically traced back, respectively, to a great *bodhisattva* (Avalokita) and a *buddha* (Amitabha). By far the more powerful of the two politically was the Dalai Lama, with his capital at Lhasa. The Ming Emperors had shown him honor, the early Manchus had established relations with him, and a holder of the title visited Peking in 1652. It remained, however, for the K'ang Hsi Emperor to extend the authority of the Ch'ing over him and his realm.

Having embarked on a policy of controlling the Mongols, the K'ang Hsi Emperor was almost inevitably led to concern himself with Tibetan politics. Many of the Mongols had been followers of the Red Sect of Lamaism, and by the time of the K'ang Hsi Emperor the Yellow Sect was gaining many converts among them. The Eleuths early adhered to the latter and sought to spread it—possibly as a means of extending their own control—while for years the Khalkhas remained loyal to the Red cult. Tibet, therefore, became a factor with which the K'ang Hsi Emperor had to reckon in dealing with the situation on his northwestern frontiers.

In 1684, after many of the Khalkhas had become followers of the Yellow Sect, the K'ang Hsi Emperor asked and obtained the co-operation of the Dalai Lama in bringing about peace among them. Galdan had been in communication with Lhasa, and the ensuing friction with Peking was allayed only by his timely death. Then, too, the chief minister of the Dalai Lama had had some dealings with Wu San-kuei during the latter's sedition

and had aroused the suspicions of the K'ang Hsi Emperor. About 1700 the latter began strengthening his position in the great plateau. His troops occupied parts of the Tibetan-Szechwan border and he commissioned as regent of Tibet the friendly commander of the Eleuth forces which for a time dominated Lhasa. Before many years a disputed succession to the Dalai Lamaship led the K'ang Hsi Emperor to undertake the conquest of the country. One of the claimants was enthusiastically supported by some of the Mongols, Lhasa was taken, and the pro-Ch'ing group was put to the sword. The movement seemed to presage the rise of still another new Mongol Empire. In 1719, therefore, the K'ang Hsi Emperor came out boldly on the side of one of the contestants, and in 1720 his forces entered Lhasa as victors. His protégé was successfully enthroned, Peking appointed two high commissioners to direct him and installed a garrison in the city, and troops were stationed at strategic points on the road to China proper. Tibet was now politically an appendage of China.

The K'ang Hsi Emperor also dealt firmly with the Europeans who, following the contacts made under the Ming dynasty, continued to come to China. The authority of China over Macao, the one European settlement on the coast, was unequivocally asserted. During the reign of the Shun Chih Emperor the Dutch had sent representatives to Peking who allowed themselves to be treated as envoys from a tributary state. They now dispatched ships to help in the Ch'ing conquest of Formosa. Since the sixteenth century the Russians had been moving into Siberia. During the Shun Chih reign period an embassy and merchants came to the capital, and in the early years of the K'ang Hsi period other emissaries and trading caravans arrived. Russian pressure on the west helped to weaken the Eleuths in the later stages of their contest with the K'ang Hsi Emperor. The Ch'ing forces and the Russians came to blows in the valley of the Amur. The Russians were there establishing small colonies and fortified posts, to the annoyance of the Manchus. In 1685 a Russian post, Albazin, was captured, and some of the garrison were taken to Peking, where they remained permanently. Neither side was especially eager for war, and after other somewhat desultory encounters, in 1689 a treaty was signed at Nerchinsk, the first between China and a European state. Among other provisions, it defined the boundary, restored to China some of the territory claimed by the Russians, arranged for a limited commerce between the two countries, and stipulated that if Russians or Chinese committed crimes in the other's territory, they were to be sent across the border for punishment by the officials of their respective governments. It was not, as were so many treaties of the nineteenth century, dictated to a prostrate China by a victorious Western power.

Against Roman Catholic missionaries, too, the K'ang Hsi Emperor asserted his absolute authority over his domains. Jesuits, notably Schall,

had attached themselves to the Manchus during the subjugation of China. About the time of the conquest, Spanish Franciscans and Dominicans from the Philippines succeeded in effecting a permanent foothold. Before the death of the K'ang Hsi Emperor, Lazarists, French Jesuits, Spanish Augustinians, Italian Franciscans, and seculars, including representatives of the Société des Missions Étrangères of Paris, had entered the country. During most of his reign the K'ang Hsi Emperor was tolerant of and even friendly to the missionaries, especially the Jesuits. During his minority, in 1664, there was a severe persecution, but when he assumed the reigns of government he had it discontinued. He was greatly interested by the scholarly Jesuits in his capital, notably by Verbiest and some of the French members of the Society. Under them he studied European sciences, mathematics, and music. He employed them in astronomical and literary pursuits. He entrusted to them the mapping of the Empire. He used them in negotiations with the Russians. He assisted them in erecting a church in Peking and in rebuilding one in Hangchow. In 1692 he issued what in effect was an edict of toleration, protecting existing church buildings and permitting freedom of worship. By 1705 there were probably more than two hundred thousand Chinese Christians, among them a few men of prominence.

However, a prolonged dispute—the so-called Rites Controversy—arose among the missionaries. This had to do chiefly with the term to be used for the translation of the word God—whether the familiar *T'ien*, so frequent in Chinese literature, could be so employed—and with questions concerning the participation by Christians in the customary Chinese rites in honor of ancestors and Confucius. If the word *T'ien* could be used, and if these rites could be tolerated by the Church, Christianity could be made to seem less inimical to Chinese institutions. If, on the other hand, the Church conscientiously felt that they must be forbidden to Christians, the faith would appear an enemy to traditional Chinese beliefs and practices and a menace to such fundamental bases of society and the state as the family and Confucianism. Most of the Jesuits favored toleration, but many members of other missionary organizations vigorously opposed it. The controversy lasted for a little over a century—from about 1628 until the final papal decision, in 1742. Much of the ecclesiastical Roman Catholic world entered into the discussion. Jealousies between orders, rivalries among European nations, the Portuguese claim to the right to control the Church in the Far East, and the rising tide of feeling in Europe against the Jesuits complicated the debate. The Pope finally decided against toleration and sent to China two successive embassies in the attempt to gain the acquiescence not only of the Jesuits but especially of the Emperor.

Before either legate arrived, the Emperor had expressed his conviction on the points at issue. This was for toleration and so was diametrically

opposed to Rome. Both papal legates irritated him, notably the first. He held that no foreigner, even though he be Pope, should attempt to enforce decrees counter to the imperial will, particularly when these would prove disturbing to basic Chinese customs. Accordingly, he gave missionaries the choice of abiding by his decision in the controversy or leaving the country. Since Rome did not issue its final edict until 1742, long after the death of the K'ang Hsi Emperor, some of the missionaries managed to reconcile their consciences with compliance. The K'ang Hsi Emperor did not allow the controversy to terminate his friendship for the Jesuits and instituted no drastic persecution. He was, however, firm in insisting upon his jurisdiction over both foreign priests and Chinese Christians and in his later years displayed more animosity toward Christianity than in his prime.

The K'ang Hsi Emperor was not only vigorous in maintaining his authority within China and in protecting and expanding his frontiers: he also actively promoted the material welfare of his subjects and encouraged literature. He spent much of his time on the road and saw for himself what was happening outside the walls of his palace. He attempted, unsuccessfully, to end the custom of binding the feet of Chinese women. He endeavored to lighten taxes and to encourage honesty and efficiency in the bureaucracy. He strove to insure a good currency. He instituted public works, especially for the control of "China's Sorrow," the Yellow River, whose floods for centuries had been a recurrent menace to the North China plain. He subsidized scholarship, financing new editions of the Classics and of rare books and having great compilations produced and published. Among the latter were a famous dictionary, a huge classified collection of literary phrases, an encyclopedia, and a rhyming dictionary. He himself was a student of the Classics, collected a library, and had many Chinese works translated into the Manchu tongue. He was the author of sixteen short moral maxims, which in later reigns were expanded by commentaries, and with these, as the Sacred Edict (*Shêng Yü*), were officially taught to the populace. The great imperial porcelain works at Ching-tê Chên were devastated during the insurrection of Wu San-kuei, but the K'ang Hsi Emperor had them restored, and their products during his reign were famous for beauty and prodigious in quantity.

## THE YUNG CHÊNG EMPEROR (1723–1735)

In his last days the K'ang Hsi Emperor had been disturbed by bitter rivalries over the succession, for he had many sons, and no rule of primogeniture existed. The successful competitor is best known to posterity under the title of his reign period, Yung Chêng. In his forties, when his father's death placed him in power, he had only a little over twelve years more of life. He was by no means a genius, but he was ambitious and a

hard worker. He reformed the finances and reduced corruption among officials. He was an interested student of religion, especially of Ch'an Buddhism. He wrote a number of books.

In internal administration the Yung Chêng Emperor was more fearful of sedition than his father had been. He had a kind of secret service for ferreting out treason. He treated several of his brothers with great harshness, perhaps to prevent them from rebelling, but possibly to satisfy old grudges. While continuing to employ the Jesuits in Peking, the Yung Chêng Emperor instituted a much more severe persecution of Christianity than had been known since his father's minority. He centralized administration more and more in the crown.

In foreign affairs the Yung Chêng Emperor had to face hostilities in the west. An uprising in the Kokonor region was followed by a fresh war with the Eleuths. These chronic enemies of his father were for a time successful and made threatening raids eastward. Eventually, however, the imperial forces inflicted defeats on them. The peace that was patched up left the Eleuths unsubdued, and their final reduction was not achieved until the next reign. Russian envoys continued to come to China, and in 1727 an additional treaty was signed, usually known by the name of Kiakhta, which further delimited the frontier between the two empires, regulated trade, and arranged for a kind of permanent semiecclesiastical, semidiplomatic mission in Peking.

## THE CH'IEN LUNG EMPEROR (1736–1796)

The Yung Chêng Emperor died in his fifties and was succeeded by a son, then in his twenty-fifth year, who is usually denominated by the title of his reign period, Ch'ien Lung. The Ch'ien Lung Emperor was to live until an extreme old age, and while he abdicated in 1796, in his eighty-fifth year, after he had ruled for six decades (the Chinese cycle), he continued to dominate the government until his death in 1799. Like his grandfather, the K'ang Hsi Emperor, he displayed marked ability. He was hard-working and energetic, and was fond of the chase and outdoor life. He traveled extensively through his domains, and ambitious and diligent as a scholar, poet, painter, and calligrapher, he was a patron of arts and literature. In personal ability he appears to have been fully the equal of the two most famous monarchs of the Europe of his day, Catherine of Russia and Frederick of Prussia, and in the wealth and population of his realm he surpassed all other contemporary rulers. In his reign the Manchu regime reached the pinnacle of its power and entered on its decline.

Under the Ch'ien Lung Emperor the Chinese Empire was rounded out to its natural boundaries and attained the greatest extent in its history.

The Eleuths were finally eliminated. A dispute over the succession to the Eleuth throne gave the Ch'ien Lung Emperor his opportunity. One of the worsted leaders, Amursana, sought refuge with him and was cordially received. In 1755 Amursana, aided by the Emperor's armies, was installed in Kuldja. He was not, however, allowed to rule in a fuliy independent fashion, for an imperial resident was placed in his capital to watch him, and the Ch'ien Lung Emperor proposed to reorganize the land in a way pleasing to himself. Amursana, ill content, soon revolted (1755), the Chinese garrison in Kuldja was massacred, and the first forces dispatched to put down the outbreak were unsuccessful. Unrest developed among some of the Khalkhas, and for a time it looked as though much of Mongolia might throw off the Ch'ing yoke. However, a Manchu general, Chao-hui, soon turned the fortunes of battle, Amursana was driven into Siberia, and the Eleuth power was completely broken (1757).

The conquest of the Eleuths was quickly followed by that of the Tarim basin. There, in Kashgar and Yarkand, two brothers, Moslems, scions of a princely family, set themselves up in opposition to the Ch'ing. Chao-hui boldly entered upon a campaign against them, but was surrounded and had to stand a desperate siege until reinforcements could reach him. When these arrived, Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan, the chief towns in the western part of the valley, fell to the Ch'ing arms (1759) and the defeated forces were pursued into the Pamir. While the suzerainty of the Empire was not carried so far westward as in the days of the Han and the T'ang, the area occupied to the north and west of China proper was much more extensive than under either. Manchu valor had revived the ancient martial glory of the realm. The recently conquered territory was organized into Sinkiang (the "New Dominion"). Into parts of it were moved, by imperial authority, to hold it for the Ch'ing, Manchu colonists and Chinese from Kansu and Shensi.

The Ch'ien Lung Emperor also met difficulties in Tibet. In 1750 an uprising in Lhasa killed most of the Chinese and Manchu residents. The Ch'ien Lung Emperor promptly (1751) dispatched an army which restored his rule, and then proceeded to strengthen his control. The Dalai Lama was confirmed in his title of temporal ruler of Tibet, but the two *ambans*—or representatives of Peking—were to supervise his political acts and were given the preponderance in determining the succession.

Before many years, a fresh power, the Gurkhas, arose in Nepal, on the southern borders of Tibet. They encroached on the frontier and in 1791 pillaged the seat of the Panchen Lama. The Ch'ien Lung Emperor thereupon sent an army, under a Manchu commander, which made the difficult march across the high Tibetan plateau, drove back the Gurkhas (1792), penetrated Nepal, and forced it to recognize the suzerainty of Peking.

From his father the Ch'ien Lung Emperor inherited a conflict with the non-Chinese peoples in the South and Southwest. Here, in Kwangsi, Hunan, Kweichow, Yünnan, and Szechwan, numerous aborigines lived under their own chieftains and observed their own customs. At the instance of a vigorous viceroy, the Yung Chêng Emperor had inaugurated a policy of extending more fully over them the imperial administrative system—in part as a protection for the Chinese settlers who were pushing into the lands occupied by the tribes—and met with serious resistance. Fighting was especially severe and prolonged in the western part of Szechwan, where the rugged nature of the country greatly assisted defense. The imperial forces were eventually successful, but not until the reign was two-thirds over.

Given an aggressive administration in China, conflict with Burma was almost inevitable, for the boundary between the two states was indeterminate, and the rude tribesmen on the frontier, who were guilty of depredations on travelers and on their more civilized neighbors on both sides of the border, might at any time become a source of friction. There was war between China and Burma from 1765 into December, 1769. The Burmese invaded Yünnan, and two Chinese expeditions into Burma followed. Neither side was overwhelmingly victorious, and the Ch'ien Lung Emperor had to be content with the recognition of his suzerainty —decidedly vague—by the court at Ava and the periodical dispatch of presents (regarded at least by the Ch'ing as tribute) to Peking.

The Ch'ien Lung Emperor intervened in the affairs of Annam. That region, which ever since the time of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti had been now in and now out of the Empire, under the latter part of the Ming had enjoyed one of its periods of independence. On the final collapse of the last of the Ming, Kuei Wang, Annam had become slightly embroiled with the Manchus. Under the Ch'ien Lung Emperor civil strife in Annam gave the imperial forces an excuse for taking sides actively in the politics of the country. As a result, the rulers of Annam received investiture from Peking and paid what the Ch'ing held to be "tribute."

In his dealings with Europeans, the Ch'ien Lung Emperor was fully as insistent upon his authority as his grandfather had been. An embassy from Great Britain, headed by the Earl of Macartney, arrived in Peking in 1793. The boats and carts assigned to convey it to the capital bore flags with the inscription: "Ambassador bearing tribute from the country of England," and while the Earl conducted himself with dignity, he was unable to obtain the commercial concessions which had been hoped from the venture. A Dutch embassy in 1795 was treated with less consideration, and also as from a tributary state. It, too, was unsuccessful in achieving its objectives. Treaties were signed with Russia in 1768 and 1792 supplementary to the earlier ones, defining the procedure in extraditing

and punishing criminals and further regulating trade, but no concessions of any importance were made to that power.

In his administration of the internal affairs of his realm, the Ch'ien Lung Emperor took vigorous measures to maintain his rule against sedition, real or potential. By a strict censorship he sought to discover and suppress all literature directed against the Ch'ing. Occasionally he had to face revolts. At least twice these were led by secret societies, once by the *Pai-lien Chiao,* or White Lotus Sect, and another time by the *Pa Kua,* or Eight Trigrams. We hear, too, of a Moslem uprising in the region of Kokonor, of a rebellion in Formosa, and of others in several of the more central portions of the Empire. It is significant that most of these occurred in the later years of the reign, when, with advancing age, the Emperor's vigor was beginning to abate.

In his treatment of Roman Catholic missionaries, the Ch'ien Lung Emperor was no more lenient than his father and grandfather had been. He continued to employ them in his capital: to assist in the astronomical bureau, to execute paintings in European style, and to erect structures of European design in his summer palace to the west of Peking, among other projects. Missionaries, too, were scattered widely through the provinces. In theory, however, their religious activities were forbidden. While in practice these were often winked at, usually they had to be carried on without ostentation, and occasionally severe persecutions were instituted. Missions suffered from additional causes. The Jesuits, the Roman Catholic body which had sent more missionaries to China than had any other, were being expelled by leading European states, and in 1773 the Pope dissolved the Society. Although the Jesuits already in China were at liberty to remain as seculars, and although, about ten years later, the Lazarists accepted the responsibility for carrying on the vacant work, the shock was severe. Moreover, the decline of missionary zeal in Europe, due to the skeptical "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century and the French Revolution and the ensuing wars which kept Europe in turmoil from 1789 to 1815, led to a diminution of support from the Occident. The Church slowly lost ground.

Like his grandfather, the Ch'ien Lung Emperor was interested in learning. He himself was a voluminous writer: of poetry, of notes on current topics, and of prefaces to books. He had new editions made of important works, and "encyclopedias" were compiled and printed. Neither his court nor that of his grandfather equaled that of Ming Huang of the T'ang or that of some of the Sung Emperors in the brilliance of the men of art and letters attached to it. It displayed little of the sparkle of real genius. There was, however, much of laborious ability.

The eighteenth century witnessed a rapid increase in wealth and population. Additional land was brought under cultivation and Chinese pushed

into southern Manchuria and into eastern Inner Mongolia. In several provinces—notably Kiangsi and Hunan, and highlands elsewhere—forests were cut down and crops were planted. Much use was made of maize and the sweet potato—plants of American origin. In time, because of improper methods of tillage, much of the upland was badly eroded and could no longer be cultivated. Heavy rains swept down from the denuded hills, and floods were augmented. But cities grew in size, and the total number of inhabitants rose rapidly—quite likely, although the census figures are not trustworthy, to heights never before approached either in China or in any other empire. By the end of the Ch'ien Lung period the population was probably near the three hundred million mark.

With all this prosperity and outward show of power, by the later Ch'ien Lung years the Ch'ing had passed its zenith. Although, until a few months before his death, the Emperor's health continued to be remarkably good for a man of his advanced years, toward the end much of the real power was in the hands of a trusted favorite, Ho Shên, a Manchu of humble origin. Ho Shên became the Emperor's chief minister. He amassed a fortune which would be considered huge even in the present wealthy Occident, his son was married to an imperial princess, and his protégés held high office. Corruption began to be rampant in the bureaucracy. Rebellions broke out.

## THE CHIA CH'ING EMPEROR (1796–1820)

No overwhelming disaster came immediately. The Ch'ien Lung Emperor handed on his throne peacefully to a son, the title of whose reign was Chia Ch'ing. Soon after his father's death, the Chia Ch'ing Emperor asserted himself against Ho Shên. He confiscated the latter's fortune and permitted him to commit suicide (in commutation of sentence of death by execution). The revolts were suppressed.

In ability the Chia Ch'ing Emperor was far from being the equal of his father and great-grandfather. He attempted to reduce the inherited extravagance by economies at court and applied himself to the business of government with diligence and energy. Yet he was compromising and far from popular. The downfall of Ho Shên by no means ended the corruption in officialdom. Rebellions continued to break out—ominous indications that the government was neither so firm nor so efficient as formerly. A mutiny disturbed the army; for some years pirates infested the south coasts; an attempt to assassinate the Emperor barely failed of success; and an antidynastic secret society engineered an uprising during which some of the plotters forced their way into the imperial palace during the Emperor's absence and were foiled, in part through the courage of one of the Chia Ch'ing Emperor's sons, the later Tao Kuang Emperor.

The Chia Ch'ing Emperor abated none of the attitude of his predecessors toward foreigners. He was, indeed, even more arrogant and unyielding. A Russian embassy was turned back, in 1806, before it reached Peking, because the Czar's envoy refused to perform the *kotow* when he should be received by the Emperor. This *kotow,* or prostration, became to Europeans a symbol of that recognition of Chinese suzerainty to which they would not agree and long remained a bone of contention. A British embassy, led by Lord Amherst, arrived in 1816, seeking better trade conditions, but it was treated with much less courtesy than had been that led by Lord Macartney. After much disagreement over the method of reception it was dismissed without an audience, and with a haughty mandate which clearly indicated that the Emperor regarded the King of England as the prince of a tributary state.

## THE BEGINNING OF THE TAO KUANG REIGN

In 1820 the death of the Chia Ch'ing Emperor brought to the throne, under the reign title of Tao Kuang, the prince who had shown such courage when rebels invaded the palace. The Tao Kuang Emperor proved to be little if any better ruler than his father: luxury and the environment of the palace were softening the fiber of the once hardy Manchus. He is said to have sought to promote economy in the expenditures of his court, but he was restive under the criticisms of the official censors—one of the useful ways which the Chinese administrative system provided for bringing public opinion to bear on the throne—and found means of curbing them. He, too, suffered from rebellions. None of them proved sufficiently serious to check the prosperity inherited from the first century and a half of the Ch'ing. Outwardly, in 1839, the Empire was still imposing. It was wealthy, and its population was probably increasing. It was unsound at the top, however, and disaster was imminent. When, in the first war with Great Britain, 1839–1842, China met the most significant crisis not only of the reign but of many centuries, it was in the hands of a ruling house whose best days were in the past. It is no wonder that the Chinese blundered and in the ensuing decades, by one misstep after another, stumbled, ill-prepared, into the greatest revolution of their history.

## CULTURE UNDER THE GREAT CH'ING EMPERORS: ART

Chinese cultural achievements under the K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung Emperors were considerable. In art there was little departure from the traditions received from the Ming. The imposing palaces and temples in Peking were maintained with but few alterations or additions.

Paintings continued to be produced in great abundance, and many of them showed technical skill, refinement, and taste. Few, if any, however, displayed outstanding genius. Flowers, birds, animals, and plants were exquisitely portrayed, but the landscapes were distinctly inferior to those of the Sung. There was much copying of old masterpieces. Beautiful works of lacquer appeared, and in carving wood, ivory, and the semiprecious stones, the handicraftsmen showed elaborate diligence and cunning.

It was in porcelain that the period has its chief claim to artistic distinction. At the great potteries at Ching-tê Chên the technique and command of material were perfect, and the product is justly famous. Even in this field, however, there was very little of creative genius. The patterns and colors—both polychrome and monochrome—of preceding dynasties were extensively followed and the innovations made do not arouse much admiration. Before the Ch'ien Lung period was half over, decline was well on the way. In addition to the Ching-tê Chên potteries, many private ones were maintained, but with rare exceptions their products were inferior to those of the government works.

## CULTURE UNDER THE GREAT CH'ING EMPERORS: LITERATURE

As we have suggested, the literary output under the Ch'ing was enormous. Vast collections and works of reference were issued by imperial command. While, in the very nature of the case, even at their best these were the product of diligence and scholarly competence rather than of genius, they are not to be despised and are evidence of the high regard in which learning was held. The civil service examinations were firmly maintained as the chief road to official preferment and social distinction, and not only did they give prestige to scholarship, but, as well, the exacting preparation for them continued to recruit a numerous educated class which appreciated good literature.

Most of the writing done under the Ch'ing was of mediocre or inferior quality. The output of the printers was voluminous, but much of it was paid for out of government funds by officials who in this way sought prestige. However, some of the literature produced was so distinctive that it is clear that originality was still to be found among the Chinese. Excellent poetry was composed. Novels continued to appear, among them what are probably the greatest and most original ever written in China. The best known and most popular of them all, the *Hung Lou Mêng,* usually translated as "The Dream of the Red Chamber," was the work of Ts'ao Hsüeh-ch'in (or Ts'ao Chan). Another novel, probably dating from about 1825, under the guise of travels in imaginary countries, advocated far-reaching reforms in the position of women—espousing the education of girls and denouncing foot-binding, the inequality of the sexes, and the

determination of marriage by fortunetelling. There were, indeed, many novels attacking officialdom and accepted social usages.

Fresh developments also took place in the theatre, although these did not always make for improvement. Additional plays were composed, many of them based on popular novels, and new—and often more raucous—forms of music were popular.

## CULTURE UNDER THE GREAT CH'ING EMPERORS: PHILOSOPHY

In philosophy the first century or so of the dynasty was noteworthy. There was much more of inquiry and creative thought under the Ch'ing than under the other great foreign dynasty, the Yüan.

The impulse that gave rise to it was the conquest of the country by the Manchus. Scholars were impelled to seek the reason for the weakness which had permitted so small a people to overrun the Empire. Among the pioneers were Huang Tsung-hsi (1609–1692) and Wang Fu-chih (1627–1679). One of the most distinguished thinkers was Ku T'ing-lin, also known as Ku Yen-wu (1613–1682). Ku actively opposed the Manchu conquest and in later years, when he had become outstanding as a scholar and was repeatedly urged to accept public office, persisted in his resolution never to serve under the hated foreigner. He believed that part of the ineptitude of the Ming had been due to the absorption of the intellectuals in fruitless discussions of the quality of human nature and of Heaven's decree. He sought a cure for the nation's ills in turning from such debates to the cultivation of character. Another independent thinker was Yen Yüan (1635–1704). Stoical, despising mere book-learning, and given to practical activity, he published little, and it was not until long afterward that his writings gained much recognition. He declared that the paralysis which had allowed his country to fall a prey to the Manchus arose from the concentration of the scholar on his books and on meditation, and that the remedy lay in hard labor at practical tasks, directed in part toward improving economic conditions. Both Ku and Yen represented a reaction against the dominant philosophy of the school of Chu Hsi.

Another phase of the rebellion against the Sung philosophers was an attempt to get back of their commentaries to the original Classics. The protestants depended largely on the studies of the Classics made by the scholars of the Han dynasty, as being nearer in time to the revered books and hence presumably more accurate than were the Sung authors. Hence their movement is generally known as that of the *Han Hsüeh,* or Han Learning. Much energy was spent on philology, in the effort to reconstruct the ancient pronunciation of the characters of the Classics. Ku Yen-wu was the author of the book which laid the cornerstone of

that science, and other scholars followed in his steps. The members of the school sought for early manuscripts, editions, and quotations, to determine what the original texts of the Classics had been. They studied epigraphy, philology, phonology, and historical geography. They developed a method of historical criticism which is clearly independent of but is surprisingly like that evolved in the Occident in recent times. Yen Jo-chü (1636–1704), for example, shook the scholarly world with a book *(Shang Shu Ku Wên Shu Chêng)* which demonstrated that the so-called "Ancient Text" (or "Ancient Script") of the Classic of History was a late forgery. A few in the Sung, Yüan, and Ming had suspected the spurious nature of this text, but none had gone so thoroughly into the subject as did Yen. Yen devoted a lifetime to the task and his arguments were conclusive, but his work was not published until 1745, nearly a generation after his death, and his findings were not accepted by the great majority of the scholars of the time. A younger contemporary of Yen, Yao Chi-hêng (1647–1715?), attempted to prove that many books attributed to ancient times are unauthentic. Hu Wei (1633–1714) showed that the diagrams which some of the Sung philosophers used to illustrate and reinforce their arguments were not from remote antiquity, as the latter had claimed, but originated with a Taoist priest in the tenth century. Ts'ui Shu (1740–1816) put in the larger part of his life casting doubt on what were usually believed to be dependable facts and documents—such as the historicity of the Emperors whom Confucius and his school held up as models, the traditional authorship of the *Chou Li*, the concluding chapters of the *Lun Yü*, and the Bamboo Books. Many another name might be given of those who contributed to this school. Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng (1738–1801), while not precisely of this school and professing to adhere to Chu Hsi, was tolerant of Wang Yang-ming. Tai Chên (1724–1777), the outstanding philosopher of the dynasty, marked the culmination of the intellectual renaissance. He rejected the dualism of the Sung for rationalistic, materialistic monism.

To the end of the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century there was much of able scholarship. With the loss of vigor which the dynasty suffered after 1800, and with the foreign wars and internal rebellions which shook the Empire in the middle of the nineteenth century, this activity declined. One of its greatest exponents and patrons, Yüan Yüan, who sought to organize research, died in 1849, the year after the outbreak of the most serious of these uprisings, that of the T'ai P'ing. The *Han Hsüeh* was not forgotten, however, and contributed to the intellectual revolution which came in the last years of the nineteenth and in the twentieth century.

The *Han Hsüeh* is significant not only for its combination of originality with reverence for the past, but also for the evidence which it affords

of the decline of Buddhism as an effective force in the intellectual life of the Empire. In the T'ang and the centuries immediately preceding the T'ang, most of the creative thought of China was absorbed in interpreting and developing Buddhist philosophy. Under the Sung, Buddhism, while producing few thinkers of any consequence, was still strong enough to mold Confucianism. Even under the Ming, Wang Yang-ming showed the effect of Buddhist environment. Now, under the Ch'ing, the *Han Hsüeh* was attempting to purge Confucianism of the Buddhist and Taoist elements which the Sung thinkers had brought into it. From one point of view, the *Han Hsüeh* was evidence of a further recession of the tide of Buddhism and the re-emergence above its waters of pre-Buddhist Confucianism. Buddhism was still powerful. Thousands of monks and nuns were in its cloisters and it remained one of the most prominent factors in the folklore, the art, the customs, and the religious life of the Empire. Under the Ch'ien Lung Emperor an attempt was made to reconcile Buddhism and Confucianism. Tibetan Buddhism was fairly prominent, through the Ch'ing rule of that land and the desire to keep the friendship of the Dalai Lama. On the whole, however, Buddhism was decaying.

Other trends of thought were represented, including that which kept up the tradition of Wang Yang-ming. The *Han Hsüeh* was far from being universally accepted and had its critics. The dominant Sung school was itself divided into at least three branches. The T'ung Ch'êng school fought the archaic and artificial literary style *(p'ien t'i)* by which sentences were composed in pairs, and strove to popularize the writings of T'ang and Sung masters and even older writers.

Confucianism as interpreted by Chu Hsi and his followers remained the orthodox philosophy of the state and was enforced through the civil service examinations. The Confucian cult was maintained much as it had been under the later rulers of the Ming. Every imperial political subdivision had a hall in which were tablets to the sage and his distinguished followers and in which sacrifices were officially offered at stated intervals. New names, too, were added to this imperial hall of fame.

## THE ECONOMY UNDER THE GREAT CH'ING EMPERORS

In the first hundred years or so of the Ch'ing, as we have said, China was as prosperous as any other large country. Thanks partly to the internal order after the suppression of the rebellion of Wu San-kuei and, as we have suggested to the new food plants derived from the Americas, population mounted to higher dimensions than at any earlier time.

Chinese sailors and merchants continued to go by ship to the South and East. During the early Ch'ing much of the copper needed for coinage was from Japan. Later, mines in Yünnan became the chief source.

The government monopoly of salt, long a source of revenue, was largely in the hands of a group of wealthy merchants in Yangchow.

## INTERCOURSE WITH THE OCCIDENT

Mention has repeatedly been made of the growing pressure from the Occident. Roman Catholic missionaries penetrated every province, bringing with them their religion, and the scholars among them residing in Peking introduced the court and the educated classes to the science and art of the West. In 1807 the first Protestant missionary, Robert Morrison, landed at Canton, and others followed. Merchants—Portuguese, Dutch, French, English, a few representatives of other European states, and, last of all, Americans—made their way to Macao and Canton. The Russians maintained an overland trade. Upon all these the Ch'ing authorities kept a strict hand. Roman Catholic missionaries were closely watched: repeated persecutions prevented their flocks from increasing much beyond the two hundred thousand mark and were slowly stamping them out. Protestant missionaries were confined to Canton, to Macao, and to overseas Chinese in places like Batavia, Singapore, Malacca, and Bangkok. Commerce was closely regulated. While some smuggling was done, most of the maritime trade was carried on at one port, Canton, and there, during much of the period, it was conducted through an official guild of Chinese merchants, the *Co-hong*. Foreign merchants in Canton were restricted to a narrow strip on the riverbank, the famous "Factories," and might with Portuguese permission find more breathing space at the near-by Macao. The Occident, growing in wealth, power, and commercial activity, would not permanently brook such constraint, and trouble loomed ahead. For the time being, however, Westerners had perforce to submit to the conditions imposed by the government in whose land they were guests.

In spite of all these restrictions, the impact of the Occident was already bearing fruit in China. The Christians included very few men of social or political prominence, especially in later years, but they were to be found in practically every province. Western science, especially mathematics and astronomy, was being studied by Chinese scholars. Cannon of the kind then in use in the West—some of them cast by Jesuits at the command of Manchus and Chinese—played a part in internal and external warfare. The Western style of painting was having its influence upon some of the Chinese artists. It is possible that the efforts of Chinese

scholars to devise a phonetic system for writing the language—of which there were at least two—were due to contact with Western alphabets.

More marked than the influence of the Occident upon China was that of Chinese culture upon Europe. The Roman Catholic missionaries translated portions of Chinese literature and wrote extensively on the country. Their works were widely read. Since their reports were, on the whole, appreciative of Chinese culture, the result in Europe was admiration for the Middle Kingdom. For a time in the eighteenth century, things Chinese became a fad. Never before had China had so much effect upon lands so distant from her borders. Rococo art reflected a knowledge of Chinese forms. Gardens, pagodas, and pavilions in Chinese style were constructed for the noble and the wealthy. Many plants were introduced from China, some of them later widely cultivated and extensively developed. Tea roses, azaleas, greenhouse primroses, chrysanthemums, mountain peonies, and China asters were among the flowers introduced into Europe from China in the seventeenth, the eighteenth, and the early part of the nineteenth century. Chinese sweet oranges were taken by the Portuguese to Europe and Brazil and spread throughout much of tropical and subtropical North and South America. Sedan chairs were fashionable. Lacquer, incense, tea, Chinese colors, and the Chinese style of painting were popular, the earliest wall papers appeared in imitation of Chinese designs, and true porcelain was for the first time produced in Europe. The deism so widespread in intellectual circles was reinforced by the knowledge of Confucian philosophy that came to the West, for the two systems had much in common. Here, said the deists, was "natural religion" actually in operation. To the "liberals" who led in the "Enlightenment" in the Europe of the eighteenth century, China was a kind of Utopia where their principles were practiced.

The admiration of Europeans for China was in marked contrast to the disdain with which that country and its culture were shortly to be viewed. The powerful realm of the K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung Emperors compelled a respect which the feebleness of the later rulers could not retain. Moreover, in the nineteenth century, information in the West about China came chiefly not from missionaries, in intimate contact with the best of Chinese society, as many of the early Roman Catholics had been. It was derived, rather, from merchants who were irritated beyond measure by the restrictions on their trade and who saw chiefly the seamy side of Chinese life. Then, too, the rapid increase of wealth and physical well-being in the Occident in the nineteenth century contributed to disdain for non-Europeans, including the Chinese.

The continued influence of China upon Japan must be noted. Several of the Ming scholars, unwilling to live under Manchu rule, with the coming of the Ch'ing dynasty took refuge in the Shogun's domains. Here they

made a marked impression upon art and literature. For a time Japan experienced a strengthening of the influence of the Confucian school. Although politically independent and making her own adaptations of what she received, she remained within the borders of China's cultural empire.

SUMMARY

The first hundred and fifty years of the Ch'ing dynasty were among the most glorious in the history of China. With the exception of the Yüan, the area ruled from China had never before been so extensive. Internal order had never been better maintained over so long a period, and as a result, prosperity was widespread and the population multiplied far beyond all previous totals. China dealt firmly with the foreigners in its midst, and its culture was admired and copied in Europe. Artistic and intellectual life flourished.

With all this vigor and activity, however, in originality the China of the Ch'ing did not begin to equal that of the Chou, or even the Han, the T'ang, and the Sung. The best that the intellectual life of the K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung periods had to show for itself was the Han Learning, and that was directing its energy not toward giving birth to new ideas, but toward discovering what the forefathers had thought and done during the great creative centuries before the Han and the Ch'in. This comparative sterility of the Ch'ing was a prolongation of that of the Yüan and Ming. For nearly six centuries China had been stirred by no great creative movement. Such innovating ability as was displayed affected merely the minority. It seems probable that without some powerful shock from the outside the Chinese would have continued to repeat, with variations, the ideas of previous centuries. It is impossible to predict infallibly what would have happened under a different set of circumstances, but it seems likely that without such a stimulus Chinese culture had reached the end of its development. However, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the clash came. Under it the old institutional and thought forms crumbled and chaos resulted. It is still too early to predict with assurance whether the shock will not prove to have been too great—whether the Chinese genius will not be so overwhelmed that it can never again make fresh and outstanding contributions. In some such contact with other civilizations, however, appears to have lain the only hope of anything new from the Middle Kingdom.

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CHAPTER TEN

# THE TRANSFORMATION WROUGHT BY THE IMPACT OF THE OCCIDENT:

## I. The Empire Is Shaken by Wars with Western European Powers and the Resulting Treaties and by Internal Rebellions (A.D. 1839–1860)

### INTRODUCTORY

We now come to the period of the greatest revolution in Chinese institutions and culture of which we have record. What changes may have been wrought in the dim ages before the Chou Dynasty we do not know. We do know that not during the centuries whose main features we are able to discern with some degree of assurance had such a thoroughgoing shattering of the structure of the nation's life been seen. Eras of transition there had been. Of these the chief were what accompanied the early years of the Chou; the turmoil toward the end of the Chou, out of which emerged the philosophies, notably Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism, that were to shape the patterns of Chinese life and thought and the imperial structure of the Ch'in and the Han; then the nearly four centuries of division and invasion, with the accompanying influx of Buddhism, that followed the downfall of the Han; next the era that began in the later years of the T'ang with the revival and reshaping of Confucianism and the emergence of a society, ideals, and political structure that, with modifications, were to persist to the close of the nineteenth century. In none of these periods, however, had the overturn of the inheritance from the past been so nearly complete as in the twentieth century.

Up to the nineteenth century, the current of Chinese history had moved on without such traumatic disturbances as had punctuated that of the Occident. One dynasty succeeded another, each founded by a successful warrior, and all, after a shorter or longer period, declining, their close signalized by rebellions and civil chaos, and frequently by invasions from

the North. Under every major dynasty Chinese civilization experienced alterations, often very marked. As we have repeatedly seen, Chinese history does not fall into a dynastic pattern. It was not fully independent of dynastic developments and changes, but several cultural eras did not conform to dynastic sequence. However, no break occurred as sharp as that between the Persian and post-Alexandrian Hellenistic sequence in western Asia, or as the one between the Roman Empire and medieval Europe. No cultural or political invasion from without had as nearly overwhelmed the native inheritance as had several which the Occident had known.

The events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were, therefore, entirely without precedent in China's history. Heretofore the most dangerous invaders had come from the north, west, and northeast, by way of the land. Now they were arriving by the sea. The ocean had been spanned. On the north, too, a menace still loomed—Russia. The Empire was beset from both sides. Up to now, cultural invasion had not been a sequel of the political domination of aliens. Now both were combined. Previously, former invaders and conquerors had adopted from China most of what civilization they possessed. Although they mastered all or part of the country, many alien rulers regarded themselves as Chinese monarchs and preserved native institutions. Ideas had come in from abroad—more than have sometimes been recognized—but the structure of Chinese life was basically very little altered by them. The major cultural importation had been Buddhism, and that had entered chiefly through peaceful contacts with the outer world. Now came peoples possessed of a high civilization very different from that of China. Far from being disposed to adopt the latter, they regarded it as backward and semibarbarous. The admiration for the Middle Kingdom which had been strong in Europe in the eighteenth century was preserved only by a few savants, and by them chiefly for China's past. The attitude toward contemporary China was almost entirely a compound of irritation, condescension, and contempt.

The conflict was one of civilizations as well as of governments and peoples. In each of the main phases of life—economic, political, intellectual, social, and religious—Chinese and Western culture displayed striking and fundamental differences. In the close interplay of nineteenth and twentieth century life, one or the other structure had to give way. In the eighteenth century it had seemed for a time that Europe might be partially Sinicized rather than China Europeanized. As the nineteenth century progressed it became obvious that the opposite would take place. The effect on China was accentuated by the fact that the culture of the West was itself experiencing rapid changes which threatened its traditional bases and even its existence. Here was an Occident being enriched by the industrial processes that had begun to appear in the eighteenth century and were to be extensively developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The West

had discovered new ways of utilizing man's physical environment. In consequence, its economic, social, moral, intellectual, and political life was being revolutionized. Moved by their desire for markets and raw materials and by the passion for power, and armed with the new appliances, Western peoples were mastering much of the globe. Wherever they went—whether to Africa, India, the South Seas, the Americas, Japan, or China—changes followed.

In China, in the clash of civilizations the institutions of two thousand years crumbled. The political and economic organization, which had proved fairly adequate for the old conditions, was quite unfitted to cope with the invasion. The Chinese looked upon the intruders as barbarians and long resisted them. However, in time, defeated in war again and again, their independence compromised, their chief cities forced to house foreign communities, and their land traversed by merchants and missionaries conveying novel ideas, the Chinese began adopting the culture of the alien. They did so partly in self-defense—in the attempt to defeat the conqueror with his own weapons—and partly because they were convinced of the superiority of much that the Westerner had to offer. Whatever the motive, the result was change affecting profoundly every aspect of the nation's life.

The story of the period has been told again and again, often in much detail. Histories of China by Westerners have usually devoted half or more of their space to the years after 1839. It would be superfluous, therefore, to repeat extensively the narrative of the past century and a quarter. If, however, an account of China's past is to be well-rounded, these momentous decades must be included; and because of their significance, especially for present-day China, we must go into them somewhat more fully than we have into any preceding era. We must always remember that we are still too near the events to view them in their true perspective. We must, however, make the effort so to see them, because upon the success with which we do so depends the accuracy of our understanding of the current situation. Time, too, may prove us to have been judges as competent as those who come after us.

The years between 1839 and 1964 are divided by events into four main periods. First were slightly over two decades (1839–1860) during which in two wars (1839–1842 and 1856–1860) with Occidental powers China was defeated and forced to permit the Westerner to reside in several important cities and to travel freely elsewhere, and to grant him a certain degree of exemption from the jurisdiction of Chinese laws and courts. The treaties then exacted from Peking were the main framework of the legal basis for the Western penetration of China. During the uneasy truce (1842–1856) that separated the two wars a rebellion broke out (1848), which traced its history to contacts with the West and which devastated some of the Empire's fairest provinces and threatened to unseat the

Manchus. Other uprisings also menaced the Ch'ing. The year 1860 ended with the dynasty in a parlous condition: the nation was saddled with treaties that compromised its independence, and rebellions were rampant.

There followed, in the second place, slightly more than three decades (1861–1893) when the dynasty and the Empire appeared to have recovered. The rebellions were suppressed and internal order was restored. In spite of recurring friction with Western governments and occasional further concessions to them, major humiliations were avoided and some show of dignity was maintained. However, while outwardly the structure of Chinese life was little altered, influences from abroad were undermining it.

Then came, in the third place, beginning with 1894, a period when the framework of Chinese civilization began to crumble. A disastrous war with Japan (1894–1895) was the signal, and was quickly succeeded by the threatened partition of the country among the powers (1895–1899). A vain effort to oust the alien (1900) ended in humiliating prostration before him. In the revolutionary attempts at adjustment which followed, the Manchus were swept aside (1912) and a republic was essayed. During the ensuing civil strife the nation declined more and more toward political chaos. At the same time startling changes came in every phase of the people's life: in the family and social structure, in religion, in intellectual activities, and in economic organization. Fresh integration seemed about to be achieved. Then, after 1931 and especially after 1937, events were complicated by the progressive conquest of much of the country by Japan.

A fourth period began in 1945 with the defeat of Japan. The existing regime, that of the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, was exhausted by the long resistance to the invader. After the expulsion of the Japanese it proved unable to reconstruct the country. The Communists, espousing an ideology of Occidental origin, took possession of the mainland (1949) and carried through a drastic reorganization which eliminated much of such of the older culture as had survived the earlier changes. Under the protection of the United States the Kuomintang continued on Formosa (T'aiwan) the government which it claimed to be the only legitimate one of China. It represented the pre-Communist stage of the revolution. China was caught in the global struggle between Communism and the "free world."

## THE FIRST WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN (1839–1842)

As we have seen, the pressure of the West on China was due to the renewed expansion of European peoples, caused by what is usually termed the Industrial Revolution. Great Britain, the Occidental power in which that revolution originated, was the chief of the maritime commercial nations, and dissatisfied with the conditions under which the Chinese permitted trade, was the first to seek to coerce the Chinese into granting

better terms. The British were accustomed to intercourse between nations on the basis of equality. To them the Chinese procedure, grounded in the conviction that all other peoples were tributary to the Emperor, was intolerable. Chinese tonnage dues, taxes on imports and exports, other fees on commerce, and trade regulations seemed galling and arbitrary. Chinese judicial processes were regarded as high-handed and unjust: the legal procedures of the two nations differed, the Chinese theory of group responsibility clashed with the British concept of individual responsibility, the Chinese authorities employed torture as part of the judicial process, and the innocent were often not given a fair hearing. Had the British been ready to abide by a basic principle of that international law by which they professed to be guided—the sovereignty of each nation—they might well have reminded themselves that they had no treaty rights in the country, were there on sufferance, and if they did not like such terms as the Chinese gave them, had no options but to ask peaceably for modifications or to withdraw. That, however, was not the temper of Europeans toward non-Europeans in the nineteenth century. Criticism of the ensuing war was not lacking in Great Britain and America, but it was on the ground that opium was being forced on China. Few challenged the right of an Occidental power to exact better conditions for what was deemed legitimate trade.

On both sides there was colossal ignorance of the other. High Chinese and Manchu officials believed the English to be "foreign devils." British contempt and irritation were extreme. Each regarded the other as uncivilized.

As has just been said, the issue was complicated by the traffic in opium. Opium had long been in use in China. As a temporary escape from the monotony and tensions of life, it had much the same appeal as alcoholic beverages have made to some other peoples. Partly because of its deleterious moral and physical effects, and partly because its rapid increase reversed the favorable balance of trade and led to the export of silver, the Chinese court renewed long-standing prohibitions against the importation of the drug. These were violated—through the connivance and venality of Chinese officials—until late in 1838, when Peking, taking alarm, in a spasm for enforcement, appointed Lin Tzê-hsü as imperial commissioner to stamp out the traffic. Lin arrived at his post in 1839 and acted with vigor. He ordered that all the contraband drug in foreign hands be surrendered and that foreign merchants give their formal promise no longer to import it. To win acceptance of his demands he virtually imprisoned the entire foreign community in Canton in its own quarters. Slightly more than twenty thousand chests of the drug were, accordingly, handed over and destroyed, and some of the foreigners gave the required bond. The British, aggrieved, withdrew—for a time to Macao, and soon to the island of Hong Kong, then almost uninhabited but commanding an excellent harbor not far from

Canton. Further friction followed, and in November, 1839, an armed clash occurred between British and Chinese warships at Hong Kong.

The war thus begun was interrupted from time to time by negotiations. It was almost entirely confined to naval attacks by the British upon Chinese ports from Canton north to the Yangtze. After the capture (July, 1842) of Chinkiang, where the Grand Canal crosses the Yangtze, had cut an important line of communication between Peking and the South, and an assault on Nanking had been ordered, the Chinese came to terms.

## THE TREATIES OF 1842–1844

The resulting treaty of Nanking (August 29, 1842), which the Tao Kuang Emperor reluctantly allowed to be signed, had as its main provisions (1) the opening of five ports—Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai—to the residence and trade of British subjects; (2) the cession of the island of Hong Kong to Great Britain—for a naval and commercial base; (3) intercourse between British and Chinese officials on the footing of equality; (4) the establishment and publication by the Chinese of a "fair and regular" tariff on exports and imports, to take the place of the dues which the British claimed were subject to arbitrary change and the venality of Chinese officials; (5) the abolishment of the Co-hong; and (6) the payment by China of an indemnity as recompense for the opium destroyed by Lin, for the debts owed by the Co-hong to British merchants, and for British war expenses. This was followed (1843) by a supplementary treaty which contained a tariff schedule, further regulations for trade, a clause which promised most-favored-nation treatment, and the beginnings of extraterritoriality.

Other Western powers whose citizens had commerce with China watched the war and its outcome with interest. Some of them soon requested concessions similar to those granted to the British. The British had asked no exclusive privileges for themselves, unless the cession of Hong Kong be called such, and although at first they were far from cordial to the idea, offered no great opposition to the extension to other nations of the terms of commercial and official intercourse that had been won by them. The United States sent a diplomatic mission which in 1844 obtained a treaty opening the same five ports to Americans, regulating trade, and elaborating extraterritoriality—defining it in criminal cases and extending it in part to civil ones. In October, 1844, the French obtained a similar treaty. In December, 1844, they brought about the issue of an imperial edict which granted permission to erect Roman Catholic churches in the ports and to Chinese to accept Roman Catholicism. In 1846 they secured a second edict that confirmed the toleration of Roman Catholicism and promised the restoration to the Catholics of some of the churches built

under the K'ang Hsi Emperor which had been confiscated in the persecutions of the past century or more. A decree of 1845 extended to Protestants the privileges of the edict of 1844. In 1845 Belgians were given the right to trade and in 1847 Sweden and Norway obtained a treaty. In 1851 a convention with Russia further regulated trade between that country and China.

These treaties and edicts provided the legal basis of much of the foreign penetration which the next ninety years were to witness. The opening of the five cities for the trade and residence of foreigners served as a precedent for designating others for the same purpose—"treaty ports," as they came to be called. Until 1929 the tariff continued to be fixed by agreement with foreign powers. It became customary to demand an indemnity of China after the latter had been defeated in war. Extraterritoriality was established and for three-quarters of a century was to be the general practice. By it, foreigners, when they were defendants in any criminal action against Chinese, were to be tried under their own laws and by their own authorities; in civil cases with Chinese they might invoke the aid of their consuls; and in controversies among themselves they were not to be subject to Chinese laws or courts. When it was devised, the system probably helped to reduce the friction between foreigners and Chinese, but it was a decided infringement upon what in the Occident were considered the prerogatives of a sovereign state.

## BETWEEN THE WARS (1842–1855)

Under the new treaties the pressure of the West upon China perceptibly increased. On Hong Kong was developed a thriving city, Victoria. Foreign merchants and missionaries settled there and in the five open ports. The Jesuits re-entered China (1840), several Roman Catholic and Protestant organizations sent representatives to begin work, and bodies, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, which had been in China before 1839 reinforced their staffs. Trade was stimulated by the growth of steam navigation. The settlement of the west coast of North America, especially California, from the older portions of the United States proceeded apace during the forties and fifties and led to more commerce across the Pacific. The emigration of Chinese laborers sprang up: to the mines of California, to Peru, and to the plantations of Cuba and British Guiana. Through these wanderers overseas, alien influences were to flow back into China. In Shanghai, which rapidly became an important center of foreign trade, the Westerners acquired lands outside the city wall. There three settlements arose: French, British, and American (the last two later—1863—amalgamated as the International Settlement), and the foundations were laid of the status that in after years was to be one of nearly complete inde-

pendence of Chinese control. The foreign commerce of Amoy, Ningpo, and Foochow did not become as important as that of Shanghai, and the foreign settlements at these ports did not attain the dimensions of those at the latter city. Portugal in effect assumed full sovereignty over Macao, although China did not formally recognize the act until 1887.

The peace that was sealed by the treaties was little more than a truce. Neither side was satisfied. From the Chinese standpoint too much had been granted, and from the foreign standpoint not enough. Friction inevitably followed. Of the five treaty ports, Canton continued to have the largest number of foreign residents. These were still confined to the old narrow "factory" district along the river front, and the Cantonese offered determined opposition to any extension of the area. British attempts to obtain better conditions were balked. Rioting, murders, and bitterness punctuate the annals of these years. Trouble, although not so marked, occurred at the other ports. The smuggling of opium continued. Much of the emigration of Chinese took the form of "contract labor," and recruiting for it was often by violence and fraud. For a time foreign ships, especially Portuguese, undertook the "convoying" of Chinese merchant craft along the coast, ostensibly as a protection against pirates, but in reality a thinly veiled form of blackmail.

The American and French treaties of 1844 made provision for their revision at the end of twelve years. Under the most-favored-nation clause of her supplementary treaty of 1843, Great Britain claimed that the one of 1842 should come up for review in 1854 and enumerated to the Chinese added regulations for intercourse and fresh privileges to foreigners which she deemed desirable. Among them were access to more cities, the legalization of the opium trade, and the residence of Western envoys in Peking. These demands were supported by the United States and France. It may be noted, lest the alien seem entirely intent on his own gains, even at the price of debauching the Chinese, that some who favored provision for the importation of opium did so on the ground that, since the drug was coming into the country anyway by smuggling, control could be exercised and a revenue derived for the Government if the traffic was regularized. In 1856 the American representative by independent action endeavored to gain a revision, then due, of the treaty of 1844. For the moment all these attempts ended in failure.

## THE WAR OF 1856–1860

War broke out over a comparatively minor incident. In October, 1856, a craft, the lorcha *Arrow*—owned by Chinese, and with a Chinese crew, but registered at Hong Kong, having a British captain, and flying the British flag—while at Canton was boarded by Chinese officers.

Most of its crew were arrested on the charge that they had been engaged in a recent act of piracy, and the British flag was hauled down. The British declared that British sovereignty had been violated and their flag insulted. The Chinese declined to give the satisfaction demanded.

This particular clash, apparently so trivial, might have been settled peaceably had it not been that by disposition and conviction both the British consul, Harry Parkes, and the viceroy in Canton, Yeh Ming-shên, were uncompromising. By the end of the month the British naval forces commenced hostilities. They captured the forts that commanded the approaches to Canton and bombarded the viceroy's yamen (official headquarters). The Chinese retaliated by what in effect was a declaration of war. The British ministry sustained the action of the British authorities in China, was defeated on the issue in the House of Commons, but dissolving Parliament, appealed to the country, won an endorsement, and went on with hostilities.

France co-operated. France and Great Britain had been allied in the war which was just closing in the Crimea, and France had been given a *casus belli* in the execution (early in 1856), by the Chinese authorities in Kwangsi, of a French missionary, Chapdelaine. Great Britain suggested that the United States also join. This Washington declined to do, although late in 1856 an American force had obtained an apology for an indignity to the American flag by dismantling the offending forts (below Canton). The United States, however, had its representative on hand to ask for a revision of the treaty of 1844 when the French and British were forcing from the Chinese the revision of their corresponding documents. Russia, with the Crimean War so recently closed, could not collaborate, but was eager to take advantage of the situation to gain what she could.

Owing to a war with Persia and to the Sepoy Mutiny in India (1857), Great Britain was delayed in pressing hostilities. Late in 1857, however, a sufficient British and French force had gathered in Chinese waters, Canton was taken, and the obdurate viceroy, Yeh, was sent a prisoner to Calcutta. Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia now dispatched demands to Peking. The reply proved unsatisfactory and the allied fleets proceeded north, where they could bring more direct pressure on the capital. The Taku forts, commanding the approach to Tientsin, were captured by the British and the French. With Peking thus threatened, the Emperor yielded, and treaties (usually called the Treaties of Tientsin) were negotiated and signed (1858), not only with Great Britain and France but also with Russia and the United States.

Before these new agreements could become effective, they had to be ratified by their respective governments and the ratifications exchanged. The Russian, French, and British documents provided that ratifications should be exchanged at Peking. This the Russian minister accomplished

without difficulty. When, however, in 1859 the British, French, and American ministers arrived off Tientsin for this purpose, more trouble ensued. The American minister went to Peking and effected the exchange, although not without some humiliation, but the British and French ministers insisted on going through Tientsin, instead of by the route selected by the Chinese. They were opposed, attempted to force a passage, and were repulsed (1859). In 1860 the British and the French returned with reinforcements, captured the Taku forts and Tientsin, and moved on Peking. In retaliation for the seizure of a party that had been sent forward under a flag of truce and the death of several of its members, when Peking was captured the Summer Palace was deliberately destroyed.

### THE TREATIES OF TIENTSIN (1858) AND PEKING (1860)

The treaties of Tientsin (1858) and the supplementary conventions, including the ones signed at Peking in 1860, effected important modifications in the status of Westerners in China and made possible a much more extensive penetration of the Empire by the Occident than had those of 1842 and 1844. Many of the details need not concern us here, but some of the provisions had major consequences. (1) New ports were opened. Ten were designated by the treaties of Tientsin: Newchwang in Manchuria, Têngchow (for which Chefoo was substituted in 1862) in Shantung, four on the Yangtze, including Chinkiang and Hankow (not all were really opened at once, and one, Nanking, not until 1899), one on Hainan (not opened until 1876), two on Formosa, and Ch'ao-chow (actually its port, Swatow) on the south coast. Tientsin itself was added in 1860. These ports, particularly those in the North and on the Yangtze, put vast new sections in direct touch with Westerners. Several of these cities were already major centers of population. Some others, through the impulse given by foreign trade, rapidly rose in importance. Occidentals therefore were concentrated in entrepôts from which trade routes radiated into large areas of the country—with fateful consequences for existing Chinese ideas and institutions. (2) The merchantmen of the powers were given permission to use the Yangtze River. (3) Peking, although not technically made an open port, was to see the hated alien living within its walls, for the treaties specified that ministers or ambassadors, with their entourages, were to be allowed to reside there. They were, moreover, to be received as representatives of independent nations on a footing of equality with China. (4) Foreigners, when armed with proper passports, were to be permitted to travel anywhere in the interior. This accorded the Westerner the privilege of going wherever he wished and so furthered the extension of Occidental ideas beyond the limits of the ports. (5) To Christians, both alien and Chinese, was given the privilege of propagating Christianity, and both were guaranteed toleration in the practice of their faith. This pro-

vision in part removed Chinese Christians from the jurisdiction of Chinese officials, for any alleged persecution could be referred by the missionaries to a consul or minister for presentation to the imperial authorities. It led to abuses, because not infrequently Chinese professed conversion to obtain the assistance of the missionary and the consul in lawsuits. Even without such abuses, the "toleration clauses" made possible the percolation of Christianity through the Empire and so in part threatened the disintegration of existing Chinese institutions. (6) The French convention of 1860 gave further sanction to the promise made in the imperial edict of 1846 that the Chinese Government would restore to Roman Catholics the religious and benevolent establishments confiscated during the persecutions of the preceding century and a half. The Chinese text, which the Chinese later claimed was not authoritative, assured to French missionaries the privilege of renting and purchasing land in all the provinces and erecting buildings thereon. It was, therefore, long a source of irritation. The further (Berthemy) convention of 1865 continued its provisions, but subject to restrictions which proved unsatisfactory to the Roman Catholics. An additional Franco-Chinese agreement of 1895 was designed to remove some of the causes of the missionaries' complaints. The net result of the mooted sections was to assist Roman Catholic missionaries in spreading their faith outside the treaty ports. The privilege of "renting and leasing in perpetuity" property outside the ports was not formally granted by treaty to Protestant missionaries until 1903, but in practice it was often conceded to them. A few other provisions can briefly be mentioned: (7) an elaboration of the regulations for extraterritoriality, (8) the cession to Great Britain of a bit of the mainland opposite Hong Kong, (9) the payment of indemnities, and (10), in a new tariff drawn up in 1858 in pursuance of the treaties of Tientsin, the legalization of the opium traffic by the placing of a duty on the drug.

By force of arms, as in 1839–1842, Westerners had obtained additional privileges in China. Through the concessions granted them in the treaties that concluded these two wars, supported on occasion by the continued show of force, they were able to permeate a reluctant China with their commerce and ideas and so to bring about in Chinese culture a revolution much more thoroughgoing than any one at the time, either Chinese or foreign, dreamed possible.

### TERRITORIAL AGGRESSIONS

As yet the aggressive Westerner had taken little of the territory of China. Here and there, however, he was nibbling at it. As we have seen, the island of Hong Kong and a small bit of the adjacent mainland (Kowloon) had been ceded to Great Britain, and Portugal had asserted an as yet unadmitted sovereignty over the peninsula of Macao, where she

had so long been a tenant-at-will. China's manifest weakness and the growth of the activities of Occidentals in East Asia led to some other encroachments.

By the treaties between China and Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the boundary between the two empires was so fixed that China was recognized as owning much of the land north of the Amur (in Chinese, the Heilungchiang). Under the later Manchus, less vigorous than their predecessors, little attention was paid to this distant and sparsely settled area. The Russians continued to push into Siberia, and shortly after the Anglo-Chinese war of 1839–1842, sent expeditions and colonists down the Amur River. In 1858 China, defeated by the French and English and disturbed by internal rebellions, by the Treaty of Aigun ceded to Russia everything that it owned north of the Amur and agreed to the joint occupancy by the two empires of the territory east of the Ussuri River. In 1860, by a new treaty, this joint occupancy was ended, and the land east of the Ussuri was ceded to Russia. Russia now possessed all the seacoast of Asia north of Korea.

At the time this loss probably did not appear to the Chinese as particularly important, for Manchuria had a comparatively small population and the settlement of the region by Chinese was very slight and in sections not directly affected by the cession. As a step in the Russian expansion toward the Pacific, however, and toward further encroachments on China, it was of great significance.

While Russia was taking territory from the Empire in the extreme North, in the extreme South France was pursuing a policy which was eventually to lead to the loss by China of its tributary territory in Vietnam. In response to the diplomacy of a missionary bishop, the French, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, had assisted in the restoration of a king of Cochin China to his throne and in the conquest, by this same ruler, of Tongking. In the eighteen forties and fifties, France intervened on behalf of persecuted French Roman Catholic missionaries and their flocks. In 1858 Spain and France joined in further naval and military operations. The Spaniards found a cause for war in the execution of a Spanish missionary bishop. In 1862 a treaty was signed which granted religious freedom to Roman Catholics, opened three ports to French and Spanish merchants, and ceded to France three provinces in Cochin China.

## INTERNAL DISORDER

The weakness of China against her foes from the Occident was both increased by and in turn facilitated the rise and progress of serious domestic rebellions.

The chief of these was due in part to the influx of new religious ideas through Christian missionaries from the West. The figure around whom it

centered, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, was a native of Kwangtung. In his twenties, while in Canton as a candidate for the civil service examinations, he appears —if we may trust the narrative of a cousin and intimate friend—to have been gven books which contained a summary of the teachings of Protestant missionaries. Some time afterward, frustrated by repeated failures in the examinations, he was attacked by a severe illness in the course of which, in visions, he was taken to a large and luminous place where he was cleansed, given a new heart, and commissioned by an old man to exterminate the demons who were leading mankind away from his—the old man's —service. Several years later, in 1843, Hung seems to have had his attention called to the books which had been given him in Canton. In perusing these he believed that he found the key to his visions—that the old man was God, the demons idols, and that he was under obligation to restore the worship of God. He inaugurated a movement, at first entirely religious, which had in it many of the outward features of Protestant Christianity.

The sect which arose out of Hung's teaching, "the Worshippers of *Shang Ti*" (a Protestant term for God), became especially strong in Kwangsi, and developed at first without much direct leadership from Hung. Into it entered many elements of Chinese provenance: the cult was a bizarre syncretism of misunderstood Christianity and native beliefs. In time, by just what process is not entirely clear, "the Worshippers of *Shang Ti*" became a political as well as a religious movement. They sought to overthrow the Manchus and establish in their place a new dynasty, to be called T'ai P'ing, or Great Peace, with Hung as its monarch. Hostilities began in 1848 but did not prove especially serious until 1850 and 1851. In 1852 the rebels moved northward into Hunan by the familiar route of the Hsiang River, taking several towns. Early in 1853 they captured Wuchang and in March of that year Nanking fell to their arms. Nanking became their capital.

In a certain sense the T'ai P'ings were a revolutionary group, the first wave, largely unintelligent, of that movement which sought to save China by reshaping it on lines learned from the West and which in the twentieth century was to work momentous changes. In their immediate effects they were largely destructive. For example, they killed many Buddhist monks and destroyed monasteries.

From another angle the rebellion was a social and economic revolt—an uprising of peasants, rural proletariat, and hand workers against landlords, rich peasants, and merchants. Serious efforts were made at land reform, the reduction of taxes on the peasantry, improving the status of women, combatting bribery and opium, ending torture in legal proceedings, improving the calendar, and promoting colloquial literature. The ultimate suppression of the T'ai P'ings was due to the support which the conservative elements of society gave to the imperial government. The influence of

Christianity was only a minor factor in bringing about the movement. Although to the last the leaders professed adherence to a strange compound of Christianity and Chinese beliefs and practices, what impelled the bulk of the rank and file was discontent with existing conditions, the love of adventure, and the desire for plunder. Religious fanaticism was only one of the ingredients. To understand the T'ai P'ings one must recall the economic pressure and the secret societies that had been a recurring feature in Chinese society, the oppression and incompetence that characterized much of the local government in the years of the decay of the Ch'ing, the chronic jealousy of and hostility to the Manchus, and the traditional trend toward revolt whenever a dynasty showed signs of weakness. One must remember, too, the tendency of some Chinese rebellions, since at least the last years of the Han, to take on the guise of religious sects.

Had Hung displayed a genius for organization or political leadership, the T'ai P'ings might well have overthrown the Manchus, for the latter, suffering from the humiliating defeat at the hands of Great Britain and harassed by other uprisings, were lamentably weak. However, he proved to be singularly lacking in the needed kind of ability, and after one raid which carried them almost to Tientsin, the T'ai P'ings never seriously threatened the Manchus' possession of the North. Their wholesale destructiveness antagonized the influential classes and made impossible the winning of the assent of the nation to their rule. The Ch'ing dynasty was so weak that the T'ai P'ings, aided by able generals who came to the fore in 1858 and by the tapping of new territory and hence new resources (*ca.* 1860), managed to hold Nanking for more than a decade and to devastate some of the fairest sections of the Yangtze Valley. Not until 1865, as we shall see in the next chapter, was Peking able to overthrow them and then only because of Chinese and foreign assistance.

The T'ai P'ings constituted only one of a number of revolts of these troubled years. About 1856 there broke out in Yünnan an uprising among the large Moslem population, owing to a clash between themselves and their non-Moslem neighbors. The non-Chinese tribes of the region took the opportunity to harass the Chinese population, against whom they had many grievances. Numerous other rebel bands in various parts of the country, among them the Nienfei, were widely spread, particularly in the North. In the Northwest the Moslems were restless. What had happened many times before was happening again. As the ruling house became weak, revolt raised its head.

### THE TAO KUANG AND HSIEN FENG EMPERORS

Had the Ch'ing dynasty possessed such leaders as the K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung Emperors, the disasters which the nation suffered at

the hands of foreigners and rebels might not have overtaken it. The growth of population and the consequent economic pressure, which were a basic cause of the internal unrest, could not have been completely countered by a strong administration. However, the K'ang Hsi or the Ch'ien Lung Emperor would have handled the situation with more vigor than did their incompetent descendants.

As it was, the Ch'ing was in that period of decline which appears to be the inevitable fate of all ruling families. Such was the Chinese system of government, where so much depended on the monarch, that both the dynasty and the Empire, with mediocrity or worse at the helm, stumbled into defeat and almost into disintegration. The Emperor whose reign period bore the name of Tao Kuang had been unable to save his realm from defeat at the hands of Great Britain in 1839–1842. He died in 1850 and was succeeded by a son who is usually known by the title of his reign period, Hsien Fêng. The Hsien Fêng Emperor proved even less competent than his predecessor and in his last days, disheartened, gave himself over to excesses. In 1860 he fled from Peking on the approach of the French and British armies and took refuge at Jehol, an imperial country seat north of Peking. Here, in 1861, he died, still a young man, leaving his throne to a five-year-old son. Defeated by foreign powers and menaced by internal rebellions, the Ch'ing seemed to be facing a dark future, and the Empire, under their nerveless leadership, to be stumbling into chaos.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

# THE TRANSFORMATION WROUGHT BY THE IMPACT OF THE OCCIDENT: II. Partial Recovery from the Shocks of the Preceding Two Decades: The Restoration of Internal Order but the Slow Permeation of the Empire by Occidental Trade and Ideas and the Failure to Accommodate the Old to the New (A.D. 1861–1893)

In 1861 it looked as though the Ch'ing dynasty might have very little longer to live. A child was on the throne, dissensions in the court were rife, the Empire had been defeated and its capital taken by foreign foes, and rebellions were wasting some of the fairest provinces. Not since the revolts in the early years of the K'ang Hsi Emperor, and perhaps not even then, had the Manchus' tenure of power been so precarious. From this impending doom the dynasty was saved temporarily by a combination of circumstances, and its demise postponed for half a century.

## THE EMPRESS DOWAGER, TZ'Ŭ HSI

New leadership emerging from the Manchus gave fresh vigor to the Ch'ing. The mother of the heir of the Hsien Fêng Emperor proved to be one of those remarkable women who at irregular intervals had forced themselves into the virtual rulership of the Empire. She is

usually best known either as the Empress Dowager, by an official designation Tz'ŭ Hsi, or by a nickname popular among her entourage and in the North, the Old Buddha. A member of the Yehonala clan of the Manchus, and of an excellent family, she was chosen as a secondary wife of the Hsien Fêng Emperor and had the good fortune to win his affection by her beauty and charm and by bearing him his heir. Upon the death of her spouse, by vigorous action and the assistance of a lifelong friend and trusted adviser, Jung-lu, and of Prince Kung, a brother of the Hsien Fêng Emperor, she got the better of a conspiracy and had herself and the Empress appointed co-regents. Much more able and aggressive than the other regent, she dominated the court. He son, usually known by the title of his reign, T'ung Chih, proved active but dissolute, and died in 1875, not long after fully assuming the administration (1872). Thereupon his mother, in a decidedly high-handed manner, placed on the throne a child who is known by the title of his reign period, Kuang Hsü. Tz'ŭ Hsi not only held the reins while the Kuang Hsü Emperor was a minor, but was the real power after he attained his majority. Upon the death of the Kuang Hsü Emperor, in 1908, by designation of this same masterful woman, now aged, another minor was installed on the throne, but the old Empress survived the Kuang Hsü Emperor by only a few hours. More vigorous as a ruler than any of the Emperors since the Ch'ien Lung reign period, Tz'ŭ Hsi was superstitious, was guilty of many major errors, was often subject to indecision, and never fully comprehended the significance of the new age into which the Middle Kingdom was being pushed by the Occident. She was ambitious, loved power and money, possessed great physical vitality, had shrewd insight into the strength and the weaknesses of men in high places, and used tact and skill in attaining her ends. She knew a good deal about Chinese literature and was a calligrapher of more than average ability.

### THE SUPPRESSION OF REBELLIONS BY THE AID OF CHINESE LEADERSHIP

The dynasty would have collapsed had it not been for loyal Chinese. It was to Chinese, chief among them a scholar-statesman from the province of Hunan, Tsêng Kuo-fan (1811–1872), that the Empire mainly owed the suppression of the T'ai P'ing Rebellion. Tsêng, although by training not a military man, and handicapped both by the jealousy of other officials and by an imperial administrative and military system that made it difficult to construct and finance an army strong enough to put down so formidable an outbreak, organized a force that, by what were often halting and blundering steps, crushed the revolt. Nanking, the T'ai P'ing citadel, was captured in 1864, and Hung Hsiu-

ch'üan committed suicide a few weeks before its fall. The year 1865 saw the last effective forces dispersed.

Tsêng was assisted by able lieutenants, among them one who became the leading Chinese statesman of the close of the century, Li Hung-chang (1823–1901). Foreigners also had a part. Many Westerners were at first disposed to view the rebels hopefully, partly because the profession of a religion which seemed a form of Christianity appeared to promise more tolerance of Occidentals than that shown by the Manchus. As time passed, the T'ai P'ings were seen to be more fanatical than the Ch'ing and fully as haughty, and their activities in the lower part of the Yangtze Valley threatened the safety and trade of Westerners. After peace had been made with the Ch'ing (1860), the powers became decidedly unfriendly to the uprising, and foreign forces helped to free the region around Shanghai from the rebels. Under Frederick T. Ward, an adventurer born at Salem, Massachusetts, at the outset against the opposition of the American and British authorities but eventually with their tacit approval, a contingent was organized, at first foreign and later Chinese with foreign officers, which won the sobriquet, "the Ever Victorious Army." After Ward's death in action, and after several experiments in commanders, a British officer, Charles George Gordon, was placed in charge, and the force gave able assistance to the Ch'ing armies until the end of the rebellion was in sight.

One of the many unfortunate results of the T'ai P'ing Rebellion was the severe blow it gave to learning. The Yangtze delta, long a center of wealth and culture, was laid waste. Most of the best libraries were burned, and many *Shu Yüan,* retreats for scholarly pursuits, were destroyed.

Another outcome of the rebellion, eventually more weakening to the traditional structures of China, was in contributions to the ultimate collapse of that order. When the radical reform movement gained control in the twentieth century, it owed much to the efforts of Chinese who had gone overseas. Some of the zeal of the emigrants is traceable to T'ai P'ings who, escaping after the collapse of their cause, kept alive abroad the desire for change. Sun Yat-sen, the archrevolutionist of the first quarter of the twentieth century, seems in his youth to have had close contact with groups of T'ai P'ing origin.

It was due chiefly to Tsêng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and other Chinese that the Nienfei, who remained formidable after the T'ai P'ings had been suppressed, were dispersed (1867).

The Moslem, or Panthay, Rebellion, in Yünnan, had its stronghold at Talifu and as its head Tu Wên-hsiu. For years it held out, but in 1873 it, too, was crushed, and chiefly by forces under Chinese rather than Manchu leadership.

It was also principally due to Chinese generalship that the Northwest and the far west were restored to the Ch'ing. In the widespread unrest

in the Empire, many of the Moslems in Shensi and Kansu rebelled, and about 1864 much of Sinkiang had become virtually independent, under a number of different leaders. It looked as though the work of the great Ch'ing Emperors in this vast region was to be undone.

The reconquest of the West was almost entirely the work of Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812–1885), a fellow provincial and former lieutenant of Tsêng Kuo-fan. He had a prominent part in the suppression of the T'ai P'ings and of the Nienfei. Before 1870 he had pacified Shensi. Slowly but fairly steadily he fought his way westward. Suchow in Kansu fell in 1873 after a siege of almost three years. Far from the central provinces and forced to find his own supplies, in more than one season Tso set his army to planting and reaping a crop for its subsistence. In 1887 Yakub Beg, his chief opponent, was removed by death—whether by violence or disease seems uncertain—and by the early part of 1878 Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan had surrendered. Tso's achievements are comparable to those of the great commanders who carried the Chinese arms into that region under the Han and the T'ang.

Just as the last of the great rebellions was being suppressed, flood and drought brought distress: floods in five of the southern provinces in 1876, and drought in 1877 and 1878 in the North, especially in Shansi and Shensi. Millions died of the ensuing famine, but by this time the dynasty had so far regained its strength that the load placed on the treasury by relief funds and loss of taxes did not prove more than a temporary embarrassment.

## EFFORTS AT RECONSTRUCTION

Chinese statesmen not only rallied to the support of the threatened dynasty by suppressing rebellions: they also sought to rebuild the weakened political and economic structure of the Empire. They revived the examination system, fought corruption, endeavored to recruit men of high character for official posts, restored education, re-established the local governments, furthered relief of the widespread suffering, promoted public health, attempted to restore state revenues, and repaired the Grand Canal as a means of bringing to the capital the grain which was important to the government. Their efforts were reinforced by the industry of millions of the common folk, who poured into the fertile lands depopulated by the rebels.

For over a decade Tsêng Kuo-fan was the most influential statesman in the Empire. A man of integrity, one of the best products of Confucianism, he was devoted to the Sung interpretation of that philosophy and promoted its revival. He sought to introduce such of Occidental methods and machines as, in his judgment, would help the Empire without

disturbing its culture. After his death (1872) no other of his stature appeared.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

The life of the Ch'ing dynasty was prolonged not only by the suppression of internal rebellion and the reconstruction of the political and economic structure but also by the absence of crises in the Empire's relations with Occidental powers as grave as those of 1839–1842 and 1856–1860. While not entirely satisfactory to Westerners, the treaties that came as the result of these wars at least promised the removal of most of the chief complaints the aliens had against their former status in China. Neither the officials nor the populace were yet prepared to be cordial to foreigners, and friction was often acute over the attempt of Westerners to obtain what had been pledged them. The Westerner, too, was still aggressive. He often wished greater privileges than those already his, and on more than one occasion encroached on the territory of the Empire. However, for several years after 1860 Western powers, and especially Great Britain and the United States, conducted their relations with China on the basis of the belief that their interests would be best served by supporting the dignity and authority of the imperial government in order to strengthen it in the suppression of internal disorder. Now that China had granted terms which made possible the growth and fairly peaceable conduct of foreign trade, those powers whose primary concern was commerce, notably Great Britain, decided that this would be best conserved through a united and orderly China, and that the most promising outlook was under the Ch'ing dynasty. Between 1861 and 1895 China suffered no such humiliation at the hands of the Occident as she experienced just before and after these years. For much of the time (1861–1881, 1894–1898) foreign affairs were conducted by Prince Kung (1833–1898). He proved unusually skilled in adapting himself and his government to the new conditions. The main events of these years in the relations with Western governments can be rather briefly sketched.

One early development was the collection of the customs duties under the supervision of foreigners. In 1853, during the T'ai P'ing revolt, a group of rebels (not T'ai P'ings) took advantage of the general disorder to occupy the walled city of Shanghai, and the imperial machinery in that port for the collection of duties on foreign imports and exports broke down. After brief and unsatisfactory attempts to find a substitute, by an arrangement between the consuls and the local *taot'ai* the Chinese appointed (1854) foreign nominees of the consuls to supervise the payment of the customs. The system worked well, and by an Anglo-Chinese agreement of November, 1858, its extension to other ports was made

possible. When the conventions of Peking (1860) charged against the customs the indemnities then assessed on China, a further organization of the service became necessary and a foreign Inspector General was appointed by Peking. In 1863 a remarkable Irishman, Robert Hart, came into this office. Under his direction the Imperial Maritime Customs, as it came to be called, had an extraordinary growth. Its chief posts were held by foreigners of several nationalities, with the British outnumbering those of any other citizenship. In a government honeycombed with corruption, the service was honest. Under it not only were the duties collected, but in addition, the coast and some of the main navigable rivers were provided with lighthouses and buoys, and an imperial post of a Western type was begun. The service was national in scope and was controlled from Peking. This centralization rendered it largely independent of the provincial organization and so ran contrary to the existing practice of committing to the provincial officials all tasks possible.

The treaties of 1858 provided for the residence of foreign ministers in Peking. To deal with them and with foreign affairs, a new central body was created (1861), the Tsungli Yamen. The necessity forced upon the government by the powers of handling foreign affairs directly through the capital rather than indirectly through the local authorities, as in many instances had formerly been the practice, tended, as did the customs service, to alter the principle on which the administration had been conducted.

For many years the problem of the reception of the representatives of the powers by the Emperor remained troublesome. The treaties of Tientsin specified that foreign envoys, when accorded audience with the Emperor, should be treated as coming from independent nations of equal dignity with China. This the Chinese found a bitter pill. While the T'ung Chih Emperor remained a minor, the question was not urgent, but when, in 1872, he attained his majority, the envoys demanded an audience. After much hesitation and long negotiation this was granted, but the ceremony was carried out with a subtle suggestion that the Empire still thought of itself as outranking other nations. Not until 1894, after the Kuang Hsü Emperor had reached his majority, was an audience given which satisfied the diplomatic body.

The Empire was very slow to send representatives to Western capitals. The first attempt was anomalous. In 1861 Anson Burlingame arrived in China as American minister. By his affability and sympathy and his policy of supporting the imperial government rather than causing it embarrassment, he won the confidence of the Tsungli Yamen. When, in 1867, he was on the eve of resigning, the Chinese authorities suggested that he serve as the envoy of Peking to the treaty powers of the West. In this capacity, with an extensive retinue, he visited the United States

(1868), representing China in public addresses in glowing, optimistic terms. There he negotiated a treaty on the basis of equality, providing, among other things, for the territorial integrity of China, for the free immigration of Chinese laborers into the United States, for reciprocal rights of residence and travel, and for freedom from interference in the development of China. In London he obtained from the British Government a declaration that it would not apply unfriendly pressure inconsistent with the independence and safety of China, and that it desired to deal directly with the central rather than with the local authorities. The American and British Governments, it will be noted, were simply giving further form to a policy which was already theirs. The mission was well received in Paris and Berlin, but in neither capital did it obtain either treaty or declaration. In St. Petersburg Burlingame contracted pneumonia and died. Deprived of its moving spirit, the mission returned to China by way of Brussels and Rome, but without additional achievement.

The Burlingame mission paved the way for resident legations in the capitals of the West. The first of these was opened in London in 1877, and in that and the following two years others were established on the Continent of Europe and at Washington.

The decades between 1860 and 1894 were not completely without friction between China and the West. Of this there was always an undercurrent, and occasionally it broke out into serious disturbance.

The British treaty of Tientsin provided that either party might demand a revision at the end of ten years. In the late sixties, accordingly, there was much discussion, in both British and Chinese circles, of possible changes in the document. While the only immediate outcome was a convention (1869) that was never ratified, what was in effect a partial revision was made by the Chefoo Convention, in 1876. This latter was precipitated by an attack, on the borders between Burma and Yünnan, upon a British exploring expedition and the murder there of Mr. Margary, of the British consular service. The British held the Chinese authorities responsible and made the incident the occasion not only for the demand of an indemnity and the safeguarding of the trade across the Burmese-Yünnan frontier, but also for the settlement of some of the outstanding differences between the two governments and for gaining concessions, such as the opening of new ports to trade, which had no connection with the original episode.

Chinese emigration was a source of irritation. The Chinese were utilizing the new facilities for trade and navigation to spread beyond the borders of the Empire. Some of the emigration was in the form of a contract labor that was little better than slavery, but by 1880 most of the abuses had been prohibited by agreements between China and the powers or by unilateral actions of the powers. Emigration to the United States

aroused much opposition in the Pacific Coast states, particularly in California, where Chinese came into competition with native American white labor. After much unpleasantness, including anti-Chinese riots, the United States, partially with the consent of China, suspended the further admission of Chinese laborers. Eventually, after 1900, without the consent of China, she prohibited it entirely.

Here and there several of the powers encroached on China's territory and on her vassal states. In the South, France extended her protectorate over Cambodia (1863), annexed three more provinces of Annam (1867), and (1874) obtained from Annam extraterritoriality for all Europeans, the opening of the Red River to navigation, and of more ports to commerce. In 1883 and 1884, due to French pressure, Annam accepted a protectorate by Paris. China, disturbed by these attacks on a vassal state and by an arrangement that would end her suzerainty, protested. Hostilities followed, although of a somewhat desultory nature and with China helpless before the high-handed French. In 1885 the difficulty was ended by Chinese recognition of the French protectorate of Annam and freedom of trade between Tongking and the adjoining Chinese provinces, but without the indemnity which the French had demanded.

In 1886 Great Britain annexed that part of Burma which she had not previously seized. In that same year China formally agreed to the change, but with the provision that the decennial Burmese "tribute" mission was still to be sent to Peking.

In 1887 China acquiesced in what was really an accomplished fact and ceded Macao to Portugal, but with the provision that it should never be alienated without her consent.

During the rebellions in the far west of the Empire, Russia, to safeguard her trade across that region, occupied much of Ili, with the promise that she would restore it to China when the latter was able to maintain order there. When Tso Tsung-t'ang had suppressed the insurgents and China asked Russia to withdraw, a treaty was negotiated which gave to Russia the better part of Ili, an indemnity, and extensive trading privileges in the West. This agreement Peking would not ratify and war seemed imminent. However, a compromise was effected by which most of Ili was returned to China and a larger indemnity was promised Russia.

### CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES

One of the most persistent sources of irritation between China and the powers was the Christian missionary. The treaties of Tientsin, which opened up the interior of China to foreign travel and guaranteed protection to the foreigner and his converts, synchronized with a rapid growth of missionary interest and activity among both the Roman Catholics

and the Protestants of the Occident. The wealth brought by the industrialization of the West and the attendant commerce furnished the means, and the revival in Roman Catholicism after the Napoleonic wars and in Protestantism by the movements following the Evangelical awakenings of the eighteenth century provided the religious incentive, for a pronounced expansion in the efforts of these two great groups of Christians to spread their faith throughout the world. It is not strange, therefore, that the years after 1860 saw the penetration of every province of China by Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries.

New Roman Catholic orders and congregations entered the country and those already represented added to their staffs. By 1897 there were a little over half a million Roman Catholics in the country, as against about two hundred thousand at the beginning of the century, and the missionaries numbered a little more than seven hundred fifty.

Protestants, who before 1860 were confined almost entirely to the five open ports and Hong Kong, had an even more phenomenal growth. Many societies now for the first time sent representatives to China. By 1895 one of them, the China Inland Mission, which was organized by J. Hudson Taylor for the purpose of taking the Christian message to parts of the Empire unreached by Protestants, had over six hundred missionaries at work. In 1893 there were about fifty-five thousand Chinese communicants in Protestant churches, most of them in the coast provinces, and in 1889 missionaries numbered nearly thirteen hundred, not quite half of them men, representing forty-one different societies. These figures were an increase from about fifty-seven hundred communicants in 1869 and from about one hundred eighty-nine missionaries in 1864.

In addition to spreading a knowledge of the Christian Gospel by the printed and oral word, Protestant missions were chiefly responsible for introducing Western medicine to China. They also had a large part in inaugurating education of an Occidental type, and in preparing and circulating literature which familiarized Chinese with Western ideas.

With merchants and diplomats, and often in advance of them, missionaries were pioneers of the infiltration of China with Western ideas. Although some were unpleasantly aggressive, and a few were bigoted and intolerant, they had sincerely at heart what they believed to be the best interests of the Chinese, usually worked with a high and selfless devotion, and helped to put the Chinese in touch with the spiritual, moral, and intellectual forces of the Occident much more than did merchants or diplomats.

When all is said for the missionary that can be said—and it is much more than is usually realized—it must also be recognized that, especially during the three and a half decades after 1860, he was often the source of great annoyance to the Chinese populace and to official-

dom. His teaching, intolerant of the customary honors to ancestors, seemed to threaten the Chinese family. Religious practices which formed an integral part of guild, community, and political life were anathema to him. Christians, therefore, appeared to their neighbors recreant to moral, social, economic, and political obligations and to be attacking the foundations of society and civilization. Few, if any, foresaw that within the next few decades these were to crumble anyway, and that the missionary would prove of help in the work of replacing them. Moreover, the missionaries' activities were often misunderstood, and the most absurd rumors about them were widely believed—for example, that in Christian orphanages and hospitals the eyes and other organs of children were extracted for medicinal and photographic purposes. Missionaries, too, in their efforts to rent or buy property in the interior frequently aroused opposition. Some Chinese of the baser sort professed conversion to obtain the protection of the toleration clauses in the treaties, and others made a similar profession to win the assistance of the missionary or his Chinese colleagues in lawsuits and feuds. Most Roman Catholic missionaries were from the continent of Europe and for years the majority of them were French. Until toward the close of the century France exercised a protectorate over all of them and used it as a means of heightening her influence in China. The great majority of Protestant missionaries were either British or Americans. Neither Great Britain nor the United States used them for ulterior purposes, and the British Government was sometimes reluctant to enforce their treaty rights, for fear that trade would be injured. Both governments, however, often felt that they must act to maintain the treaty rights of their missionary citizens, and in doing so repeatedly clashed with the Chinese authorities.

The persecutions, riots, and disturbances that arose out of the work of the missionaries are too numerous to catalogue here. The most serious between 1860 and 1894 were the so-called Tientsin massacre (1870), in which a mob destroyed a Roman Catholic orphanage and the adjoining church and killed the French consul and several other French men and women, including ten sisters and one priest, and widespread riots in the Yangtze Valley in 1890 and 1891, in which Protestants were the chief sufferers.

Chinese officialdom sought to obtain new agreements that would limit the activity of the missionaries and establish a more effective control over Chineses Christians. To this the powers would not agree, and the status of missionaries and Chinese Christians remained as it had been fixed by the Treaties of Tientsin and the French Convention of Peking (1860), with a slight modification of the latter by the Berthemy Convention (1865).

## FOREIGN TRADE

During these years of the restoration of the domestic authority of the Ch'ing and of comparative quiet in China's international relations, the infiltration of the Empire by the culture of the Occident was proceeding not only through the activities of Christian missionaries but also through a growth in commerce. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1870, with its more direct route from Europe, and the increased use of steam in navigation, augmented the commercial pressure on China. Foreign vessels developed a profitable carrying trade along the coast and on the Yangtze. But the total value of imports and exports rose with surprising slowness. Between 1865, when the close of the T'ai P'ing Rebellion allowed trade to come back toward normal, and 1885, it increased only about a fifth. After 1885 it grew more rapidly, nearly doubling by 1894. Cotton led as the major article of import, with opium second. Tea and silk remained the chief exports, but by 1893 were suffering from competition with other Eastern lands—in the case of tea, chiefly India, Ceylon, and Java, and in the case of silk, Japan and the Levant. In the seventies the American share in the carrying trade, which had been very large, sharply declined. The British were still predominant in the ocean-borne commerce and therefore also in the foreign communities in the treaty ports.

In the treaty ports that loomed most prominently in foreign trade, the merchants and some of the missionaries generally resided in special "concessions"—British at Newchwang, Tientsin, Hankow, Kiukiang, Chinkiang, and Canton, and French in Tientsin and Canton—in which the usual arrangement was for the ground to be leased in perpetuity to the foreign government and then sublet to individuals. These resembled but were not identical in form with the older settlements in Shanghai. In all of them foreigners lived a life largely apart from the Chinese. Most merchants did not know the Chinese language, although to this there were notable exceptions. They were protected by extraterritoriality. Only in business did those in commercial pursuits have contacts with the Chinese, and then more often than not through an interpreter and "pidgin English." Of the foreigners, the missionaries were the ones who usually touched Chinese life intimately at the most angles. Under these circumstances, the permeation of the Empire by foreign culture was slower than it might otherwise have been.

## BEGINNINGS OF MODIFICATIONS IN CHINESE CULTURE

In spite of the presence of the foreigner, until the late eighteen nineties the institutions and thought of China were almost entirely

unaffected by contact with the Occident. When compared with the total of the domestic trade, foreign commerce was very small and of little importance. Economically, the Empire was still practically self-sufficing. Of the imports, only opium made a perceptible impression on any large proportion of the population. Most of the Westerners were concentrated in a few treaty ports and numbered merely a few thousand. Christians were too few and too scattered to alter the mores of their fellow countrymen. The economic, social, intellectual, and political structure of the nation was predominantly as it had been a century before.

Some exceptions there were—foreshadowings of change. The T'ai P'ing revolt had shaken orthodox scholarship by devastating its chief stronghold, the Yangtze Valley. Chinese organized (1873) the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, which came to have a large share in coastal and river transportation. The first railway in China—running out of Shanghai—was built by foreigners, then bought by the Chinese, and its rails and rolling stock shipped to Formosa and allowed to rust. It is only fair to add that this apparently reactionary procedure seems to have been adopted chiefly because the Chinese objected to the extension of foreign-owned property outside the ports. By 1894 the beginnings of a system of railroads had been constructed by the Chinese in the North. In the early eighties a telegraph line was built, under contract from the government, between Shanghai, Tientsin, and Peking. There was a slight development of coal mines by modern methods. The introduction of Western appliances might have proceeded more rapidly had the Chinese not been fearful, because of the probable international complications, of admitting foreign capital, either directly or by loans.

Some attempts were made to arm the country against the West with Occidental devices: arsenals, a few modern war craft, and troops drilled and equipped after the European fashion.

In Peking and Canton the government established schools for the training of men for the diplomatic service. Yung Wing, who had received his intitial education in things Western in a school maintained by Protestant missionaries and had had a college course in the United States, promoted the introduction of Western machinery and was responsible for inducing the government to send to the United States, in the seventies, over one hundred youths to study in the schools there. The government abruptly terminated the mission before all of the group had completed their training, but the experiment was a foreshadowing of the great student migration of the twentieth century.

However, no fundamental changes were made in the structure inherited from the past. A few innovations and adaptations were instituted, but, able as many were, few if any of the statesmen were aware that the age into which the Empire was being hurtled would necessitate drastic and

basic reconsideration of the foundations of the existing civilization. No tinkering with details or improvement in morals would suffice.

SUMMARY

For nearly a generation after the first armed conflicts with the Occident, most Chinese who thought about the matter at all—as the vast majority did not—believed that the Empire would be able to hold the foreigner at arm's length and go on without altering its life. Internal order was restored and the country resumed its ordinary pursuits almost exactly as it had before the interruption of foreign wars and internal rebellions. However, the seeming security was illusory. The cumulative effects of Western influences would sometime become apparent. Christian missionaries and their converts, foreign ships and sailors, Western merchants with their Chinese connections, buildings in the ports in Occidental style, imports of machinery and machine-made goods, returning Chinese travelers, of whom there were a few, letters from Chinese overseas, telegraphs, foreign banks, and translations of Western books—all were making impressions with which conservatism would sometime have to reckon. Within a few years a small neighbor, who had heeded the writing on the wall, delivered a blow that was to lead to the collapse of exclusiveness and that was followed by changes which were the more overwhelming because they had so long been resisted.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

# THE TRANSFORMATION WROUGHT BY THE IMPACT OF THE OCCIDENT: III. The Crumbling of the Structure of the Old Culture and the Foreshadowings of the New (A.D. 1894–1945)

## RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, 1871–1893

The decades of comparative quiet and security which followed the foreign wars and rebellions of the middle of the nineteenth century were rudely terminated by a contest with a near neighbor, Japan. The defeat which the Empire then suffered was followed by the renewed aggression of Western powers and by internal changes which proved momentous.

During the seventeenth, the eighteenth, and the early part of the nineteenth century, Japan had been even more nearly closed against intercourse with the Occident than had China. In 1853, shortly after the first war between China and Great Britain, an American expedition led by Commodore Perry entered the Bay of Yedo, and the opening of Japan to more extensive contact with the Occident followed. Much more quickly than the Chinese, leaders among the Japanese saw the necessity of adjusting their country to intercourse with the Occident. By 1894 they had made remarkable strides toward the reorganization of the entire structure of the life of the nation. Among those who rapidly rose to leadership were men who early sensed the fact that the entire world was about to be dominated by the Occident and that, whether a people liked it or not, if it was to retain its political independence it must adopt the appliances and methods which had given the West its power. Politically, the dual form of government and feudalism were abolished, a constitution modeled partly after that of Prussia was adopted, and an army and a navy of Western type were created. Intellectually, a school system like that of

Europe and America was constructed, and much of the literature of the West was put into Japanese. In economic life, the beginning was made of an industrialization which continued to proceed apace, with factories, railroads, and a merchant marine of steam craft. More quickly than any other non-Occidental people, the Japanese adapted themselves to the new day and achieved admission to the family of Western nations.

The greater success with which the Japanese accepted the Occident did not prove them superior in ability to the Chinese. China was so much larger that her task was more difficult. The Japanese, too, had the tradition of learning from foreigners: they had adopted and adapted Chinese civilization, and most important movements in thought and culture in China had had repercussions in Japan. On the other hand, except for Buddhism, the Chinese had consciously learned little from any one: they regarded themselves as teachers, not pupils. Japan, regimented under the Tokugawa Shoguns, was more easily directed by those in favor of Westernization once they had obtained control than was China, for the latter was not by tradition so closely co-ordinated. In Japan, moreover, was the tradition that the Emperor reigned but did not govern and that the imperial house was too sacrosanct to be disturbed. The institution of the Emperor formed a center of unity, and the government could be altered without abolishing it. In China much more in practice depended on the Emperor, and if he proved incompetent, rebellion against him might be justified. Dynasties had changed many times. When, in 1911–1912, in conformity to this tradition the Ch'ing passed the way of its predecessors, the unity and peace of the nation were shaken to their foundations.

Several years before 1894 the new Japan had begun to clash with China. In 1871 a treaty between the two countries was signed on a reciprocal basis, without some of the concessions, so galling to the Chinese, contained in the current treaties with Western powers. About the same time, however, trouble arose over the Liu Ch'iu (Ryu Kyu) Islands, which paid tribute to China and were also claimed by the Japanese. In 1871 some inhabitants of the islands were killed by aborigines on Formosa (T'aiwan). The Japanese raised the question of China's responsibility, and upon a disclaimer by that country, in 1874 sent a punitive force which occupied part of Formosa. This act endangered peace, but the matter was amicably adjusted by the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and the payment by China of compensation to Japan for lives lost and roads and buildings constructed. In the process China tacitly renounced suzerainty over the Liu Ch'ius.

More serious friction arose over Korea. Here China claimed suzerainty, acknowledged by annual tribute-bearing embassies from Seoul to Peking and by the Chinese investiture of each new Korean ruler. The relationship was of that somewhat nebulous kind subsisting between China and

several of her neighbors, but was stronger in the case of Korea than of some others. For centuries Japan also had been interested in Korea. Japanese armies had operated in the peninsula, and from 1671 to 1811 occasional missions were sent by Korea to Japan.

Korea was slower than either China or Japan to open her doors to the West. The Japanese obtained a treaty with Seoul in 1876 (on the explicit basis of the independence of Korea), and this was followed, in the 1880's, by treaties between Korea and several Occidental powers. In Seoul struggles between the court cliques were complicated by the opposition of antiforeign, conservative elements to the new intercourse with the outside world. In one of these the Japanese legation was attacked (1882) and both Japan and China sent forces to restore order. In the ensuing settlement Japan declined to accept Chinese mediation. In the main, the conservatives among the Koreans looked to China for support and the liberals to Japan. In 1884, in a palace upheaval, the king sought refuge with the Japanese guard; the latter occupied the palace, and an attack was made on the Japanese, in which Chinese troops stationed in Seoul joined. In the negotiations which followed, China and Japan each agreed (1885) to withdraw its troops from Korea, not to send them into the country to suppress disorder without notifying the other, and to remove them, if so dispatched, as soon as quiet was re-established.

Peking, urged on by Li Hung-chang, was determined not to renounce its suzerainty over the peninsula. A customs service was organized for Korea, theoretically independent of, but practically partially subordinate to, the similar service in China. Yüan Shih-k'ai, later President of China but then a protégé of Li Hung-chang and in Korea on military duty since 1880, was for a number of years kept at Seoul as Chinese resident.

## WAR WITH JAPAN, 1894–1895

Participation of Japan and China in Korean affairs at last brought on war between the two countries. A rebellion of a secret society, the Tong Haks, led the Korean monarch, on the advice of Yüan Shih-k'ai, to ask for Chinese assistance. This was sent, and the Japanese, not to be checkmated, also dispatched troops. In the meantime the Korean forces had dispersed the rebels, but the Chinese and Japanese remained, watching each other. Tokyo proposed that Japan and China join in promoting reforms in the decadent and inept Korean Government. This Peking declined to do. In the negotiations it continued to claim suzerainty over Korea, a relationship which Japan refused to recognize. The Japanese took forcible possession of the palace and the monarch's person, and a decree was issued abrogating the Korean treaty with China and calling upon the Japanese to expel the Chinese troops. This was soon followed

by the outbreak of war between China and Japan. The struggle was brief and full of humiliation for China. Although its forces often put up a courageous resistance, largely because of corruption in the administration and inefficiency in the use of even such modern naval and military equipment as it possessed, China was defeated on sea and land, and the fortified posts of Port Arthur in Manchuria and Weihaiwei in Shantung, although armed after the European manner, were captured.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), which terminated the war, was also humiliating. China was constrained to acknowledge the independence of Korea (thereby renouncing the traditional suzerainty), to cede to Japan Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula (on which Port Arthur was situated), to pay an indemnity, to open four more ports, and to give to Japan the privileges of the most-favored-nation pending the negotiation of a new commercial treaty between the two countries. This treaty of commerce, when drafted, gave Japanese extraterritorial privileges in China and continued the most-favored-nation status. Japan had thus driven China from Korea, annexed important territory, and acquired for its nationals in China the privileges enjoyed by Westerners —at the time when it was seeking to rid itself of the extraterritoriality granted to Westerners in its own domains.

## RENEWAL OF EUROPEAN AGGRESSION IN CHINA

The defeat of China at the hands of Japan was the signal for a renewal of European aggression in China. The closing decades of the nineteenth century found European powers engaged in a scramble for such of the world as had not already been parceled out among Western peoples. Western European countries were being more and more industrialized, were increasing in wealth, and wished to control "backward" peoples, both as a matter of prestige and for markets, raw materials, and an outlet for surplus capital. They partitioned most of Africa and extended their possessions in Asia. They now proceeded to encroach upon a palpably impotent China in a manner which threatened the speedy dismemberment of that Empire. To recount all the intricacies and details of the negotiations and even the resulting treaties and conventions would unduly prolong these pages. However, the main outlines of what was done must be sketched.

First of all, Japan was made to disgorge part of the territory ceded by China. The ink was scarcely dry on the Treaty of Shimonoseki when France, Russia, and Germany lodged protests with Tokyo against its possession of the Liaotung Peninsula. They alleged that it would be a menace to the capital of China, render illusory the independence of Korea, and make precarious the peace of East Asia. The powers were, of course, moved by no regard for China: their interests in both Europe and East Asia were

involved. Japan was in no position to defy the powers. Tokyo renounced its claim to the Liaotung Peninsula in return for an additional indemnity from China.

To pay the indemnity to Japan, China had recourse to foreign financiers. The privilege of advancing the first portion of the loan—made on the security of the maritime customs and with the possibility of demanding additional guarantees in the form of political or other concessions—was won by Russia, who was to have the assistance of French bankers. To offset the Franco-Russian combination, Great Britain and Germany insisted that China also borrow from the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation—a British institution—and the Deutsche-Asiatische Bank. This China did in 1896 and 1898, giving as security not only the customs revenue but also the salt tax and likin in part of the Yangtze Valley.

In June, 1895, Franco-Chinese conventions were signed in which China consented to a modification of the frontier between itself and Annam. Territory was thus given to the latter (in effect to France), some of it land which the year before China had earmarked for France by promising not to cede it to any other nation. By these conventions China also opened three new treaty ports on the Sino-Annamese frontier, agreed that in the event of the exploitation of mines in Yünnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung, French manufacturers and engineers would be given prior rights of assisting, and made provision for some railway building in the region.

This was a threat to British interests in Burma, Southwest China, and the Yangtze Valley. Great Britain sought safeguards in an understanding with France in January, 1896. By an agreement with China in February, 1897, she obtained a "rectification" of the frontier between China and the British possessions on the south, the opening of the West River and ports on it to commerce, the promise not to cede certain portions of the frontier without British consent, the assurance that railways in Yünnan when built would connect with British roads in Burma, and additional trading privileges.

Worse for China was to follow. In 1895 Germany asked Peking for a coaling station, but was refused. Berlin did not give up the project, and in 1896 fixed its eyes on Kiaochow Bay, an excellent harbor on the southern coast of Shantung, on which Russia also had designs. The opportune murder in Shantung of two German Roman Catholic missionaries (November, 1897) gave the desired pretext. Kiaochow was seized by German ships, a heavy indemnity was exacted, and in March, 1898, Germany obtained a ninety-nine-year lease to Kiaochow Bay with about two hundred square miles of the adjacent territory, the right to build fortifications, the privilege of constructing two railways in the province, and the promise that if China ever needed foreign assistance in Shantung, in capital, persons, or material, it would be asked first of Germans.

A few days later Russia obtained a twenty-five-year lease on Talienwan

(more commonly known to foreigners as Dalny and, later, as Dairen) and Port Arthur—on the tip of that Liaotung Peninsula so recently retrieved from Japan—with the privilege of erecting fortifications and naval depots and building a railway to connect the territory with the main line across Manchuria (for which, as we shall see in a moment, provision had been made in 1896). A glance at the map will show that this gave Russia a strangle hold on Manchuria and put her in a position to control the sea approaches to the North.

Great Britain was opposed to any alienation of Chinese territory, for that threatened to close the open door to its trade—its chief interest in China. The Russian lease of Port Arthur, however, made the British eager for a counterweight to a naval station dominating so much of the North. With the consent of Japan, whose troops were still occupying it pending the payment of the last of the indemnity promised in 1895, and with formal assurance to Berlin that they would not build a railway into the interior and so compete with German interests, the British acquired (1898) a lease to Weihaiwei "for as long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the possession of Russia." In the same year Great Britain obtained a ninety-nine-year lease to such of the peninsula of Kowloon, opposite Hong Kong, as had not been ceded it in 1860.

In the spring of 1898, France was given a ninety-nine-year lease to the Bay of Kwangchow, in southwestern Kwangtung.

Thus within a few weeks the leading European powers had acquired leaseholds on the coast of China that might be followed by partition.

Other steps were taken which looked in the same direction. In 1897 France had wrested from China a promise that the latter would never cede the Island of Hainan to any third power. In February, 1898, Great Britain obtained assurance from China that the latter would not alienate to any other power any territory in the provinces adjoining the Yangtze, and in April of that year France was given a similar assurance for the provinces bordering on her possessions in Southwest Asia. When, also in April, 1898, Japan asked for such a promise for Fukien (opposite Formosa), she was told that China would not alienate any part of that province to any power.

Still another form which foreign aggression and competition assumed was the demand for concessions to build railways. Such concessions, of course, would make a convenient basis for a claim to the territory they traversed, in case, as seemed very possible, China was to go the way of so much of the non-Occidental earth and be partitioned. Late in 1896, Russia obtained a secret alliance with China against Japan with the provision for the construction of a railroad across Manchuria. This line, to be known as the Chinese Eastern, was to be a subsidiary of the Russo-Chinese Bank and was, in effect, a continuation of the Trans-Siberian Railway. It would not

only save distance as against the all-Russian route on the north bank of the Amur, but would, as well, give Russia a grip on Manchuria. Special privileges were accorded the road which increased this hold. China also promised to seek only from Russian banks the loans it might require for the construction of certain trunk lines it contemplated building north of the Great Wall. Li Hung-chang, who negotiated the agreement, was hoping to play Russia off against Japan and so to save something for China.

In addition to the concessions granted the Russians in Manchuria and the Germans in Shantung, the British obtained the predominant financial position in the Peking–Mukden line. In June, 1898, a contract was signed with the Belgians for a loan on the proposed road from Peking to Hankow. The Belgians had French and Russian support and the backing of French capital. Americans acquired, in 1898, the concession for a line from Hankow to Canton, but some years later, after the Belgians had bought a controlling interest in the American company, the grant was repurchased by the Chinese. In 1899 a concession was made to British and German interests for a railway—which Americans thought had been secured to them the preceding year—between Tientsin and the Yangtze, the Germans to finance and build the northern and the British the southern portion. In 1896, 1897, 1898, and 1899, France obtained concessions for railways in the South, the most important of which was for one from Tongking into Yünnan. In 1898 the British won concessions, or signed preliminary agreements for them, for roads from Shanghai to Nanking and from Shanghai to Hangchow. In 1898 and 1899 agreements were made with an Anglo-Italian company for mines and railways in Shansi and Honan, with the Russo-Chinese Bank (and later transferred to a French syndicate) for a railway to connect the capital of Shansi with the Peking–Hankow line, and with a Franco-Belgian syndicate for a road paralleling the Yellow River. Great Britain attempted to keep the Yangtze Valley clear for her own railway projects by an agreement with Germany (1898) for reciprocal respect for each other's spheres, and with Russia (1899), whereby Great Britain was not to encroach with railways north of the Great Wall, or Russia in the Yangtze Valley.

There were also grants of concessions similar to those that Great Britain had enjoyed in several of the ports. Most of those made at this time were in Hankow, which appeared about to become a great railway center.

The British attempted to assure the continuation of their predominance in the administration of the customs by a promise from Peking (1898) that so long as their trade remained greater than that of any other nation, the Inspector General would be of British nationality. The French endeavored, with scant success, to obtain the confirmation of a similar control over the postal service.

AMERICA AND THE OPEN DOOR POLICY

In 1898 and 1899, then, the scramble for portions of what seemed to be a disintegrating empire was both active and sordid. The Chinese Government, unable to defend itself by force, found its chief recourse in delay. Occasionally it scored a victory—as when, in 1899, it declined to give Italy a naval station on the coast of Chêkiang. Too often, however, it was helpless. Russia appeared to be about to seize full control of Manchuria and Mongolia, Germany of Shantung, France of much of the South and Southwest, and possibly, Great Britain of the Yangtze Valley.

Within the next few years, three major efforts were made to save the Empire from its impending doom. One of these was by foreigners, the other two by Chinese.

The one by foreigners was what is usually known as the "open door policy." Its purpose was to keep all of China accessible to the trade, and so far as possible, to the other economic activities of citizens of all nations —to insure equality of treatment to all, in all of the Empire. It was not especially altruistic, for the powers who were its leading advocates had their own interests chiefly in mind. However, it had as an obvious corollary the preservation of the territorial integrity of China. In its broadest sense the policy was not new. Great Britain had not attempted to restrict to itself the privileges accorded it in 1842. The most-favored-nation clauses in several of the treaties between China and Western powers were a distinct attempt in that direction. Repeatedly in their intercourse with China —as in 1858—several of the major powers had acted co-operatively.

As we have suggested, the British viewed with alarm the leasing of territories and the creation of spheres of influence, for these threatened to obstruct the free course of their commerce—their chief interest in China. They reluctantly entered the struggle to obtain what special privileges they could, but repeatedly their spokesmen declared themselves for the open door, and their government made several attempts to preserve it.

The best-remembered action at this time in favor of the open door was by the United States. Americans were as yet too engrossed in the development of the resources of their own broad land to take as active an interest in economic openings in China as did some other peoples. They had, however, some commerce, and as we have seen, had taken part in the struggle for railway concessions. In 1898, moreover, the United States acquired the Philippines and Hawaii. Now, in 1899, Secretary of State John Hay attempted to safeguard the open door by obtaining the assent of the powers to certain specific promises: that there should be no interference with any vested interest in any "sphere of interest" or leased territory, that the Chinese tariff should apply to all merchandise in such regions and be collected by the Chinese Government, and that harbor dues and railroad

charges in these "spheres" should be equal to all. Notes embodying these proposals were sent to Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Italy, France, and Japan, and a favorable reply was given by all, although evasively by Russia. The Hay notes were in part a surrender of full equality of opportunity, for they admitted the existence of "spheres of interest." However, they may have helped to avert the partition of China.

## THE REFORM MOVEMENT

One of the two major efforts by Chinese to save the Empire from disintegration was by those who wished to effect changes in China, largely after Western patterns. The reformers were numerous and of varying degrees of radicalism. After the war with Japan many Chinese became convinced that they must adopt some of the Western devices which had enabled their enemy, whom they had thought of as much less strong than they, so easily to defeat them. Reform societies were organized, a few with influential members. The powerful viceroy, Chang Chih-tung, for a time sponsored one of them. In a book called *Learn* (largely a compilation of essays by various authors), while stressing loyalty to Confucianism and the dynasty, he advocated the adoption of some of the new methods from the West, lest the Empire lose its independence as several other states had done. The writings and personal counsel of Protestant missionaries, notably Timothy Richard, stimulated and helped guide the movement.

More radical by far than Chang Chih-tung was a young man best known later as Sun Yat-sen or Sun Wên. He was born in the year 1866, in a village about forty miles from Canton, the son of a tenant farmer, and when he was about thirteen years of age, at the suggestion and expense of an older brother who had migrated to Hawaii, he was sent to Honolulu to receive a Western education. In Honolulu, in 1879, he was placed by his brother in a school conducted by an Anglican bishop, and was there for about three years. He became convinced of the truth of Christianity, and his brother, alarmed, had him recalled to China. Sun, returning to his native village, but by no means cured of his new convictions, disfigured the images in the local temple. For this sacrilege he had to flee to Canton. There he was befriended by an American Protestant missionary physician. Before long he again began studying—this time in Hong Kong and also chiefly, although not entirely, with Protestant missionaries. Here he was baptized, and here, in 1892, he received a medical diploma. He began practicing in Macao, and there organized a reform society most of whose membership was made up of men trained in Protestant mission schools. The Portuguese Government soon ordered him out, probably because he was competing with Portuguese physicians. He went to Canton and petitioned Peking to start agricultural schools. This request was not granted, and he joined

in organizing a revolt against the Manchus. The plot was discovered, some of Sun's friends were captured and executed, but he himself escaped to Hong Kong (1895) and then to Japan. Sun now became a wanderer among the Chinese overseas, seeking to enlist their support in the overthrow of the dynasty and the foundation of a republic.

A reformer, rather than a revolutionist as was Sun Yat-sen, and more immediately prominent than the latter, was K'ang Yu-wei. K'ang, also a native of Kwangtung, was born in 1858. His training was purely Chinese. He had, however, imbibed the traditions of the Han Learning and criticized vigorously the historicity of several of the older classical writings. He maintained that many of the Classics venerated by the orthodox scholars were forgeries made by Wang Mang and his chief minister to sanction their social and political program. He would thus attack the conservatism of his times and prove that Confucius, far from being a conserver of the values of the past, was a creative ethical leader and statesman, to whom reformers could turn for inspiration and guidance. He thereby sought to show that in Confucius support could be found for his own radical views. He made of Confucius a religious reformer and helped to inspire a later attempt at a new Confucian cult. He worked out a social and political philosophy that was largely his own. His program included the eventual erasing of national boundaries, the popular election of officials, and the abolition of the family, with the rearing of children and the care of the aged in public institutions. He professed to base his philosophy upon a passage in the *Li Chi*, and he would have the ancient books read as guides to solving present problems. It must be added that K'ang did not seek to carry out at once all his program. As immediate steps he advocated much less drastic measures.

Under pressure from the reformers—of whom the three mentioned above were only among the more prominent—between the peace of Shimonoseki and the summer of 1898 a number of innovations were undertaken or projected by the provincial and national governments and by private initiative. Schools teaching Western subjects were founded and railways planned.

The reformers found a champion in the Kuang Hsü Emperor. Not physically robust or forceful, brought up in the seclusion of the palace, with the masterful Tz'ŭ Hsi always keeping a vigilant eye upon him, the Kuang Hsü Emperor had neither the vigor of personality nor the direct contact with the outside world to enable him to be the kind of leader which the dynasty and the Empire needed. However, he was intelligent, studious, felt that something must be done, and read eagerly some of the literature of the time, including the books of K'ang Yu-wei. In the summer of 1898, with K'ang as a confidant and adviser, he instituted what were later known as the hundred days of reform. During June, July, August, and September of that year, edict after edict was issued introducing changes.

Compared with the sweeping innovations of a few years later, none of the decrees advocated anything especially radical. Contrasted with the official conservation of the time, however, they were startling. Among them were decrees ordering a modification of the civil service and military examinations, the establishment of a system of schools including an imperial university for the study of the new as well as the old learning, the founding of an official bureau of translation, the encouragement of railway building, military and naval reform, the opening to Manchus of professions other than office-holding, and the abolition of many sinecure posts.

The decrees aroused a storm of opposition from those who by conviction or interest were wedded to the old order and from some who, while willing to see change, believed the Emperor to be acting too precipitately.

### THE ATTEMPT AT SALVATION BY REACTION: THE COUP D'ETAT OF 1898 AND THE BOXER UPRISING

The conservative elements looked to the Empress Dowager for support and leadership. In September, 1898, Tz'ŭ Hsi took charge of the government. She had kept closely in touch with the developing situation and at first had allowed the Emperor to go his own way. However, she distrusted his measures and became both alarmed and annoyed by the rapidity and—to her—lack of wisdom with which he was veering toward the left.

Conflict between the two was inevitable, for heretofore the Old Buddha had kept the Kuang Hsü Emperor in leading strings, and independence of action on his part must lead to a trial of strength. The Emperor moved first, secretly ordering the death of Jung-lu, her loyal supporter and trusted adviser. Yüan Shih-k'ai, to whom the Emperor committed the execution, revealed the plan to Jung-lu and the latter at once went to the Empress Dowager. Tz'ŭ Hsi acted promptly. She had the Emperor seized (September 22, 1898), and although she permitted him to live and to retain the title, she kept him a prisoner in a portion of his own palace and in his name once more assumed the regency. Several of the reformers were arrested and executed, and others, including K'ang Yu-wei, escaped a like fate only by fleeing the country. Many of the edicts of the hundred days were countermanded. A second Chinese attempt to save the country —by conservatism—was in full swing.

The reaction culminated in an outbreak, usually known as the Boxer Rebellion, which, ultimately with the sanction of the Empress Dowager, sought to oust the alien and his ways from the Empire.

That an antiforeign upheaval of some kind came was not surprising. Irritation against the "foreign devils" was widespread. The defeat by Japan, the seizure of ports by European powers, the granting of railway concessions and the beginning of railway construction, fear of the partition

of the Empire, and bitter feeling against missionaries and their converts contributed to it. Famine added to the unrest. After 1897 sporadic outbreaks against the foreigner were frequent.

The Northeast was the scene of most of the violence. Here was the court, now given over to reaction. Here were some particularly antiforeign officials. Antiforeign groups arose. They were sometimes known as the I Ho T'uan and were also termed the I Ho Ch'üan, or "Righteous Harmony Fists." From this latter designation and from the gymnastic exercises that were practiced came the Western name Boxers. The groups early adopted such slogans as "Protect the country, destroy the foreigner," and "Protect the Ch'ing (dynasty), destroy the foreigner." Into their membership pressed many rowdies. They were also associated with some of the secret societies which abounded in China. As had long been customary in such popular organizations, charms and occult practices were employed which the users believed would render them invulnerable to enemy weapons.

It was in 1899 that the Boxers began seriously to annoy Westerners. In Shantung, where the antiforeign Yü Hsien was Governor, they persecuted Christians and killed an English missionary. Yü Hsien, under pressure from the powers replaced by Yüan Shih-k'ai, was welcomed at court as a hero and was appointed Governor of Shansi. By June, 1900, the situation in Chihli (Hopei) had become acute. Christians were being massacred and aliens were in danger. To safeguard the latter, and especially the legations in Peking, on June 10 an international body of troops left Tientsin. It was attacked, however, and with difficulty made its way back. To protect the foreign community in Tientsin, now in danger, the Taku forts, commanding the river approach from the sea, were stormed by parties made up of six nationalities (June 17). This was interpreted by the Boxers and the court as a declaration of war. In retaliation, the Tientsin concessions were attacked and the diplomatic body ordered to leave Peking within twenty-four hours. On the morning of June 20 the German Minister was killed while on his way to the Tsungli Yamen, and that afternoon foreigners and Chinese Christians were placed in a state of siege in their refuges: the Roman Catholic cathedral and the legation quarter. The powers assembled at Tientsin an allied relief expedition, but not until the middle of August did it fight its way through to Peking and effect the release of the beleaguered.

In the meantime, the storm brought distress outside as well as inside the capital. Throughout the Empire aliens were in danger, especially missionaries, for by the nature of their calling the latter were more frequently beyond the shelter of the treaty ports than were merchants. Most foreigners in the interior found it advisable either to go to the ports or to leave the country. Except in the Northeast, very little loss of life occurred. In

Chihli (Hopei), Shansi, Manchuria, and Mongolia, however, the toll was heavy. Here more than two hundred foreign missionaries and several thousand Chinese Christians were killed. In Shansi the truculent Yü Hsien was particularly rabid against the strangers and their converts, and personally assisted in the execution of a Roman Catholic bishop.

That the loss of life was no greater was due in large part to the Chinese and Manchus themselves. At the court were those, among them Jung-lu, who recognized the folly of the war, and their moderating counsels were not without effect—even during the siege of the legations. In local communities many Chinese, both private citizens and officials, risked their lives to save foreigners. On June 20 the admirals off Tientsin declared that they were using force merely against the Boxers and those who opposed them in their attempt to rescue their fellow countrymen at Peking. This meant that the powers did not consider themselves at war with China but as merely helping to suppress an internal upheaval which threatened the lives of their nationals. The viceroys at Nanking and Wuchang and several of the governors took steps to preserve order within their jurisdictions. Li Hung-chang, now viceroy at Canton, attempted to obtain the assurance of the powers that they did not consider a state of war to exist. When the inevitable diplomatic settlement should be made, it would be of advantage to China if she could claim that as a nation she had not fought. Certainly the loss of life and the consequent penalties were very much less than if all Chinese officialdom had supported the war party.

Even though only a small minority actively attempted to oust the alien, in the autumn of 1900 the situation for China was humiliating. Peking was in the hands of the powers and had been plundered by their troops. The court had fled precipitately and igominiously to Hsianfu. Contingents of foreign soldiers went through much of Chihli (Hopei), relieving missionaries who had been standing siege at isolated points and wreaking vengeance for the indignities shown to their nationals during the preceding months. The Russians had taken possession of much of Manchuria.

## THE POST-BOXER SETTLEMENT

The diplomatic settlement which officially adjusted the Boxer outbreak was arrived at in 1901 after prolonged negotiations and much wrangling among the powers. The terms were drastic, but not so much so as some of the powers had wished. The American Government exercised a moderating influence on the side of the territorial integrity of the Empire and of an indemnity within China's capacity to pay, and an Anglo-German agreement, to which France, the United States, Italy, Austria, and Japan acceded in whole or in part, attempted to prevent the acquisition of territory or the violation of the open door.

The terms of the Protocol, as it is called, can be briefly summarized as follows: (1) an apology for the murder of the German Minister and the erection of a memorial monument; (2) the punishment (by the Chinese Government rather than the powers—a device which helped to save some prestige to China) of some of the officials chiefly responsible for the attacks on foreigners; (3) the suspension for five years of the official examinations in towns where foreigners had been mistreated; (4) an apology for the murder of the chancellor of the Japanese legation; (5) the erection by the Chinese Government of expiatory monuments in desecrated foreign cemeteries; (6) the prohibition by China for two years or more of the importation of arms and ammunition; (7) the payment by China of an indemnity of 450,000,000 haikuan taels—in United States currency $333,000,000—with interest at four per cent, in thirty-nine annual installments, ending with 1940, to be secured by the maritime customs, the salt tax, and the native customs, and to be distributed among thirteen of the powers, Russia receiving the largest share, and Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan, the United States, Italy, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden following with amounts progressively smaller in the order named; (8) the reservation to foreigners and the defense by the powers of the legation quarter in Peking; (9) the razing of the Taku forts, thus to permit free communication between Peking and the sea; (10) the maintenance of free communication between Peking and the sea by right of occupation by the powers of certain specified points; (11) the publication of edicts designed to discourage further antiforeign outbreaks; (12) the amendment of existing treaties of commerce and navigation (a provision carried out in 1902 and 1903 with the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, but without revolutionary additions to earlier documents); (13) the improvement of the river channels leading to Tientsin and Shanghai; and (14) the reconstruction of the Tsungli Yamen into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Wai Wu Pu*) which should be accorded precedence over all the other ministries of state, thus giving added dignity to intercourse with foreign powers.

By the Protocol, as the price of the mad action of Tz'ŭ Hsi and some of her officials, China was saddled with a large addition to her debt, the legations in Peking took on the guise of armed fortresses, and other humiliations were endured. For more than two decades thereafter, many aliens, consciously or unconsciously, took the arrogant attitude of those living in a conquered country, and the Chinese seldom dared openly show resentment. Any antiforeign movements were promptly and vigorously dealt with. The Ch'ing dynasty was badly shaken. It had shown itself incompetent to lead in the necessary reorganization, either when headed by the reforming Kuang Hsü Emperor or by the reactionary Tz'ŭ Hsi. The Empire lacked the leadership at the top which the times so urgently demanded.

Still, although in fact a foreign-occupied country, China retained the semblance of independence and territorial integrity. The partition which had been threatened in 1898 and for which the events of 1900 might have been given as a pretext was not accomplished. China emerged from the Boxer year less weakened than some observers would have deemed possible.

### THE RUSSO–JAPANESE WAR (1904–1905) AND ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1905–1910)

Although China emerged from the Boxer madness with its territory nominally intact, its possession of one great region, Manchuria, was seriously threatened. A war between Russia and Japan soon followed in which Manchuria was the chief battlefield and which ended with Japan as well as Russia firmly entrenched in the land of virgin resources.

Russia, while professing friendship for China, was reluctant to withdraw from the occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces which it had effected during the Boxer uprising. Again and again it delayed the evacuation of the region beyond the time promised and seemed bent on permanent possession.

To these Russian ambitions Great Britain, Japan, and the United States offered opposition. The United States was unwilling to go to war to enforce its policy, and Great Britain, embarrassed by the struggle with the Boers in South Africa, could scarcely do so. It was left to Japan to act. Reinforced by an alliance with Great Britain (1902) in which each party undertook to come to the other's aid in case more than one power were to attack the other in defense of its interests in East Asia, and after repeated attempts to reach a settlement by negotiation, Japan suddenly struck (February, 1904). Its primary concern was for Korea, where Russia was also aggressive, but most of the fighting was in Manchuria. China declared its neutrality. The major neutral Western powers suggested to the belligerents that they localize the area of warfare. This they agreed to do, although Russia maintained that all Manchuria must be included in the zone. As the war progressed, the United States, fearing that in the negotiations of peace between Japan and Russia neutral powers might make demands for Chinese territory, obtained from the chief of them the assurance of their adherence to the policy of the integrity of China and the open door.

In the war, Russia was badly defeated. In the peace treaty (of Portsmouth, September 5, 1905), the terms which vitally concerned China were the recognition by Russia of Japan's paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea; the transfer to Japan of the Russian rights in the Liaotung Peninsula and in the railways of South Manchuria; the

withdrawal by Russia and Japan of their troops from Manchuria, but the retention there of guards for the railways; the promise of Japan and Russia that they would not obstruct any measures common to all countries which China might take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria, and that the railways in Manchuria would be used purely for commercial and industrial, and—except in the Liaotung Peninsula —not for strategic purposes; and the declaration by Russia that it did not possess in Manchuria "any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity." China soon signed a treaty with Japan assenting to such terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth as dealt with matters within her territory, and in a secret agreement granted to Japan additional advantages in Manchuria.

The Russo-Japanese War greatly increased Japan's tangible interests in China. Not only did the island empire succeed to Russia's holdings in South Manchuria,. but its augmented influence in Korea, followed shortly, in 1910, by the annexation of that country, brought it to the very borders of China. Increasingly Japan was a major factor in Chinese affairs.

Instead of settling the Manchurian question, the war complicated it. The Three Eastern Provinces continued to be a storm center in China's international relations. Japan, having obtained a foothold there at great cost in blood and treasure, was fully as jealous of its position as Russia had been. It rapidly developed its holdings, and complaints were not long in forthcoming that the principle of the open door was being violated. British and Americans were especially outspoken in their criticisms. The Japanese blocked all the various projects by British and Americans for the construction of railways in Manchuria. The British Government did little, at least partly because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was revised and renewed in 1905 and again in 1911. The United States, which after 1905 was moving away from its earlier policy of warm friendship for Japan, was left as the chief hope of official opposition from the West to the extension of Japanese control. The Root-Takahira notes of 1908 seemed for a time amicably to settle Japanese-American differences over Manchuria, but these were revived in 1909 by the proposal of the American Secretary of State, Knox, that the Russian and Japanese railways in Manchuria be neutralized through their purchase, by China, by means of an international loan. The effect of the Knox plan was to drive the Russians and Japanese to an agreement (1910) to maintain the *status quo*.

China, too, attempted by various measures to retain and strengthen her hold in Manchuria. Peking reorganized the admission of the three provinces, planned railways, and attempted to enlist foreign capital.

International friction over Manchuria remained a prominent feature of China's international relations. The region was a chronic storm center.

## REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL CHANGES: INTERNAL POLITICS, 1901–1931

The humiliation of the Boxer uprising and its aftermath, and the helplessness of China while Russia and a Westernized Japan fought on her soil, at last convinced even the most conservative that the only way to avoid national ruin was reorganization and the adoption of at least some of the processes of the Occident. Some entered upon these changes with reluctance. Others were enthusiastic. After 1900, however, the structure of China's older culture crumbled. The changes affected every realm of the nation's life: political, economic, intellectual, religious, and social.

In domestic politics the opening decades of the twentieth century, and particularly the years after 1911, presented a kaleidoscopic picture. In general, until 1926 the record was one of the progressive collapse of central and local government and an increase in civil strife, banditry, and anarchy. The *descensus Averni* was not constant: at times it appeared to have been halted and recovery even seemed to have begun. Until the year 1926, however, each attempt at stabilization proved abortive and was followed by renewed and often intensified disorder.

In general, the causes for the disastrous record were six: the pressure of the Occident and Japan, the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty, the necessity of making radical alterations in the political structure of the country, corruption, economic distress, and internal dissensions.

The pressure of the Occident and Japan took many reforms, but it always increased rather than abated. It made inevitable profound changes in all phases of China's culture, including the government.

The collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty deprived China of its best chance of going through the inescapable transformation without chaos. Although the structure of the Chinese state left a great deal to local initiative, much depended on the Emperor. We have seen that, again and again through the centuries, when that office was incompetently filled rebellions wasted the land. When weakness at the top was too marked, the dynasty was overthrown and a period of civil strife followed. This strife usually lasted for several decades, and once, after the downfall of the Han, for several centuries. Military chieftains fought each other for the control of the Empire, often taking dynastic names and establishing ephemeral states, until one conquered all the others and succeeded in uniting the Empire under his sway and in passing the throne on to other members of his family. Had the Ch'ing survived, this rivalry might have been avoided or controlled. By the end of the nineteenth century that ruling house had proved utterly incompetent to meet the challenge and its disappearance could not long be delayed. With the downfall of the Ch'ing, the traditional struggle between military leaders began again.

This time, however, the civil strife which had always been the inter-

lude between dynasties was complicated by attempts at basic innovations in the form of government. Heretofore, after Ch'in Shih Huang Ti and the Han had devised machinery for ruling the Empire, each dynasty had been content to adopt, with modifications, the framework inherited from its predecessor. Even foreign conquerors had done this. When the Ch'ing fell, this was no longer possible. The new problems thrust upon the state by the coming of the West and the new ideas from abroad made imperative a reconstruction more revolutionary even than that of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti. No people has the political genius to work out a new system of government without experimentation and the attendant mistakes. Certainly new political machinery cannot be evolved for so large a mass as four hundred millions, most of whom are quite unprepared for the change, without costly failures. When, as in China, the attempt to devise a new type of government was complicated by strife between self-seeking military chieftains, the result could only be temporary chaos.

The breakdown of government was furthered by widespread corruption. Much of this existed under the Ch'ing, notably in the declining years of the dynasty. It bred a popular distrust of officialdom. When traditional controls were removed, the selfish use of political power for private profit was accentuated. This fostered rebellion and still greater lack of confidence in government.

Anarchy was accentuated by economic factors. Under the excellent government of the great Emperors of the Ch'ing, prosperity was marked and population mounted. The disorders of the nineteenth century brought about no widespread economic breakdown, except temporarily in the third quarter of the century. The civil strife of the twentieth century, however, so consumed the scanty surplus of food in many regions and so disrupted economic life over wide areas that millions were brought into dire poverty. To this was added, after 1931 and especially after 1937, the miseries of foreign invasion. Many, deprived of their ordinary livelihood, took to banditry or swelled the ill-disciplined cohorts of the warlords. The armies and the hordes of bandits increased the distress; still others were driven to depredations on their neighbors; and a vicious circle was created which made the establishment of order increasingly more difficult.

Moreover, China's troubles were complicated by the ever-changing combinations, intrigues, and clashes between the many social, economic, and political groups which were part of the structure that the new China inherited, in more or less modified form, from the old. Guilds, clans, secret societies, and political cliques were involved. Secret societies, indeed, played a much larger part than all but a few well-informed foreigners realized. Many of the political and military leaders belonged to them, and their affiliations often determined or modified political events. Chinese politics were exceedingly complex, with many currents and cross-currents, and were confusing in the extreme.

Only the main outline of the story need here be given. As we have repeatedly seen, the Ch'ing dynasty had been in decline since the close of the eighteenth century, and its demise had been postponed only by the loyalty of some able Chinese. By 1901 its sands had nearly run out. The Boxer fiasco further discredited it. The Kuang Hsü Emperor was virtually a prisoner. The father of the heir apparent was one of the most ardent supporters of the Boxers, and the heir apparent himself an uncouth roué. The new heir apparent appointed after 1900 was an infant. Tzŭ Hsi, while able and vigorous, was aging, had little or no comprehension of the world into which the Empire was being rushed, was bound to tradition, and was utterly unable to give the needed leadership.

After 1900 the Ch'ing attempted to reorganize the government to meet the demands of the new day. Important changes were effected in the administrative system, from the central boards in Peking to the bureaucracy in the provinces. A beginning was made of a new code of laws. The old civil service examinations were discontinued, and a system of tests was introduced for aspirants for public office, based upon Western as well as Chinese subjects. Fiscal reform was projected. Army reorganization was planned, and a part of it was carried out, especially by Yüan Shih-k'ai, in the North. A commission sent to the United States and Europe studied the forms of government in use there, a constitution was promised, and steps were taken looking toward the introduction of representation based upon popular election. Provincial assemblies and a National Assembly were convoked, the former in 1909 and the latter in 1910.

Given competent leadership, the dynasty might have made the needed adjustments. As it was, the new wine proved too potent for the old wineskins. On November 15, 1908, the Empress Dowager died, presumably preceded by only a few hours by the Kuang Hsü Emperor. With the passing of Tz'ŭ Hsi went the last outstanding figure in the imperial house. The infant heir apparent came to the throne (under the reign name of Hsüan T'ung) and the regent did not have the force of character required by the times. Under these circumstances, the dynasty was easily upset.

The revolution that overthrew the Ch'ing broke out in Hankow and Wuchang in October, 1911, the 10th being the day that was later celebrated. There had been unrest in the Yangtze Valley, particularly in Szechwan, over a foreign loan to finance railways in South, Central, and West China and an accompanying greater centralization of railway administration under Peking. By the end of September, 1911, active revolt had arisen in Szechwan. A fortuitous incident in Hankow brought about the premature inception of a more widespread outbreak. Troops in Wuchang, mutinying, forced their commander, Li Yüan-hung, to lead them in the new movement; a republic was declared, and the strategic cities Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow quickly fell to the rebels. So unexpected had been

the uprising in the Wuhan center that it surprised even the most ardent anti-imperialists.

Peking called to its assistance Yüan Shih-k'ai. Yüan had been dismissed soon after the beginning of the new reign, probably because of his betrayal of the regent's brother, the Kuang Hsü Emperor, in 1898. As the creator of the strongest army in the country, he appeared indispensable. He responded somewhat deliberately to the frantic summons for help and came only on his own terms. Had he acted promptly, he might possibly have suppressed the revolt. As it was, he dallied, and although Hankow was retaken by the end of October, the interval had been sufficiently long to enable the revolution to gain headway. In October and November, city after city and province after province threw off the Manchu yoke, and in them independent governments were set up. The only fighting of any importance was in the Wuhan cities (Wuchang, Hankow, and Hanyang) and Nanking. In several places Manchu garrisons, helpless, were massacred. Concessions by Peking availed nothing. Before the end of the year, a national council representing the revolutionists assembled at Nanking and (December 28) elected as President of the Republic Sun Yat-sen. Sun had been in Europe at the inception of the outbreak, but recently, amid great acclaim, had returned to China.

Before Sun's arrival, negotiations had begun between Yüan and the revolutionists. Wise heads on both sides strove to save the country from further debilitating civil strife. Yüan succeeded, partly by threats, in convincing the court of the import of the writing on the wall, and on February 12, 1912, edicts were issued from Peking, in the name of the young Emperor, by which the Ch'ing accepted its fate. The Hsüan T'ung Emperor abdicated and Yüan was instructed to organize a republic. The Emperor, so the republicans agreed, was to retain his title for life, was to receive a large annuity, and was to keep his private property and the use of a palace. The tomb of the Kuang Hsü Emperor was to be completed at public expense. Manchus, Moslems, Mongols, and Tibetans were promised equality with the Chinese and were secured in their titles and their property. Within a few days, further to insure peace, Sun withdrew from the presidency, and the republican body at Nanking elected Yüan in his stead. Li Yüan-hung, who had become a popular hero by his part in the outbreak of the revolution, was elected vice-president. The Ch'ing dynasty, with a minimum of bloodshed, had passed the way of its predecessors. The nation, outwardly united, had embarked on a perilous experiment with republican forms.

So perished, with scarcely a struggle, a monarchial institution which in theory had had its beginnings in prehistoric times, which had been given a definitive form by Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, and which had been modified by the Emperors of the Han and of later dynasties. With it

inevitably went much of that elaborate bureaucracy and many of those political theories which were among the greatest achievements of the Chinese; disorders could scarcely be avoided.

The abandonment of the monarchy and the attempt to transform China into a republic seemed the height of folly. The Chinese were scrapping political institutions with whose operation they were familiar and were seeking to adopt a form of government with which they were quite inexperienced. However, this offered some, perhaps the best, hope of avoiding prolonged civil war and possible foreign intervention. The Ch'ing dynasty could, at best, have been kept alive but a little longer. Yüan Shih-k'ai, the most powerful military figure in the country, and hence possessed of the best chance of founding a new dynasty, would probably not have been peacefully accepted as Emperor by the nation and certainly not by the revolutionists. There was a bare possibility that under the name of a republic the nation might develop in orderly fashion the political institutions required by the new day.

At first it looked as though this hope might be realized. Rapidly, however, the machinery inherited from the old regime disintegrated. The new was slow in being constructed. Within a decade and a half only the barest shadow of a national government remained and the country was racked by fighting.

The administration of Yüan Shih-k'ai began fairly auspiciously. Yüan controlled the strongest army, and outwardly had the support of the republicans and the former adherents of the Manchus. He succeeded in keeping the capital at Peking, near the center of his strength. The foreign powers accepted him.

Almost immediately, however, Yüan's troubles began. The provisional constitution which the body at Nanking adopted in March, 1912, and to which he was supposed to conform, placed the president under the control of Parliament and gave him little real power. He was to have about the functions of the president of France under the Third Republic. Parliament, when elected, was dominated by the radicals who had brought about the revolution and who had been organized into the Kuomintang. A decisive clash between Yüan and the radicals came in the spring and summer of 1913. Against the opposition of the Kuomintang, Yüan completed a large loan made by banking groups of five countries: Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and Japan. This both gave him the sinews of war and assured him the moral support of these powers. When he replaced with his own men several of the military commanders in the Yangtze Valley and the South, his critics, with the endorsement of Sun Yat-sen, broke out into open rebellion and declared a "punitive expedition" against him. Yüan easily suppressed the outbreak and Sun fled to Japan. Yüan followed up his advantage by obtaining the adoption of the

sections of the "permanent" constitution which had to do with the selection of president. He secured his own election to that office, unseated soon afterward (November, 1913) the Kuomintang members of Parliament, and then (January, 1914) dismissed the remnant of Parliament.

Thus rid of the elements which had inaugurated the revolution of 1911, for more than a year Yüan preserved the outward form of a republic, but with changes in its structure that made it clearly submissive to himself. In 1915, after going through the motions of a carefully directed "referendum," he declared the monarchy restored with himself as Emperor. Opposition proved stronger than he had anticipated. Japan, supported by Great Britain, Russia, and France, counseled delay. In December, 1915, rebellion broke out in distant Yünnan and quickly spread to adjoining provinces. Yüan first postponed his formal enthronement, and then, as the rebellion spread, canceled the monarchy. The insurgents were not content to leave him in power on any terms. Broken by chagrin and ill health and with his prestige gone, Yüan died of disease (June 6, 1916) before his enemies could remove him.

The vice-president, Li Yüan-hung, had not consented to Yüan's restoration of the monarchy and had been elected president of the opposition government which Yüan's opponents had set up in Canton. With Yüan gone, the entire country recognized him as president. Although well-intentioned, Li was not strong enough for the difficult post, and the calm which followed his accession was deceptive. He pleased the radicals by restoring the constitution of 1912 and recalling the Parliament which Yüan had dismissed. Fêng Kuo-chang, a prominent military figure in the Yangtze Valley, was elected vice-president. Tuan Ch'i-jui, a henchman and appointee of Yüan Shih-k'ai, and commanding the support of the military machine which the latter had built, continued as premier. The major factions were thus represented in the government, but it required a leader with more than Li's ability to keep them working harmoniously.

In the spring of 1917 the inevitable dissension broke out, over the question of China's entry into the World War. In March China broke off relations with Germany. Tuan wished her to take the next logical step, but Parliament refused to join in a declaration of war while he was premier. The President acceded and dismissed Tuan (May 23). Tuan withdrew to Tientsin and here a group of military leaders representing the faction which had formerly backed Yüan Shih-k'ai declared the independence of several provinces, most of them in the North. Li Yüan-hung, faced with this opposition and without adequate military support, called in as mediator Chang Hsün, a picturesque chieftain who had adhered to the Manchus in the revolution of 1911 and was now military governor of Anhui and in command of a force astride the Tientsin–Pukow railway.

Following the counsel of Chang Hsün, the President dismissed Parliament (June 13th). On July first, after bringing his troops to Peking, Chang Hsün electrified the world by declaring the restoration of the Ch'ing dynasty—an act probably due to his sense of the traditional Confucian obligation owed by a minister to his prince. The generals assembled at Tientsin, however, were not minded to tolerate any such turn of events and marched on Peking. Before the middle of July Peking had been taken, Chang Hsün had sought sanctuary in the Dutch legation, the boy Emperor had again retired, and the Republic had been officially restored.

Li Yüan-hung refused to resume the presidency, for he had lost enormously in prestige and had no powerful friends at hand to support him. Fêng Kuo-chang, as vice-president, automatically came into the presidency, and Tuan Ch'i-jui resumed the premiership. The northern military group was now in control. The following year (August, 1918), a body assembled by it, and known, because it was dominated by the military chiefs, or Tuchüns, as the "Tuchüns' Parliament," passed over Fêng for the presidency—because he was from another clique than that of Tuan—and elected to the office a scholar and ex-official of the old regime, Hsü Shih-ch'ang. Tuan's group, now organized into what was called the Anfu Club, was supreme.

In the meantime, members of the radical Parliament of 1913, once dismissed by Yüan Shih-k'ai and now again by Li Yüan-hung, assembled in Shanghai and Canton, and set up, with Canton as the usual headquarters, a government which they declared to be the only legitimate one, for they held the constitution of 1912, under which they had been elected, still to be binding. The Canton regime did not have nearly the power of its rival at Peking and often its hold on life was tenuous. However, much of the South acquiesced in a nominal allegiance to it. The country, accordingly, was divided. In 1921 Sun Yat-sen was elected president of the southern government and maintained himself precariously at Canton.

The government at Peking became progressively weaker. In the summer of 1920, Chang Tso-lin, the master of Manchuria, and two other generals, Ts'ao Kun and Ts'ao's most powerful lieutenant, Wu P'ei-fu, joined in a successful effort to drive Tuan Ch'i-jui and the Anfu clique out of Peking. Hsü Shih-ch'ang, a somewhat pathetic figure, was left with only the shadow of power. In 1922 Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin went to war with each other. Chang was defeated and withdrew his troops to Manchuria. Wu, victorious, sought to bring the nation together by ousting Hsü from the presidency and calling back into power Li Yüan-hung and the Parliament of 1913, under whom the country had last been united. The effort proved disappointing. From the outset both Sun Yat-sen and Chang Tso-lin were hostile, and other powerful commanders were unreconciled. The following year (1923) a rising military figure and subordinate

of Wu P'ei-fu, Fêng Yü-hsiang, who had already gained distinction by his conversion to Protestant Christianity and his vigorous attempts to propagate his new faith among his troops, helped to make Li Yüan-hung regard his position as untenable. Li, disheartened, once more withdrew to the quiet security of a foreign concession in Tientsin. Soon afterward (September, 1923), Wu's technical superior, Ts'ao Kun, by the use of heavy bribes, was elected to the presidency by what remained of the Parliament of 1913. The twelfth anniversary of the Revolution of 1911 was celebrated by the promulgation of what was optimistically called "the permanent" constitution.

By this time the recurrence of civil war had become almost as regular an annual event as the return of spring, and in 1924 the major generals were once more moving against one another. This year Chang Tso-lin was victorious, owing chiefly to the sudden defection of Fêng Yu-hsiang from Wu P'ei-fu. Ts'ao Kun was deprived of his office and imprisoned, and Fêng and Chang placed Tuan Ch'i-jui at the head of the Peking Government. Tuan, however, did not have the title of president, but was denominated what may be translated as "provisional chief executive." Moreover, he had under him only the skeleton of a national government. In 1925 the inevitable falling-out between Fêng and Chang resulted in the withdrawal of the latter, thanks to the disloyalty of some subordinates. The following year (1926), however, Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin ignored their differences for the moment and joined in driving Fêng Yü-hsiang's forces out of Peking and into the Northwest. A few weeks afterward, Tuan Ch'i-jui retired to the convenient haven of Tientsin. Not even a "provisional chief executive" was left in the capital. A rapidly shifting cabinet kept up, with the consent of the warlords, the form of government with which the powers, in default of anything better, were willing to deal, under the fiction that it was the legal representative of China.

While what remained of a government at Peking went through the motions of speaking for the country, all semblance of actual national political unity was rapidly disappearing. In fact the country was divided among many warring chieftains, most of whom rose to power rapidly and as quickly disappeared, and the boundaries of whose spheres of influence were constantly shifting.

Throughout the country the continuous strife was producing increasing war weariness. The spirit of nationalism, reinforced by the impetus given it almost everywhere in the world by World War I, was growing, particularly among the younger intellectuals. As we shall see in a moment, this nationalistic sentiment was directed in part against the special privileges of foreigners. It also wished to unify China internally. Now, in the spring and summer of 1926, there came rapidly into prominence a movement which seemed to offer hope to these aspirations and which soon

attracted to itself, either actively or passively, most of the progressive and radical elements in the country and was looked to expectantly by all who longed for an early end of China's woes.

Sun Yat-sen was very successful as a propagandist. He also possessed idealism, in striking contrast to the crass self-seeking of most of the military chiefs of the day. An omnivorous reader in both Western and Chinese literature, he was a student of society—a social philosopher—and dreamed of a new Utopia. Of his many interesting suggestions for the reorganization of the country, some were bizarre and impracticable, but others had in them a hint of genius. Sun had a gift of attracting others to himself, and no one else quite so much caught the imagination of the younger elements in China. As an inspirer of revolution he was extraordinarily able. As an administrator he was a distinct failure. Under his leadership the Kuomintang and the government of which he was the head made little progress toward mastering the country. On March 12, 1925, he died in Peking while on a mission to the North to confer with Fêng Yü-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin.

Sun's death was of almost as much service to his cause and his party as his life had been. Not long before his end, in 1923, he called to his assistance as advisers Russians of the Communist school—because, so he declared, in his struggle to overthrow the Peking Government he had sought help in vain from the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. The chief of these Russians was Michael Borodin, a vigorous and astute revolutionary who had been educated in the United States and who had had experience in Chicago, Mexico, and Turkey. Under the tutelage of these counselors the organization of the Kuomintang was made to conform in large degree to that of the Russian Communist Party. Sun Yat-sen (à la Lenin) was canonized as the national hero, and weekly memorial services before his picture were encouraged. He left behind him a last will and testament directed to the nation and several books outlining his program. These were now adopted as infallible guides for the party and the nation. The will was regularly read in public with great solemnity, and one of the books, the *San Min Chu I,* or the Three People's Principles, became the party's manual. These three principles—government by the people and for the people, a sufficient livelihood for all, and freedom from the control of foreign nations—were broadcast as popular slogans. Propaganda was highly developed and very skillfully employed. The attempt was made to adapt Communism to Chinese conditions. Unions of laborers and peasants were organized against the propertied classes. Agitation was directed in large part against the "capitalistic" and "imperialistic" powers of the Occident. But Sun Yat-sen had come to oppose Russian Communism and had rejected the orthodox Marxian theory of the class war. The Kuomintang had more than one element.

In the summer of 1926 the armies of the Kuomintang—or Nationalist Party, as the title was loosely translated—began a northward advance. Their young general, Chiang Kai-shek (or Chiang Chieh-shih), proved an able leader, and propaganda helped to smooth their way. Here at last seemed to be salvation from the interminable civil wars, the heartless selfishness of the militarists, and the economic distress of the past few years. Little well-organized opposition existed short of the North. The progress of the Nationalist armies was almost an uninterrupted triumph. By the early spring of 1927 the Yangtze had been reached, Wu P'ei-fu and the general in command in the Shanghai area (Sun Ch'üan-fang) had been eliminated, and such centers as Wuchang, Hankow, and Shanghai had come into the possession of the Nationalists. It was freely predicted that the autumn would see Chiang in Peking.

Victory was delayed by dissensions within the party. The Communist wing of the Kuomintang gained in power as the tide of victory mounted. In central China, and especially in Hunan, radicalism was in the saddle. Through the party organization and the newly formed unions of laborers and peasants, "capitalists" and "imperialists" were denounced, many of the wealthy were dispossessed, particularly of their lands, and some of them were murdered. The headquarters of the government, established at Hankow, was dominated by the left wing. Communism was strengthened by returned Chinese students from Russia. The Soviet Government had set up in Moscow, especially for them (1925), a university named after Sun Yat-sen, which by the end of 1927 had an enrollment of about six hundred, mostly from Hunan and Kwangtung. The more moderate elements in the party, led by Chiang Kai-shek, looked with alarm upon the growing left wing, realizing that before long it would alienate the more substantial portions of the population. The Communists were out not only to destroy religion, including Christianity, but Confucian morality, and much of the nation was scandalized. Then, too, many believed that the Russians were interested in China merely as a cat's-paw against the capitalistic powers of the West.

The issue began to come to a head after the capture of Nanking in March, 1927, when radicals roughly handled foreigners and killed some of them. The right and left wings were soon openly at outs with each other and the progress northward came to a pause. The moderates organized a government at Nanking, in opposition to the one at Hankow. Before the end of 1927 public opinion had turned overwhelmingly against Communism; the moderates, led by Chiang Kai-shek, were in control; non-Communist members of the left wing had broken with the Communists; the government in the Wuhan cities had come to an end; the Soviet advisers were on their way to Russia; many of the radicals had been executed and others, among them the widow of Sun Yat-sen, were in exile;

and the Nationalists had closed the Russian consulates. The government which the right wing set up at Nanking was distinctly anti-Communist in tone and depended for its finances upon the bankers of Shanghai.

At the head of the Nanking Government was Chiang Kai-shek. In 1927 his position was strengthened by his marriage to Miss Soong, a sister of Madame Sun Yat-sen. Since T. V. Soong, a brother of Madame Chiang, was Minister of Finance and another sister was the wife of H. H. K'ung, the Minister of Industry, Labor, and Commerce, people began to speak of the "Soong dynasty." The Communist elements were outlawed and were no longer vocal in the national councils of the party.

In the spring and summer of 1928 the Nationalist advance once more began. In co-operation with the forces of Fêng Yü-hsiang and of Yen Hsi-shan—the latter the "model governor" of Shansi, where he had held office since 1912—Chiang Kai-shek's forces moved northward. In June the Nationalist armies entered Peking. They renamed it Peip'ing, "Northern Peace." While retreating to his capital, Mukden, their most formidable opponent, Chang Tso-lin, was killed by a bomb. His son and successor, Chang Hsüeh-liang, made his peace with the Nationalists and nominally accepted a prominent place in their organization.

Theoretically the country was now united. Certainly the main military figures gave outward support to the Nationalists. At Nanking an administration had been set up on the outline suggested by Sun Yat-sen, with Chiang Kai-shek as its ranking officer. It was still a one-party government, dominated by the Kuomintang, but more than any other of the many attempts under the Republic, it sought to combine the machinery of the Occident with the best of the devices of the older China. In several of the chief posts were able men, most of them formerly students in the Occident. The outlook appeared more hopeful than for many years. Nanking throbbed with life as it had not since the times of the T'ai P'ings, new government buildings were erected, and on Purple Mountain, overlooking the city, was built an imposing tomb, to which, with great pomp, were brought the remains of Sun Yat-sen.

In itself the Kuomintang helped to give unity to the country. Its organization was almost nation-wide. Its many units, the *Tangpu* (the name usually given to the executive committee of the local precinct or sub-precinct organization), had much influence in local affairs and headed up in the National Congress of the party. This was represented, in the long interims between meetings, by the Central Executive Committee. The Central Executive Committee, in turn, controlled the national government. In many respects the political situation at the beginning of 1929 was more encouraging than at any time since the revolution of 1911.

However, the nation's troubles were far from an end. Much of the country was overrun with bandits, some of whom were made more ruthless by

the profession of Communist principles. Famine was taking a toll of millions of lives in the Northwest. In only a few provinces was Nanking's authority effective enough to bring taxes into the national treasury. In 1929 a serious rift appeared in the Kuomintang. The major military figures could not long live in harmony. In the spring and summer of 1930 Yen Hsi-shan and Fêng Yü-hsiang joined in opposing Chiang Kai-shek.

By the autumn of 1930 the latter had won and the Nationalist Government at Nanking had gained a breathing space. Fêng Yü-hsiang was in semiretirement, Yen Hsi-shan had withdrawn first to the security of mountainous Shansi and then had sought sanctuary in Tientsin, and Chang Hsüeh-liang, although he had advanced his forces south of the Great Wall and had occupied much of Hopei (as the province of Chihli had been renamed by the Nationalists), professed to be on friendly terms with Nanking.

In spite of official disapproval by Nanking and Mukden, and of vigorous anti-Communist reactions in many places, Communism remained strong. Russian agents were still at work and numbers of the students were becoming Communists. From 1930 to 1933, indeed, large sections of the country, especially in Kiangsi, Anhui, Northern Fukien, and Hupeh, were in the hands of those who called themselves Communists. Campaigns waged against Communists by Chiang Kai-shek and his associates in 1930 and 1931 were interrupted by dissensions within government ranks and by the Sino-Japanese crisis of 1931 (of which more in a moment).

The most serious rift in the ranks of the Nationalist Party in 1931 was the protest against the rule of Chiang Kai-shek by a number of leaders of varied political background. In the spring these malcontents gathered at Canton and there set up a government which claimed to represent the Kuomintang but which repudiated Chiang Kai-shek. The Manchurian crisis of the autumn tended to encourage negotiations. The collapse of Chang Hsüeh-liang before the Japanese in the autumn of 1931 weakened Chiang, for the former had been a strong supporter of the latter's government. In December, 1931, to pacify his opponents and the many vociferous students who had flocked to Nanking and were clamoring against him for his failure to take more vigorous action against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek resigned the titular headship of the civil regime. However, he remained the dominant military figure in the Nanking Government and as such was still the most powerful man in the nation.

## RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN POWERS, 1911–1919: FURTHER HUMILIATION

While the downfall of the Manchus, the subsequent struggles between rival aspirants for power, and the attempts to devise new governmental machinery were distracting the country, momentous changes were

taking place in China's relations with other nations. For about eight years China descended still farther into the valley of humiliation. Then began one of the strangest spectacles of the time. China, although distraught by civil strife and utterly impotent to obtain her will by armed force, began to make headway against the powers and to cancel the privileges which, for more than three-quarters of a century, she had been progressively conceding to aliens. This was halted only by the events in Manchuria which began in 1931.

First came the further humiliation. Both Great Britain and Russia took advantage of the internal weakness of China which followed the Boxer year to extend their spheres of influence—the former into Tibet and the latter into Mongolia. In 1904 the British, alarmed by Russian machinations in Tibet and moved by a desire for commerce, dispatched an armed expedition which fought its way to Lhasa and obtained a convention which provided for trade and forbade the Tibetans to grant concessions without the consent of Britain. In 1906 China, as Tibet's overlord, confirmed the agreement, with safeguards against further aggression by the British. In 1907 an Anglo-Russian agreement recognized Chinese suzerainty in Tibet and promised that neither power would seek concessions in the country. China had begun by force to strengthen its position in Tibet. After the establishment of the Republic it still attempted to do so and insisted upon regarding Tibet as an integral part of its domains. By the end of 1912, however, Chinese troops were driven out of all but the edges of the land, and Tibet became practically independent. Efforts were made, at British instance, to settle Anglo-Sino-Tibetan relations by negotiations, but with results to which the Chinese would not consent. In 1914 Great Britain and Tibet reached an agreement whereby, among other provisions, inner Tibet —that portion of the country which adjoined India—was to be autonomous, although nominally still under Chinese suzerainty.

In the last years of the Ch'ing, China had pursued an aggressive policy in Mongolia. For years Chinese settlers had been pushing the frontier of cultivated land ever northward of the Great Wall into Inner Mongolia. Just before their downfall, much to the annoyance of the natives, the Manchus were seeking to increase their authority in Outer Mongolia. The revolution of 1911, accordingly, was welcomed by the Mongols as an opportunity to throw off the Manchu yoke. Late in 1911, Outer Mongolia declared its independence, and the Hutukhtu of Urga, the ranking ecclesiastic of the Lamaistic sect of Buddhism of that region, was invested with the headship of the state. In 1912 Russia recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia in return for an extension of Russian privileges in the area. The following year China, in an agreement with Russia, assented to the new status in return for the Russian acknowledgment of Chinese suzerainty in the country. In 1915 a tripartite agreement between the

interested parties confirmed this relationship. The Russian claim to a voice in Mongolian affairs was, therefore, acknowledged by Peking.

The loan made to Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1913 by an international group of bankers, which had much to do with the break between the radicals and himself, increased the grip of foreign financiers on China—chiefly by pledging the salt tax to pay the debt and placing the collection of the tax under foreign administration. The co-operative feature of the loan helped to allay friction among the powers, but so strongly did President Wilson feel China's independence to be compromised that he withdrew the support of his government from the American participants, and the latter did not join in the final arrangements.

The outbreak of the European war in 1914 brought fresh difficulties to the harassed young Republic. With so much of the world in turmoil, it could not hope to remain unaffected. Serious complications came early. On August 15, 1914, Japan presented an ultimatum to Germany, advising the latter government to withdraw its armed vessels from Japanese and Chinese waters and to turn over to Japan the leased territory of Kiaochow "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." No reply was vouchsafed by Berlin and on August 23 Japan declared war.

This action of Japan was natural in view of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a Franco-Japanese entente dating from 1907, and an entente and treaties with Russia. Events proved, however, that it was not out of loyalty to treaty commitments that Japan entered the war. Its interest in China was growing. Japan's population was rapidly increasing, and since the pre-emption by the white races of the best of the unoccupied sections of the world denied it the possibility of relief by extensive emigration, the one recourse for a livelihood for the added millions was the continued development of industry and commerce. If these were to prosper, Japan must have both markets and a convenient source of raw materials, including iron and coal—for nature had endowed it with but little of the one and insufficient supplies of the other. China was at once both an adjacent undeveloped market of great possibilities and an available storehouse of raw materials. It is not surprising, therefore, that Japan regarded the maintenance of easy access to China as essential to its very life and was fearful of the closing of the door to China by greedy Western powers. Now, with most of the Occident engrossed in deadly struggle, was its great opportunity to make secure its position in its huge neighbor.

The Japanese promptly followed their declaration of war on Germany by an attack on Kiaochow, the leasehold of the latter power in Shantung. In this their forces were assisted by a small British contingent, but the enterprise was primarily theirs. The campaign was conducted with scant regard for China's neutrality. Territory, railways, and telegraph lines outside the leased area were seized, and individual Chinese were treated

cavalierly. When, in November, 1914, Tsingtao, the city which dominated the Kiaochow region, surrendered, Japan appeared to have every intention of remaining in possession, not only of that port, but also of much of Shantung.

In January, 1915, Japan followed up its activities in Shantung by what became notorious as the Twenty-one Demands. At the outset made secretly, they soon were known to the world. They were in five groups. The first had to do with Shantung. Here China was to assent to any agreement which Japan might make with Germany for the disposition of the latter's possessions in the province, to promise not to alienate any part of the coast to a third power, to open additional cities to foreign trade, and to grant to Japan certain railway privileges. The second group stipulated that in South Manchuria the Japanese leaseholds—on Port Arthur and Dairen (Dalny) and the railways—were to be extended to ninety-nine years, that anywhere in South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia Japanese might reside, travel, engage in business, lease and own land, and open mines, and that in these regions no official advisers were to be employed without the consent of Japan. The third provided that the Hanyehp'ing Company, an iron mining and smelting operation in Central China, was to become a Sino-Japanese enterprise and that it could not be sold without Japan's consent. The fourth group sought to bind China not to cede or lease to a third power any harbor, bay, or island along its coast. The fifth, the most far-reaching of all, demanded that China employ Japanese as advisers, share with Japanese the administration of the police departments in important places, purchase from Japan half or more of its munitions or establish a Sino-Japanese arsenal, grant certain railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley, and give to Japanese the privileges of religious propaganda and of buying land in the interior for schools, hospitals, and churches—and that Japan be consulted before foreign loans were contracted for mines, railways, and harbor works in Fukien.

When these demands became known, a storm of protest swept over China. In the United States, too, criticism was freely expressed, and shortly after China had yielded to Japan's ultimatum and agreed to comply with Japan's modified requests, the American Government notified both Tokyo and Peking that it would not recognize any agreement impairing American rights in China or the political or territorial integrity of China or the open door. However, China could not hope to support its position by armed force, the United States would not do so, and possible opposition from Great Britain, France, and Russia was estopped by the necessity of retaining Japan's support in the European war. China did demur, however, and only after months of negotiation and a sharp ultimatum was Japan able to obtain a settlement. Even then Tokyo had to be content with only part of what it had asked. China acceded to the first three groups with important modi-

fications in its favor; group four was met by a presidential mandate which directed that no portion of China's coast should be leased or ceded to any power; and the fifth group was reserved for further consideration, except that Peking stated that it had not permitted foreign nations to establish on the coast of Fukien dockyards, coaling stations for military use, or naval bases, and that it had no intention of borrowing foreign capital to set up such establishments. Japan had won only a partial victory, and at the price of the bitter hatred of the Chinese.

Although it had obviously bungled, Japan did not give up its purpose to strengthen its hold on China. In February and March, 1917, it obtained secret assurances from Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy that at the peace conference these powers would support its claims to the former German holdings in Shantung.

In 1917, China entered the war against the Central Powers. It broke off relations with Germany in March, and in August declared war. Because of its domestic weakness, China could take no active part in the struggle. It seized the German and Austrian vessels interned in its ports and chartered some of them for the service of the Allies. It permitted what had already begun: the recruiting of Chinese laborers for noncombatant service in England, France, Africa, and Mesopotamia.

To China formal entry into the war brought both advantages and disadvantages. China canceled the portions of the Boxer indemnity due its enemies and obtained the suspension for five years of payments on that indemnity due the Allies, with the exception of most of those owed to Russia and some portions required for supporting educational projects initiated by the return of the indemnity due the United States. It took over the German concessions in Tientsin and Hankow and the Austro-Hungarian concessions in Tientsin. China also obtained a seat at the peace conference, with the hearing of its grievances assured. On the other hand, Japan's influence in China was augmented. Although American authorities sought to minimize their significance by the Lansing-Ishii notes (November, 1917), the one great foreign opponent of Japan's aggressions in China, the United States, by recognizing that Japan, because of "territorial propinquity," had "special interests in China," appeared to have acceded to Japan's claims. A "war participation board" with a Japanese adviser, an "arms contract," and extensive loans by Japan to Peking on the security of railways, mines, forests, telegraphs, taxes, and bonds seemed ominous. In 1918 the two countries entered into agreements for military and naval co-operation. Such "co-operation" would mean more Japanese control.

For a time it looked as though Japan might substitute herself for Russia in northern Manchuria. With the Russian revolution of 1917 and the temporary chaos before the new Socialist Soviet Republic eliminated opposing elements, eastern Siberia fell into disorder. There was interven-

tion (1918) in eastern Siberia by Japan, the United States, and some of the European Allies. Japan, with the largest body of troops, sought control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and might have obtained it had it not been for the appointment in 1919, largely at the insistence of the United States, of an inter-Allied railway commission (in which Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, China, and the United States were represented) to operate the road. This inter-Allied control lasted into 1922. In 1920, before it was withdrawn, China asserted itself and for a time had the upper hand in administering the line.

The end of the war and the peace conference at Paris gave China an opportunity to state its case to the world. This it did through an able delegation representing not only Peking but also the government at Canton. The conference listened, but in the Treaty of Versailles confirmed Japan in the possession of the former German properties in Shantung. China declined to sign and concluded a separate treaty with Germany. The peace settlements, however, marked some gains. China's late enemies lost their extraterritorial privileges, their special concessions, and their share in the unpaid portion of the Boxer indemnity. By signing the general treaty with Austria—in which the objectionable clauses about Shantung were not included—China acquired membership in the League of Nations, a channel for the further presentation of its position. Japan, moreover, promised eventually to restore Chinese sovereignty in Shantung.

## RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN POWERS, 1920–1931: CHINA PARTLY WINS EMANCIPATION

World War I marked a significant turning point in China's relations with foreign powers. From now until the autumn of 1931 China made progress toward regaining the privileges which for nearly three-quarters of a century it had been conceding to aliens. The West was too weakened and divided to impose its will on non-European peoples as forcibly as formerly. Occidental writers were soon talking about "the rising tide of color," "the revolt of Asia," and "the twilight of the white races," and instanced movements in Negro Africa, Egypt, Turkey, India, and China, in support of their analysis. Liberals in Europe and America talked approvingly of the "self-determination" of subject peoples and objected to the use of arms to restrain "national" desires. A war-weary Occident was inclined to prefer peaceful adjustments to gunboat diplomacy. The wave of western European political aggression was receding. The fact that some Western powers had been deprived of their special privileges in China furnished a precedent for demands that the others surrender theirs. The war had greatly stimulated nationalism the world over, and China proved one of the most fertile soils for its growth.

Chinese nationalism employed with great effect an old Chinese weapon, the boycott. Often used by Chinese in local disputes among themselves and from time to time against foreigners, it was now organized on a nation-wide scale. The telegraph and postal service, covering all China like a network, and the rapid growth of daily newspapers helped to make concurrent action possible. Students were eager agitators. The populace was appealed to by slogans, vivid posters, and fiery speeches. The Chinese, powerless in armed conflict with Japan and the West, had developed in the boycott an instrument which proved as potent in attaining their ends as have been some successful wars.

The rising Chinese nationalism fulminated against the Shantung award of the Treaty of Versailles. Students led in the denunciation. Two cabinet officers regarded as particularly pro-Japanese were forced to resign, and a nation-wide boycott against Japanese goods attacked the enemy at a peculiarly vulnerable point—its commerce.

Insistent nationalism was chiefly responsible for the transfer to China by Japan of the former disputed property in Shantung and for simultaneous progress toward the abolition of foreign control in China. In the winter of 1921–1922, at the invitation of the United States, a conference was held in Washington on the limitation of armaments and on Pacific and Far Eastern questions. Competition in the construction of navies and naval bases, and friction in the Pacific, seemed to threaten another war, and this the conference sought to forestall. Great Britain, France, Japan, China, Italy, the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal were represented. Once more China urged its claims on the nations. Most of the treaties and agreements which emerged from the gathering affected it, some of them profoundly. Several of them marked another step in the relaxation of foreign domination. The "Four Power Treaty" between Great Britain, the United States, France, and Japan, reinforcing for ten years the *status quo* in the Pacific, tended to stabilize conditions in that area and to insure China an opportunity to work out its salvation untroubled by a general war in that region. In a "Nine Power Treaty" all participants in the conference agreed to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, to give China free opportunity to develop and maintain a stable and effective government, to use their influence to preserve the open door (described as "the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China"), to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China to seek special privileges that would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and to respect China's rights as a neutral in any war to which it was not a party. The nine powers agreed to a revision, by a commission, of the duties on imports into China. They also promised to appoint a commission to study extraterritoriality, with a view

to assisting China in effecting legislative and judicial reforms which would make possible its relinquishment. Those having postal agencies in China agreed to discontinue them not later than January 1, 1923. The powers declared it to be their purpose to withdraw their armed forces as soon as China assured the protection of the lives and property of foreigners within its borders. Resolutions were adopted concerning foreign radio stations in China, the unification of Chinese railways, the reduction of Chinese military forces, the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the notification of all of the powers of the treaties and agreements which each had with China. Finally, the conference gave Japan and China the opportunity to come to an understanding about Shantung. Japan proved conciliatory and promised to return the former German holdings in the province. However, it retained a share in some of the mines and large commercial interests and landholdings in Tsingtao and insisted upon lending to China the sum needed for the redemption of the railways, with the provision that during the term of the loan the roads were to have a Japanese traffic manager. The Twenty-one Demands and the treaties of 1915 still rankled in Chinese breasts, and Japan, while refusing to re-examine them, declared, although not by formal agreement, that it would abandon all claims to preference in loans for railway building in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, to priority in the appointment of advisers and instructors in South Manchuria, and to the reservation made in 1915 that the fifth group of the demands should be postponed for further discussion. At the conference, moreover, Great Britain promised to restore Weihaiwei to China, and complied, in October, 1930. China did not obtain all that it asked of the conference, but made marked headway toward doing so.

In still another direction—in its relations with Russia—China registered some gains in its struggle to free itself from partial foreign domination. The Russian Revolution of 1917, which overthrew the Czarist regime and by the end of the year replaced it with Communist control, could not but alter Sino-Russian relations. For a time collapse and civil strife in Siberia made impossible any aggressive Russian action. In 1919 the Peking authorities took advantage of the situation to renew Chinese control in Outer Mongolia. For more than a year Chinese troops and diplomacy succeeded in re-establishing Chinese authority at Urga. Early in 1921, however, Baron Ungern, a picturesque anti-Communist Russian, captured the city and brought Chinese rule to an end. In the summer of 1921, he in turn was driven out by Soviet troops, and a government was set up which was friendly to Moscow. While, by a treaty of May 31, 1924, Soviet Russia recognized Outer Mongolia as "an integral part of the Republic of China," it regarded that region as autonomous and entitled to freedom from Chinese interference in its foreign affairs, and opened direct relations with it. The influence of China became negligible and that of Soviet Russia dominant.

In some other phases of its relations with Russia China had better success. For a time after the Russian Revolution, the Czarist diplomatic and consular staffs continued to function in China, supported by the Boxer indemnity. Many adherents of the old regime—"White Russians"—took refuge in China. In August, 1920, China suspended Boxer indemnity payments to Russians; the following month it withdrew its recognition of the Czarist officials within its borders; and before long the Russian post offices in China were closed. In 1919 the Soviets issued a manifesto offering to negotiate with China on the basis of the renunciation of all special privileges of Russia and Russians in China, the cancellation of further payments on the Boxer indemnity, the restoration to China, without compensation, of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the mines and forests acquired by the Czar's government from China, and the return of territory seized by the former regime. Much of what Moscow proposed to give up it no longer possessed, and its surrender of extraterritoriality would injure chiefly the Russian "Whites"—on whom the Soviet were quite happy to inflict suffering.

When it came to actual negotiations, Soviet Russia proved unwilling to fulfill some of its promises, particularly those concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway. On May 31, 1924, an agreement was signed which annulled all treaties between the Czarist Government and China and relinquished Russian extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction, the Russian portion of the Boxer indemnity, and special Russian concessions in China. But, while consenting to the principle of the eventual restoration of the Chinese Eastern Railway to China, the agreement provided that the Chinese must buy back the line, that the amount and conditions of repurchase and of the provisional management should be determined by conference between the two governments, and that in the meantime the road should be operated under the terms of the original contract of 1896. In the case of the Boxer indemnity, the Russian share was not to be canceled unconditionally but was to be set aside for education among the Chinese and was to be administered by a commission of three—two appointed by China and one by Russia—no action of which could be taken without a unanimous vote. Russia, therefore, held a veto in the use of the funds.

On September 20, 1924, Russia entered into an agreement with "The Autonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces"—meaning Chang Tso-lin—which attempted a settlement of the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It was much like that of May, although it differed in some important respects. The Russia of the Soviets was no more minded to relinquish its control over the road than had been the Russia of the Czars.

Joint management of the Chinese Eastern Railway by Russians and Chinese was marked by repeated friction. This was increased by the anti-Communist, anti-Russian reaction in China in 1927, especially since Chang Tso-lin was particularly bitter against Communism. In July, 1929, the

dissension culminated in the seizure of the road by the Chinese and the dismissal and arrest of the Soviet officials. For several months a virtual state of war between China and Russia existed along the Siberian-Manchurian frontier. Before January, 1930, a Russian invasion forced the Chinese to restore the *status quo* in the operation of the railway, but negotiations looking toward a permanent settlement dragged on for months, unsatisfactorily and inconclusively.

Toward the end of 1932, Russian relations with China became less unfriendly. China, looking for support against Japan in Manchuria and impatient with the failure of the League of Nations to restrain the Nipponese, was willing to bid for Russian support. Accordingly, Nanking and Moscow resumed cordial diplomatic relations.

Against other privileges of Westerners China made continued gains. Several more of the major powers remitted the unpaid portions of the Boxer indemnity due them. Never was the remission unconditional. The released funds were allocated to specific purposes, most of them for the benefit of the Chinese. Progress was made by the Chinese in regaining control of the portions of their cities administered by aliens. The German concessions at Hankow and Tientsin and the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin were restored to China as a result of the World War. The Russian concessions fell into its hands some time after the collapse of the Czarist regime. Persistent pressure, by boycott, agitation, and force, brought about increased Chinese participation in some and the return of still others. This pressure first became spectacular after an incident on May 30, 1925. A strike in Shanghai led to a demonstration in the International Settlement by students and other sympathizers with the workers. The police arrested some of the agitators, and in the disturbances which ensued, goaded to self-defense by the attacks of Communists who wished to provoke them to violence, fired into the crowd. Resentment against foreign privileges was already acute and the shooting of May 30 precipitated an antiforeign, and especially an anti-British, explosion. A boycott was organized which lasted for months and cost British merchants millions of dollars. On June 23, 1925, an armed clash occurred between the Chinese and the defenders of Shameen, the foreign settlement in Canton. In August and September, 1926, a fight between British and Chinese forces over an attack on British shipping at Wanhsien, on the upper Yangtze, further strained the relations between the two countries. When, in 1926 and 1927, the Nationalists moved northward into the Yangtze Valley, there was widespread propaganda against "imperialism," particularly as represented by the British. Foreigners, especially British and Americans, were harassed. The British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang were seized by the Nationalists, and only large forces of foreign marines kept the radicals from annexing the settlements at Shanghai. Under the circumstances, foreigners felt it

necessary to yield to some of the demands. The Shanghai Mixed Court, by which Chinese defendants were tried, and which had been taken over by the consular body in 1911, was restored to Chinese control on January 1st, 1927. Chinese were admitted to membership in the councils of the French Concession and the International Settlement in Shanghai, the British Concession in Tientsin, and the International Settlement (Kulangsu) at Amoy. The British concessions at Hankow, Kiukiang, Chinkiang, and Amoy were returned to the Chinese, the first two in 1927, the third in 1929, and the fourth (not Kulangsu but a small area in the city) in 1930. In 1929 Belgium agreed to return her concession in Tientsin. Several concessions remained in the hands of the powers, however, and in 1930 Japan declined to accede to China's suggestion that she restore the one held by her in Hankow.

The Chinese regained the right to fix their import and export duties. In 1928 and early in 1929, practically all the powers, with the exception of Japan, entered into agreements with China consenting to tariff autonomy. Japan signed such an agreement in May, 1930, and ratifications of a similar Sino-Dutch treaty were exchanged in November of that year. The Customs Administration, while still largely under the direction of foreigners —as it had been for two generations—and maintained much on the old lines, was more and more under direct Chinese control.

In the abolition of extraterritoriality China, while making considerable progress, was not so successful. The commission promised by the Washington Conference was appointed and visited China, reporting in 1926. It believed that the situation did not yet justify the extinction of extraterritoriality, but offered suggestions looking toward the gradual attainment of the goal. China made various attempts to hasten the desired end. New treaties based on "equality" and specifically providing for tariff autonomy and the jurisdiction of local courts and laws over their respective nationals were signed with a number of countries (1919–1930). Several of the treaties by which extraterritoriality had been granted provided for their termination in whole or in part at fixed dates or after certain periods of notice. In 1926 the Chinese Government took advantage of these clauses to declare the treaties at an end at the specified dates, and to say that new treaties would be negotiated only on the basis of equality and reciprocity. In July, 1928, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a declaration to the effect that all "unequal treaties . . . which have already expired shall *ipso facto* be abrogated and new treaties shall be concluded" and that the Nationalist Government would immediately take steps to terminate those "unequal treaties which have not yet expired and conclude new treaties."

Most of the powers against whom specific steps had been taken protested the legality of the action, denying that the wording of the treaties

gave China the right which it claimed. Mexico alone acceded. With the others prolonged negotiations followed. By 1928, of the approximately 130,000 foreigners (excluding Koreans) living in China, 75,000, or over half, were without extraterritorial status.

Against Great Britain, Japan, France, and the United States—who controlled China's relations by way of the sea—China made little progress. These powers were, to be sure, conciliatory, and Great Britain especially offered (January 27, 1927) to make important modifications in the privileges of its subjects in China. They persisted, however, in conserving the main structure of extraterritoriality. New treaties with the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, moreover, while assenting to the resumption by China of tariff autonomy, contained no provision for the end of the obnoxious status of aliens. Brazil and Peru retained their extraterritorial privileges, although a new treaty with Peru was in process of negotiation. To a Chinese note of April, 1929, to the powers, stating that before January 1, 1930, the new civil and commercial codes would be ready for promulgation and that China desired to have restrictions on its jurisdictional sovereignty removed at the earliest possible moment, Great Britain, France, and the United States replied that the time was not ripe—that China had not sufficiently re-established order and reorganized its courts and laws to be able to insure protection and justice to foreigners. In December, 1929, Nanking announced, by unilateral action, the termination of extraterritoriality, to take effect on January 1, 1930, but by ordering the appropriate branches of the Government to frame regulations to make this operative, it postponed the actual assumption of jurisdiction over the foreigners involved. On May 4, 1931, Nanking issued a mandate announcing the completion of these regulations and declaring that they would go into effect on January 1, 1932. The Japanese attack on China in the autumn of 1931, and domestic political troubles, prevented the Chinese from carrying out their purpose at the announced time.

The powers were less inclined than in earlier years to impose their will on China by gunboats and marines. In South Manchuria, where it was strongly intrenched, Japan at first was not unconciliatory. It permitted the Chinese to construct railway lines. Some of these, to be sure, were financed by Japanese funds and were feeders to the (Japanese) South Manchuria Railway. Others of them, it believed, offered competition to Japanese roads and contravened an agreement of 1905 (not contained in any formal treaty) which Tokyo held forbade such construction. China did not have the mailed fist shaken under its nose so much as formerly.

By 1931 Manchuria seemed to have become clearly Chinese, at least in population. Russia still had an effective voice in the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and Japan retained the South Manchuria Railway, with its railway zone and with important mines. In Dairen (Dalny)

on the leased territory on the Liaotung Peninsula, Japan had developed a great modern city as the chief port of the Three Eastern Provinces. It had huge and increasing investments in the region which it could not willingly allow to be jeopardized. All Manchuria remained a potential seat of grave international friction. In actual occupancy, however, the Chinese were more and more claiming it as their own. Until the twentieth century Manchuria had remained largely undeveloped, although Chinese were settling extensively in the southernmost of the three provinces. During the twentieth century the Chinese poured in by the millions. Especially under the Republic, when much of North China was troubled by civil war and famine, and Manchuria was relatively prosperous and orderly, the migration swelled. By 1930, the greatest movement of population on the planet was that into the Three Eastern Provinces. Under these circumstances, the demands of a nationalistic China for increased control were greatly strengthened.

The Chinese attitude toward aliens was changing. For many years, and especially after 1900, foreigners had acted as though they were living in a conquered and subject country, many of them with open contempt for the Chinese. The Chinese had writhed under an attitude so galling to a people who traditionally regarded outsiders as barbarians, but they had had, perforce, to tolerate it. They now discovered that the powers had become halfhearted in defending the treaty rights of their citizens. Particularly in the interior the foreigner did not enjoy the prestige and security which once were his. The Chinese authorities were often powerless to protect aliens against bandits and Communists.

In spite of the gain which the Chinese had made toward abolishing special foreign privileges, by 1931 these were far from having disappeared. Several of the powers, among them the majority of those having the chief commercial and territorial stakes in China—Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and France—retained most of what they had once possessed. Many alien residents still viewed the Chinese with disdain. Foreign gunboats continued to patrol the coast and the Yangtze River. The legations, reluctant to move to Nanking, were ensconced in their semifortress in Peip'ing. China had made amazing inroads on the structure of alien control and privilege, but much of it remained.

## RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN POWERS: RENEWED JAPANESE AGGRESSION: INITIAL STAGES, 1931–1937

In 1931 new and startling developments occurred which soon altered the entire situation in East Asia. They were preliminary stages of what culminated in the second world war of the twentieth century. So far as China was concerned, the slightly less than six years from Sep-

tember, 1931, to July, 1937, embraced the initial section of the renewed struggle with Japan. The second portion was from July, 1937, to December, 1941, and the third section, which began in the last-named month, ended in August, 1945, with the defeat of Japan.

In September, 1931, Japan, for several years conciliatory and friendly, suddenly reversed its policy and began waging what in effect was an undeclared war on China. The Japanese had become increasingly restive over the Chinese encroachments on what they believed to be their rights in Manchuria. Japan was crowded and its population was rapidly growing with no chance of an outlet through emigration. The country suffered acutely in the world-wide depression which began in 1929. To many Japanese Manchuria seemed their "life line," and their control of that region the one hope of escaping a national collapse. A growing group of military men and superpatriots were impatient with the halfway measures of the politicians and diplomats. Chinese nationalists, on the other hand, were more and more resentful of Japan's special position in Manchuria. Chang Hsüeh-liang's government was not always considerate of Japanese interests and was frequently extremely annoying to the Japanese authorities.

In the summer of 1931 a conflict occurred between Chinese and Koreans over an irrigation ditch, but with no casualties. Koreans, overcrowded at home, had moved into the adjacent portions of Manchuria by the hundreds of thousands. For the most part they remained Japanese subjects. In Korea, public opinion was inflamed by the disorders in Manchuria, and anti-Chinese riots broke out. In June a Japanese army officer and several companions were shot by Chinese soldiers in an interior station in Manchuria, and the Japanese maintained that the Chinese authorities were not sufficiently active in punishing the offenders.

On the night of September 18–19 Japanese troops seized Mukden. This action was followed, in the next few weeks, by the occupation of other strategic centers in Manchuria, including several in North Manchuria, in what had been regarded as the Russian sphere of interest. Chang Hsüeh-liang, most of whose forces were south of the Great Wall, had headquarters in Peip'ing and with manifestly waning prestige. With the collapse of Chang's regime in the Three Eastern Provinces, temporary local governing committees of Chinese were set up, with assistance and often under pressure from the Japanese. Early in 1932 a Manchuria-wide government, officially known as Manchoukuo, was organized, ostensibly by Chinese and Mongols, but manifestly with Japanese assistance and reinforced by Japanese troops and many Japanese advisers. On February 18, 1932, Manchoukuo declared its independence of China. P'u-i, the last Emperor of the Ch'ing dynasty, who, it will be recalled, had ruled from 1908 to 1912 under the reign title of Hsüan T'ung, was asked to be

the head or regent. He accepted and was inaugurated in his new capital, Ch'angch'un (soon renamed Hsinching, the "New Capital"), on March 9, 1932. Later in the year Japan officially recognized the regime and negotiated with it a defensive alliance.

The new government, upheld by Japanese bayonets, had an uneasy course. Much of Manchuria was overrun by irregular troops, by bandits, and by volunteer corps which received aid from the Chinese south of the Great Wall. But by 1933 Japan seemed to have pacified the region.

Early in January, 1933, Manchoukuoan-Japanese forces began the invasion of the province of Jehol, which Japan claimed to be part of Manchoukuo. Within a few weeks the Chinese defense crumbled and the occupation was completed. In April, 1933, the Japanese, alleging the necessity of protecting the recently won boundaries against Chinese aggression, moved south of the Great Wall.

In the meantime, in China proper a vigorous boycott was organized which seriously cut into Japanese trade. Friction occurred, notably in Shanghai. The Japanese peremptorily demanded the dissolution of the Shanghai boycott associations. Although the Chinese municipal authorities eventually expressed a willingness to comply, Japanese marines, supported by the fleet, occupied by force Chapei, a densely populated section of the city (beginning January 28, 1932). In the fighting which followed, a large section of the city was laid waste. Chinese troops offered an unexpectedly stout resistance and were dislodged only after a month of heavy fighting. Hostilities ceased early in March, 1932; partly through the machinery of the League of Nations a working peace was restored; and the Japanese began to evacuate the occupied areas.

The rest of the world was deeply concerned. Although officially war was not declared between China and Japan and technically the two nations were at peace, in actual fact war was in progress. Both governments were members of the League of Nations, both had signed the Pact of Paris renouncing war "as an instrument of national policy," and Japan had bound herself by the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China." The situation gave the peace machinery of the world its most severe test since the close of World War I.

Promptly after the incident of September 18, 1931, China appealed to the League of Nations. Although not a member of that body, the American Government early expressed to Japan and China the hope that both would refrain from further hostilities. Space forbids a recounting of all the diplomatic steps taken in and out of the League of Nations to bring about a peaceful settlement. The United States and the League worked in fairly close conjunction. On January 8, 1932, the United States notified both China and Japan that it would not recognize any agreements between

Japan and China which would "impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, independence, territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China" or "any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris." From the name of the American Secretary of State who devised and sent the note, the policy thus expressed became known as the Stimson Doctrine. It was in the tradition of American Far Eastern policy and marked a step toward the more active participation of the United States in the effort to save China from Japan.

The League of Nations found the problem extremely knotty. Smaller member nations vigorously denounced Japanese action, for if it were allowed to go unrebuked and unchecked, their own safety would be threatened. The large member powers were more guarded. Both Japan and China agreed to the appointment by the League of an international commission of inquiry. This commission, headed by the Earl of Lytton, proceeded to East Asia. In the autumn of 1932 it reported to the League, giving an account of events and suggesting a method of settlement which it felt would safeguard the interests of both contestants. The report satisfied neither China nor Japan, but the Japanese were the more outspoken in their disapproval.

On February 24, 1933, the Assembly of the League, acting under Article XV of its Covenant, adopted findings which condemned Japan, and recommended a method of settlement by negotiation between Japan and China in close co-operation with a committee on which the League, the United States, and Russia were to be represented. Japan dissented and on March 27, 1933, served notice on Geneva of its intention to withdraw from membership in the League.

By the summer of 1933 it was clear that at least for the time being Japan was the victor. On May 31, 1933, China and Japan signed a truce by which Chinese troops were to be withdrawn from an area between Peip'ing and the Great Wall, and the Japanese were to retire north of that barrier. This truce was in effect a treaty of peace by which Nanking tacitly acquiesced in Japan's position in Manchuria. In Manchuria Japanese were building railways which would reduce the importance of the Chinese Eastern and were negotiating with the Russians for the purchase of that line. Except for bandits, armed opposition to the new regime of Manchoukuo had been crushed.

The Japanese feared Russia as the most probable menace to their plans. In December, 1932, diplomatic relations between China and Russia, which had suffered from the conflicts of 1927 and 1929, were re-established, and this Japan viewed with suspicion as an incipient combination against her. To be sure, the Chinese Eastern Railway was removed as a

bone of contention. In March, 1935, after long negotiations, Russia sold to Japan her holdings in the line. Yet friction was frequent on the borders between Japanese-controlled Manchuria on the one hand and the Russian East Asian provinces and Russia-aligned Outer Mongolia on the other. Russia made it clear that any encroachment on Outer Mongolia would not be tolerated. Armed clashes were frequent in the second half of the 1930's, and in 1938 serious fighting occurred near the corner where Manchuria, Siberia, and Korea met. In November, 1936, Japan and Germany entered into an anti-Comintern pact, clearly aimed at Russia, and in August, 1937, China and Russia signed a nonaggression pact, quite obviously as a warning to Japan.

After 1933 Japan continued to strengthen its hold on Manchuria and to develop the resources of the region in its own interest. It gave the area a unified and fairly stable currency, tied to the yen. It greatly curtailed the use of opium, long a severe scourge. It gave to Manchoukuo a monarchical form of government. On March 1, 1934, P'u-i, hitherto the regent of the new state, became officially Emperor under the reign title of Kang Tê. The new order was to be based upon Confucianism. Yet the resounding designation of the ostensible ruler and the nominal independence of Manchoukuo were not permitted to shake Japanese domination. Japanese were in key official positions either openly or as "advisers." Japanese rapidly extended the railway system, partly for strategic reasons and partly to exploit the resources of the puppet state. The endeavor was made to knit Manchoukuo into the economic fabric of the Japanese Empire. In general, to Manchoukou was allocated the role of supplying raw materials for the industries of Japan and of providing foreign exchange for the Japanese bloc. Coal, oil shale, iron ore, and timber were to be contributions to Japan, and the sale of the soya bean and its derivatives, oil and bean cake, for which the chief market had been in Germany, was to aid in enhancing the imperial supply of foreign exchange. Iron works were developed, notably at Anshan. Japanese poured in, chiefly as business men, officials, and soldiers. After a pause, the immigration of Chinese from the south of the wall was resumed. In 1936 Manchoukuo was said to have a population of nearly thirty-four millions, which was being augmented at the rate of over eight hundred thousand a year.

After 1933 the Japanese army continued to edge forward in Inner Mongolia and in the northeastern provinces of China proper. In Inner Mongolia the Japanese endeavored to take advantage of the long struggle between Chinese and Mongols. The Chinese were chiefly farmers, seeking to push farther the cultivated land at the expense of the grazing grounds of the pastoral Mongols. Climatically the region was marginal. Not always was the rainfall sufficient to mature planted crops. Yet the Chinese pressure of population was so great that many took the risk. The Mongols

were, quite naturally, antagonistic. The Japanese professed to side with the latter. However, the Mongol leaders did not always willingly cooperate. By 1937 the Japanese were in control of most of Chahar, the province which lay immediately to the west of Jehol. Presumably they would press on westward into Suiyüan. In 1933, by an arrangement known as the Tangku Truce, the Chinese and Japanese agreed to withdraw their troops from an area in the northeast of the province of Hopei, thus demilitarizing a zone next to Manchoukuo. This would prevent effective Chinese efforts to regain Manchoukuo, and marked a Japanese step southward of the Great Wall. In 1935 the Japanese constrained the Chinese to remove one of their armies from Hopei, to dissolve units of the Kuomintang in the region, and to undertake to suppress anti-Japanese activities. In 1935 there were rumors that Japan was planning the organization of an "autonomous" government, independent of Nanking and presumably under Japanese control, which would embrace Hopei, Shansi, Shantung, Chahar, and Suiyüan. Nanking sought to forestall the move by setting up in the eastern part of Hopei a regime which, while still affiliated with it, would be less objectionable to the Japanese.

Japan was serving warning on the rest of the world that it would not brook outside interference in China. In 1933 it proposed the close political and economic collaboration, through a formal protocol, of itself, China, and Manchoukuo, but since this meant in practice Japanese control, Nanking would not give its consent. In 1934 a spokesman for Tokyo's foreign office declared that the Japanese would oppose "any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan" and would include in this category "detailing military and naval instructors or military advisers to China" and loans "to provide funds for political uses." Japan was seeking to make China a protectorate.

The Chinese were striving to put the country in readiness for the heightened struggle which must come with Japan. Chinese students, in their youthful ardor, organized against Japanese encroachments. Older heads, apprehensive of provoking the extremists in Japan, endeavored to restrain the hotheads but labored assiduously to make such preparations as they could for a war which might be postponed but which, short of a miracle, could not be avoided without abject submission. The building of roads for automobiles was pushed. The railroad from Wuchang to Canton was completed, thus giving through rail communication between Peking and Canton except for the unbridged Yangtze. Several other railways were constructed. Industrialization proceeded. The beginnings of an air force were initiated.

In 1936 an uneasy peace was patched up between the Kuomintang and the Communists. This came in the course of a long and exhausting strug-

gle which obviously was weakening the country in its resistance to Japan. Chiang Kai-shek, the most powerful figure in the Kuomintang, was pushing for the unification of the country. His most obdurate opponents were the Communists. For some time their chief center had been in Kiangsi. There they sought to establish a separate administration. The armies of Chiang Kai-shek pressed them so hard that late in 1934 the Reds evacuated their strongholds in that part of the country. By a series of forced marches they made their way, at a heavy cost in life, by what was called "the Long March," over a route of possibly six thousand miles, much of it across incredibly difficult mountain terrain, to the Northwest. In territory in Shensi and in the northeastern portion of Kansu, a strong Communist enclave was developed. The capital was eventually at Yenan, west of the Yellow River, about a hundred miles south of the Great Wall. Chiang Kai-shek endeavored to have his troops attack the Communists there and eliminate them. He entrusted the task to Chang Hsüeh-liang, who had headquarters at Hsianfu. Some of the Communists began fraternizing with Chang's troops and urged that the weakening civil strife be suspended and a common front presented against Japan. When Chiang Kai-shek went to Hsianfu to inspect the progress of the anti-Communist campaign, he was taken captive by Chang Hsüeh-liang (December, 1936). His life was in imminent danger, but late in the month he was released. The war against the Communists was called off, and in theory harmony was established and co-operation against the Japanese menace undertaken. Yet the ostensible peace was little better than an armed truce.

## RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN POWERS: RENEWED JAPANESE AGGRESSION: THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION IS ACTIVELY PUSHED IN CHINA PROPER, 1937–1941

While the Chinese were moving, somewhat haltingly, toward unity and were making progress toward the defense of their country, events in Japan were leading to a more active extension of Japanese arms in China. Many Japanese were discontented with conditions in their home land. They were feeling the pinch of economic pressure and were impatient with the Diet, the political parties, and the capitalists, for to these they attributed the nation's woes. They wished more control by the military and more vigorous action on the continent. Through a series of assassinations of high officials, the most spectacular of which were in February, 1936, they strove to purge the government of the elements to which they were opposed. Increasingly the control of the army and navy was passing into the hands of extremists, fanatical militarists who dreamed of the expansion of the empire, the expulsion of Western influence from China,

and the knitting of all East Asia, later enlarged to "Greater East Asia," into a "Co-prosperity Sphere" in whose benefits all its members would share—but in which Japan would hold the hegemony. The chauvinists did not immediately gain full control, but eventually they became dominant.

In July, 1937, the Japanese army took a step which precipitated a momentous and titanic struggle. On the night of July 7, a clash occurred on the edge of Peip'ing between Chinese troops and Japanese who were executing training maneuvers in a section where they had no treaty right to be. Although locally the Chinese were disposed to be conciliatory and to withdraw their troops, punish the responsible officers, and suppress anti-Japanese activities, the Japanese army rushed reinforcements into Hopei. Late in the month it took Peip'ing. It expanded its operations in Hopei, Chahar, Suiyüan, and Shansi. In the last-named province it encountered formidable resistance from the Communists, now (August, 1937) in theory incorporated into the national forces as the Eighth Route Army. Yet, apart from the Communist obstacle, it appeared to be having its own way.

The war could not be confined to the North. Apparently the Japanese had underestimated the degree to which the spirit of nationalism had permeated the country. No longer, as during the Anglo-Chinese wars of the preceding century or even as recently as the suppression of the Boxers, could foreign troops operate in one section while the rest of the land kept peaceably about its normal pursuits. In several parts of the country Chinese mobs attacked Japanese. Fighting broke out in and near Shanghai. The central government was clear that the hour for final decision had struck and that the Japanese must be resisted to the full extent of the nation's strength. The best troops and the air force, pitifully small, were thrown into the defense of Shanghai and its neighborhood. The immediate outcome was not long in doubt. The Japanese, with much better and more extensive mechanical equipment, the full command of the sea, and the industrial basis at home for a long struggle, poured in such forces as were required. The Chinese lacked the industries requisite for a modern war, had few well-trained officers, and possessed only a weak air force and no navy. In November, 1937, the Chinese retreat from Shanghai began. Early in December of that year Nanking, evacuated by the national government, fell a victim to the advancing Japanese troops amid scenes of wholesale rape and the slaughter of helpless prisoners and civilians, which shocked the civilized world. The Chinese moved their capital to Hankow and then, after a few months, to Chungking. Chungking, at the upper end of the difficult gorges of the Yangtze, was comparatively secure from attack except from the air.

Within a few months after July, 1937, the Japanese were in com-

mand of most of the railways, of a large proportion of the lower reaches of the chief navigable rivers, and of several of the main riverine and coastal ports. They were in a position to begin the slow strangulation of China should the latter not acquiesce in their program.

Yet Chinese resistance continued. Thousands of Chinese, including a very large proportion of the student and more substantial classes, moved west to "free" China. There refugee universities set up temporary plants. With striking resolution and with no little skill, machinery was taken west to continue the manufacture of equipment for the maintenance of the struggle. Industrial co-operatives were organized to further both democracy and the production of needed goods. Behind the Japanese lines in "occupied" China, guerrillas harassed the enemy. Neither the Nationalist Government, controlled by the Kuomintang and with Chiang Kai-shek as its leading figure, nor the Communists showed signs of yielding. They were unable to drive the Japanese out. To their surprise, the Japanese found themselves confronted with a long war.

In pursuance of their plan to win the "co-operation" of the Chinese, the Japanese set up a regime which they hoped would comply with their wishes. They professed to be fighting to liberate the Chinese from Communism and those associated with Chiang Kai-shek. In December, 1937, they set up at Peip'ing what was termed the Provisional Government of the Republic of China, with elderly, anti-Kuomintang Chinese in charge. Eventually they induced a former intimate of Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ch'ing-wei, to head a regime which they trusted would be something more than provisional. On March 30, 1940, the "return" of the "national government" to Nanking was staged amid great pomp. The government of which Wang Ch'ing-wei was now the titular chief executive was hailed by the Japanese as the legitimate one for the entire country and as representing the real Kuomintang and the heir of the Sun Yat-sen tradition. With it Tokyo entered into treaty relations with a promise for reciprocal respect for each other's territories and sovereignty and for co-operation against Communism and in economic, political, and cultural measures. The new Nanking government gave formal recognition to Manchoukuo and was in turn recognized by the then associates of Japan, Germany and Italy, and their satellites. It was obviously as much a puppet as was Manchoukuo. Wang Ch'ing-wei never possessed real power and died in 1944.

Japan went about the organization of the portions of China proper which it occupied in such fashion as to take advantage of their resources. Mines, railways, telephones, telegraphs, factories, banks, dockyards, and shipping were taken over by Japanese companies, or if the Chinese shared the ownership, the control was in Japanese hands. Japan also reconstituted the schools of "occupied" China in such a way that they would support its aims. Japanese was substituted for English as the second language taught and textbooks were revised to make them friendly to Japan.

Among the dark phases of the Japanese occupation were the rapid extension of the sale and use of narcotics, dissensions and corruption among Japanese officialdom, and ruthless treatment of the Chinese.

The Japanese slowly tightened the noose of blockade around the unoccupied portions of China. They had full command of the sea and of most of the main ports. Supplies still reached "free" China through the blockade. They also went in by way of Hong Kong, for that was in British hands, and by the railway from French Indo-China to Kunming, formerly Yünnanfu, the leading city of the province of Yünnan. Moreover, with a prodigal expenditure of human labor a track traversible by automobiles was built from the China side of the border to connect with roads and railways in Burma. This was what became famous as the "Burma Road." It was more a symbol and an aid to morale than of assistance in goods transported, for it was narrow, in places tortuous, and traversed high divides and deep canyons. Yet it gave connection with Rangoon and so with the outer world, and some freight began to move over it. The Japanese made progress in plugging these holes. In the summer of 1940 the fall of France before German arms, the defeat of the British at Dunkerque, and the threatened German invasion of the British Isles gave Japan the opportunity to bring pressure on the two powers. Through agreement with the Vichy regime in France, Japan sent troops into Indo-China and ended the shipment of supplies into "free" China by road and railway from the ports in that region. In July, 1940, the British authorities, most reluctantly, felt constrained to suspend for three months the shipment of goods to China by way of the Burma Road.

For the time being, Japan had nothing to fear from Russia. In a pact of April, 1941, framed when Moscow was co-operating with the Axis powers, the two governments entered into a nonaggression agreement. The German invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941 directed all the energies of the Soviets to the European theatre. This meant that Russia was unwilling to enter into a war with Japan and thus to face foes on two fronts. Japan, accordingly, had no serious threat from that quarter. Moreover, Russia, while maintaining correct diplomatic relations with Chungking, could not be expected to give the latter much help in the form of munitions. Distances for transport across Sinkiang were great, and even had they been shorter, Russia had need for all the war supplies which it could muster, and in addition, would not risk antagonizing Japan to the point of hostilities.

## RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN POWERS: THE JAPANESE INVASION BECOMES PART OF WORLD WAR II DECEMBER, 1941–AUGUST, 1945

On December 7, 1941 (December 8, by Chinese time), by dramatic and sudden Japanese moves, the Sino-Japanese conflict was

broadened and became an integral part of the vast world struggle then in progress. The British Empire, the Netherlands, and the United States became involved in war with Japan and, therefore, were actively on the side of China. This brought to the assistance of China the resources of these powers, in the aggregate enormous, and spelled ultimate defeat for Japan.

The events of December 7–8, 1941, while bursting like a bomb upon a startled world, were a climax of a long trend. As we have seen, the League of Nations and the United States had been critical of Japan's adventure in China since its inception in September, 1931. Commencing with the momentous Hay note of 1899, the open door in China had increasingly become one of the major concerns of the foreign policy of the United States. After its victory over Russia in 1905 Japan had been the growing threat to the realization of that policy. By various means, some of which have been noted in the preceding pages of this chapter, the United States had endeavored to check Japan. On the renewed advance of Japan into China in 1937, the League of Nations and the United States had made clear their disfavor. Public and governmental opinion in the United States progressively hardened against Japan. Washington long contented itself with lodging protests against Japanese violations of American property and persons in China. Even a Japanese attack in the Yangtze upon the American gunboat *Panay* in December, 1937, did not bring the United States into the war. However, by successive steps short of war the United States strove to restrain Japan. It strengthened its fleet and its Hawaiian defense. In July, 1939, it denounced its commercial treaty with Japan and within the next two years took measures to restrict exports to Japan of iron, steel scrap, and petroleum products, commodities essential to Japan's armed forces. The United States gave financial aid to China. Negotiations between Japan and the United States made it increasingly clear that neither power would accede to the other's proposals for adjusting the difficulties. The United States was unalterably opposed to Japan's program in China, and Japan was adamant. Japan, in a formal note, terminated the discussion on the very day that its forces assailed Pearl Harbor, seized the International Settlement in Shanghai, and bombed Singapore and centers in the Philippines.

The early effect of the Japanese attack upon the United States, the British Empire, and the Netherlands Indies was to render the position of China more perilous. The British were fighting in Europe with their backs to the wall and could not even successfully defend their own possessions in East Asia. The huge resources of the United States could not be immediately mobilized and made effective in prosecuting the war. The United States gave priority to winning the fight against Germany and Italy. In the Pacific, distances were vast and Japan had the advantage of the command of most of the littoral of the east coast of Asia.

Japan promptly followed up the advantage acquired by its initial moves. On Christmas Day, 1941, Hong Kong capitulated. Thus another important hole in the cordon that was being tightened around China was stopped. Before the middle of the summer of 1942 Japan had taken the Philippines and Guam, thus cutting off American outposts in the western Pacific, had captured Singapore, had overwhelmed the Dutch power in the East Indies, and had expelled the British from Burma. By the conquest of Burma Japan closed ingress to "free" China by the Burma Road, thereby locking another of the few remaining doors of communication between the fighting Chinese and their friends in the outer world. Japan had all but succeeded in expelling the Westerner from China. Of the Occidental enclaves of a few years earlier, only Portuguese Macao remained, and that on sufferance.

"Free" China showed the effects of the long strain. On the land front a stalemate seemed to have set in. From 1940 to the middle of 1944 the Japanese made few important gains in the interior, but the Chinese could not muster enough power to expel them from positions already acquired. Inflation appeared, both in "free" and "occupied" China. By the middle of 1945 prices were more than fifteen hundred times what they had been five years earlier. Dissensions within the Chinese ranks were not healed. In moving west the national government found itself in part dependent on the landed interests in Szechwan, as it had earlier been on the bankers, merchants, and manufacturers in the Shanghai area. This tended to make it conservative and to deepen the gulf between itself and the Communists, for the latter wished to dispossess the wealthy landowners. Some of the warlords survived and had to be pacified by subsidies. Chiang Kai-shek was compelled, if even a semblance of national unity was to be preserved, to attempt to hold together very diverse groups. Within officialdom corruption and inefficiency were rife. The rift between the Kuomintang and the Communists was unhealed. Each maintained its own government and armies, the one centering at Chungking and the other at Yenan. Although the Communists had a representative at Chungking and the latter had the recognition of all the powers but those in the Axis and the adhesion of more of "free" China than did Yenan, no love was lost between the two regimes, and Chungking was keeping some of its best troops on the border to watch its rival. While in general in 1944 "free" China was more nearly united under Chungking than it had ever been under Nanking, transportation by automobile was breaking down, and with its weakening, internal ties were threatened. Nor did "free" China have the kind of industry essential for the waging of mechanized war.

Slowly their associates in the struggle, chiefly the United States, began to bring in aid to the beleaguered Chinese. Air communication was developed with India. The route was one of the most difficult in the world, over the high and tangled mountains between Assam and Yünnan, and

chronically imperiled by Japanese air attacks. Yet, before three years had elapsed after Pearl Harbor, freight was being brought in by the air in larger amounts than had ever been transported over the Burma Road. Before the end of 1944 American air forces in "free" China were mounting, bases for them were built and in operation, and not only were Japanese ships, troops, and installations in China proper being bombed, but Japanese war plants in Manchuria and the Japanese islands were also being hit. Chinese planes, provided by the United States, were in action against the Japanese. British, Chinese, and American forces based on India forced the Japanese out of the north of Burma. Early in 1945 they were so far successful that road communications between China and Assam were opened through a new highway, the Ledo Road, built over difficult terrain and connecting in Yünnan with the Chinese roads. A pipe line, for the conveying of petroleum and petroleum products, was under construction from Assam to China. Moreover, in the Pacific the Americans were pushing back the Japanese. In May and June, 1942, the American navy inflicted severe defeats upon the Japanese fleet in the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway. That summer American forces won a foothold on Guadalcanal, in the Solomon Islands. By the end of 1944 they had acquired springboards in the Gilbert, Marshall, and Mariana groups, they had recaptured Guam, and they had effected landings in the Philippines and in the process had dealt severe blows to the Japanese navy. In February, 1945, they retook Manila. Before the end of 1944 the Japanese were expelled from the Aleutians. By the middle of 1945 American island-based and carrier-basesd planes had bombed important centers in Japan, the Kuriles, the Bonin and Volcano groups, and Formosa. Strategic footholds had been acquired on Iwo Jima (in the Volcano Islands) and on Okinawa (one of the Liu Ch'iu Islands). Moreover, American and British submarines took heavy toll on Japanese shipping, thus making more difficult the utilization by Japan of its overseas empire and the maintenance of its armies of occupation.

Yet, as the Allied and especially the American tide advanced against them, the Japanese strove persistently and with considerable success to push farther into "free" China. In 1944 and the fore part of 1945 they took most of such of the railways as had remained in Chinese hands. In doing so, they all but established through rail communication between Manchuria and Canton, largely cutting off from Chungking the parts of China east of that line. They also captured some of the air bases from which American and Chinese planes had been operating. They seized Foochow, one of the few seaports remaining in Chinese hands. The outcome of the titanic struggle seemed to be resolving itself into a race between, on the one hand, China's associates, chiefly British and Americans, pressing in through the ring of Japan's defenses and bringing succor

to the "free" China which had been bearing the long strain of war, and the Japanese army on the other hand, in the drive to move on into China, dispersing the Chinese armies, and entrenching itself ever more deeply.

In spite of the advance of Japan on its soil, the exhaustion of prolonged war, the dissensions within its borders, and the rapidly mounting inflation, even after 1937 China was making progress in a number of directions. In their segment of the country the Communists were increasing in strength, building up their organization and their army. They maintained elaborate and, in general, effective resistance to the Japanese. In the areas, much larger in extent and population, that were controlled by the Kuomintang through the Chungking regime, progress was also being achieved. Much criticism was directed against the Kuomintang, and the party itself contained factions. Secret societies and dissident groups more or less openly flaunted the authority of the government. Yet Chiang Kai-shek retained his leadership. If anything, it was strengthened. He visited India. He shared in a conference in Cairo, in 1943, with Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain and President Roosevelt of the United States. Concentration camps were maintained for those deemed dangerous politically, yet through the People's Political Council (first constituted in 1938) an organ was provided for an expression of public opinion. In the earlier days of the removal of the center of government to Szechwan, before inflation and war weariness had become acute, a thrill of adventure was apparent in the West. Migrants from the coast brought to the interior Western influences, and the permeation of Occidental culture in that region was stimulated. Improvements were made in local governments, the enrollments in schools mounted, the opium poppy was suppressed, industrial co-operatives were organized, natural resources were surveyed, efforts were put forth to bring into the Chinese cultural circle the non-Chinese peoples on the Tibetan borders, and the influence of the central government in Sinkiang was strengthened.

Advance was registered in freeing the land from the restrictions and inequalities imposed by the treaties and conventions of the nineteenth and the fore part of the twentieth century. In "occupied" China Japan went through the motions of turning over to Chinese administration several of the foreign concessions in the ports. These included Japanese concessions in five cities, British concessions in Canton and Tientsin, and the famous and wealthy International Settlement in Shanghai. Steps were taken to restore Chinese authority in the several French concessions and in the Italian concession in Tientsin. In 1943 Japan accorded to Nanking the right to tax its subjects and their property. All these measures were transfers of nominal authority to a puppet government that was controlled by Japanese, and so were more apparent than real. However, when Japan had

been expelled, Occidental powers would find difficulty in re-establishing their special privileges in the areas affected. In 1943 Great Britain and the United States negotiated new treaties with China in which they surrendered the extraterritoriality which had long been a source of friction. That same year the United States repealed the exclusion acts against the Chinese, placed that people on the quota basis with European immigrants, and permitted the naturalization of Chinese. For China the war was far from being without compensating features.

In August, 1945, Japan was brought to its knees. For months the Americans had been tightening the cordon around the islands. The Japanese navy had been decimated, and leading cities, including especially Tokyo, had been bombed and then devastated by the ensuing fires. On August 6 the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima with startling effect. Two days later they let loose another bomb, on Nagasaki. On that day, August 8, in the pursuance of an agreement reached at Yalta in February, 1945, between Russia, Great Britain, and the United States, Russia declared war on Japan and rapidly moved its forces into Manchuria. On August 14 Japan's capitulation was announced and on September 2 (September 1 by United States time) the documents effecting the surrender were formally signed on an American battleship in the Bay of Tokyo. Even before that day the Japanese armies were being evacuated from the soil of China.

Now followed a new stage in the long history of China. It was marked by an acceleration of the revolution brought by the impact of the Occident, and by momentous changes in the life of its peoples.

## CHANGES OTHER THAN POLITICAL, 1894–1945: INTRODUCTORY

The developments in China's internal politics and international relations between 1894 and 1945 were startling. At the same time, as though these were not enough for any one people to face, a revolution was being wrought in other phases of the nation's life. Under the impact of the Occident all the main features of the structure of Chinese culture were being altered, some of them drastically. The pace was accelerated by the struggle with Japan in the 1930's and 1940's. In less than a generation the Chinese had moved into a different world: economic, religious, intellectual, and social. To ignore the changes would be to miss parts of the picture which may prove the most significant. Since we are to recur to them in later chapters, at this point they can be summarized much more succinctly than have the political events.

The revolution was accentuated by the fact that during these years, especially after 1914, Occidental culture was suffering from profound

disturbances. China was in contact with a West which itself was being basically modified and much of whose life was in process of disintegration.

## CHANGES IN ECONOMIC LIFE, 1894–1945

The West was most aggressive in the realms of politics, economics, and religion. Naturally, therefore, not only in government but also in the economic and religious phases of China's life these five decades witnessed striking innovations.

It was chiefly for better facilities for commerce that the Occident had forced on China the treaties of 1842–1844 and 1858–1860. Commerce was the main interest of the power which long held the leading place in China's maritime relations—Great Britain. In its broadest sense, commerce was also the major concern of Japan. China, with its huge population—the largest of any nation—and its traditions of hard work and canny trading, was presumably the greatest potential market in the world.

In spite of all these factors, the increase in foreign commerce, while marked, was not phenomenal. China's total foreign trade for 1913 was more than twice the value of that of 1899, and that of 1899 had been a record, being two-thirds greater than that of 1894 and nearly three times that of 1884. World War I saw a decline followed by a slight growth, the figures for 1918 being about six per cent greater than those for 1913. After the war came a sharp increase: the totals for 1921 were almost fifty per cent larger than those for 1918, and for 1929 more than twice those for 1921.[1] The totals for 1929 were more than seven times those for 1894. With the world-wide financial depression which began in 1929, the increase practically ceased, and in 1932, as might have been expected, particularly in view of political and Sino-Japanese developments, a decline of about one-third was registered. After 1937 the increasing Japanese blockade worked further diminution until imports to "free" China dwindled almost to the vanishing point. A very little went by air. Some trade was carried on across the borders between the "free" and the "occupied" sections. Japan all but monopolized the commerce of the territories she held.

Even the pre-1929 gains were not as large as might first appear. The totals compared were in a currency subject to wide fluctuations. In terms of gold dollars the peak of foreign trade was reached in 1920. These years were ones of rapid growth in international trade the world over. Consequently, while in 1896–1898 China's foreign trade was 1.5 per cent of

[1] In figures, the average annual total foreign trade for 1911–1915 was 923,900 haikuan taels, for 1916–1920 1,182,501 haikuan taels, for 1921–1925 1,707,595 haikuan taels, and for 1926–1930 2,154,522 haikuan taels.

that of the world, in 1911–1913 it had risen only to 1.7 per cent and in 1921 only to 1.9 per cent of that total. Japan, with a sixth or a seventh of the population of China, had about the same proportion of the world's commerce. India, with a population probably about a fourth smaller and with a per capita wealth possibly no greater and perhaps less, had twice as large a proportion. Economically, China was still self-contained. Her time-honored self-sufficiency, her defective systems of internal transportation, and her civil strife combined to make her relatively unresponsive to external commercial pressure. Her poverty and the chaotic state of her currency were additional obstacles to the realization of her commercial possibilities. As a market for other nations she was comparatively undeveloped.

In the half century from 1894 to 1945 the nature of China's exports and imports and the proportions of her trade shared by foreign countries altered considerably. In 1894 cotton led the list of imports in value, with opium second. Tea and silk, although suffering from the competition of other countries, were the chief exports. In China's overseas trade the British predominated.

By 1945, among the registered imports, opium had disappeared. A phenomenally successful campaign carried on against it toward the close of the Ch'ing, and the consent of Great Britain, eliminated it from lawful trade. However, under the disorder that eventually came in under the Republic the domestic production rose markedly, for military chieftains found it a convenient source of revenue, and some of them practically compelled the cultivation of the poppy. Opium was imported in large quantities, but surreptitiously and partly in the form of concentrated derivatives, such as morphine and heroin. In sections controlled by the Japanese after 1937, the sale of opium products mounted in striking fashion. Cotton remained an important item, but its relative prominence decreased. With the rise of cotton mills in China, cotton yarn and cloth declined among the imports. In 1913 cotton goods formed almost a third of the imports and in 1931 and 1932 less than ten per cent. More and more the list of imports became varied, and included hundreds of items, many of which, in total value, were significant. Among the products which loomed large were kerosene (almost trebled in quantity between 1900 and 1929, used extensively for lighting purposes, and sold through a nation-wide network of agencies by such huge foreign concerns as the Standard Oil Company and the Asiatic Petroleum Company), foodstuffs, tobacco (much of it cigarettes, the consumption of which had become nation-wide under an efficient and persistent campaign of advertising), and metal goods, including especially machinery. The civil wars of later years led to the importation of large quantities of arms and ammunition.

In the main, imports were made up of manufactured goods, products of the factories of Japan and the Occident. The growing prominence of

machinery on the list, however, was evidence that factories were being built and that China was beginning to produce goods by the new methods. Raw cotton, principally of long-staple varieties, was being imported for use in the mills. Significant, too, was the prominence of flour and wheat, for it showed that China was depending on other countries to help it meet the ever-present problem of the pressure of population upon subsistence. Sugar and rice were also among the imports. Some plants of foreign origin were introduced, among them new kinds of cotton and of drought-resistant grains. By 1937 China was arriving at the position of being an importer instead of an exporter of food and raw cotton and an exporter rather than an importer of manufactured goods.

Tea did not disappear from among the exports, but by 1927 it was only about three per cent of the whole. Silk remained the largest single item, but it was only about a fifth or a sixth of the total. It suffered greatly in competition with Japan. In both America and Europe, however, the best quality of Chinese silk was in demand for the finest fabrics. Such items came to the fore as vegetable oils (from the soy bean, the peanut, sesamum seed, a tree whose oils were used in varnishes, and the castor bean—an export which grew rapidly before and during World War I and which waned afterward), bean cake, dried vegetables, eggs (in great quantities), furs, hair, coal, raw cotton, cotton goods and thread, timber, antimony, and some cereals. The exports were still chiefly of raw materials, the product of field and mine, but here and there were manufacturers, an indication that the industrial age was arriving. Cotton goods increased from less than one per cent of China's total exports in 1913 to about ten per cent in 1932. This seemed to mean that China was less and less a market for the products of the mills of Lancashire and Japan and more and more a competitor in foreign markets. Some of the exports showed the effect of the rapid development of Manchuria, with its soy beans, its coal, and its timber. One form of export, which in total market value did not bulk large but from which large economic and aesthetic consequences might follow, was seeds and plants. One American botanist, for example, introduced from China to the gardens of Europe and America over a thousand new plants and sent abroad seeds of more than fifteen hundred different species. A French missionary is said to have sent home specimens of at least four thousand species from Yünnan alone. The Department of Agriculture of the United States Government had agents in China searching for plants which might prove of value in America.

The machinery by which foreign trade was handled was altered. The old style comprador who served as an intermediary between Chinese and foreigners was disappearing. More and more foreign manufacturers had their own agents who dealt directly with Chinese merchants. More Chinese firms were appearing in the importing trade and tended to deal with foreign

countries without the aid of intermediaries. Chinese banks were entering into competition with foreign banks. The marked decline in the proportion of trade which passed through Hong Kong—from 28.7 per cent in 1913 to 16.8 per cent in 1929, 15.6 per cent in 1931, and 8.7 per cent in 1932—seemed to indicate that this British-controlled port of middlemen was being supplanted by direct dealing between Chinese merchants and foreign lands.

Great Britain continued to lead European countries in the total amount of its trade with China. As late as 1927 it had more than twice that of any other nation of Europe. In direct commerce with China Japan surpassed it. However, the anti-Japanese boycott which began in 1931 as the result of Tokyo's Manchurian adventure, in 1932 gave the British Empire a larger proportion. Before 1930 the United States passed Great Britain and in 1932 surpassed Japan. In 1913 the British Empire had 18.7 per cent of China's foreign trade, Japan 19.4 per cent, and the United States 7.5 per cent. In 1929 the percentages were 15.1, 26.8, and 16.8 respectively. In 1932 they were 20.6, 18.4, and 21.6 respectively. The British percentages included all the Empire, comprising not only the United Kingdom, but Canada, Australia, India, and the Straits Settlements as well. Those for the British Isles were much less—in 1913, 17 and in 1929 only 8.5. The British retained their old position of leadership in China's sea-borne commerce. Until the spread of Sino-Japanese hostilities in the 1930's, they had more tonnage entering and clearing from Chinese ports—approximately a third of the whole—than any other people, although by 1930 the Japanese almost equaled them. In 1930 they probably still had as much capital invested in China as did any other nation. In that year, as nearly as could be determined—although the figures are very doubtful—the investments in China of the major foreign countries were, in round numbers: Great Britain about one and a quarter billion gold dollars (if Hong Kong was included), Japan about the same (of which about a billion dollars was in Manchuria), Russia between two hundred and four hundred millions (largely in the Chinese Eastern Railway, subsequently sold to Japan), the United States probably between two hundred and two hundred and fifty millions (of which between fifty and eighty millions were in philanthropic enterprises, such as missions), France two hundred millions, and Germany one hundred millions. Of Western nations, the United States, next to Great Britain, had the largest financial stake in China. Moreover, in spite of the keen competition of Canton and the declining importance of the foreign middleman, Hong Kong, a British possession, continued a great distributing center for the China trade. In the later years of the period, it will be recalled, except during and after 1932, about a sixth of the exports and imports of China were listed as passing through that port. The trade of China with all parts of the British Empire, including Hong Kong, was, therefore, decidedly in excess of that of Japan. Until 1942,

outside of Manchuria, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation remained the leading foreign bank, and British influence, although badly shaken, continued to be strong in the administration of the customs service. Shanghai, too, where until the 1940's the British remained more prominent than any other foreign people, continued to be the chief port of entry for foreign goods. However, in the total commerce of Great Britain, China was not so important as in that of Japan or the United States. In 1929 China accounted for more than a fourth of Japan's foreign trade, for about three and a half per cent of that of the United States, and for only about one and a half per cent of that of the United Kingdom.

Even before its conquests in the 1930's and 1940's, Japan loomed prominently in China's economic life, and China was similarly very important to Japan. In 1927, 91 per cent of the iron ore produced in China was from properties under Sino-Japanese control, and most of it was consumed in Japan—which, as we have seen, lacked extensive iron deposits of its own. In January, 1930, Japanese owned and operated in China cotton mills having 39 per cent of the spindles of the entire country.

The fifty years which followed 1894 witnessed great changes in the internal transportation system of China. The twenty years after 1894 were ones of railway building, for they saw the construction of two roads connecting Peking with the Yangtze Valley, of trunk lines in Manchuria, and of several shorter roads in various parts of the country. However, before the entire country could be equipped with railways, World War I and increasing civil strife intervened. Foreign capital was reluctant to enter and little domestic capital could be obtained. The major part of the country, therefore, and even most of China proper remained entirely unequipped. Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Tibet were without a single mile, vast Szechwan was equally free from the iron horse, and south of the Yangtze, only a few hundred miles had been constructed. After 1914, most of the new railway building was in Manchuria. By 1930 over a third of the total mileage was there. With the increase of civil war, especially after 1925, existing lines, except in Manchuria, fell into alarming disrepair. Their use by rival armies all but ruined the rolling stock and jeopardized the maintenance of the roadbeds. Their receipts were often appropriated for military or other nonrailway purposes; frequently their equipment was not paid for; and interest on bonds was repeatedly allowed to become overdue.

After the Kuomintang came into control, railway building was resumed in China proper. By the year 1942 the line between Canton and Wuchang was completed and various other roads, notably in Hunan, Kiangsi, Anhui, Kwangsi, and Chêkiang, had been constructed.

What the railway failed to provide was supplied in part by the automobile. Especially in the decade before 1937, this new type of conveyance came into widespread use. Thousands of miles of road were built, hundreds

of them being even in such relatively backward provinces as Kwangsi, Kansu, and Kweichow. After the retreat to the West in 1938 the construction of roads was pushed in Yünnan and Szechwan. Much of the construction was by military leaders for the operations of their armies, but a large proportion was for peaceful purposes. Motor omnibuses plied between many of the leading cities. In numbers of cities new, broad streets were driven through, even in congested districts, and here and there ancient city walls were torn down and replaced by broad thoroughfares. These made possible the use of automobiles in centers where the old narrow streets would have prevented it. However, most of the automobiles were in the ports, especially Shanghai, and the vast majority of the city streets were left as before, impassable or inconvenient for motor cars. Moreover, most of the new highways had dirt surfaces. Very few would support traffic in heavy trucks. The automobile was still employed almost exclusively for passengers and not for freight. Except for the infrequent railways, the latter was, perforce, transported as formerly: by boat, on the backs of men and animals, or by cumbersome carts. Late in the 1930's and in the 1940's the exigencies of war increased the use of trucks for freight. Between 1941 and 1945, because of the Japanese blockade, new cars could not be brought in and other fuels had increasingly to be substituted for gasoline.

Marked development was registered in steam navigation, most of it on the coastal waters and the Yangtze and its tributaries. Though Chinese companies were growing, most of the larger steamers were foreign-owned. Long before 1937 the "fire wheel boat" had penetrated even into Szechwan, and craft with especially powerful engines plied the dangerous gorges which were the main outlet from that great inland province. Bicycles were introduced and in some sections became numerous. By the 1930's the airplane had become an established feature of Chinese transportation. Regular air service was maintained for mail and passengers between several of the principal cities. Airplanes penetrated some of the more remote provinces. After 1937 the conflict with Japan speeded up the use of planes.

In production, the factory and Western machinery were being introduced. Long before 1937, in such cities as Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, and Tientsin, and in numbers of smaller centers, factories were in operation. The chief output of the new power-driven machinery was cotton goods. China ranked third among the cotton-growing countries of the world: it was surpassed only by the United States and India. With the vast supply of cheap labor, and with coal available, the manufacture of cotton by modern Western processes mounted. By 1928 about a quarter of a million Chinese were employed in cotton mills. In 1929 China had one hundred and twenty cotton mills, nearly two-thirds of them the property of Chinese, forty-four of Japanese, and three of British citizens. Measured by numbers of

spindles, the Japanese owned about two-thirds as much of the enterprise as the Chinese, and the British a little less than a tenth as much. Approximately half of the cotton manufacturing was in Shanghai.

Although cotton yarn and cloth were the chief products of the new processes, factories were erected for a variety of other goods. Steam filatures appeared in a number of cities. Flour mills, mills for pressing oil from the soy bean, match factories, saw mills, and sugar refineries were among the kinds of plants equipped with modern machinery.

However, the industrial revolution had barely begun. By 1930 only about one per cent of the population was connected with large-scale industry. Internal unrest made foreign capital reluctant to enter the country, and the Chinese themselves did not yet possess the quantities of fluid capital or the type of banking system essential for the financing of an extensive industrialization. The returns elsewhere for the meager supply of such capital as existed were so great that such long-term investments as factories were not favored. Technical skill was scanty, transportation facilities were usually inadequate, and taxes and official interference were often disastrous. Nor had the Chinese yet succeeded in operating many of the stock companies by which the industrialization of the Occident had been made possible. Time-honored loyalties required that, regardless of the interests of stockholders, directors create posts for members of their families. This militated against the efficiency of the Western device. The bulk of the manufactures of China were, therefore, still produced by the customary handicraft methods organized in small units by guilds. After 1937 the Japanese invasion led to a migration of modern industry to the West. Machinery was moved and set up in new sites in "free" China.

Rifts in the old organization of the industrial life of the country began to appear. In many places, especially in the chief cities, the guilds were weakening, particularly in occupations in which the new methods had been introduced. Labor unions were formed, notably among workers on the railways and in the new industries. Before 1926 they had begun to be important, and the Kuomintang, in its northward movement of that and the following year, actively encouraged their organization. Unions of peasants were also initiated by the Kuomintang. The unionizing of workmen and peasants was due chiefly to the radical, Russian-advised elements in the Kuomintang. When, in 1927, the latter were discredited and suppressed, the unions formed by them suffered reverses and many of them disappeared. By 1937 they were, on the whole, few and weak. Long before 1937, chambers of commerce became familiar features of the business structure of many of the cities. They were an easy evolution from the guild system or were formed by federations of existing guilds.

The currency became worse confounded. To the copper cash, the many kinds of taels, and the foreign-coined dollars of the monetary system in existence before 1894 were added Chinese-minted dollars of several

varieties, a subsidiary coinage of silver and copper (much debased), and floods of paper issued by banks, governments, and generals. Plans for improvement were elaborated, but while the Nanking Government showed self-constraint in the issue of paper currency, on the whole, attempts at reform proved illusory. The situation was complicated by the use of silver as a medium in large transactions in a world where the normal standard was gold. Foreign exchange fluctuated widely and foreign and domestic commerce suffered. Chinese founded many banks on Western models and competed with the foreign banks which played so large a part in the finances of the country.

Prices were mounting. This was due partly to the general rise, before 1929, the world over, and partly to the fact that, having entered into the economic life of the world, China could not preserve permanently a scale decidedly lower than that of other nations. The prolonged civil strife operated in the same direction. Wages rose, and as a rule probably about kept pace with the heightening cost of living—although accurate figures for the nation as a whole were lacking. In the larger centers, and especially in the new industries, the tendency appears to have been to shorten the hours of labor rather than to increase the standard of living. Late in the 1930's and in the 1940's the Japanese invasion was followed by skyrocketing inflation, and in both "free" and "occupied" China prices rose to fantastic heights. This applied both to commodities and to labor.

Severe famines occurred in portions of the country, especially the North. Famines were no novel phenomenon. Drought, flood, and a lack of adequate means of conveyance to transport food to the afflicted sections were not new. Civil strife aggravated the dearth, for fighting used up surpluses of grain and the breakdown of government weakened some of the usual agencies for administrating relief. It must be noted, however, that by 1937 Chinese organizations, both state and private, showed an increased willingness and ability to cope with such domestic distress.

Evidences of what alterations might be expected in the physical environment of the nation were seen in some of the cities. For example, in Amoy, once called the dirtiest port in China, by the 1930's broad, concrete-paved, electric-lighted streets took the place of the narrow, crooked, rough ones of other years, four- and five-story ferro-concrete buildings were erected, a modern sewage system and a supply of running water were installed, parks and recreation centers replaced slums, and the surrounding hillsides were cleared of graves in order to be terraced for future residences for the living.

## CHANGES IN RELIGIOUS LIFE, 1894–1945

The years after 1895 witnessed marked changes in the religious life of the country. These were in part due to the total impact of

the Occident—political, economic, and intellectual—and in part to Christian missionaries.

To the first cause must be ascribed the weakening of Confucianism. Even before the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty, the abolishment (1905) of the traditional system of civil service examinations shook to its foundations the form of education on which the perpetuation of Confucianism largely depended. Other innovations in education brought in new subjects of study and ended the concentration on the old learning. The substitution, in 1912, of the Republic for the Empire, dealt Confucianism another blow. The form of government was swept aside with which Confucianism had been almost inextricably associated. Some of the religious ceremonies maintained by the state disappeared, notably those which had been performed by the Emperor, and many others gradually lapsed. Confucius himself was unacceptable to numbers of the new student class, for he had supported monarchical institutions and his name was identified with the now discredited conservatism and the discarded system of education. With the growth in popularity of Western science and other studies from the Occident, interest in the Classics waned.

Confucianism did not succumb without a struggle. Attempts were made to show that it was not incompatible with the new order and to have the Republic adopt it as the official cult. Here and there for some years officials and associations of scholars maintained the customary rites in honor of Confucius and his disciples. Study of the Classics was embodied in the new curricula. A philosophy which had become part of the very bone and sinew of the nation could not at once disappear. In the China of the 1940's Confucianism was still an important influence. It had, however, suffered greatly.

To the general impact of the Occident were to be ascribed a widespread loss of interest in and an antagonism to religion. In many countries the twentieth century witnessed a decline in religion. To thousands the great increase of knowledge of his physical environment which man had achieved through scientific methods had made religion intellectually untenable. To even larger numbers, absorption in the pursuit of physical comforts made possible by this new knowledge rendered religion unimportant and irrelevant—or even an enemy. This skepticism and preoccupation with material concerns found in China peculiarly fertile ground, for much of the traditional philosophy tended to make China's scholars agnostic. One of the most prominent of the younger thinkers declared that China's educated class had outgrown religion earlier than any other large group in the history of mankind. The militant antireligious convictions of Russian Communism were especially influential. In 1922 an organized antireligious movement came to birth, and the radical elements in the Kuomintang were vigorous in their antireligious activities, especially

during the days of their power in 1926 and 1927. Most of the agitation was focused against Christianity, for the latter was palpably foreign in its origin and in much of its leadership, and it was associated with the "capitalistic" nations for which Communism had so strong an aversion. Some of it, however, was directed against other forms of religion. More than one temple was converted into a school, and the Taoist "Pope" was forced to flee from his accustomed residence.

Here and there the religious spirit showed signs of a fresh awakening. In some sections a reform movement galvanized the somnolent Buddhism into activity. For a time, especially before 1922, ephemeral syncretic sects, such as the Tao Yüan, interested small minorities. For a few years after 1926 it looked as though Sun Yat-sen would become the center of a new state cult. A weekly ceremony in his honor was required in all schools, and his tomb near Nanking became a kind of shrine. Yet by the 1940's enthusiasm for this innovation had waned.

Most of the earnest and aggressive new life in religion entered through Christianity. After 1895 and until about 1925, Christianity had a phenomenal expansion. The persecutions of the Boxer year proved only a temporary check: in the long run, through the added zest which came to the Church from the heroism of the martyrs, they probably stimulated the spread of the faith.

The reasons for this growth were to be found partly in China and partly in the Occident. Conditions in China were favorable. The old structure of Chinese life was crumbling, and with it went much of the resistance it offered to Christianity. Things Western were popular. In many places the Christian missionary was the only resident Westerner. As a representative of the Occident, therefore, he was given a hearing and was often influential. Repeatedly the altruistic services of the missionary won respect for the Christian message. Numbers of thoughtful Chinese, eagerly seeking means of extricating the nation from its confusion and weakness, and taught by their Confucian rearing that the salvation of the state and society depended ultimately upon the moral character of the individual, wondered whether the needed dynamic might not be found in the Christian Gospel. Never since the period of disunion between the Han and the T'ang had conditions in China been so favorable for the acceptance of a foreign faith, and at no time in the more than twelve centuries since it first reached China had Christianity there been confronted with so great an opportunity.

The situation in the Occident was propitious. Europe and America, the regions from which missionaries came, were increasing rapidly in wealth, and so had the means for expanding their religious enterprises. In Protestantism the years were ones of growing enthusiasm for foreign missions. The magnitude of the opportunity in China stirred the churches

and optimism was seen for the outlook both for China in general and for missions in particular. Even World War I, accompanied and followed though it was by momentous changes, did not at once work a reduction in the total support from the Occident. To be sure, Protestants in Great Britain had difficulty in maintaining their missions at their prewar level, and German Protestant mission societies were impoverished. Support from Protestants in the United States, however, more than made up for the deficiency. The War was quickly followed by huge campaigns in the American Protestant churches for added funds and personnel for foreign missions, in the attempt to make permanently effective the idealism with which much of America had entered that struggle. The result was extensive reinforcements for the staffs of American missions.

The interest of American Protestants in China, both before and after World War I, led to an increase in their proportionate share in missions in that country. In 1889 the numbers of British and American Protestant missionaries in China were about equal, and together they accounted for more than nine-tenths of the missionary body. In 1929 Americans made up approximately three-fifths of the total foreign staff of Protestant missions in China.

Roman Catholics augmented their efforts in China, both before and after World War I. French missions declined relatively from the predominance which they once held, particularly after the separation of Church and State in France in 1905 and the actions of the French Government against Catholic schools. However, the increase from other nationalities more than compensated for the difference. In Roman Catholic circles World War I was followed by an enhanced interest in foreign missions. Especially among American Catholics, concern for foreign missions, once negligible, rapidly mounted, and much of it centered on China.

The figures of this growth of Christian missions were impressive. In 1889 the roll of Protestant missionaries in China contained about thirteen hundred names. In 1905 the number had risen to almost thirty-five hundred, in 1910 to more than five thousand, and in 1936 to slightly more than six thousand. Because of furloughs and health leaves, the number actually at work in China at any one time was probably about one-fifth or one-sixth less than each of these figures. In 1890 not quite six hundred fifty foreign Roman Catholic priests were in China. In 1896 or 1897 the number was a little more than seven hundred fifty, in 1901 more than a thousand, in 1912 nearly fifteen hundred, and in 1926 over seventeen hundred. In 1926 the total foreign staff—bishops, priests, lay brothers, and sisters—was slightly over three thousand, and in 1933 about forty-four hundred.

The number of Chinese Christians rose even more markedly. In 1889 Protestant communicants numbered about thirty-seven thousand,

in 1898 about eighty thousand, in 1904 about one hundred and thirty thousand, in 1914 a little over a quarter of a million, in 1922 slightly over four hundred thousand, and in 1932 about four hundred fifty thousand. In 1936 the total Protestant community, reckoning baptized Christians and those under instruction, was over seven hundred thousand. In 1896 there were about half a million (baptized) Roman Catholics in China, in 1901 the number was estimated as being over seven hundred thousand, in 1907 about nine hundred thousand, in 1912 a little short of a million and a half, in 1918 a little under two millions, in 1924 a little under two and a quarter millions, in 1929 a little less than two and a half millions, and in 1941 slightly above three and a quarter millions. In no other non-Occidental country—with the exception of the Philippines and India—were there so many Roman Catholics. There were as well, in the 1930's, over one hundred thousand Russian Orthodox, most of them non-Chinese.

The activities of the missionaries, particularly of Protestant missionaries, were multifarious. Protestants, seeing the Chinese hunger for Western types of education, opened many schools, stressing especially secondary and higher education. They founded and maintained some of the best educational institutions in the country. They gave much attention to hospitals and to education in Western medicine. The Western style medical and nursing professions owed to them their inception and most of their development. Protestants organized Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, schools for the blind, and leper asylums. They promoted education in public health, helped in relieving famine, and aided the study of agricultural problems and methods. From the impulses derived from Protestants came a valiant Chinese effort to teach the masses to read. Protestants prepared and distributed an extensive religious literature: in 1924, for instance, they circulated nearly ten million copies of portions of the Bible. They presented the Christian message to millions, partly through the printed page, partly in personal conversations, and partly by means of public meetings. Although divided, as is the nature of Protestantism, into scores of denominations, they made extensive progress toward co-operation and union.

Protestant missions and the Protestant Christian community were having an influence quite out of proportion to their numerical strength. Some of the nation's leading educators either were Protestant Christians or had studied in Protestant schools. The Commercial Press, in the 1920's the largest publishing house in the country and an influential purveyor of the new knowledge, was founded by men trained in a Protestant mission press. Several of the nation's outstanding political leaders were baptized Protestant Christians—among them Sun Yat-sen, Fêng Yü-hsiang, Chiang Kai-shek, and some of the heads of ministries of the Nanking Government.

Roman Catholics were not so diverse in their activities. Compared with Protestants, they had little medical work, nor did they place such emphasis upon schools for educating the general public. They did not attempt to influence from so many angles the life of the country as a whole. They concentrated, rather, upon building Christian communities. To this end they brought thousands into catechetical schools, often paying the expenses of those in attendance. They expended much energy upon baptizing infants in danger of death, and as a corollary, maintained scores of orphanages for the care of destitute children and for rearing in the Catholic faith those waifs who survived infancy. Most of the education provided by Roman Catholics was of a religious nature—giving to the laity the rudiments of the faith and preparing a Chinese clergy. Prospective priests were required to undergo a prolonged and exacting training.

Roman Catholics continued to be much more numerous than Protestants—although until 1925 the proportionate rate of increase of the latter was greater—but Roman Catholicism made less impression upon the life of the country at large.

Upon the masses of the nation the direct effect of Christianity, whether Protestant or Roman Catholic, was still negligible. Professing Christians totaled less than one per cent of the population, and the great majority of the Chinese were probably only barely aware, if at all, of the existence of the faith.

Beginning about 1925, Christianity, and especially Protestantism, suffered grave reverses. The antireligious movement, which became largely and often explicitly anti-Christian, began in 1922, was revived in 1924, and was intensified as a result of the Shanghai incident of May 30, 1925. In 1926 and 1927 the left wing of the Kuomintang, encouraged by Russian Communists, was vigorously anti-Christian. Christianity was accused, among other things, of being "imperialistic" and "capitalistic," and since the rage of the nationalists was just then directed chiefly against Great Britain, and a considerable number of Protestant missionaries were British, Protestantism suffered more than Roman Catholicism. In 1926 and especially in 1927, at the height of the activity of the left wing of the Kuomintang, a great exodus of Protestant missionaries occurred. When, in the summer of 1927, the conservative reaction set in, missionaries began to return.

Christian schools became the target of many nationalists, on the ground that they existed for religious propaganda rather than education, and that they were part of the cultural invasion of the imperialistic powers. Since Protestants had devoted a larger proportion of their efforts toward maintaining schools than had Roman Catholics, they suffered more from this phase of the attack.

Added to the specifically anti-Christian agitation was the danger from

the widespread banditry. Missionaries, being foreign and supposedly rich, were believed to be valuable for ransom. Scores of them were captured and many lost their lives.

While in the Occident support for Roman Catholic missions was increasing, in the mid-1920's support in the United States for Protestant missions fell off. For a variety of reasons, beginning about 1924 a marked decline in giving cut the incomes of most of the major American Protestant mission boards. The incomes of Protestant missionary societies in the rest of the world remained about stationary, and so did not make up for the loss in American contributions. The world-wide financial depression that began in 1929 brought further losses in gifts. This meant that while Protestant missions were under heavy fire in China, their support from the Occident was suffering. The combination proved serious. Accurate figures are lacking, but it is certain that the growth of Protestantism in numbers of communicants decidedly slowed after 1924 and in many places experienced an actual decline. Nor did the Roman Catholic community show as large a rate of increase as in the immediately preceding years.

In some respects the persecutions and trials of the years after 1924 stimulated Christianity to deeper rootage in Chinese soil. It became unmistakably obvious that if the faith was to survive in the intensely nationalistic China of the day it must become more Chinese in sympathy and leadership. Rome took pains to show itself friendly to Chinese patriotism. After the Shanghai incident of May 30, 1925, group after group of Protestant missionaries and board after board came out in favor of removing from the treaties the clauses guaranteeing toleration for missionaries and Christianity, and some expressed themselves as opposed to extraterritoriality and foreign control of the tariff. Partly because of the nationalistic wave, Protestants rapidly put Chinese into positions of leadership. They elected several Chinese bishops, named Chinese as heads of their colleges and universities, and in many other ways sought to transfer control to them. Roman Catholics redoubled their efforts to train a Chinese clergy, and in 1926, at Rome, the Pope consecrated six Chinese priests to the episcopate—the first since the sole previous appointment in the seventeenth century. Within the next four years five more Chinese were raised to the episcopate, and by 1940 at least nineteen ecclesiastical divisions were administered by Chinese. In its financial support and in its liturgy and creeds the Church was still largely foreign, but it was less exotic than it had been a decade before.

The Japanese invasion had mixed effects upon Christianity. In Manchuria after 1931 some check was placed on the activities of missionaries and churches. After 1937, as the Japanese moved farther into China, many missionaries were forced to leave. After 1941 British and Ameri-

cans in "occupied" China were interned. Thousands of Christians joined in the exodus to the West. There, especially among Protestants, they strengthened the Christian cause. Christians, both Chinese and foreign, by their ministry to the sufferers from war, won much respect from non-Christians. Yet missionary staffs were being depleted. World War II and transportation difficulties put obstacles in the way of reinforcements. From some countries funds were cut off. Christianity was under a new handicap.

## CHANGES IN INTELLECTUAL LIFE, 1894–1945

Fully as great as the changes in government and in the economic and religious life of the country were those in education, literature, and language. Between 1895 and 1945 the mental life of China was in greater flux than at any time since the Chou.

In 1895, in spite of a few foreshadowings of change, China's intellectual life was still shaped almost entirely by the civil service examinations. Through these led the road to power and social recognition, and all formal education was determined by their requirements. As we shall see in a later chapter, the system had its virtues as well as its defects. Success in it demanded, however, so exclusive a devotion to Chinese classical studies and to the acquisition of skill in writing in a highly artificial literary style that few of those passing through it had leisure, and scarcely more of its products had interest for venturing into other fields of learning. China's literati were all but impervious to what their fellows in the West were thinking and achieving.

After 1895, and particularly after 1900, conditions rapidly changed. Schools with curricula combining Western and Chinese subjects were established in increasing numbers. The abolition, in 1905, of the old civil service examinations brought to an end the structure by which much of Chinese thought had been molded. The government planned a school system in which the old and the new learning would be combined. It had as its ideal compulsory primary education for all, with higher primary and secondary schools and universities.

Enormous difficulties confronted the realization of such a plan—among them the training of the thousands of teachers required, political influence in appointments to faculties and corruption in administration, the cost of equipment, and the expense of maintenance and salaries in a country heavily burdened by the exactions of military leaders. Progress was slow. Promising universities arose and attracted students, only to disintegrate after a few years with a change in leadership and the fluctuations of politics. The disorganization was particularly great in the years 1926–1928 when the Nationalist Government was fighting to establish itself. In 1923 about six and a half million pupils were enrolled in government

schools of all grades (a substantial increase over any preceding year for which figures are available); about half a million were in schools maintained by Christian missions, Protestant and Roman Catholic; and an unknown number, perhaps three or three and a half millions, were in private schools of the old type. Figures for 1931 showed thirty-four universities and colleges with 17,285 students, sixteen technical institutions with 2,168 students, and about thirteen hundred secondary schools with 234,811 students. Many cities extended their primary schools, especially after 1928. In 1929–1930 primary schools enrolled over eight million eight hundred thousand children. True to their traditions, the Chinese had a passion for education and showed an almost pathetic confidence in it as a means of national salvation. Private initiative supplemented that of the government.

The quality of the new education often left much to be desired. Many teachers were badly prepared and owed their positions to family or political influence. In numbers of instances the physical equipment of the schools was inadequate. Students were restive under discipline, whether moral or intellectual, often insisted upon a deciding voice in the management of the institution, and at times demanded that all be given credit for the work of a course, regardless of their competence. The faculty, for fear of losing their positions, usually yielded. Fortunately there were exceptions. Some schools consistently maintained high standards.

Many Chinese sought the new learning either in Japan or in its sources in the West. After 1900 their numbers swelled to one of the greatest student migrations in history. Most ambitious youths were dissatisfied until they had studied abroad. For some years they flocked to Japan by the thousands. A large proportion of the prominent military men were trained there. From time to time the stream to that country dwindled, partly because of the recurrent strong feeling against Japan after 1915. America was the host of other thousands, hundreds of whom were financed by the remitted portions of the Boxer indemnity due to the United States. This fund, moreover, was drawn upon to establish just outside of Peking a higher school, Tsing Hua, largely after American models. For years the United States had more Chinese students than did any European country. English was by far the most widely used of the European languages and was much sought. Immediately following World War I, France made a strong bid for Chinese students, offering many inducements. In 1930, of the 1,484 applying to the Ministry of Education for passports to study abroad, 55.6 per cent were expecting to go to Japan, 18 per cent to the United States, and 11.6 per cent to France. Hundreds were in other European countries, notably Great Britain and Germany, and for a short time before the anti-Communist reaction of 1927, in Russia.

The "returned students" played a notable part in the new China, and

more and more came into control, especially in politics and education. In 1929, for example, of the employees of the National Government at Nanking, nearly six per cent had studied in the United States, nearly four per cent in Europe, and nearly seven per cent in Japan. A still larger proportion of the higher offices at Nanking was filled by them.

The Japanese invasion of the 1930's and 1940's worked marked changes. In Manchuria it discouraged higher education and made the schools subserve the regime. Many universities in China proper moved to new sites in the West, beyond the Japanese zone. In "occupied" China Japan reorganized the curricula of the schools to suit her purposes. In "free" China the numbers of students in all grades rapidly mounted. Yet inflation, undernourishment of teachers and students, and lack of proper buildings, libraries, and laboratories wrought grave hardship.

Chinese students, both those trained abroad and those whose education had been entirely in China, were inclined to take an active interest in public affairs. In this they perpetuated the tradition of the older education, for that had been designed to prepare men for the service of society through the state. Particularly after 1911, students gave much attention to political agitation. The "Student Movement," at times organized on more than a local scale, was often a factor to be reckoned with. For example, students were prominent in effecting the various boycotts against Japan and Great Britain. The Student Movement was particularly strong in middle (secondary) schools. The youths of that age were susceptible to mob psychology and were easily swayed by older leaders, often from the outside, who found it to their advantage to organize them. Students were engrossed in the campaign of the Kuomintang in 1926 and 1927, and as is the nature of impetuous youth, gravitated toward the left. Many became zealous propagandists of Communism. Several of the Communist leaders had studied in France, Germany, and Russia. When, in 1927, the anti-Communist reaction set in, numbers were executed for their radicalism. The authorities now frowned on student activities and admonished the youth to concentrate on their books. For a time the Student Movement subsided. In 1931 it revived and had an active part in agitating for direct action against Japan and in bringing about a change of government in Nanking. In "free" China in the 1930's and 1940's it largely ceased. The Kuomintang was unfriendly and organized a "youth corps" to reinforce its own power. Many students were so pressed by the physical struggle for existence that they were apathetic. In Communist China youth was strongly indoctrinated with the ideals of the dominant party.

Inefficiency there was in much of the new education, and energy was often diverted from intellectual pursuits to political agitation. Yet there was activity in scholarship. Western and Chinese philosophers were examined. Some had their advocates and all were freely criticized. Ancient

Chinese thinkers, such as Mo Ti, long looked at askance by the orthodox, were enthusiastically rediscovered. Reprints were issued of many books proscribed by the Ch'ing. China's history came in for fearless restudy. Both the critical procedure developed in the Ch'ing dynasty by the scholars connected with the Han Learning, and the methods of Western historians, were applied to the records of China's past—to the discrediting of much that had been currently accepted, particularly concerning the pre-Confucian period.

Books multiplied, and publishing houses arose as their purveyors. Translations of hundreds of Western works were printed. Experiments were made in fresh types of literature. New journals appeared, many of them inconsequential and most of them ephemeral, but some of them influential and all of them sympathetic of the variety and freedom of thought and the desire for literary self-expression which characterized the young educated class. One of the most famous of the journals was the *Hsin Ch'ing Nien Tsa Chih* ("The New Youth Magazine"), begun in 1916 and first edited by one of the outstanding writers of the period, Ch'ên Tu-hsiu.

Other printed channels of the new ideas were the textbooks for the schools; the newspapers, which sprang up like mushrooms and most of which were of very poor quality and used largely for political, personal, and partisan propaganda; and the placard, with vivid pictures and telling phrases, developed largely for propaganda.

Moving pictures from the Occident (especially the United States) invaded the land and achieved popularity. Although looked upon primarily as a form of amusement, they depicted (even if in distorted and bizarre fashion) the life of the West and could not fail to be a potent means of education. As a rule their quality, both morally and aesthetically, was atrocious. The Western ones were often discards and the increasing numbers of Chinese films were fully as bad.

Among the most influential scholars of the time was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who first came into prominence in the reform movement of 1898 as a pupil of K'ang Yu-wei. Although he was more of a popularizer than an exact and careful thinker, his writings were widely read. Younger than he but also having an enormous effect upon the thoughtful youth of his time was Hu Shih (1891–1962). Of a scholarly family and trained in the older learning, he had a brilliant career as a student in the United States, and returning to China, wrote and lectured voluminously and ably.

In the general disintegration and modification of the intellectual containers of the past, the language itself could not hope to escape. Hundreds of fresh terms described the new objects and ideas. Some of them were imported from Japan, where for more than a generation Chinese characters in new combinations had been used to name the machines and to express the concepts entering from the West. Others were coined

in China. Various attempts were made to substitute for the cumbersome though beautiful written characters a simpler and purely phonetic system, but none achieved wide success. Quite otherwise was the outcome of a movement to adopt as a medium for scholarship and serious writing a dignified form of the Mandarin—the vernacular most widely spoken—rather than the old literary style, remote from the tongue of every day. The vernacular had often been employed in centuries past for such purposes as the writing of novels, but the new movement to utilize the *pai hua,* or "plain speech" of the people, for literary purposes is usually dated from a manifesto of Hu Shih, on January 1, 1917. Hu Shih had the courage of his convictions and employed the *pai hua* in his own writing. Others followed, and in spite of some criticism from the conservatives, the *pai hua* quickly became the medium of the younger and some of the older writers and was polished into a worthy literary vehicle. The revolution was fully as great as the substitution in Europe, some centuries earlier, of the vernaculars for Latin as the language for scholarship. Along with the use of the *pai hua* went the effort to have all the country adopt one dialect of the spoken language, a form of the Mandarin, as the *kuo yü,* or national speech. This was taught in the schools, including non-Mandarin districts (it was made compulsory in 1920), and gained rapid headway. Especially in the provinces along the southern coast, where Mandarin had once been as little understood as though it were a foreign tongue, by 1937 student audiences were easily able to follow addresses in it.

Much of this fresh intellectual life was styled the "New Tide," "Renaissance," "New Thought," or "New Culture" movement. The "New Tide" had many angles. It included the use of the *pai hua,* experiments in novel types of literature, the examination of China's past, discussions of philosophy, and in general the many intellectual currents which joined in the stream that was the new China. It strongly emphasized what it believed to be the value of the scientific approach and made much of the social science, psychology, and education. It also had a political aspect, the reinforcement of nationalism. It was individualistic and incorporated a revolt against the past. It was given impetus by the prolonged visits to China, for extensive lecture tours, of outstanding Western thinkers, notably John Dewey and Bertrand Russell.

The "New Tide" had no headquarters. For some years, under its chancellor (1917–1923), Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei—a *Hanlin* under the old regime and later a student in Germany and France—the National University at Peking was its most active center. A number of brilliant men, such as Ch'ên Tu-hsiu and Hu Shih, served on the faculty, and intellectually the University was the most stimulating institution in the country. Misfortune overtook it, however, the more prominent members of its staff resigned, and the leadership of the movement scattered.

The "New Tide," technically so called, is said to have begun in 1916

and to have reached its height between 1920 and 1923. It was essentially the proclamation of fresh ideas. When, as was soon the case, these found wide acceptance and controversy died down, the reason for its existence passed. As a phase of the coming of novel currents of thought it ceased to be. However, much of the general intellectual activity of which it was an expression continued.

What the outcome of all this intellectual ferment would be no one could accurately predict. For the time, scholars of the new type, both young and old, were chiefly animated question marks. Much of their skepticism was purely destructive. The old Confucian orthodoxy had passed. Many schools of thought, as in the Chou, were competing for the mastery. In the realm of mind, as in that of politics, chaos was the order of the day. Some there were, however, who were groping toward the building of a substitute for what had been swept aside.

## CHANGES IN SOCIAL LIFE, MORALS, AND CUSTOMS, 1894–1945

The revolution in political forms and ideals, the innovations in economics and religion, and the intellectual unrest could not fail to be accompanied by great changes in social organization, morals, and customs. The telephone, the moving picture, the widespread use of electric lights in cities (which made another type of night life possible), the factory, the railway, the automobile, the newspaper—all joined, as in the Occident, to revolutionize society. The innovations were chiefly in the ports, and here were by no means universal. Even as late as 1945 vast areas were but slightly affected. Yet the changes had begun and were prominent in the centers from which they would be most likely to spread through the rest of the nation.

Many of the old forms of etiquette were passing and were being succeeded by others, often less elaborate and more brusque. Sometimes, in the transition, a lamentable lack was shown of any of those manners which ease the intercourse between individuals and groups, and in which the Chinese had been traditionally skilled.

Old styles of dress were also going. Even before the revolution of 1911, the queue, the form of wearing the hair imposed by the Manchus, had begun to disappear somewhat furtively. With the revolution came a wholesale cutting of queues—although that appendage persisted and in the 1930's was seen even in such a modern city as Shanghai. By the 1930's the coiffure of bobbed hair had been widely adopted among women and girls. Many abandoned Chinese garb for Western costumes. While, with the increase of nationalism, especially after 1925, for a time a decided reaction occurred in favor of the traditional garb, Occidental styles were in part retained and later increased again in use. This was particularly true in the uniforms of soldiers and of school children

and older students and in the dress of those who had frequent intercourse with the foreigner in business and diplomacy.

The relations between the sexes were shifting. Freedom of social intercourse between boys and girls, and men and women, once looked upon with abhorrence after childhood years and tolerated only with women of doubtful morals, now became frequent and respectable. Women were given more liberty. Sometimes they participated in politics and were employed in government posts. In the radical movement of 1926–1927 even Amazon corps were heard of.

Youth paid less deference to age. More and more young people insisted upon making their choice of their life mates without the interference or even the advice of parents.

Here and there the large family was breaking up. Instead of members of several generations living in patriarchal groups in one compound, as had often been the custom, in the case of such new groups as laborers in the factories and graduates of secondary and high schools it was not unusual for each married couple to have its individual home. In some circles concubinage was regarded with less tolerance than formerly.

Never before in the recorded history of China had the gap in customs and outlook between generations been so wide and deep.

These changes, like so many of the others, did not come simultaneously throughout the length and breadth of the nation, nor were they to be found everywhere in equal degree. They were more in evidence in the cities, particularly along the coast and where were the largest numbers of foreigners. The westward movement of population to "free" China in the 1930's and 1940's spread them in hitherto remote and slightly altered areas. In the 1940's the presence of thousands of American troops accelerated them. Rural districts were the least affected, and in many places life was but little modified. Practically everywhere, however, some departure from the past was seen. The old China was going, never to return.

## SUMMARY

The years following 1894 witnessed the most startling and revolutionary changes in China's history. Foreigners threatened the nation's independence. Although it was not subjugated to an alien political yoke nearly as fully as it had repeatedly been in earlier centuries, and by the 1930's had made decided progress toward the recovery of such portions of its independence as had been sacrificed, in almost every other phase of its life the country yielded to the Occident. It was frequently said that China was experiencing in one generation a transition as varied and momentous as that through which Europe had passed in the Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, the French Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution.

The political framework under which the nation had been living for

more than two thousand years—and to which it owed its unity—was swept aside, and experiments were being made with Western types of government. Nothing which could confidently be called stable had emerged. Administratively the land was divided, and repeated civil strife and banditry were impoverishing it.

On the other hand, in some respects the country was more nearly a conscious unit than ever before. Nationalism—reinforced by the new educational system, the telegraph, the Customs Service, the post office, and to a less extent by the railway, the steamship, the automobile, and the airplane—was welding China together and was as effective in producing cultural uniformity as was the old administrative system.

These new institutions and appliances, with others, bade fair also to transform the economic life of the people.

Religiously the practices and beliefs of the masses were little altered, but the observances maintained by the state were discontinued or fell into neglect, and the Confucian theory by which social relationships had long been ordered was either discredited or on the way toward desuetude. Christianity made notable gains, and Buddhism experienced something of a revival, but the majority of the educated were moving toward a religious skepticism which at times became militant.

Intellectually the younger educated men and women had passed almost completely out of one world and into another and were dominated by an enthusiasm for science—of a Western type.

Socially old customs were going, here and there the family was showing signs of disintegration, the relations between the sexes were being revolutionized, and former moral standards were actively challenged.

The nation had struck its tents and was on the march.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

# THE TRANSFORMATION WROUGHT BY THE IMPACT OF THE OCCIDENT: IV. The Communists Capture the Mainland and Undertake the Thorough Remaking of China (A.D. 1945–)

On the defeat of the Japanese and the end of World War II China entered upon another stage in the transformation wrought by the impact of the Occident. In its course the revolution which had begun following the defeat by the Japanese fifty years earlier became progressively more sweeping. The Communists took possession of the mainland. Professing to adhere to the ideology set forth by Karl Marx, they set about a reorganization of the entire life of the country: political, social, economic, religious, and intellectual. In the process much of the old that had survived the previous stages of the revolution was swept into the discard. Much continued. Some basic attitudes persisted and were even strengthened. Among them were a sense of cultural superiority and with it the ambition to spread the Chinese version of Communism, especially among undeveloped nations; an ethnocentrism and chauvinism heightened by contact with Western nationalism; the determination to master all the area which had been tributary to the Ch'ing Dynasty at its height; an ambition to make China a force to be reckoned with the world around; the subordination of the military to the civil authority; the tradition of great public works undertaken by the state; and an appeal to reason in political education, ethics, and interpersonal relations. Although modified, the language and the characters through which the language was written were preserved. Yet at no time since the Chou, Ch'in, and Han, when the main outlines of China's culture had been shaped, had such drastic changes been wrought. When, in 1964, these lines were penned, the revolution of which the Communist stage was the latest had only begun. No one could know what

the next stage would be. The observer could merely be sure that change would continue.

### THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS CONFRONTED BY THE PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION

The defeat of the Japanese in the summer of 1945 confronted the National Government with the problems of reconstruction. Throughout the war the Chinese had been buoyed up by the hope of a better day when once the enemy had been expelled. The cherished dream envisioned a unified country and rapid recovery from the economic damage wrought by the invaders and the fighting which had expelled them.

The obstacles to the fulfillment of the dream were formidable. Not since the abdication of the Ch'ing had any one government succeeded in making its authority effective in all the territory that had been ruled by that dynasty. As we have seen, the country had been divided among various war lords. The pattern that had characterized the downfall of earlier ruling houses had been repeated. Strong men had collected armed forces and had contended for the mastery of the realm. Had it not been for the irruption of the Occident, if the precedent of earlier centuries had persisted, after a shorter or longer period one of the competitors would have eliminated his rivals and inaugurated a new dynasty. But from the Occident had come the ideal of another form of government, a republic. The continuation of the Confucian monarchy was impossible. Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, followed by Chiang Kai-shek, the Republic of China had been created. The Republic of China was dominated by the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party. But even before the Japanese invasion it had not brought all the former Ch'ing domains to full loyalty. Chiang Kai-shek had sought to rule through the forms of a republic. But his was in essence a one-man regime. He had marked ability and tended to think of the welfare of the country as being dependent on himself. He regarded himself as a Christian, but his ideals were compounded of that faith, the program of Sun Yat-sen, and the Confucian heritage, with the last in the ascendant. In the top echelons as well as the lower ranks of the government that Chiang headed were many men of Western training who wished to see China become a democracy as that term was understood in the Anglo-Saxon world. However, they were a minority. Nor were they united. Moreover, large numbers of influential men were not committed to that ideal. As in earlier centuries, many officeholders were chiefly concerned to fill the rice bowls of themselves and their kindred, or sought power for its own sake. As was to be expected, under such circumstances officialdom was honeycombed with corruption. Outside the Kuomintang were numbers who were not in accord with that party and who, while seeking to promote democracy,

headed factions that advocated differing approaches to China's problem and sought a voice in the government. In addition, the Kuomintang had always to face the Communist regime. Each profoundly distrusted the other and was intent on the full mastery of the country.

Added to the political and ideological factors were chronic economic problems, rendered acute by the years of war. The population, already grown beyond the means of subsistence under the prewar economic structure, had been further impoverished by long domestic conflict and foreign invasion. Railways and other means of transportation, never sufficient for the requirements of the new age, had deteriorated. The beginnings of industrialization had suffered. Inflation was both a grim reality and a continuing threat. Physical relief to the millions of sufferers from the war was imperative.

To top it all, the Republic of China was exhausted by the long struggle against the Japanese. It had borne the main brunt of the invasion. It had been saved partly by its determined resistance and partly by the aid of its Western friends, especially the United States. But for that aid it would probably have collapsed.

## COMPLICATED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The problems of reconstruction were complicated by the web of international relations in which China was entangled. As we have repeatedly seen, in the nineteenth and the fore part of the twentieth century foreign powers had thrust themselves on the Empire, and the attempt of the Boxers to free the land had only compromised more drastically the independence of the country. The Japanese invasion and World War II had added further complications.

A new factor brought by the war was the United Nations. The Republic of China was represented in the gathering in San Francisco in the spring of 1945 which drew up the charter of that body. Along with the U.S.S.R., France, Great Britain, and the United States, it was given a permanent seat on the Security Council. The charter was signed in June, 1945, and on the ratification of the required number of governments, came into effect in October of that year.

Another new problem was the repatriation of the Japanese, both the armed forces and the civilians. The United States gave substantial assistance, but the burden was primarily one for the Republic of China and was added to the others which that regime had to bear and at a time when they were particularly pressing.

Relations with the U.S.S.R. presented difficulties. For nearly three centuries Russia had constituted a recurring menace. The land frontier between the Ch'ing Empire and Russia was longer than any other on the

planet. Again and again friction had developed. The Republic of China had not been able to escape it. At the end of World War II the U.S.S.R. had official relations with it rather than with the Communists. In April, 1945, Stalin assured Patrick Jay Hurley, the American Ambassador to China, when the latter saw him in Moscow, that the U.S.S.R. would join with the United States and Great Britain in bringing about the unification of the armed forces in China and declared that he regarded Chiang Kai-shek as "selfless" and a "patriot." The following month Stalin told Harry Hopkins, a representative of President Truman, that the Chinese Communists were not qualified to unify China, that Chiang Kai-shek was the only Chinese able to do it, and that the U.S.S.R. looked to the United States to assist in the reconstruction of China. Mao Tse-tung's emphasis upon the peasants rather than the industrial workers as the basis for revolution differed from that of Stalin. Stalin was intent on recovering for Russia what had been lost to Japan in the war of 1904–1905. In February, 1945, at Yalta, where China was not represented, Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin agreed that Dairen was to be internationalized, that the pre-eminent interests of the U.S.S.R. there were to be recognized, that the lease on Port Arthur which Russia had obtained in 1898 and had been forced to give to Japan in 1905 was to be assigned to the U.S.S.R., that the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, providing as they did Russian access to Dairen, were to be placed under a joint Soviet-Chinese company, but with assurance of the preservation of the Russian interests in the line, and that the *status quo* in the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia) was to be preserved. Yet the Yalta arrangements also provided that China was to have full sovereignty in Manchuria, and that the provisions concerning Dairen, Port Arthur, the railways, and Outer Mongolia were to require the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek bitterly resented the fact that the Yalta negotiations had been carried through without consulting him. He did what he could to salvage all that was possible.

On August 14, 1945, after prolonged negotiations, the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. signed a treaty and entered into agreements by which they promised to collaborate in the common war against Japan, not to enter into any alliance directed against the other, to work together closely after the coming of peace, to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both governments, and not to interfere in the internal affairs of either. The treaty was to remain in force for thirty years. In an exchange of notes the U.S.S.R. "reaffirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty" over Manchuria, and China agreed to the independence of Outer Mongolia if a plebiscite in that country favored it, gave the U.S.S.R. a favored position in Dairen, approved the joint use of Port Arthur by the two powers, the defense of that port by Russia, and the union of the Chinese Eastern

and South Manchurian Railways under the equal ownership of China and Russia with a Russian citizen as manager. The U.S.S.R. thereupon rushed troops into Manchuria. At the request of the Republic of China it delayed its evacuation of Mukden until that government could take possession. However, the Russians systematically stripped Manchuria of much of its machinery and sent it into their own territory. They disarmed the Japanese. When they had done so they withdrew but left behind them large quantities of Japanese arms and ammunition. The Communists moved into the countryside and seized them.

### THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ATTEMPTS RECONSTRUCTION

In the face of the many domestic difficulties and the international complications, the government of the Republic of China set itself to the herculean task of reconstruction. It endeavored to accomplish what it had been unable to achieve even before it was weakened by the prolonged attack by the Japanese. It attempted to extend its administration not only to areas which it had controlled before 1931, but also to the regions which had long been under the Japanese. Of these the chief were Manchuria, where its authority had never been effectively asserted, and T'aiwan (Formosa), which had been under Japanese rule since 1895. By the year 1947 progress had been made toward attaining these goals. The National Government had stationed troops in some of the chief cities of Manchuria, notably Mukden. It had placed a governor over T'aiwan. However, in Manchuria the Communists were taking possession of the countryside. The governor placed in charge of T'aiwan was rapacious and corrupt. Although by blood and language the large majority of the T'aiwanese were Chinese, they had long been separated from the mainland and viewed officials sent by the National Government as foreigners. The conduct of the new arrivals further alienated them.

In areas in China proper recently occupied by the Japanese, numbers of the representatives of the National Government aroused hostility. They tended to regard the Chinese who had remained under Japanese rule as collaborators with the recent enemy. The capital of the Republic of China was once more established in Nanking. Officials who returned there from "free" China and the citizens who had been under the rule of the Japanese puppets had had such different experiences that co-operation in reconstruction was difficult.

Loud complaints were heard of the lack of democracy in the National Government. The regime was in the hands of one party, the Kuomintang. Sun Yat-sen had believed that to be necessary, but had professed to see in it a temporary stage which was to be followed by one in which other parties would share. Many said that the government under the Kuomintang

was a police state. Numbers of dissidents, especially among the students, a class which had long had a record of vigorous protest and action against administrations which they did not like, were imprisoned, or in other ways visited with severe measures. The Communists were especially vocal.

### FRIENDLY ATTEMPTS BY FOREIGNERS TO HELP WITH RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION

Friends of China in other countries were moved by the plight of the people and the stupendous task which the widespread suffering presented to a government crippled by war, confronted with multitudinous problems, and handicapped by corruption and inefficiency. From many lands and agencies, some private and some official, efforts at relief came. Although only recently organized, UNRRA (the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) was one channel. The United States Government was another agency. Christian missionary organizations, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, were active. Roman Catholics and Protestants strove not only to help in physical relief, but also to renew their varied programs which had been interrupted by the war.

### THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SEEKS TO HELP RESTORE INTERNAL PEACE

Conditions in China were of deep concern to the Government of the United States. The United States had long interested itself in China. It had sought to safeguard the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. It had been drawn into active belligerency in World War II by its efforts to curb Japan's aggression in China. It had borne the main burden of the defeat of Japan by sea and by air and during the war had given substantial direct help to the Chungking government. In the course of its effort to defeat Japan the United States Government had endeavored, in vain, to induce the regimes headed respectively by Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists to unite in presenting a common front to the invaders.

Now that Japan was eliminated, the United States Government believed that if China was to achieve reconstruction internal unity was imperative. Its representatives helped in the disarming and repatriation of the Japanese and aided the National Government in reoccupying the parts of the country which had been under Japanese rule. It supported the forces of the National Government with military supplies, naval vessels, and air equipment.

Late in 1945 President Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China as his personal representative to help in the "unification of China

by peaceful, democratic methods." Marshall had had experience in China and had been chief of staff in all theatres in World War II. He was a man of high integrity, marked ability, and complete selflessness. On his arrival, early in January, 1946, he was able to induce the Political Consultative Conference called by Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking to endorse a program for bringing together all parties, including the Kuomintang and the Communists, under the leadership of Chiang and the guidance of the principles of the *San Min Chu I*, "to construct a new China, unified, free, and democratic." Marshall induced the National Government and the Communists to cease fighting each other, to join in creating one national army, and to set up executive headquarters in Peip'ing. The carrying out of the agreement was entrusted to the executive headquarters, and on it the National Government, the Communists, and the United States were represented. In spite of this agreement, fighting broke out between the Communists and troops of the National Government, but Marshall succeeded (June, 1946) in bringing about a truce.

When the capital of the National Government was returned to Nanking negotiations continued, but the conflicting aims of the Kuomintang and the Communists proved irreconcilable. Each was intent on controlling all the country. Each accused the other of bad faith. The Communists refused to send representatives to the National Assembly, which met in Nanking in November, 1946, to frame a constitution which, it was hoped, would fulfill the dream of Sun Yat-sen by ending the period of tutelage under one party and introducing a democratic multiparty regime. The Communists were enraged by the dispatch of Nationalist troops to North China, a region which they considered their own. Their anger mounted when, in spite of Marshall's efforts to bring about a truce, the Nationalists pressed their siege of Kalgan, a strategic center north of Peip'ing, and took it about a month before the meeting of the National Assembly.

The United States satisfied neither the extremists in the Kuomintang nor the Communists. Both accused the American Government of aiding the other. The Communists especially were loud in their denunciations. At Marshall's instance, J. Leighton Stuart—a prominent Protestant missionary educator who had been born in China, had spent most of his life there, and had the confidence of many Chinese—was appointed American ambassador. He and Marshall labored to bring the dissidents together. In January, 1947, in spite of Chiang Kai-shek's urgent plea that he remain as his adviser, Marshall left China for Washington and became Secretary of State.

In the summer of 1947 President Truman sent a mission to China to ascertain the facts in the situation. It was headed by General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had been Chief of Staff for Chiang Kai-shek in the latter part of the war. He was given ambassadorial rank and with his subordinates

collected a mass of information. Before leaving China he spoke out publicly and bluntly. He pointed to the corruption and inefficiency in the National Government. In reporting to President Truman, he said that the continued fighting in Manchuria was draining the strength of the National Government and recommended that the United Nations take immediate action to end the war there and place the region under a joint trusteeship of China, Russia, Great Britain, France, and the United States. He held that if this was not done the Communists would dominate not only Manchuria but the rest of China as well.

### THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT FAILS IN ITS OBJECTIVES AND IS FORCED OFF THE MAINLAND

Wedemeyer proved a true prophet. In spite of Marshall's repeated advice, Chiang Kai-shek kept an incompetent and corrupt military commander in Manchuria and appointed as his successor an able general who was handicapped by illness and by the lack of trustworthy subordinates. Chiang Kai-shek himself went to Peip'ing to direct the campaign in Manchuria, but he did not succeed in stemming the retreat, and early in November, 1948, Mukden, the last stronghold of the National Government in Manchuria, was taken by the Communists. A few weeks earlier Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, had fallen to them.

Early in January, 1949, the National Government appealed to the governments of Russia, France, Great Britain, and the United States to act as intermediaries in the negotiation of peace with the Communists.

The attitude of the Chinese people would have made such action by the powers futile. The nation as a whole had lost faith in the National Government. In spite of many officials of ability and integrity, the widespread corruption, the inefficiency, and the police measures taken to restrain dissent had alienated the majority. The final blow to confidence followed the failure of the attempt of the National Government in the summer of 1948 to curb inflation. The paper currency of the National Government had rapidly deteriorated in purchasing power. The effort was made to issue a currency based on gold, and those having that metal were induced or required to give it to the state in return for the new notes. After a few weeks the latter shared the fate of the earlier issues. Those who had trusted the state became hostile. The National Government had palpably lost "the Mandate of Heaven"—as dynasty after dynasty had done on its approaching demise.

The only viable alternative to the National Government or complete chaos was the Communists. None of the other parties had the numerical strength or the discipline to fill the vacuum. In 1949 the Communists rapidly advanced. Possibly to their surprise, resistance quickly crumbled.

On January 15 they occupied Tientsin. The last day of January they took Peip'ing. On March 24 they seized Taiyüan, the capital of Shansi. On April 20 they crossed the Yangtze and on April 24 they were in Nanking. By the end of May they had taken possession of Hankow, Hanyang, Wuchang, and Shanghai. The National Government moved its capital to Canton and then to Chungking. The bulk of its troops, chronically unpaid and with officers whom they did not trust, had no stomach for fighting. In January, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek retired from the presidency. But he retained his headship of the Kuomintang, and on March 1, 1950, he resumed the presidency. By the middle of 1950 he and those who followed him took refuge on T'aiwan (Formosa). There they continued the outward forms of the Republic of China. On October 1, 1949, the Communists proclaimed the People's Republic of China, with its capital at Peip'ing, now given its earlier name, Peking. They were preparing to drive the National Government out of its last refuge, when international developments to which we will turn in a moment prevented the attainment of that goal.

The Communist Party owed its victory partly to the vacuum created by the weakness of the National Government and its other rivals and partly to its disciplined leadership and organization. It had recovered from its defeat in the 1920's and had learned by its long resistance to the National Government, the endurance of "the Long March"—the arduous journey of its leadership to escape the pressure of Chiang Kai-shek's forces on its former holdings south of the Yangtze to its new center at Yenan in the Northwest—and its sturdy guerrilla resistance to the Japanese. In spite of repeated internal tensions, its leadership presented a united front to its enemies. In contrast with the Russian experience with the strife between Trotsky and Stalin and then the post-mortem denigration of Stalin by Khrushchev, which were for all the world to see, after the Yenan days that united front was outwardly preserved—at least until the time when these lines were penned.

## THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP

The Communist leaders continuously most in the eyes of the world were Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Chu Tê. Mao Tse-tung (1893—) was the son of a peasant in comfortable economic circumstances in Hunan, the province famous in the second half of the nineteenth century as the home of Tsêng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang, who had done much to rescue the Ch'ing dynasty from the demise threatened by the rebellions of the third quarter of that century. He went to school in Changsha, the capital of Hunan, and was caught up in the fresh currents that were stirring the youth of his day. He had sufficient training in the older classical literature to be familiar with it, later to write poetry in traditional forms, and to preserve a continuing admiration for the historical fiction of the earlier days. He sensed that the future would

demand physical fitness, joined with other youths in accustoming his body to hardship, and acquired the remarkable endurance he displayed in later years. He was impressed with the writings of the pioneers in the new intellectual and social currents, first K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and then Hu shih and Ch'ên Tu-hsiu. After graduating from a normal college in Changsha in 1916 he went to Peking and was there for two periods, at least part of the time in Peking University, the center of the throbbing life of the "New Tide." He worked in the library of that institution and was an omnivorous reader. Then and in later years he covered much of the revolutionary thought that was issuing from Chinese pens and from translations of Western writers. By the summer of 1920 he had become a convinced Marxist. Not far from the same time Ch'ên Tu-hsiu had taken the same step. Even before arriving at Marxist convictions, Mao had begun organizing laborers and engaging in political agitation in Hunan. Although he co-operated with the Communist Party early in the 1920's he differed from the then orthodox line and held that the revolution must come from the peasants rather than from the industrial proletariat. His "heresy" for a time cut him off from the Party, but in 1931 he was restored to its good graces and became outstanding in the Communist areas in Kiangsi. In January, 1935, during the Long March, he was elected the chief of the Party. From then on his leadership of the Chinese Communists was not successfully challenged.

Chou En-lai was from a far different background but was also early swept into the revolutionary tide. Born in 1898, he was the son of a scholar who aspired to office under the Ch'ing dynasty. His father saw to it that he was early introduced to the traditional learning. In his teens the lad enrolled in one of the best of the new schools which were combining the old with the new. He participated in the student movements that protested against the "unequal treaties," studied in France and Germany, and while in Europe became noted as a Communist. Returning to China, he quickly rose to prominence in the Party. He survived various crises in its stormy history and in Yenan continued to be outstanding. In the years of Communist triumph he remained in the front ranks and had much to do with the foreign diplomacy of the People's Republic of China. Suave and charming when he chose to be, he had the polish that characterized the scholar official class of the Empire. In this he was in sharp contrast with Mao Tse-tung, who never attempted to throw off the manners of his peasant rearing.

Like Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i was a native of Hunan. He, too, was the son of a prosperous farmer. After graduating from a normal college in Changsha he went to Shanghai and enlisted in the Socialist cause. Returning to Central China, he became a labor organizer. He was soon active in the national labor movement. He was repeatedly in Russia. By 1945 he was in the inner circles of the Chinese Communist Party and was regarded as an outstanding expert in Communist theory. He was not as

much in the public eye as were Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, but he was eventually (1959) raised to the titular head of the state.

Chu Tè was the military man of the quartette. Born in 1886 in Szechwan of a well-to-do father, as a boy he was given the traditional classical education. In his early twenties he was introduced to Western subjects and acquired a military training. After the revolution that upset the Ch'ing dynasty, he continued a military career and eventually became an adherent of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang. In 1924 he went to Germany to study and while there was converted to Communism. After returning to China, he organized a Communist force in the mountains of Hunan and Kiangsi, joined with Mao Tse-tung, and was appointed the commander-in-chief of the Red army. He shared in the Long March. When the Communists mastered the mainland, he was put in high office in the People's Republic.

## THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE COMMUNISTS

The Communist leaders and their cohorts faced an array of problems which might well have discouraged even as determined and convinced a company as were they. Many of the obstacles which had confronted the National Government remained and were aggravated by the failure of that regime. The railroads and other means of communication were, if possible, in worse state than at the defeat of the Japanese. The currency was worthless. The Russians had carried off most of the transportable machinery of the industrial establishments in Manchuria—where, thanks to the Japanese, was most of the manufacturing in the country. Population had outstripped the means of subsistence. In vast areas the local and provincial governments had broken down. Overseas trade had not been restored even to its prewar level. Many foreign countries regarded the Communists with distrust or hostility and could not be expected to give financial assistance. Although it had retreated to T'aiwan, the National Government was unreconciled and Chiang Kai-shek was determined to return to the mainland.

In some respects the magnitude of the problems constituted an opportunity. The National Government was so discredited that it could as yet offer no effective opposition. Nowhere else did formidable organized rivals exist. The inarticulate masses and the articulate intelligentsia were prepared to welcome any promising alternative to the existing chaos.

## THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM

Surprised and rendered confident by the rapidity of the collapse of the armies of the National Government, the Communists at

once undertook the realization of the program to which they were committed. They were determined to reshape China in such fashion as to make it a socialist country according to their interpretation of Marxism. That meant, negatively, the sweeping away of much of the remnants of the old China. It included, positively, the re-education of the entire nation to conform to the Communist ideology. It also entailed the restoration and extension of the railways, the industrialization of the country, improvement in public health and in education, the reclamation of waste lands, the reforestation of the hills and mountains stripped of trees and soil by the wasteful methods of earlier generations, the utilization of the minerals and soil, the harnessing of streams for power and irrigation, and better agricultural methods to increase the supply of food and of raw materials for textiles. The Communist program also embraced full emancipation from the remnants of foreign imperialism; the restoration of Chinese suzerainty in all areas that had ever acknowledged it, even when that acknowledgment had entailed little or no actual rule; and winning such a voice in the affairs of mankind that China would be respected as a major, perhaps *the* major power in the world scene—a place commensurate with her past achievements and her position as the most populous of nations. The pride enshrined in her historic title, "The Middle Kingdom," persisted and was enhanced.

To bring their program to realization, the Communists entered upon campaign after campaign, endeavoring to mobilize all the resources of the country. At the time these lines were written, less than sixteen years after the Communist capture of the mainland, the outcome was by no means certain. Evidences were accumulating that the nation was being pushed beyond the nervous and physical capacity of the human frame. The cost in suffering and lives had been staggering. The ostensible purpose was the welfare of the people as a whole. The effort was declared to be more than justified by what future generations would enjoy. Millions joined enthusiastically in the effort, for the Communists gave the country the strongest government that it had known for centuries. But no one could safely predict that the goal would be attained.

At first sight the Communists appeared to be intent upon sweeping aside all the nation's past as evil and beginning afresh to construct a new society based on their understanding of Marxism. Yet on more discerning appraisal, the Communists were seen to be holding, whether consciously or unconsciously, to much in the traditions which we have noted in the history of China. The Communists professed to be done with Confucius. Yet they loudly proclaimed that they were laboring for the welfare of the people as a whole—an ideal which Confucianism had long inculcated. Confucianism had taught that true civilization was to be achieved under the leadership of an elite educated in its ideals and dedicated to the service

of the masses. This, too, was what Communists strove to achieve, but with principles which they regarded as taught by Marx-Leninism. The self-examination which the Communists enjoined in their education could claim precedent in Confucian practice. The atheism that was part of the Marxist dogma found congenial soil in a culture whose intellectuals had tended—under the influence of Sung Neo-Confucianism and other strains in Chinese philosophy—to be religiously agnostic. China's past had repeatedly witnessed efforts to regiment the entire population. That was first seen on an Empire-wide scale under Ch'in Shih Huang Ti in the third century before Christ. But it had again and again been attempted. Moreover, Emperor after Emperor had carried through public works at the cost of thousands of lives in forced labor—as in the building and repair of the Great Wall, the construction of the Grand Canal, and the erection of palaces and of such capitals as Ch'angan. Here the Communists could find ample precedent for their vast undertakings through the ruthless exploitation of labor. The effort put forth to spread the Chinese brand of Communism over all mankind and especially through East Asia, thus "liberating" other peoples, had kinship with the long-cherished conviction that the Chinese way of life was the only true civilization and that a benefit was being conferred by persuading or compelling others to adopt it.

Unless we are to lengthen these pages far beyond their due proportion in a book as comprehensive of all China's history as this attempts to be, we must drastically summarize and condense the record of the fifteen years which followed 1949. We must stop at a semicolon, for because of the inexorable calendar we must pause in our account when the Communist stage in China's history was as yet unfinished and when its future was unpredictable.

One other generalization we must make. The Communist stage was both a continuation of the revolution brought by the impact of the Occident, and a sharp break. The preceding stages had been brought about primarily by the impact of western Europe, especially Britain, and the United States. That impact had come either directly or indirectly, the latter mainly through Japan. Anglo-Saxon liberalism and democracy had been the chief sources. Until late in his life, when he turned to Russia, so far as he was indebted to the West Sun Yat-sen had been predominantly in contact with ideals of Anglo-Saxon provenance. He was a Protestant Christian. Chiang Kai-shek was baptized a Methodist and his second wife's family had been reared under American Methodist influence. Numbers of the officials in the National Government had been educated in the United States, and some in high places had come to a profession of Christianity through Anglo-Saxon Protestant missionaries. The Communist victory was a major defeat for Western, predominantly Protestant, ideology.

### THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPT TO CUT CHINA'S TIES WITH THE ANGLO-SAXON WEST

When they obtained possession of the mainland, one of the early acts of the Communists was to cut the ties of China with the West, especially the United States. That was to be expected. In the "cold war" which was developing, the chief antagonists were Russia and the United States, and the Communists looked to the U.S.S.R. as the champions of Marxism. The Communists regarded Great Britain as the leading villain in the imposition of the "unequal treaties" on China. They resented the extensive aid given by the United States to the National Government. To their mind, Christianity was intimately associated with Western imperialism. They held that to be true of both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. The well-known hostility of the Papacy to Communism heightened the antagonism of the Chinese protagonists of Marxism to the Roman Catholic Church.

Even before the Communists had taken over the mainland, they viewed the United States as their most dangerous foreign enemy. In October, 1949, they arrested the American consul in Mukden on the alleged charge that he had beaten a Chinese employee. The American State Department vigorously denounced the action and appealed to thirty nations to join in the protest. After a few weeks the consul was released and left China. Great Britain gave official recognition to the People's Republic of China soon after its proclamation. But that did not prevent the new regime from instituting progressively severe restrictions on British merchants. Within a few years all British business men had left the mainland. Through Hong Kong, restored to Great Britain after the defeat of Japan, the British continued their long-standing commerce with the Chinese, but they were even more effectively shut out of residence on the mainland than before the treaties that followed their first war with China.

The Communists promptly took steps to cut off connections between Christians and their fellow believers in the West. Although they were frank in their atheism, they professed to grant full religious tolerance if their rule was not endangered. However, they regarded all Christian missions as cultural imperialism. They denounced, and induced some Christians to denounce, missionaries, especially the most notable Protestant missionaries of the past and the present, declaring them agents of political as well as cultural imperialism. Protestant missionaries had long had as their goal the bringing into being of self-supporting, self-propagating, self-governing churches. The Communists required the Chinese Protestants to conform to that ideal. They insisted that all ties be severed with churches outside China, that missionaries leave, and that financial aid from foreigners be discontinued. They induced some of the Protestant leaders to organize

nationally in support of the "three-self" program. A number of Protestant missionaries were imprisoned or put under house arrest. A few were subjected to "brain-washing" to induce them to endorse the Communist program. Although for several permission was long delayed, the large majority of the Protestant missionaries were allowed to leave the country. Many were expelled after being publicly disgraced. All educational and philanthropic Protestant institutions, except three or four theological schools, were taken over by the state, and by 1964 were reduced to one.

Roman Catholics were treated more harshly. They were required to cut all ties with the Vatican. Corresponding to the measures taken with Protestants, the Communists persuaded some Catholics to form the Catholic Patriotic Association and brought pressure on the Chinese episcopate to join it and to perpetuate the apostolic succession by consecrating several of their fellow clergy as bishops. Rome broke off communion with those who complied—a step which the Communists welcomed. Numbers of Catholic missionaries were imprisoned and tortured in an attempt to compel them to confess that they were spies of the imperialists. Many Chinese priests and nuns were imprisoned, tortured, and subjected to "re-education" and "brain-washing" to bring them to support the Communists. An undetermined number perished. Protestant and Roman Catholic congregations in the rural areas dwindled or disappeared. They persisted longer in the cities, and adult conversions as well as the baptism of infants continued, but in diminishing numbers. But more and more restrictions were placed on the churches, and communication with their fellow believers in other countries, even those within the Communist bloc, was increasingly difficult.

## "LAND REFORM"

As was to be expected from the emphasis of Mao Tse-tung on the peasantry, the Communists early began what they called "land reform." By this they meant the expropriation of the holdings of the landlords and of such institutions as temples, ancestral shrines, monasteries, schools, and churches, and the distribution among the men who farmed it of the soil thus released. By May, 1951, three-fourths of the rural population was officially reported to have profited by the program. Ten million hectares were said to have been confiscated and divided among eighty million peasants. The following year "land reform" was declared to have been completed. In the process thousands of the landlords and of moneylenders who had battened off the peasants lost their lives. Public meetings were held to hear complaints of alleged oppression. "People's courts" conducted the trials. Many of the accused were killed in mass

executions. Estimates varied as to the number of landlords and money-lenders who perished. Some of them ran into the millions.

### THE ORGANIZATION OF PEASANT PROPRIETORS INTO "MUTUAL AID TEAMS," "CO-OPERATIVES," "COLLECTIVES" AND "COMMUNES"

The Communists were not content with the distribution of the landlords' holdings among the peasants. They believed that national welfare and the supplies required for the growing population, the laborers in the mounting industries, the production of cotton and other fibers for textiles, and the needed foreign exchange, including repayment of the Russian loans, made necessary the more effective organization of agriculture. This they attempted in accordance with what they held were socialist principles. Although in 1953 they declared that the total production of food was much in excess of those figures, it was probably about that of the last prewar year. In pursuance of its goal the government sought to institute "mutual aid teams" made up of from fifteen to thirty families each. In 1953 Peking claimed that teams of this kind numbered six millions. Beginning in 1954 the "mutual aid teams" were transformed into "agricultural producers' co-operatives." They were means of pooling land, implements, draft animals, and labor. The land itself was still privately owned. In June, 1956, the claim was made that 91.7 per cent of the farm households were in these co-operatives. As was to be expected, critics said that the majority of the peasants joined reluctantly and that the finances and accounting entailed were in arrears. In 1956 a further step was initiated. The co-operatives were transformed into "collective farms." Some of the latter were owned by the state and others jointly by the members of the farms. By the summer of 1958 the assertion was heard that 95 per cent of the peasant households were in these collectives. The state farms were mostly in the Northeast and embraced only a small proportion of the cultivated land. On them tractors and other mechanical devices were employed. In 1958 a still more drastic program was announced. Farm households were organized into "communes," with common kitchens and dining rooms and the collective care of the aged, of infants, and of the rearing of children. The ostensible purpose was to supplant the fragmentation of the land into small holdings, on which machinery and draft animals could not be economically utilized, with larger units, which could be cultivated more efficiently. In the communes local industries were inaugurated to utilize labor during the slack seasons of agriculture. By the autumn of 1958 the government reported that 23,397 communes had been set up and that they contained 112,240,600 families, or 90.4 per cent of the peasant population. Pronounced dissatisfaction followed and by 1963 modifications had been proclaimed. The control of the land was

turned back to smaller, workable groups similar to the co-operatives, and the peasants were permitted to grow much of their own food and livestock on land which they were allowed to own. Attempts were made by deeper plowing and enlarged use of fertilizers, to increase agricultural production. But it was said that the cadres to whom supervision was entrusted had insufficient familiarity with local soils and other conditions. Production fell off. How much the food shortages and under-nourishment of the early 1960's were due to the system, how much to natural calamities, and to what degree to the growing population could not be adequately determined. Yet it was said that many of the farmers joined in the communes wholeheartedly and sacrificially. By 1964 attempts were made at reemphasis on the communes.

The socialization of agriculture included the fixing of quotas for the co-operatives and communes, and compulsory sale to the government for reselling through state agencies to the urban population, for use by officials, for export for foreign exchange, and for repayment of the Russian loans.

The government entered upon large-scale public works to control floods, increase irrigation, and reforest the denuded uplands and sterile soil. It organized extensive efforts to fight plant and animal diseases, exterminate pests, improve agricultural techniques, and introduce better seeds. In the 1960's critics declared that much of this program had not only failed but had given rise as well to conditions which hampered production.

### THE STATE MASTERY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

The Communists applied their socialist principles not only to agriculture. They also took over trade and industry and in time made them state undertakings. Here the transition did not entail the wholesale violence and executions which had accompanied land reform. On the eve of the Communist capture of the mainland, only a small proportion of the trade and manufacturing were government enterprises. By the end of 1954 it was said that only about a fifth remained fully in private hands. In some instances a private firm suffered such embarrassment from government regulations that at its request it became an agent of a government company. Then it was transformed into a joint state-private enterprise. On other occasions the transition was at once to a joint undertaking of the state and the former owners. In still others the government expropriated the business directly. Industry, retail and wholesale trade, and handicrafts were progressively taken over by the government. For a time small retail merchants were permitted to continue and the state contented itself with wholesale operations. Co-operatives were encouraged. But by 1958 the free market had been drastically reduced.

Associated with the nationalization of trade and industry were price-

fixing, rationing, and the allocation of quotas of foods and other commodities to localities and individuals.

### THE RE-EDUCATION OF THE CHINESE

Important though the applications of socialism to agriculture, trade, and industry were, even more sweeping was the program for the re-education of the Chinese people. The Communists set about inculcating upon all the nation their views of the universe, history, man, ethics, and the structure of society. Never before had any government entered upon as drastic a remaking of the culture of so numerous a people. Earlier stages of the revolution brought by the impact of the Occident had destroyed important aspects of the inherited culture. Before the Communist victory three of the foundation stones of the old China had disappeared: the civil service examinations based on the Confucian Classics, the educational system that prepared for the examinations, and the monarchy. They were bulwarks of the Chinese way of life which dated from before the time of Christ. The Confucian family remained. Badly weakened by the acids of Western modernity, it still did much to shape the mores of the nation. Now it, too, was swept into the dust bin.

The Communists did not completely disregard China's history. They reinterpreted it. They viewed it from the standpoint of Marxist ideology. Chinese equivalents of such terms as "feudal" and "bourgeois" were employed to disparage institutions and customs which Communists viewed as blocking the kind of society which they wished to construct. Whether consciously or unconsciously, they were following the precedent of several dynasties. Again and again a ruling house had taken stringent measures to bring the Empire to conformity with what it deemed orthodoxy. Ch'in Shih Huang Ti had sought to extirpate all the schools of the Chou dynasty except that on which he based his regime. Beginning at least as far back as the later years of the T'ang, successive dynasties had supported Confucianism through the civil service examinations based on the standard writings of that school and latterly as interpreted by Chu Hsi and other scholars of the Sung. For generations the Ch'ing Emperors endeavored to inculcate Confucian standards by the regular, frequent, and wide public reading of the Sacred Edict. That document was an enlargement of precepts of the K'ang Hsi Emperor which extolled Confucian morality and denounced Buddhism, Taoism, and Christianity. The rigorous self-examination of adherence to the teaching of Marxism, reinforced by group fellowship and confession, had a foreshadowing in a Confucian example of daily introspection to measure the scholar's conformity to moral standards.

The attack upon the traditional family was especially marked in the early days of Communist domination. Youths were encouraged to denounce

their fathers as "reactionaries" and "rightists." This was in direct contradiction to "filial piety," a basic principle of Confucianism. Instead of the historic "five relations": between prince and minister, father and son, older brother and younger brother, husband and wife, and friend and friend—three of which had to do with the family—children in the nurseries were taught "the five loves": for the fatherland, for the people, for labor, for science, and for public property. None of them so much as mentioned the family. In the communes a deliberate attempt was made at the rearing of children collectively rather than in the family. Although the breakup of the traditional family had begun before the Communists, and much of the criticism of pre-Communist intellectuals had been directed against the Confucian family with its patriarchal authority, the servitude of women and children to the head of the family, and the dictation of betrothals and marriages of the young by the old—here for the first time was a thoroughgoing comprehensive attempt to achieve it.

The attack on the Confucian family did not necessarily mean loose sexual morality or the fluidity of marriage ties. A strict morality was inculcated in the service of the people and the country. Prostitution was discouraged. Efforts were made by the courts to settle disputes between husbands and wives. The marriage law of 1950 carried further some changes begun under the National Government. In contrast with traditional mores, it ruled that marriages were to be arranged not by the parents or matchmakers but by the immediate parties. It also prohibited concubinage, bigamy, and the betrothal of children, and permitted the remarriage of widows.

This legislation reinforced a basic change in the status of women which had already begun. Binding the feet of women had been disappearing. It continued to pass. Under the constitution of 1954 women were granted full political, economic, domestic, social, and cultural equality. In 1954 the All-China Federation of Democratic Women claimed a membership of eighty millions. Among other objectives it stood for equal pay for equal work and for a higher proportion of women in the government. By 1964 progress toward the achievement of these goals was being registered.

Various channels and means were employed to effect the re-education of the Chinese people and to bring conformity to Communist standards. Membership in the Communist Party entailed indoctrination. It brought with it privileges as well as duties and in a highly competitive society was sought as a way to livelihood, prestige, and power. In 1949 the members of the Party were said to total about 4,500,000. In 1959 the figure was reported to have risen to 13,960,000. The accuracy of these statistics is questioned. At least once the central authorities were apparently disturbed by the quality and dubious orthodoxy which followed the rapid growth and took steps to weed out the undesirable elements. But the total of Party

members was still impressive. The many local units of the Party were centers of indoctrination for the masses. The army and the militia were also media of indoctrination. Enrollment in either was accompanied by the teaching of Communist precepts. Methods of mass propaganda made possible by the mechanical devices copied from Russia and the Occident were extensively employed. The radio reached millions. "Movies" centered largely on revolutionary themes approved by the authorities. A vast mass of literature was issued, much of it in popular form. To its preparation were directed the talents of men and women who had achieved distinction as writers or who aspired to recognition. Much was accomplished by cartoons, placards, and "comic strips." In all schools, from the elementary grades through the universities, indoctrination was through formal instruction and through meetings and assemblies. In the early years of Communist rule attention was paid to "thought reform." "Political study" and "mutual aid" groups were set up in which were enrolled officials of former regimes, famous scholars, and university presidents and teachers. In these groups and centers, from mature officials and aspirants for employment in the new government to the humblest students, intensive instruction was given in Marx-Leninism as interpreted by Mao Tse-tung. Thousands were encouraged to write confessions of their "errors" and "immoralities." In extreme cases they read them in public, with denunciations of their past, descriptions of the manner in which their views had been changed under Communist guidance, recognition of remaining "defects," and a pledge to overcome them through continued self-examination and the aid of "progressive" colleagues and Party members. Long meetings were held for this purpose. The recalcitrants were imprisoned or were put in compulsory labor units for "reform" through work. All this was deemed necessary if the Communists were to achieve their purpose and remake China into the kind of Socialist society which was their goal. For many the process brought both mental and physical suffering. In spite of the effort of the authorities to obtain genuine conversions, and through repeated self- and group-examinations to eliminate "insincerity," underneath was much seething unrest or timid but unconvinced conformity. Yet for millions acquiescence was attained and with it an unquestioning docility.

In January, 1956, Chou En-lai invited intellectuals to put forward nonconformist views. In May, 1956, the head of the propaganda department said publicly: "Let a hundred flowers bloom and diverse schools of thought contend." In February, 1957, Mao Tse-tung in a long discourse repeated the invitation. Whether Mao believed that thought reform had so far succeeded that such permission could safely be granted, whether he was moved by the revolts in Hungary and Poland in 1956, or whether he hoped to lure dissent into the open and so to eradicate it is not known. Whatever his motive, much criticism of the Communist program was voiced. In June,

1957, the government acted vigorously to silence the disaffected. Some were killed, others were imprisoned, and still others were constrained to admit their "errors."

### GIGANTIC EFFORTS TO REPAIR THE ECONOMIC DAMAGES WROUGHT BY WAR AND TO CONSTRUCT AN INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETY

The reorganization of agriculture through land reform, mutual aid teams, co-operatives, and communes, the nationalization of trade and industry, and the sweeping effort at reshaping the mind of the Chinese people were by no means the only features of the Communist program. Determined efforts were made to repair the damage inflicted on the currency, the transportation, and the industry of the country by the long years of domestic strife and foreign invasion and to build a structure that would place China in the forefront of the nations of the world in providing its people with the products of modern science and machines.

To this end the Communists quickly endeavored to set up a monetary system which would eliminate the inflation that had been one of the immediate causes of the wide loss of confidence in the National Government. They forbade the use of silver dollars, gold, and foreign currencies. They sought to cut down government expenditures, to have a more effective centralized control of provincial and local budgets, and they issued their own People's Currency (JMP). Although the JMP was not based on cash reserves, the Communists kept prices from spiraling as rapidly as under the National Government. The effort was not entirely successful and in 1954 a new JMP currency was issued and was exchanged for the old at the rate of 1 to 10,000. The Communists had declared that the first JMP was among the most stable currencies in the world. They also claimed that the new JMP was based on reserves of silver, gold, and foreign exchange. That assertion did not hide the fact that the JMP was a managed currency and that the government's budget had mounted sharply. Yet for some of the years the government insisted that it had balanced its budget and had achieved a surplus to repair the deficits of earlier years. Although the People's Bank remained the only institution authorized to issue currency, and the Communists attempted by the compulsory purchase of government bonds to limit the amount of money in circulation, agricultural producers' co-operatives printed notes of small denominations, which circulated widely in rural areas.

The Communists set about the repair and extension of railways and highways. They restored bridges, improved the rolling stock, and kept the passenger service running more nearly on time and with cleaner coaches than had been seen for many years. They also extended the railway system by new construction. They gave wide publicity to the erection of a bridge across the Yangtze at the Wuhan center. That difficult engineering

feat had long been contemplated. When achieved, it gave uninterrupted rail communication between Canton and Europe by way of Peking. New rail lines were built. Among them were ones in Szechwan, in the Southwest, to the coast, and especially in the North and Northwest. By 1960 double-tracking was proceeding on the through lines from Peking to Canton and from Peking to Shanghai. Highways were improved and new ones were constructed. Some asphalt roads were pushed through with banners and slogans.

Ambitious public works were undertaken, as, for example, on the Yellow River, notably at the Sanmen gorge in Honan, to produce hydroelectric power and electric lighting, to reduce the danger of floods, and to enlarge irrigation.

Much of the rail and highway construction and of the harnessing of the rivers was accomplished by a vast expenditure of manpower. That was largely by forced labor. Critics said that most of this was in effect slavery and declared that millions were involved in it. The Communists spoke of reform through labor and employed that device to deal with dissidents. They also required students in the many schools, especially of secondary and higher grades, to alternate periods of study with assignments to manual labor. They thus sought to break down the traditional scorn of the scholars for work with their hands and to help identify the intellectuals with the rank and file of the population. Soldiers in the extensive armed forces were also employed in construction.

The Communists entered upon an ambitious and determined program of industrialization. To this end they increased investment, especially in heavy industry. That meant reducing consumption and tightening the belts of the rank and file—millions of them already below the level of comfortable subsistence. They were willing to do this for the sake of future generations. They boasted that within a few years they would equal Great Britain in the totals of manufactured products. In consonance with what was being done in some other countries, they formulated five-year plans for which goals were set. The first five-year plan embraced 1953–1957. That was followed by a second five-year plan for 1958–1962. These plans included agriculture and railway construction as well as manufactures. To insure that developments in agriculture and industry would proceed concurrently, the phrase "walking on two legs" was coined —meaning emphasis upon both phases of economic activity. The Communists strove for rapid development, a hope voiced in the slogan of 1958, "the great leap forward." In the earlier years they sought help from Russian technicians and imported some physical equipment from the U.S.S.R. By 1964 they were obtaining no assistance from their former great ally, either in personnel or machinery. They restored and improved some of the Japanese plants in Manchuria. They built additional factories. They engaged ambitiously in the production of steel. At one stage they encour-

aged this in many small establishments. They claimed that the quotas officially set for the country had been more than reached and that peasants had been educated in a confident respect for modern methods, but critics declared that much of the product was so handicapped by impurities that it was useless. As time passed, the government said that while heavy industry was being maintained, a larger proportion of effort was being expended in light industry, largely for consumer goods.

Much of the industrial development was in the West, especially the Northwest. Population was being moved into those areas. For example, in Inner Mongolia Chinese were outnumbering Mongols. Industrialization was not, as formerly, primarily in the coastal provinces, from contacts by sea with the West and Japan, but inland. Lanchow, the capital of Kansu, from being a sleepy town became a hive of industry, with broad streets, burgeoning factories, large government offices, huge apartment houses, theatres, hospitals, and schools. It was a gateway to enterprises in Sinkiang.

Among non-Communist foreign specialists the precise degree of achievement in industry was a matter of debate. The figures released by the government were optimistic. For example, the claim was made that the major goals of the second five-year plan had been reached three years before the completion of that period. They were said to show that in 1960 not only had the budget been balanced, but that an increasing proportion was being devoted to economic reconstruction and cultural development rather than to military purposes. Statistics were cited to prove that between 1957 and 1960 the production of steel had mounted sixfold, from 3,000,000 to 18,400,000 metric tons, and that that of coal had risen in those years from 130,000,000 to 425,000,000 metric tons. However, non-Communist experts questioned these totals, partly on the grounds of the difficulty of the collection of precise figures by the government, and partly because they might well be inflated for purposes of propaganda, both domestic and foreign. Reports were widespread of inefficiency, of wastage due in part to breakdowns or delays in transportation, and of slowing down attributable to overfatigue. Some motor vehicles, machine tools, generators, and precision electronic instruments were being produced, but the quantity and quality were not clear. The agricultural crisis of the early 1960's led to a paring of the goals of industrialization, the shelving of many projects, the removal to the rural areas of much of the urban population, and the command to the factories to turn out more farm machinery, consumers' goods, and fertilizers.

An increasing proportion of the manpower in mining and industrial projects was by laborers organized into unions. Industrial, but not crafts unions, were co-ordinated into the All-China Federation of Trades Unions administered by an executive committee elected by a national labor congress which met every five years. In addition were national assemblies of

the several industrial unions, and the regional, provincial, and local federations. The unions were expected to induce their members to follow the policies of the state, to prevent waste and corruption, to conduct recreation halls and cultural centers, to maintain spare-time schools for their members, and to operate training schools for their officers. They were, as well, required to further political education in the purposes of the government. Public recognition was given to workers who exceeded production goals. Hours of labor were long, regimentation was strict, and wages were reduced by "voluntary" contributions for government bonds and savings and by union dues. Wages were in part based upon the prices of the commodities needed by the worker. Piece rates were set up. Women had an increasing share in industrial labor.

Housing constituted a major problem. To meet the need for the laborers as well as for others attracted to the cities under the new regime, large additional buildings with many apartments were erected. They were particularly prominent in Peking, but they were also found in many other urban centers.

Attempts were made to safeguard the health and the safety of workers in factories and mines. In a land where life had traditionally been cheap and the accident rate high, efforts were put forth to adopt some of the devices of the welfare states of the West, whether Communist or non-Communist. In the 1950's laws were passed for insurance against death, disability, illness, and old age. Workers' hospitals, rest homes, and sanitariums were projected and some of them were erected. Free medical clinics were provided for several of the larger factories.

In some of the cities communes were set up. Much of this was said to have been at the voluntary initiative of women who sought through handicrafts and small industrial undertakings to augment the family income.

## EDUCATION

The Communists carried further and modified the programs for education which had been begun under the National Government. This was esesntial if China was to be industrialized and to take an effective part in the modern world. The Communists sought to eliminate illiteracy. In 1960 they claimed that between 1949 and that year the illiteracy of workers had been reduced from eighty per cent to twenty per cent. They said that in 1959 the illiterates in the population at large had been reduced to eighty millions. They aimed at universal primary and junior secondary education. In 1959 official figures had it that eighty-six millions were in primary schools and twelve millions in secondary schools. In 1960 the Communists were planning to integrate these two stages of education and so to make them continuous for every child. If the objective were

to be attained, hundreds of thousands of teachers would be needed. Efforts were made to recruit and train them. Other kinds of schools were promoted. Institutions on a university level were multiplied and utilized to prepare promising youth for research and for furthering cultural advancement. For the burgeoning industries technical schools were favored to provide personnel for designing and handling machinery and for business administration. Part-time schools were carried on for workers who were regularly employed. In 1960 the claim was made that colleges of this kind were conducted in each of the 17,000 counties of the country. In the early years of Communist rule the number of higher educational institutions was reduced by consolidating those which seemed to be superfluous. The trend was also to have each of them specialize on some branch: agriculture, medicine, engineering, mining, physical education, or foreign languages. For a time, only Peking University and the Chinese People's University were devoted to general studies. As the years passed, the number of institutions of higher learning once more increased. Only a minority were under the direction of the central government. The majority were supervised by the provincial, municipal, and autonomous regions' administrations. In the economic crisis of the early 1960's, the school enrollment was said to have been reduced twenty percent in 1961–62 and in 1962–63 another twenty percent.

In all schools of whatever grade Russian experience was influential. For some years Russian advisers were sought and Russian texts were translated. Before the mainland came under Communist domination, English had been the favored foreign language. It was still taught, and in 1962 was the one most widely used. Russian was then next to it.

In all the schools, of whatever grade or constituency, political education in Communist principles and practice was required. Under the National Government, the *San Min Chu I* of Sun Yat-sen had been standard. Sun Yat-sen was still rendered lip service as a revolutionist, and his widow was given a high post in officialdom. But Mao Tse-tung was esteemed the paragon of orthodoxy and his writings were held to be authoritative.

Chinese students continued to go abroad. Now, however, the vast majority went to Russia and substantial minorities were in Communist-ruled countries in central Europe. None from the mainland, unless they were refugees, went to the United States, the land which had been host to more than any other country in the West. In the early 1960's, with the cooling of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China, the number of students going to Russia fell off sharply and in Moscow the dwindling remnant for the most part kept severely aloof from all but their fellow countrymen.

For a time in the 1950's many foreign students, chiefly from Asia

and countries of the Communist bloc, came to Peking. Early in the 1960's, except for the Indonesians, their numbers declined and those who remained felt themselves isolated from the Chinese.

As the years passed, the regimentation of students and teachers was tightened. The government did not repeat the experiment of "letting the hundred flowers bloom." What dissatisfaction existed was strictly underground and found no overt expression.

### ATTEMPTS AT LANGUAGE REFORM

With their revolutionary attitude, the Communists could be expected to make changes in the language. In the earlier part of the century the "New Tide" had been marked by innovations. Among them, as we have seen, were the use of the vernacular in serious writing and the attempt to have one form of the spoken language adopted in all the country. The Communists sought to complete some of these changes and to introduce others. They continued an earlier program which pressed for the universal use of a standard form of the Mandarin to supersede the many reciprocally unintelligible vernaculars which impeded oral communication, especially on the coast south of the Yangtze. They also ordered the teaching of Mandarin in the elementary and secondary schools of non-Chinese ethnic groups in such areas as Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang. They worked on the phonetic writing of the language, but did not succeed in obtaining the wide use of any one system. They not only devised new characters, but they also sought to promote the use of simplified forms of existing characters and to further the learning of a standard list of the characters that were most frequently employed.

### THE PROMOTION OF HEALTH

In a variety of ways the Communists endeavored to improve the health of the nation. They pushed sanitary measures, especially in the leading cities and on the passenger coaches on the railways. They enlisted thousands of teachers, students, and health workers in campaigns to remove refuse from the streets, to construct public comfort stations, to dig wells, and to eliminate flies, mosquitoes, and rats. In 1958 they launched the Patriotic Health Drive with slogans against four pests—grain-eating sparrows were added to the other three. When the reduction of the numbers of sparrows was followed by an increase in the insects which fed on food-producing plants, bedbugs were substituted for the sparrows in the four pests that were fought. The Communists sought to train thousands of midwives so to aid in the care of mothers and offspring that the infections would be eliminated which carried off a large proportion

of the infants in the first few days after birth. They required regular group callisthenics for students, clerks, factory-workers, and soldiers. They promoted vaccination against smallpox, inoculation against some other diseases, including cholera, the manufacture and use of antibiotics, and other public health measures. They stepped up the education of physicians, surgeons, and nurses. In doing so, they were unable to reach immediately the standards attained in much of the West. They endeavored to promote the traditional forms of medical practice as well as those which originated in the Occident. They fought epidemics of the bubonic plague. The efforts to kill the rats by which the infection-carrying parasites were spread were a phase of the campaign. Hospitals were multiplied. Crèches and nurseries were established for the infants and young children of working women.

In the intense efforts to improve public health in a short space of time, weaknesses were inevitable. Many of the personnel were inadequately trained. Numbers of hospitals were below required standards. Complaints were heard that in the care of the sick preferred treatment was given to officials, Party members, and soldiers, to the neglect of the rank and file. Yet some foreign observers remarked the deep interest shown by physicians in patients of any rank.

In the 1960's a reaction was apparent. Travelers reported that the cities were not as clean as in the mid-50's. That and the reappearance of beggars and prostitutes were to be expected. The government had put on such intense pressures and in so many aspects of the nation's life for brief spaces of time in efforts to attain its goals that overfatigue had come. Early in the 1960's, although actual famine was reported to be nonexistent, the widespread shortage of food could not but lead to a decline in energy and a relaxation of efforts in many directions. How far this would become chronic and to what extent it would be a passing phase of the revolution could not be safely predicted when these lines were written.

Shadowing all the campaign for better public health was the mounting population. So far as the efforts at public health succeeded they would aggravate the problem. In March, 1957, a major campaign for birth control was launched. But before the end of the year it was discontinued. Contraceptives were still available and birth-control clinics remained open, but they were no longer stressed. In 1962 a fresh and more determined effort was made to postpone the age of marriage and to keep families to two children to one couple.

Early in the 1960's the government engaged in extensive purchases of grain from Canada and Australia to relieve the shortage which it ascribed to natural disasters. It also appeared to strive for an equitable distribution of such food as was available. But it would not admit that the widespread hunger was a symptom of overpopulation.

SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS

Whether the slackening of effort in the promotion of public health, the threat of population explosion, and the overfatigue which issued from the repeated high-powered drives for achievement in industry and transportation were evidence of irreparable weakness in the Communist regime was uncertain when these pages were penned.

Enough was known, however, to make clear remarkable advances in some areas to which the Communists were devoting attention. Thisworldly as they were, the Communists pinned much of their faith on science. The marked native ability of the Chinese had long been demonstrated under other than Communist auspices. The government sought to direct this into scientific research. It availed itself of scholars who had been trained in America and western Europe and who either chose to remain under Communist rule or were unable to escape. For some years it also had help from Russians. The government was determined to overtake and if possible to surpass the achievements of the West. Although it sought to curb a few experiments and theories which it deemed ideologically reprehensible and subjected some foreign-trained scientists to "thought reform," it provided laboratory facilities for research. In 1956 a twelve-year plan for the development of the sciences was formulated. The Chinese Academy of Sciences co-ordinated government research institutes. The latter were reported to number thirty-one in 1952 and sixty-eight in 1957. For the five years from 1952 to 1957 the total personnel was declared to have tripled, the research personnel to have more than quadrupled, the technical personnel of higher ranks to have more than doubled, and the graduate students to have multiplied six times. In 1963 the prediction was freely made that within a few years the Chinese would have developed an atomic bomb. Relatively unbiased foreign specialists who were able to visit the country reported excellent work in several directions. Among them were the survey of China's resources in minerals and soil, with reports of much larger deposits of iron ore and oil shale than had previously been known.

In archaeology marked progress was registered. In the construction of roads and factories many graves and historic sites were uncovered, and trained experts were able to investigate them and to publish their findings. For example, much new light was shed on paleolithic and neolithic cultures, on the history and civilization of the Shang period, and on the Ch'angan of the Sui and T'ang dynasties; and the tomb of the Wan-li Emperor of the Ming was carefully excavated and its treasures placed on public exhibition.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The political structure by which the Communists controlled the mainland gave evidence of the influence of the U.S.S.R. Yet it was not a blind copy but possessed distinctive features.

Of primary importance was the Chinese Communist Party. It had come into being in 1920 and had held its first national congress in 1921. Before its triumph on the mainland it had experienced many vicissitudes. Among them were its abortive alliance with the Kuomintang in the 1920's, its defeat, its revival south of the Yangtze, the Long March to escape the relentless pressure of Chiang Kai-shek, and the years of resistance to the Japanese from the headquarters in the Northwest. Disciplined by these hardships and yet not weakened by having to bear the full brunt of the Japanese invasion as the National Government and the Kuomintang had been, the Party was prepared to take advantage of the vacuum created by the latters' failure.

One of the early steps of the Communist leaders after mastering the mainland was to modify the character of the Party membership. In accordance with the earlier policy of Mao Tse-tung and the exigencies of the situation, the recruits had been predominantly rural in origin, from the North and Northwest. Many had joined the Party from the sense of adventure and for personal gain in power and livelihood. Now the effort was made to weed out the less desirable elements and gain recruits from other than peasant background. To accomplish the first objective a vigorous campaign was instituted to purge the unworthy and to carry through a thorough indoctrination in Marx-Leninism with self-criticism and public criticism in group meetings. By this process, so far as possible, party cadres *(Kanpu)* who were guilty of graft, arrogance, and lack of sympathy with laborers and peasants were either reformed or dropped. The second objective was sought by admitting and training members from urban elements and intellectuals and from wider areas.

The seventh National Congress met in 1945. The eighth was convened in 1956. In theory, provincial party meetings were to be held, but some of them had not been convened until 1956. The National Congress of 1956 was composed of over a thousand delegates. Its chief achievements were the confirmation of the actions submitted to it by the Central Committee and preparatory conferences, and the adoption of a revised constitution. A new Central Committee was elected. The real power was in the small Politburo and the latter's Standing Committee. The Standing Committee had six members, four of whom we have already met: Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, and Chu Tê.

In additon to the Communist Party, several parties with much smaller memberships were permitted. They were made up of those who expressed themselves as willing to collaborate with the Communists. But they were

not allowed to recruit their numbers from soldiers, peasants, workers, or police and were from teachers, scientists, and others of the intelligentsia. To some members posts were given in the government. In the "blooming and contending" period many spoke out in sharp criticism of the Communists. In the stern curtailment of freedom of speech which followed, the dissidents were branded as "rightists" with a "landlord" or "bourgeois" background and with a record of former association with the "reactionary Kuomintang clique." Some were removed from their posts, and others, after public recantations, were allowed to resume office. Late in 1959, apparently because they were deemed no longer dangerous, P'u-i, the last Ch'ing Emperor, and thirty high-ranking military officers and civil officials of the National Government, who had been captured at the time of the Communist victory on the mainland, were officially pardoned.

In addition to the minor parties, the Communist Party sought support from the Communist Youth League, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Young Pioneer Corps, the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, the Chinese Science and Technology Association, and the All-China Athletic Association.

For the government of the People's Republic of China a constitution was adopted in 1954 by the first National People's Congress. The constitution had been framed by a drafting committee, a majority of whose members were Communists and whose chairman was Mao Tse-tung. The constitution declared that the People's Republic of China was a people's democratic state led by the workers and based on an alliance of the workers and peasants. It declared China to be a unified, multinational state in which all power belonged to the people. The minority nationalities were guaranteed freedom to use their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their own customs. They were in autonomous areas and might adopt rules subject to the approval of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The constitution was designed as a guide for the economic development of China in the period of transition to socialism. Citizens were guaranteed freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of demonstration, freedom of religious belief, inviolability of person and dwelling, freedom to choose and change residence, and privacy of correspondence.

The supreme authority lay with the National People's Congress. The members of the Congress were elected for four years and were in five categories. The Congress chose a Standing Committee which became the effective governing body. It had a chairman, a vice-chairman, a secretary-general, and a number of other members. All were elected by the Congress and were subject to recall. The chairman of the Standing Committee was the titular head of the People's Republic of China. Under him and the Standing Committee was the State Council with a premier, vice-premiers

and various general offices, ministries, commissions and bureaus. It was, therefore, the executive branch of the government. Under the Standing Committee were also the Supreme People's Procuratorate, which served as a check on the entire system to safeguard the interests of the state and the Party; the Supreme People's Court; and the National Defense Council.

With some modifications, the provincial and local divisions of the state were continued as they had existed under the National Government and, indeed, under the Ch'ing dynasty. The main exceptions were the communes introduced in 1958 and minority nationality areas on the fringes of China proper. On the plea that they compromised the authority of the central government, the constitution of 1954 abolished the five Greater Administrative Regions which had been created in 1949 for the minority nationalities. But it continued the local districts and the counties in these areas. A little later autonomous provinces were set up for minority groups: Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang for the Uigurs, Kwangsi for the Chuang, and Ninghsia for the Moslems. Although the traditional local units were retained throughout the country, the forms of government in them were altered. In a general way, they were reflections of the national structure. A hierarchy of People's Congresses was set up. The members of each Congress were elected by the next lower Congress. Every People's Congress had its People's Council. Somewhat similarly, a hierarchy of People's Courts was instituted, paralleled by People's Procuratorates. The People's Courts replaced the People's Tribunals, which had been authorized in 1950 to assist in the "land reform" of the early years of Communist rule.

### THE COMMUNISTS ATTEMPT TO EXTEND THEIR AUTHORITY OVER ALL THE TERRITORY WHICH HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE CH'ING EMPIRE

The Communists endeavored to extend their authority over all the vast area which had once recognized the suzerainty of the Ch'ing dynasty. By the year 1964 they had made progress toward this goal, but in some areas had not succeeded. Although they encountered some opposition among the Moslems, in the main they achieved their purpose in Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and among the non-Chinese tribes in Ch'inghai, Hsik'ang, Yünnan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi. In Outer Mongolia they were frustrated. There they competed with Russia and with a Mongolian particularism which sought full independence. They gave aid in finances, laborers, and advisers, but in 1961 the United Nations admitted Outer Mongolia to full membership. Although its independence was thus formally recognized, the country was clearly being drawn into the orbit of the U.S.S.R. In Korea, as we shall see in a moment, the Communists supported a government in the North which claimed dominion over the

entire country but were defeated in the South by the United Nations. With Chinese Communist help a friendly regime obtained the mastery of North Vietnam. In 1963 and 1964 the Chinese Communists were aiding friendly elements in Laos and Cambodia and were openly sympathizing with the North Vietnamese effort to take over South Vietnam.

A spectacular adventure, which established Communist rule but at the expense of wide international censure and of friction with India, was in Tibet. By an agreement signed May 23, 1951, Tibet accepted the suzerainty of the Communists. In December, 1953, preliminary steps were taken to transform Tibet into an autonomous region with a form of government which would revise that of the Dalai Lama. These measures created unrest, and in March, 1959, revolt broke out. When the Communists attempted to arrest him for his alleged share in the uprising, the Dalai Lama fled to India. In the ensuing fighting numbers of Tibetans were killed and many became refugees. The holders of the post of Panchen Lama had long been rivals of those who held the office of Dalai Lama. The Communists took advantage of the division, induced the Panchen Lama to come to Peking, and in 1960 had him endorse their program of "land reform" and the abolition of what they scored as the serfdom imposed by monasteries. Previously, in October, 1959, the General Assembly of the United Nations had passed a resolution deploring the recent events in Tibet and calling for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetans. In August, 1960, the International Commission of Jurists, a nongovernmental organization recognized by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, issued a long report which on the basis of a mass of evidence declared that the Communists were guilty of genocide in the attempt to destroy the Tibetans as a religious group and that they had violated the declaration of human rights adopted by the United Nations. Undeterred, the Communists continued their measures for what they called the "liberation" of the Tibetans.

In 1964 the Communists were constructing a road from Nepal to Tibet, thus seeking to extend the traditional Ch'ing suzerainty over that border country.

The Communists made no effort to reclaim Macao and Hong Kong, both historically part of China and with predominantly Chinese populations. Macao had been under Portuguese rule since the latter part of the sixteenth century but in the twentieth century was of slight commercial importance. Hong Kong, made up of islands and a bit of the mainland ceded to Great Britain in 1842 and 1860 and of the New Territories under a ninety-nine year lease granted in 1898, was far larger in population and in commercial importance. Taken by the Japanese in December, 1941, it was restored to the British after the defeat of Japan (1945). The Communists showed no disposition to take it over. Apparently they deemed it a convenient door into the non-Communist world, and the British author-

ities were careful to maintatain a strict impartiality between the Communist and Nationalist regimes. The (Communist) Bank of China had a huge building through which they carried on foreign exchange operations. Refugees from Communist China flooded into Hong Kong. Some were wealthy. The majority were destitute. In 1964 the population was in excess of 3,500,000. The British colonial administration made valiant efforts to provide low-cost housing for the millions of poor. Private relief agencies assisted in giving food, shelter, and clothing to the unfortunates. Because of the cheapness and abundance of labor, factories multiplied and exported their products. Tourists, chiefly American, added substantially to the colony's income.

### UNDER THE PROTECTION AND WITH THE AID OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CONTINUES

An area that had once been ruled by the Ch'ing dynasty and continued to stand out against the Communists was retained by the National Government of the Republic of China. It was made up chiefly of T'aiwan (Formosa, as it was known to Westerners) and some smaller islands, mainly the Pescadores (Panghu) in the strait slightly west of T'aiwan, islands close to the shore of Fukien, principally Matsu and Quemoy, and some islands off the coast of Chêkiang.

Here the National Government, officially known as the Republic of China, continued. It was dominated by the Kuomintang and had Chiang Kai-shek as its president. He was re-elected as his successive terms expired. It claimed to be the only legitimate government of China, and its leaders professed to look forward to the time when it could be restored on the mainland. In the meantime, T'aiwan was governed as a province.

When the National Government moved its headquarters to T'aiwan the United States was not committed to defending it. Powerful forces, with Senator Robert A. Taft and former President Herbert Hoover as vigorous spokesmen, were emphatic (January 2, 1950) that the navy prevent invasion. But President Truman promptly said (January 5, 1950) that the United States would not give armed assistance. However, when Communist "volunteers" entered the war in Korea against the United Nations, Truman reversed his stand and ordered (June 27, 1950) the Seventh Fleet to prevent a Communist attack on Formosa. At the same time, he asked the National Government to abstain from efforts to dislodge the Communists from the mainland. To this the National Government agreed. The Communists denounced this action of the United States as "aggression" and interference in China's domestic affairs. The U.S.S.R. sided with the Communists, but was not able to persuade the United Nations to condemn the Americans. In the general peace treaty signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, Japan relinquished all claims to T'aiwan and the

Pescadores, but the present and future status of the islands was not mentioned and the Republic of China did not sign the treaty. In May of the following year, after long negotiations, Japan and the Republic of China entered into a treaty of peace in which Japan renounced all claims to T'aiwan and the Pescadores. In February, 1953 President Eisenhower said that the Seventh Fleet would no longer be employed to shield Communist China. This declaration was approved by Chiang Kai-shek, for it seemed to give his government freedom to act against the Communists. In 1955 the Republic of China and the United States entered into a treaty of mutual defense against attack by an enemy. That same year the Republic of China formally ended its state of war with Germany.

The Communists were not content to permit the National Government to continue. Again and again they expressed their determination to "liberate" T'aiwan and were vituperative in their denunciation of the "Chiang Kai-shek clique" and the United States. From time to time they shelled Quemoy and Matsu. In 1956 their batteries launched an attack on these islands on an unprecedented scale and engaged, unsuccessfully, the National Government's planes over the T'aiwan Strait. Late in October the attack declined. In 1955 the Republic of China withdrew its forces from islands off the coast of Chêkiang, but it strengthened its defenses on Quemoy and Matsu. In the summer of 1962 the deterioration of conditions on the mainland encouraged the Nationalists to believe that the time was opportune for an invasion to eliminate the Communists. To counter the possibility of that move, the Communists concentrated heavy forces on the coast of Fukien opposite T'aiwan and stepped up their bombardment of the offshore islands. In public statement and in conversations between its ambassador and the Communist ambassador in Warsaw, the United States was emphatic that it would not support a Nationalist invasion of the mainland but would protect T'aiwan and the Pescadores against a Communist invasion. Peking loudly denounced the United States, and Russia said that it would come to the rescue of the Communists if Washington aided a Nationalist attack on the mainland.

In the meantime the National Government had endeavored to improve conditions on T'aiwan. It thus sought to offset the ill will engendered by its actions immediately following its occupation of the island. It early instituted land reform. This it accomplished by purchasing the holdings of the landlords and distributing them, together with government land, among the peasant cultivators. It thus avoided the class bitterness and the execution of the landlords which had been a phase of land reform on the mainland. By 1954 it declared that tenancy of land had been reduced to a fifth of the cultivated land. The National Government stressed education and said that in 1954 nine-tenths of the children of school age were in elementary schools. By classes for adults it claimed to have reduced illiteracy from 35.6 per cent in 1949 to 17.76 per cent in 1953. It increased

the numbers in secondary and higher schools. The study of Sun Yat-sen's *San Min Chu I* was compulsory. *The Four Books* and *The Five Classics* were also a part of the required curriculum. The National Government erected highways and put the railroads into working order. It increased hydroelectric installations. It aided rapid industrialization. It strove to increase the food supply by better agricultural methods, by bringing marginal lands into cultivation, and by dams to increase irrigation. It promoted local and provincial self-government and reported that the large majority of the population voted in the elections.

Because of the danger from the Communists and the hope of restoring its rule on the mainland, the Republic of China maintained armed forces of about 600,000. To recruit the ranks as the men who had come from the mainland advanced in years, universal military service was required.

In all this effort, substantial aid was given by the United States. It took the form of subsidies for improving economic conditions and strengthening the armed forces, and of technical advisers, both to the military and to civilian enterprises.

The Republic of China continued to face serious problems. The first efforts to establish its rule after the expulsion of the Japanese left deep scars. A chronic gulf existed between the native T'aiwanese and the mainlanders. The government endeavored to bridge it by the required teaching of Mandarin as the one vernacular, but many who had come to maturity under Japanese rule and had learned Japanese found the transition difficult. Population rapidly mounted—from about 7,617,000 in 1950 to an estimated 11,302,656 in 1962. The increase brought problems of living standards. Always the danger had to be faced of Communist infiltration. To guard against it police measures were taken. Chang Hsüeh-liang, who was once a serious threat to Chiang Kai-Shek and had been forced to accompany the exodus from the mainland, was held in protective custody but was accorded lenient treatment. The Kuomintang continued to dominate the government. Minority parties existed and among them were critics of the regime who were silenced by vigorous methods. Numbers of T'aiwanese wished independence, both of the mainlanders and of the Communists. In 1962 some of them supported a "government in exile" in Japan.

Yet the Republic of China continued to be recognized by many governments and had special relations with several of them, including its near neighbor, the Philippine Republic. In 1964 it appeared to have no prospect of re-establishing itself on the mainland, but on T'aiwan it seemed to be fully as stable as was the People's Republic on the mainland. It sought to counter the activities of the People's Republic in Africa south of the Sahara, and with success in some countries.

THE COMMUNIST ADVENTURE IN KOREA

In Korea the Chinese Communists attempted to assert the influence which had been exercised by the Ch'ing dynasty.

The outcome of World War II brought an international crisis. Korea had been tributary to the Ch'ing dynasty. As we have seen, late in the nineteenth century Japan and China had clashed over their respective interests and as a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 China had been constrained to acknowledge the independence of the country. Japan rapidly extended its control and in 1910 formerly annexed the peninsula. Unrest against the Japanese was chronic and the defeat of Japan in World War II meant the end of Tokyo's rule. On August 10, 1945, two days after the entry of the U.S.S.R. in the war against Japan, Russian troops moved into North Korea. On September 8, 1945, the United States placed troops in the South. An agreement between the occupying powers fixed the thirty-eighth parallel as the line of demarcation. The function of the armies was said to be the carrying out of the Japanese surrender. Disagreement quickly developed between the Russians and Americans over a method of enabling the Koreans to form a government for the country. The Russians set up a Communist regime north of the thirty-eighth parallel. At the instance of the United States, the United Nations appointed a Temporary Commission for Korea. The Temporary Commission attempted to organize a government for all Korea, but the Russians would not permit it to enter the North. Through it the Republic of Korea was created and was declared to be based upon the wishes of the large majority expressed through free elections. The Assembly of the United Nations voted (December 12, 1948) that it was the only such government in Korea. The Republic of Korea was recognized by the United States and a number of other nations outside the Soviet bloc. In 1948 a government was formed in the North which claimed to be the legitimate one for all Korea and was recognized by Russia and several of its satellites. On June 25, 1950, in an effort to bring all the country under the rule of the Russian-supported regime, North Korean troops, supplied with Russian arms, marched south of the thirty-eighth parallel, claiming that they had been attacked by the forces of the Republic of Korea. On June 25, at the request of the United States, the Security Council of the United Nations, which Russia was then boycotting, voted, nine to nothing, with Yugoslavia abstaining, that North Korea had committed "a breach of the peace," demanded that it withdraw its forces north of the thirty-eighth parallel, and called on the members of the United Nations to assist in carrying out the resolution. Two days later President Truman ordered United States air and sea forces to aid the Republic of Korea and commanded the Seventh Fleet of his government "to prevent any attack on Formosa."

The tide of battle swept back and forth across the hapless peninsula. In the initial weeks the North Koreans occupied most of the South. By the middle of August, 1950, United Nations forces, sent by several governments, with the Americans predominating, began pushing back the North Koreans. By the end of the year they were approaching the Yalu River, the boundary between Korea and Manchuria.

In October, 1950, the Chinese Communists entered the fray. They sent thousands of troops, which they declared were "volunteers." They chose to ignore the United Nations and held that the United States was the "aggressor." With their high-powered methods of propaganda they whipped up war sentiment on the mainland to "restrict America, aid Korea." They claimed that American planes had bombed targets in Manchuria and that the Americans had used planes to sprinkle lethal germs in that region. Backed by the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China sent representatives to the United Nations to bring their complaints against that body. After some weeks the Chinese Communists, frustrated, withdrew their delegates. On February 1, 1951, the General Assembly of the United Nations declared the People's Republic of China to be an aggressor. In the following May it called on all the member nations to refrain from sending to the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists arms or other materials that could be used in war.

Hostilities ended in an uneasy armistice. Negotiations were begun in the spring of 1951. They dragged on into 1953. On July 27, 1953, the armistice was signed. Prisoners were permitted to choose between repatriation and remaining with the side which had captured them. A large number of Chinese and North Koreans decided against returning home. Only a few of the United Nations' soldiers elected to remain with the Communists.

For the Chinese Communists the war had at least three important results. (1) It heightened their antagonism to the United States. (2) It increased their self-confidence. For the first time in history a Chinese army had successfully met and driven back a major Western military force. The precedent of the humiliating defeats of the nineteenth century and the Boxer outbreak had been broken. The Chinese Communist claim that the United States was a "paper tiger" had apparently been sustained. The People's Republic of China had snapped its fingers not only at the United States but also at the non-Communist world represented in the United Nations. Even some non-Communist Chinese were gratified by the achievement. (3) The People's Republic of China became continuously involved in North Korea. Indeed, North Korea became a satellite. Among other measures, Peking poured large sums into the region—totaling several scores of millions of dollars (U. S.).

### THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ADVANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Another area where Chinese influence had from time to time been strong and into which the Chinese Communists moved was Southeast Asia. Under more than one dynasty Chinese rule had extended into Tongking and Annam. There the People's Republic of China made its weight felt. French influence, dating from the seventeenth century, in the nineteenth century had become French domination, either under the guise of protectorates or by outright annexation. It extended over Tongking, Annam, Cochin China, Cambodia, and Laos. French authority had been weakened by the Japanese occupation during World War II. In the years that followed World War II it was erased. That was partly through the Communist Party, the Viet-Minh, founded and headed by Ho Chi Minh. In 1954 the Viet-Minh armies, aided by Chinese Communists, won a decisive victory over the French. At an international conference in Geneva in that year, in which the Korean issue was decided, through an armistice a division of territory was agreed upon between North Vietnam, controlled by the Viet-Minh, and South Vietnam, which in 1955 became a republic under the devout Roman Catholic, Ngo Dinh Diem. Laos and Cambodia were declared neutralized. At Geneva Chou En-lai, the chief representative of the People's Republic of China, sought to dominate the conference. Neither the United States nor Ngo Dinh Diem subscribed to the Geneva settlement of the Southeast Asia question.

Friction continued. In the 1960's Communist forces, aided by the Chinese, were making uncertain the situation in Laos and through guerrilla operations were penetrating South Vietnam. The United States was endeavoring to prevent the domination of Laos by the Communists and was giving extensive aid to South Vietnam, with both financial subsidies and military assistance to the forces that were fighting the Communist guerrillas. In 1962 Peking let it be known that it regarded the American military participation as aggression and a danger to the peace in East Asia. Peking extended financial support to North Vietnam. By the 1960's it had given the equivalent of several scores of millions of dollars (U. S.). Yet the Chinese were not popular with the North Vietnamese. But the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem by a military *coup d'état* late in 1963 was followed by heightened Communist activity and early in 1964 President de Gaulle attempted to reassert French influence in the region.

### CHINESE COMMUNISTS SEEK TO MAKE THEIR WEIGHT FELT IN SOUTH ASIA AND INDONESIA

The Chinese Communists were not content with seeking to control what a few years before had been French Indo-China. They

also attempted to have an important voice in other parts of South Asia and the adjacent islands.

The Chinese populations in Singapore, Malaya, Thailand, and Indonesia were tempting, and Peking endeavored to champion them. Among them, notably in Singapore, Communists were stridently vocal. Measures taken by the Indonesian government restricting the economic activities of the Chinese brought coolness in what had been cordial relations and an exodus of Chinese followed.

At a conference of Asian and African governments in Bandung in Indonesia in April, 1955, Chou En-lai, by the geniality and charm which he could exude when it suited his purposes, did much to allay the suspicion of some of the Asian delegates. In 1960 Peking entered into friendship and nonaggression treaties with Burma, Nepal, and Afghanistan, and negotiated boundary agreements with Burma and Nepal. In 1962 they made a similar agreement with Pakistan. For some years relations with India were friendly. But Communist activity in that country aroused resentment. In 1959 Chinese Communist measures in Tibet, soon followed by the dispatch of troops to areas on the northwestern, north-central, and north-eastern border states of India, brought a serious strain between Peking and New Delhi. Ladakh, where hostilities first centered, was hard to reach from India and was important to the People's Republic of China for its routes connecting western Tibet with Sinkiang, and as a religious center whose influence extended far into Tibet. In the Autumn of 1962 the fighting became more acute on all fronts. The Indians fought bravely, but were poorly equipped and were driven back. On November 21, 1962, the People's Republic of China said that it would withdraw its forces to twenty kilometers behind the lines of actual control on November 9, 1959. The Indians were not satisfied, for some of the territory which it claimed would still be in Chinese hands. In December, 1962, representatives of Egypt, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, Ghana, and Ceylon met in Colombo in an attempt at mediation. Their recommendations were presented to both New Delhi and Peking. But when these lines were penned (early in 1964) a peaceful settlement had not been achieved.

### THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS SEEK TO EXTEND THEIR INFLUENCE AMONG THE "UNDERDEVELOPED" PEOPLES OF THE WORLD

In accordance with their conviction that they were exponents of the true interpretation of Marxism and therefore, as historic China had long been, of the highest civilization, the Chinese Communists attempted to extend their influence among all the "underdeveloped" peoples on the planet. They concerned themselves with the Middle East, and among other measures, gave financial aid to Nasser and his United Arab Republic. In 1960 they recognized the Algerian government-in-exile—

in that respect going further than the U.S.S.R. They reached out to Africa south of the Sahara. In 1961, for instance, they presented in Ghana an impressive exhibit of their products. They actively assisted Castro and his regime in Cuba. Early in 1964 Chou En-lai made an extended trip to Egypt, Algeria, and several African states south of the Sahara. The Chinese Communists cultivated the good will of Latin Americans. Visitors from these and other countries were cordially received in Peking and were shown the favorable aspects of the Communist achievements.

### ATTEMPTS AT RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

Attempts by both Japanese and Communist Chinese to establish friendly relations were checkered and, on the whole, unsuccessful: Chinese memories of Japanese aggression and invasion were a handicap. The fact that Japan entered into treaty relations with the Republic of China on T'aiwan was an affront to Peking. Communists were active in Japan, but were minorities regarded with jaundiced eyes by the majority parties in that country. Nor could the Japanese ignore the close ties between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communists or free themselves from their decades-long fear of the Russians and enmity towards them. Yet reciprocal trade relations could be of advantage to both Japan and the Chinese mainland. China was a potential market for some Japanese manufactures. Chinese raw materials, especially iron, might prove useful to Japanese factories, and the Japan market would help the Chinese Communists to desirable foreign exchange. Unofficial trade missions passed between the two countries. Between 1952 and 1956 the volume of the trade between Japan and the mainland of China multiplied ten-fold. Yet in 1956 it was less than two per cent of Japan's foreign commerce. Moreover, in 1958 even that small amount was abruptly terminated by Peking. The ostensible reason was the tearing down of a Chinese Communist flag by a drunken Japanese. Tokyo had not yet officially recognized the People's Republic of China, but Peking demanded that its flag be protected when displayed in Japan.

### SHIFTING RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R.

The relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communists were marked by alternating degrees of cordiality and coolness. Down to 1963 relations of the Chinese Communists with the U.S.S.R. were in general in four periods. The initial two were before the Communists took over the mainland and have already been noted. The first covered the years from the time when Sun Yat-sen sought Russian aid and the Communists attempted to infiltrate and control the Kuomintang to the break between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists late in the 1920's.

The second embraced the years from that event to 1949. In it Stalin seemed to have written off the Chinese Communists as not hewing to the Party line.

The third period was one of close co-operation and lasted from 1949 into 1957. The degree of co-operation varied. Moscow lost no time to giving recognition to the formal proclamation of the People's Republic of China. After prolonged negotiations in Moscow, which seem to have been an indication of hard bargaining, on February 12, 1950, a thirty-year pact of friendship and mutual aid was announced. Under it the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China were reciprocally to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each and were to come to each other's assistance in case of aggression by Japan if Japan was supported by an ally. By further agreements, the U.S.S.R. promised to withdraw its forces from Port Arthur and to return the railways in Manchuria when a peace treaty with Japan had been concluded, or at the latest by the end of 1952. It recognized that the administration of Dairen belonged entirely to the People's Republic of China, and guaranteed credits to the extent of $60,000,000 (U.S.) for the purchase of equipment and other materials from Russia. The credits were to bear one per cent interest and were to be repaid in raw materials, tea, food, gold, and American dollars. With much fanfare, a Sino-Soviet Friendship General Association was organized (October 5, 1949), which by 1951 claimed a membership of sixteen millions. Pictures of Mao Tse-tung and Stalin were prominent and ubiquitous. Russian technicians came in numbers, and industrial equipment was sent to assist the Chinese in a variety of enterprises. Munitions and airplanes were provided to aid the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea and in other ways to equip the Communist armed forces. In October, 1954, significantly as the outcome of a visit of a Russian delegation to Peking rather than of a Chinese delegation to Moscow, as in 1949–1950, the U.S.S.R. agreed to turn over to Peking by January 1, 1955, its installations in the Port Arthur naval area and its share in the joint Sino-Soviet development companies. The death of Stalin in 1953 emboldened the Chinese Communists to take a more nearly independent position. But they joined, although moderately, in the anti-Stalin reaction led by Khrushchev. In 1956 Chou En-lai gave his support to Moscow in the Polish and Hungarian crises by interrupting a trip to Burma to fly to Warsaw and Budapest to show the support of the Chinese People's Republic to Moscow. However, marked as was the assistance of the U.S.S.R. to Peking, Moscow did not give atomic weapons to its Chinese ally. Its financial aid was not large and much of it was in the form of loans for which repayment was demanded—chiefly in food, a commodity which China could ill afford.

The fourth period of the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communists began in 1957 and was marked by tensions which

were still unresolved when these lines were written. The causes were ostensibly ideological. Khrushchev maintained that the conquest of the world by Communism could be achieved peaceably. Peking's spokesmen insisted that it could only come through war. They supported Albania, where the regime was denounced by Khrushchev. Moscow was critical of Peking's communes and did not hesitate to say that they were unwise. The interests of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China clashed, although less openly, in North Korea. Late in the 1950's and early in the 1960's Chinese influence was predominant. Back of the dissension lay ill-concealed rivalry for leadership in the Communist bloc. Khrushchev was insistent on the traditional Russian pre-eminence. True to the ancient Chinese tradition of setting the standard, as the Middle Kingdom, for human civilization, Peking claimed to be the orthodox interpreter of Marxism. Contributory, too, was the Sino-Russian competition, which was older than Communism. China had lost more territory to Russia than to any other Western power. In the mid-nineteenth century Russia had annexed lands north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri which were claimed by the Ch'ing dynasty and in the second half of that century had nibbled at a portion of Sinkiang. It had taken the occasion of the Boxer outbreak to extend its tentacles into Manchuria. In the Communist era it had withdrawn from Manchuria, but it was successfully competing with Peking in Outer Mongolia. In 1962 Russia was obviously unhappy over the extension of Peking's influence in Southeast Asia and was aiding India with arms and air equipment in the border conflicts with the Communists. In 1961 Russia cut by nearly a half its aid to the People's Republic of China and Sino-Russian trade declined sharply.

In 1962–1964 tension mounted. Peking openly accused Moscow of withdrawing technical personnel and financial aid and attributed to that fact much of the slowing down of industrialization and of such projects as the Sanmen dam. It declared that Moscow had unilaterally broken its promises of aid, including that of 1957 for assisting Peking in the development of an atomic bomb. It roundly condemned Moscow for entering into the pact of 1963 for terminating the aerial testing of atomic weapons. It strongly hinted that Russia should return the territory taken from China in the 1850's and 1860 north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri. The withdrawal of Russian aid weakened Peking's air and submarine power. Peking posed as the champion of underdeveloped nations and colored races as against the U.S.S.R., which it strongly suggested was easing its campaign against capitalism and was siding with the white nations. Yet when (early in 1964) these lines were written, no sharp diplomatic break had occurred and Russia still promised to come to the assistance of Peking if it were attacked by capitalist states.

Early in 1964 the international position of the People's Republic of China was enhanced by the establishment, on de Gaulle's initiative, of

diplomatic relations between Paris and Peking and the severance, by Nationalist protest, of official ties between the Republic of China and France.

### THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS EXPRESS UNALLOYED ENMITY FOR THE UNITED STATES

The Chinese Communists were unremitting in their antagonism to the United States. That country was declared to be the chief enemy of the peace, which was one of their slogans. The protection given by Washington to "the Chiang Kai-shek clique" in T'aiwan was a chronic provocation. It was declared to be blatant interference in China's civil war and internal affairs. The part of the United States in resisting the Communist attempt to take over Korea was met with both vituperation and armed force. Policies and actions of the United States in various parts of the world were denounced—as in Lebanon, Cuba, Laos, and South Vietnam. Neither country gave the other *de jure* recognition, but through scores of diplomatic conversations, as in Geneva and Warsaw, each accorded the other an approach to grudging *de facto* recognition. Nor did Peking venture on all-out war with Washington, whether in Korea or over the latter's protection to the forces of the Republic of China in their defense of Matsu and Quemoy.

### THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

In the relations between Peking and Washington the determined opposition of the United States to the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations was a chronic irritation. Numbers of member governments, including some as friendly to the United States as that of Great Britain, believed the attitude of Washington to be mistaken. The British officially recognized the People's Republic of China and maintained an embassy in Peking. In 1954 the British Socialists, led by Attlee, the head of the Labor Party, sent a delegation to Peking. But the British embassy was not in full strength, consular regulations were exiguous, and in practice the Chinese Communists had only slightly more official intercourse with the British than they had before the first Anglo-Chinese war (1839–1842). The United States insisted that the People's Republic of China was not peace-loving, a requirement which the charter of the United Nations made prerequisite for membership. It also pointed out that that government was still (1964) at war with the United Nations: in Korea the uneasy armistice continued. In the United States some citizens hoped that both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China could have membership in the United Nations, but it was by no means clear that Peking would accept admission on those terms. For a thoughtful appraisal of the continuity of the People's Republic of China with China's past, see O. Edwin Clubb, *Twentieth Century China* (Columbia University Press,

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# THE CHINESE

## Their History

## and Culture

VOLUME II

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

# THE CHINESE PEOPLE: RACIAL COMPOSITION

Racially the Chinese are a mixed people. That much we know. We have definite records of many invasions of the fertile valleys and plains of North China by non-Chinese stocks from the less favored regions on the north, northeast, and west. Whenever one of these incursions led to a prolonged or extensive occupation of territory—as numbers of them did—it must have been followed by an infiltration of the blood of the conquerors into that of the conquered. Knowing as we do the names of at least the chief of these invaders, we can be aware in a general way of some of the more potent strains which in the past two thousand or twenty-five hundred years have mingled with whatever may have been the Chinese stock or stocks at the dawn of recorded history. Hsiung-nu, Turks of various kinds, several branches of the Mongols, Tanguts, and Tungusic peoples, including the Juchên and the Manchus—to mention only some of the more prominent—each occupied part or all of North China. Each must have made a more or less permanent contribution to the population of the region. It is also a commonplace that the Chinese are bordered today, as they have been for centuries, by non-Chinese of many kinds—such as the Koreans, the Mongols, the Tibetans, the Miao, the Lo-lo, and the Mo-so—with almost inevitable intermixture.

We do not know, however, all the racial strains which have entered to form the Chinese of today, nor are we sure of the relationship among many of the stocks of whose names we are aware. That is chiefly because we are not certain of all the components of the population of what is now China, at the dawn of the historic period. It is not yet clear, for example, whether the earliest civilized Chinese were a mixture—even though, from analogy with other early inhabitants of fertile valleys, we may guess that they were. We can only conjecture that the sharp division between commoners and aristocrats in ancient times represented also a racial difference. It is clear that the civilized Chinese of the Shang and the Chou were surrounded by peoples whom they regarded as barbarians and who appear to have been divided into many tribes. What the precise ethnology of all these barbarians was, however, is by no means established. Nor are we at all sure of the racial affiliations of these early Chinese themselves.

South China was quite probably once peopled, at least in part, by negritos of types similar to those still found in some of the islands southeast of Asia. Linguistic groups represented in the South and Southwest, which probably to some extent were associated with racial stocks, were the Mon-Khmer, the Tibeto-Burman, and the Sino-T'ai. The T'ai, now strong in the extreme South and Southwest, and represented by the modern Thai, very likely once reached much farther northward than at present. Possibly, too, there were other strains.

Through the centuries there has been a southward migration of Chinese from the North into and south of the Yangtze Valley. The northern Chinese there encountered other peoples whom they probably partly drove back and partly absorbed. Again, however, we do not yet know whether the Chinese were originally related to these stocks, and, if so, to what extent. It is obvious to the most casual observer that the Chinese of the North are somewhat different from the Chinese of the South—for instance, that as a rule the former tend to be taller by an average of two or more inches, heavier, less dark of complexion, with less broad noses, more conservative, and less high-strung than the latter. The people of Central China are intermediate between the two extremes. How much these differences are the result of varying racial admixtures and how much they are due to contrasts in climate, food, and physical environment is not, however, at all clear.

Even more difficult than the determination of the racial stocks that have formed the Chinese is the assessment of the proportion in which the different known strains have entered into the present population. The process of amalgamation by which the Chinese of today have come into being is by no means complete. Chinese are usually black of hair, yet many, especially among the children, have light-brown hair, and a reddish tinge is not unknown. The Chinese are usually scant of beard, yet heavily bearded individuals are by no means lacking. Chinese are popularly called members of the "Yellow Race," yet, although the skin of most Chinese is, when compared with that of the peoples of Northern Europe, "yellow," some, particularly among the classes where bathing is customary and the body is protected by clothing from the sun and wind, have a skin as white as that of Europeans. Chinese are usually spoken of as "slant-eyed," yet great numbers entirely lack that kind of physiognomy. Some variations are, of course, individual and occupational. Others, however, appear to be survivals of racial differences.

Among peoples obviously Chinese some marked groupings occur which verge on the racial and are evidence of imperfect amalgamation. One of the most notable examples is the Hakkas. The word itself means "guest people" or "stranger people." The Hakkas dwell mostly in the hilly regions of Kiangsi, Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, and parts of

T'aiwan. They speak a distinctive dialect and possess some customs which set them apart from their neighbors. They appear to be the descendants of immigrants from the North who came south at several different times and were never fully absorbed, but preserved, among other characteristics, a tongue more nearly like that of the North than the other Chinese around them. Moslems, too, while most of them are Chinese in language and a large proportion of them are of older Chinese stock, often have differences in accent, dress, and appearance which reveal traces of immigrant blood, and some are distinctly non-Chinese in race and language. The immigrant Moslem stock is itself not uniform, but has in it at least Turkish, Mongol, and Arab strains, each of which predominates in certain sections.

In the South and the Southwest are numerous peoples who are not Chinese in speech or customs. Intermarriage has been frequent, and in many places the process of assimilation to the Chinese—which has undoubtedly been in progress for many centuries—can still be observed. In Szechwan, Hunan, Kweichow, Yünnan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, including Hainan, and T'aiwan, are thousands of these non-Chinese peoples. As a rule they tend to inhabit the hills and mountains, apparently because the Chinese have driven them out of the more fertile valleys and plains. They are divided ito numerous tribes, such as the Chung Chia, the Miao, Miao Tzŭ, or Miao Chia (made up of several groups, among whom are the Hei Miao, or "Black Miao," presumably so-called because of their dark-colored clothes, and the Hua or "Flowery" Miao), the Kachins, the Keh-lao, the Loi (on Hainan), the Lo-lo, the Yao, the No-so, and the Man Tzŭ or Man Chia. The ethnological classification of these peoples is highly debatable. One linguistic analysis divides them into three groups: Lo-lo, Shan, and Miao; and another, into Mon-Khmer, Shan, and Tibeto-Burmans. It is probable that some of them are unassimilated remnants of peoples who were once more widespread in China than at present and have been in part absorbed by and so have entered into the racial composition of the people whom we now call the Chinese. Usually they are inferior to the Chinese in civilization (although representatives in Vietnam and Thailand have reached high cultural levels) and are regarded by the latter much as folk of primitive manners are nearly everywhere viewed by peoples of more advanced cultures. The Chinese have exploited them, have driven them out of desirable lands, and have held them in contempt.

In the North and Northwest live other peoples whom the Chinese have not absorbed. In regions such as Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia the non-Chinese form the majority and the Chinese are obviously still immigrants. In Inner Mongolia the Chinese seem to be making a fairly effective bid for supremacy wherever sufficient moisture exists for settled agriculture. Latterly, as the Communists have promoted industry in the region,

thousands of Chinese have moved in as laborers. In Manchuria the Chinese are in the ascendant, although in some sections the Koreans are serious competitors. In the northernmost tier of the old Eighteen Provinces, especially in Kansu, reside many unassimilated descendants of immigrants. Numbers are Moslems, and religious differences slow down amalgamation.

In spite of all the surviving variations in race, the great mass of the Chinese people is remarkably homogeneous in physical appearance and culture. The differences are neither so marked nor so numerous as are those in western and central Europe, in the Near East, or in India.

The approach to uniformity is probably due chiefly to the type of government and culture under which the Chinese have lived. The political structure of the Empire, made up largely of a bureaucracy educated in the orthodox philosophy of the state and inculcating conformity to this philosophy, welded the peoples into a cultural whole. Political unity favored movements of peoples within the Empire. Some of these were engineered by the state—for example, the extensive colonization and forced migration under the Ch'in and the Han and in recent years under the Communists. Others were entirely voluntary and often took place on a large scale in times of famine, when thousands of refugees fled from their old homes in search of food. The absence of marked differences of caste and the principle of recruiting the powerful official class on the basis of worth as disclosed in the civil service examinations, and not on that of birth, helped to produce a more or less fluid society in which wide intermarriage was comparatively easy. The long-established custom that no man could marry a bride of his own family name operated in the same direction. Conquerors were usually assimilated fairly promptly. This was in striking contrast with India, where caste lines tended to keep races apart and to preserve blood distinctions between the successive waves of invasion. The political unity of China during a large part of its history and the consequent absence of internal political barriers to migration within the Empire also made for uniformity—in contrast, for example, with Europe. As a result, no other group of mankind anywhere nearly equal to the Chinese in numerical strength approximates it in homogeneity.

## NUMERICAL STRENGTH

As to the numerical size of population, all totals have been a source of sharp disagreement among experts. Census methods comparable in accuracy with those employed in the modern West, Japan, and India have never been applied to China as a whole. The best estimates possible are approximations which may be in error by tens of millions. For example, a census was taken by the government in 1910,

in which the returns were by households. Serious uncertainty exists as to the average number of individuals in a household, and attempts to translate the figures from households to individuals resulted in such variant totals for all China as 342.6 millions and 329.6 millions. Even the accuracy of the number of households is highly debatable. A careful estimate made in 1918 and 1919 by the Protestant missionary forces gave a total of individuals in all China of 452.6 millions (for China proper and Manchuria of 440.9 millions), but the compiler declared that the then population of the Chinese Republic was between 350 and 400 millions. An estimate in 1920 by the Post Office placed the population of China proper and Manchuria at 427.6 millions, and another one in 1926 by the same agency gave for China proper and Manchuria a total of 485.5 millions. At least one other calculation is still higher than this last. Another estimate, for 1930, put the population in that year at 445 millions. Official figures of the Nanking Government for 1928 gave it as 441.9 millions and for 1936 as 479 millions. One of the greatest of Occidental authorities on population statistics, after years of study and evaluation of available returns, estimated all China to have had 342 millions in 1930, but recognized "that no one knows what the population of China is within many millions." His figure, however, was vigorously contested as far too low. The official figures of the People's Republic of China for 1953, which did not include T'aiwan, was 582.6 millions. In 1961 the Chinese Communists put the total at 678 millions, which included T'aiwan. In that year the United States nonofficial Population Reference Bureau estimated that there were 716 million Chinese.

The population is very unevenly distributed. The areas of greatest density are in the fertile alluvial plains in the southeastern part of Kiangsu and the northeastern part of Chêkiang, on the North China plain, particularly where Shantung, Honan, and Hopei corner on one another, in the productive Red Basin in the center of Szechwan, and around Canton, where favorable harbors and rich bottom lands encourage trade and agriculture. Other congested centers are along the coast of Fukien and Chêkiang and in and around the Wuhan cities in Hupeh.

The necessary inaccuracy that is the despair of all who wish exact figures for today bedevils all attempts to estimate the numbers of Chinese in earlier centuries. The Chinese Government has many times taken enumerations. This was an almost inevitable accompaniment of the levying of taxation and of the recruiting of armies. As a rule, however, the returns gave only the totals by households or adults. Even in these the percentage of error was probably high, if for no other reason than because of the desire of individuals to avoid taxation or military service and of officials to juggle the figures for their own benefit. Even if the summaries were accurate, the problem would remain of determining from them the total

population. Moreover, the areas included were not always the same. The results of the several attempts that have been made to estimate what the population of the Empire was at various periods must, then, be regarded as conjectures which may be very far removed from the truth.

Ma Tuan-lin, a distinguished scholar who flourished in the thirteenth century A.D., is responsible for the statement that in the ninth century B.C. a census gave 13.7 million persons between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five as living north of the Yangtze River, and an estimate based upon his report declares that the total population of this area was then 21.7 millions. Ma Tuan-lin gives the results of ten enumerations of the population taken between A.D. 2 and 155. The average of the ten, reduced to individuals (on a conjectural scale that may be greatly in error), is 63.5 millions, varying from 83.6 millions, the first, to 29.1 millions, the fifth, the great differences being ascribed to civil war and to incomplete returns. Probably, too, the areas measured were not exactly the same. In A.D. 280, after long strife, the population is put at 23.1 millions, and in 606 at 46 millions. An estimate for A.D. 618, much higher than some others, places the total at 129.45 millions. A return from 652 gives 3.8 million households, or, on the basis of 5.5 persons per household—at best a rough estimate—20.9 million individuals. One for 733 gives 7.86 million households, or, on the same basis, 43.2 million individuals, and another, for 755, 9.6 million households, or, again on the basis of 5.5 persons per unit, 52.8 million individuals. These four, all from the T'ang dynasty, reflect something of the prosperity of that period. In 1097, under the Sung, before the provinces in the North had been lost to invaders, the total population, based on households (19.4 millions) is estimated at 106.7 million persons. In Mongol times the figures indicate a population of between 55 and 60 millions. Ming figures point to a population of about the same total as under the Mongols. Under the Ch'ing, especially in the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth century, when the Empire was enjoying great material prosperity, and new plants from the Americas augmented the supply of food, the totals seem to have mounted very rapidly. Many estimates have been made, based in part upon census returns. What appears to be a fairly conservative set of figures, arising out of the studies made by Western scholars, gives the following totals:

| | |
|---|---|
| 1650 | 70 millions |
| 1710 | 140 " |
| 1850 | 342 " |
| 1910 | 342 " |
| 1930 | 342 " |

Another set of figures, less conservative, gives the following:

| | |
|---|---|
| 1741 | 143,410,559 |
| 1771 | 214,600,356 |
| 1793 | 313,281,795 |

| | |
|---|---|
| 1800 | 295,237,361 |
| 1821 | 355,540,258 |
| 1840 | 412,814,828 |
| 1849 | 412,986,643 |

Still another estimate puts the total in 1779 at 275,000,000 and in 1850 at 430,000,000.

## THE EXPANSION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

All the figures for the past two hundred and fifty years which have any claim to credibility indicate a phenomenal growth in the population of China—an increase, it may be noted, which is paralleled by that of the rest of the world.

The Chinese have been not only multiplying but also geographically expanding. For many centuries that expansion was largely but by no means exclusively southward. Migration also brought the Chinese into the highlands of Shansi, Shensi, and Inner Mongolia, into the valleys of Kansu, into Szechwan, into Yünnan, into Manchuria (for long, only in inconsiderable numbers and in the southern districts), and, to a limited extent, into the oases of what is now Sinkiang. After all of this expansion, however, at the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty, nearly three centuries ago, the Chinese were chiefly confined to China proper.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (and probably, although less markedly, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) the Chinese spread widely beyond these boundaries. There were several causes: the great multiplication of population under the beneficent rule of the strong Ch'ing Emperors furthered by the introduction of new food plants from the Americas, the improved transportation facilities and the economic development of lands in the Pacific basin, and latterly, political disorders in China proper. The Chinese have proved to be physically adaptable to many different climates. They have thrived in the winter cold of Manchuria and in the heat of tropical lands. To be sure, those who have moved into Manchuria have been from northern China, where the winters are frigid, and those who have gone to the tropics have been from the provinces on the south coast, so that in neither case was the change in climatic environment revolutionary. Even with this qualification, the Chinese have proved adaptable. As manual laborers they have been industrious, frugal, and capable of withstanding great hardships. As merchants and artisans they have been enterprising and persistent. As a race they have displayed marked capacity for survival and multiplication, qualities which have given them an advantage in competition with other peoples.

In the past three centuries the Chinese have spread into many and widely scattered regions. They have pushed into Inner Mongolia. They

have poured into Manchuria by the millions. During most of the years of the greatest strength of the Ch'ing dynasty, the Manchu rulers attempted to reserve the larger part of their ancestral home for their own race. They long tried to keep the Chinese out entirely, and when that proved futile, to restrict the immigration to certain sections, chiefly in the province of Fengtien. Yet considerable numbers of Chinese filtered past the barriers set up by the Manchus into some of the most fertile portions of the forbidden districts. For years, although there were many permanent settlers, much of the migration into Manchuria was seasonal—made up of laborers, chiefly from Hopei and Shantung, who went north for the months when they could find work on the farms and in the winter returned to their homes. By 1900 there were probably only between ten and fifteen million people in all Manchuria (and perhaps much less), although of these the majority seem to have been Chinese. In the twentieth century the population of Manchuria has greatly increased. One estimate placed it at twenty-two and a half millions in 1920 and in 1927 at more than twenty-six millions. In 1932 it was estimated as being thirty millions. Of the thirty millions all but about two millions were Chinese or assimilated Manchus. In 1953 the total was said to be nearly forty-seven millions. This growth was due partly to the improved transportation afforded by the railways and steamships, partly to labor-recruiting agents from Manchuria, partly to the opening of new lands, and partly to the disorder south of the Great Wall. Immediately before 1931 the movement to Manchuria was stimulated by Chinese officials. In parts of Manchuria settlers were offered free lands. Chinese government railways gave them reduced rates, and at least one governor of Shantung encouraged his people to go. Numbers migrated north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri and hence constituted a factor in the population of the eastern part of Siberia.

The Chinese have settled T'aiwan. At the outset of the Ch'ing dynasty that island appears to have had comparatively few of them. However, it became a haven for many partisans of the Ming and for a time was controlled by Koxinga. After annexation by the Manchus it remained part of the Empire until, in 1895, it was ceded to Japan. It was peopled largely from Kwangtung and Fukien, and the movement to its shores continued even after the Japanese occupation. Today the bulk of the population is of Chinese stock, either pure or mixed with other elements. In 1949 that stock was largely augmented by the coming of the Nationalists who took refuge from the Communist occupation of the mainland.

A fairly extensive migration has moved towards the lands immediately to the south of China. Indeed, the Chinese have here won an economic empire, even though the political control remains in other hands. Most of the emigrants have found occupation as merchants or laborers. They have come chiefly from Kwangtung and Fukien. A large proportion have thought

of China as their home, and their remittances to their families and the contributions, both economic and in ideas, which returning wanderers made to their native communities have been important factors in the development of the two southern coast provinces.

In the days of the Spanish occupation Chinese were prominent in the economic life of the Philippines. From time to time their number was reduced by massacres, but they persisted in coming. The major part of the retail business and much of the wholesale trade have been in their hands.

Several scores of thousands of Chinese are to be found in Vietnam. They have had a large share in the retail trade and at one time controlled much of the rice market.

Chinese have long been in Thailand, especially in Bangkok, and have intermarried extensively with the Thai. They have been prominent in business, the trades, and the professions, and in their hands has been much of the mining, the refining of sugar, and the rice milling.

Chinese have been very important in the trade and industry of Burma. They have come both by sea and overland by way of Yünnan.

In what, in 1941, was British Malaya—the British-controlled portions of the Malay peninsula and its adjoining islands—the number of Chinese was about equal to the native Malay stock. They began arriving centuries before the British occupation, but under British rule greatly multiplied and formed—and still form—the major part of the population of Singapore. As laborers, artisans, merchants, miners, contractors, planters, and professional men, they have been largely responsible for the economic development of the region. The British were in possession politically and controlled no small part of the economic life, but the Chinese profited enormously from the peace and prosperity that were the fruitage of British rule. The Chinese have been so important a factor in the population of Malaya that in more ways than one they have constituted a special problem: for example, it has been a moot question as to how large a share they should be given in the government. In the 1950's Communism was strongly represented among them.

For centuries the East Indies has known the Chinese. Fairly large migrations took place under the Ming and again after the downfall of the Ming. For some years after the beginning of their power in the East Indies, the Dutch encouraged the Chinese to come, for the presence of the latter aided the development of the islands. When, in later years, the Chinese seemed to have become a menace, the Dutch instituted restrictions. The Chinese continued to arrive, however, particularly after the middle of the nineteenth century, and by 1917 their number in the Dutch East Indies was estimated at seven hundred seventy thousand, of whom nearly half were in Java. A census of 1930 gave the total as 1,233,856 (749,530 men and 484,326 women) and that of 1940 placed the total at 1,430,680. Thousands were

manual laborers in mines and on plantations, but other thousands were skilled mechanics and traders and many became large landowners and wealthy merchants. In the 1950's and 1960's they constituted a problem for the Republic of Indonesia, their legal status was a subject of negotiation with the People's Republic of China, and severe restrictions were placed on them. To Borneo likewise the Chinese have been going for hundreds of years, and the island now contains an undetermined number of them. As elsewhere in the lands immediately to the south and southeast of China, much of the mining and trade is in their hands.

In Australia and New Zealand the chief attraction that first drew numbers of Chinese was gold mining, although a few had arrived earlier for other purposes. The initial large immigration was in the eighteen fifties. Before long, opposition developed, for the Chinese proved competitors to some of the dominant white stock. Restrictions were placed on Chinese immigration, and the total number of Chinese in the two dominions is small. Groups of Chinese, none of them—except in Hawaii—numerically very considerable, are to be found in several others of the Pacific Islands.

Early in the twentieth century an experiment with Chinese contract labor was made in the gold mines of South Africa, but it was not long continued and the laborers were sent home. Only a few hundred Chinese are now to be found in that country.

The Chinese first began coming in large numbers to the United States in the eighteen-fifties in connection with the gold rush to California. They supplied much of the unskilled labor, and later many were employed in building and maintaining railroads. Agitation against them began early, the basic reasons being that, with their low standard of living, they competed successfully with white laborers, and they were not easily assimilated. Except for the temporary residence of such groups as merchants and students, immigration was prohibited—earlier, for periods of years, and later (1902 and 1904), indefinitely. In 1943 this exclusion was repealed. Except for a large number of students, most of the Chinese in the United States have been engaged in such specialized occupations as domestic service, market-gardening, labor in canneries, laundering, and restaurant-keeping. After the Communists mastered the mainland of China, many Chinese intellectuals came to the United States.

At the time of their annexation to the United States the Hawaiian Islands contained about twenty-five thousand Chinese residents, and that in spite of measures which had been taken in the eighteen-eighties and eighteen-nineties to reduce the number of new arrivals. After annexation, the exclusion acts of the United States were applied, and Chinese laborers who were not American citizens were forbidden to go to the mainland. Chinese still constitute one of the largest racial elements of the extremely mixed population of the islands.

In Canada the story is similar. Chinese began coming in numbers in the eighteen-sixties to engage in mining and to do much of the rough work in building the Canadian Pacific Railway. Opposition developed because of competition with white labor, and restrictions on further immigration were enacted, chiefly in the form of a head tax on each arrival. The tax was increased until it became almost prohibitive.

There are Chinese contingents in Mexico, in several of the countries of Central and South America, and in some of the islands of the West Indies. The largest numbers have been in Mexico, Cuba, Trinidad, British Guiana, Panama, Brazil, and Peru, the two last-named countries having more than any of the others. In 1931 a vigorous anti-Chinese movement broke out in Mexico which led to the exodus of several thousands, and some anti-Chinese agitation occurred in Peru.

Except for the laborers employed in the World War, and for students, very few Chinese have been resident in Europe.

From this necessarily brief and somewhat statistical survey, it is clear that widespread migrations of Chinese have been in progress, especially during the second half of the nineteenth and in the twentieth century. Outside the political boundaries of China (or at least the territories occupied by the Ch'ing dynasty), however, the total number of Chinese, when compared to that of those who have remained at home, is inconsiderable. Emigration has afforded but little relief to the congestion of population in China.

The small size of this movement overseas has been due in part to the reluctance of the Chinese to expatriate themselves and in part to the restrictions placed on them in most of the lands to which they would care to go. Unpopularity has been the result partly of the clannishness of the Chinese—for, in spite of extensive intermarriage with natives, they have tended to keep apart—but probably has been due chiefly to economic factors. In lands immediately south of China the Chinese trader and moneylender have often been more aggressive and thrifty than the natives and have held some of those stocks in a kind of economic servitude. Frequently, therefore, they have been both feared and hated. In lands like Australia and North America, which have been pre-empted by the white race and which are suitable for extensive settlement by them, the Chinese laborer, with his industry and his lower standard of living, was feared as a competitor and was either completely or all but completely excluded. Wherever he has gone, especially in Malaya and Indonesia, the Chinese has contributed substantially to the prosperity of his adopted country.

The effect upon China of this rather limited overseas migration has been very considerable. Economically, the sums brought or remitted home by the emigrant have made for the prosperity of the regions from which he has come—chiefly the provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung. In the realm of

ideas the results have been little short of startling. It was an emigrant, Sun Yat-sen, who more than any other one man was responsible for the pre-Communist radical political revolution in China, and his initial impulse came from his residence, as a boy, in Hawaii. For years, in his propaganda for renovating China, he sought and obtained support from his fellow countrymen abroad. These, indeed, have again and again aided in financing changes in many realms of Chinese life: political, economic, intellectual, and religious. Thousands of other emigrants, some of them nationally and even internationally known, but most of them obscure, have returned to the land of their ancestors, seeking to bring it into partial conformity to the ways of the Occident. The transformation in China during the past few decades might not have been so thoroughgoing and certainly in many instances would have taken a different course had it not been for these emigrants.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

# GOVERNMENT

## INTRODUCTORY

One of the most noteworthy achievements of the Chinese has been in the realm of government. Here they have been among the most successful of all the peoples of the globe. Judged by the area and the number of people which it controlled, the length of time it endured, and its record in promoting the unity of an empire and maintaining order and insuring justice, the governmental structure which disappeared in the twentieth century compares favorably with that of any other ever devised by man.

Under such dynasties as the Han, the T'ang, and the Ch'ing the area governed by the Chinese through their political machinery has been surpassed only by such empires as the Mongol (which, though ephemeral, was huge), the British, and the Russian, and possibly the Roman, the Arab, and the Spanish. Even under such dynasties as the Sung and the Ming, China was larger than western Europe. With the exception of the British Empire at its height, the population held together by China's political structure at the beginning of the twentieth century was greater than that ever under one government.

The Chinese state which has been transformed in the twentieth century has had a longer duration than any other of which we know. Its roots go back into the Chou dynasty. Its essential outlines, as it was at the close of the nineteenth century, took form in the Ch'ien Han, in the second century B.C.

The government of China was not faultless. In spite of it and sometimes because of it, civil strife and foreign invasion often devastated the land. Under it injustice and inhumanity were fairly chronic and at times widespread. Occasionally it broke down almost completely. The Chinese seem never to have been as successful in ruling subject peoples or peoples of very diverse racial stocks and cultures as were the Romans and the British.

When all of this has been said, the fact remains that seldom has any large group of mankind been so prosperous and so nearly contented as were the Chinese under this governmental machinery when it was dominated by the ablest of the monarchs of the Han, the T'ang, the Sung, the Ming, and the Ch'ing.

It was owing largely to their government that the Chinese achieved and

maintained so remarkable a cultural unity and displayed such skill—all the more notable because they were partly unconscious of it—in assimilating invaders. When one recalls how western Europe, no larger than China proper and with no more serious internal barriers of geography, failed, both to its great profit and infinite distress, to win either political or cultural unity, the achievement of the Chinese becomes little short of phenomenal. It was, indeed, a success which ultimately defeated itself. Political and cultural unity, with the concomitant lack of the stimulus which comes from variety, tended dangerously toward self-satisfaction and stagnation, and so, ultimately, toward weakness and decay.

Why were the Chinese so successful in their government? A completely accurate answer is probably unattainable. However, a few contributing elements seem fairly clear. One was the political- and social-mindedness of the educated classes. When, in the throbbing intellectual life of the Chou, the Chinese first began to put down in writing anything like an adequate record of themselves, the articulate were largely absorbed with political and social themes. The chief concern of most of the outstanding thinkers of the Chou was the present well-being of man—the creation of a society which would make for the good life. Theories as to what constituted the good life differed, and still greater lack of agreement existed as to the means by which it was to be attained. Eventually, as we have seen, after experiments with Legalism and Taoism, one of the schools of thought, usually called Confucianism, was adopted—by the Han and in a modified form—as the orthodox philosophy on which the state was to be built.

In Confucianism was the second reason for China's success with government. Any attempt to sum up in a few words the political theory which goes under that name is probably foredoomed to be unsatisfactory. This is partly because, in spite of its professed allegiance to Confucius, a good many other influences molded it, and the proportions of these changed from time to time. What is called Confucianism underwent many alterations and varied from age to age. Taoism was a fairly constant factor in Chinese life, and since in some periods it was popular at court and much studied by many of the educated, its influence on political ideals was not inconsiderable. Taoism made for quietism, a minimum of governmental machinery, and a distrust of force. In contrast, what usually goes under the name of Legalism was also persistent. Perhaps it should best be characterized as the administrative mind. It made for autocracy and the close regulation of collective and individual life. Other philosophies of the Chou, which as separate schools had disappeared before the close of the Han, also left their impress. In general, Confucianism believed that human society could prosper only as men preserved right relations to one another and to the universe about them. Ethics was stressed. The education of all the nation in moral character was regarded as one of the chief purposes of the state. This was to be by the example of the ruling classes rather than by force.

Hence much emphasis was placed on discovering and training officials who would measure up to the ideal. Happiness, so Confucianism declared, depended in no small degree upon the maintenance of right relations between men and the universe about them. This was to be achieved partly by righteousness of life and partly by the regular and correct observance of ritual, particularly of the sacrifices and prayers to the spirits of many kinds by which man was believed to be environed. Even those who, like Hsün Tzŭ, were entirely skeptical as to the existence of these spirits, contended that the ritual should be perpetuated—for purposes of social control.

In the third place, the success of China's government was due to the means by which the Confucian ideals were inculcated. The beginnings of the system of state education, especially for the ruling classes, are said to be traceable in the Chou or even earlier. Whether or not this is true, the device of a bureaucracy recruited through civil service examinations was one of the most noteworthy inventions of the Chinese. Although across the centuries Confucianism underwent striking modifications, the bureaucracy persisted and was a continuing feature of the government from dynasty to dynasty. We know that some of the principles back of it are to be found in the writings of the thinkers of the Chou. We know, too, that in its essential features it was, in embryo, in operation under the Ch'ien Han, and that it was elaborated by later dynasties. The bureaucracy, membership in which in theory and often in practice was based upon merit, attracted to itself much of the ability of the nation. Through it lay the chief road to what ambitious men most crave: power, social recognition, and financial independence. Admission to it was by way of the civil service examinations. These, in turn, at least in later centuries, were designed to test the applicant's competence in remembering and expounding the tenets of Confucianism as contained in its standard texts. Since education in the schools was mainly for the purpose of preparing candidates for the examinations, that, too, was based upon Confucianism. As a result the governing class and all who aspired to belong to it were given a uniform training in Confucianism. The prestige, influence, conviction, and self-interest of this class joined in inculcating in the masses a similar although not so thoroughgoing a uniformity. As a consequence China was fully as much a cultural as a political unit. By its acquired momentum, cultural integrity persisted when, at intervals, the structure of the state was temporarily disrupted, and proved an aid to reunion.

## THE STRUCTURE OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT AS IT WAS BEFORE THE MODIFICATIONS WROUGHT BY THE COMING OF THE EUROPEAN

To the Western specialist in political science the history of government in China should prove fascinating. Here is a vast body of po-

litical thought, experimentation, and experience reaching back over hundreds of years. An extensive literature provides a mine of information. Education was so much for the purpose of preparing recruits for the service of the state and had to do so largely with the underlying principles, and so many of the intelligentsia actually held official positions, that for a large proportion of those who produced and read literature, government was a major interest. In consequence, Chinese histories, including the voluminous dynastic records, have a good deal to say of government and the functions performed by it, and treatises of varying antiquity, some of them very extensive, deal more specifically with it.

It is difficult to parallel all the Chinese political structure with Occidental examples. Some Western observers have insisted that the Chinese state was always so different from any known in the Occident that in the Western sense of the term it can scarcely be called a government. This, it must be emphatically said, is not true. However, enough differences existed between Chinese and Western political forms to give some ground for the assertion. In pre-twentieth century China, unity was dependent not upon a feeling of nationality, as in the modern world, or primarily upon force (although that entered into the plan), but upon cultural ideals, in part social, in part moral, and in part political, which were inculcated through the imperial organization.

Occasionally in the preceding chapters hints have been given of some of the main developments in political machinery: an early Chinese state centering around a monarch and occupying only a small territory; the fissiparousness of the Chou, with the progressive increase of territory occupied by the Chinese and the decline in the power of the central authority; the conquest by the Ch'in of the whole Chinese cultural area and the establishment of a highly autocratic state ruling through a hierarchical bureaucracy and according to the principles of the Legalist school; the collapse of the Ch'in with the partial revival of decentralization under the Han, and then, also under the Han, the strengthening of the power of the monarch operating through a modified form of the hierarchical bureaucracy of the Ch'in recruited partly through civil service examinations and based upon Confucianism; the interesting experiments of Wang Mang; the interruptions in the operation of an empire-wide government during the years of invasions and civil strife between the Han and the Sui, with the many attempts at re-establishing it under the various states of that period; the strong centralization under the Sui and the early Emperors of the T'ang, utilizing and developing the structure inherited from the Ch'in and the Han, followed by partial decentralization and the weakening of the effective authority of the monarch; and the perpetuation, with modifications and amplifications, of the machinery of the Ch'in, the Han, and the T'ang by the Sung and the Ming, and even by foreign conquerors, including the

Mongols and the Manchus. Since the Han no basic revolution had been made in the form of government. Many changes in detail there were, and occasional interruptions in the operation of the machinery. Territorial subdivisions varied in titles, names, numbers, and boundaries; the relations of officials to one another and to the Crown were repeatedly modified. However, even Wang An-shih, with all his radicalism, did not venture to interfere with the essential features of the administrative system. The bureaucracy was a constant institution. Bent chiefly on enjoying the fruits of a structure already in existence, the Manchus wrought modifications which were comparatively minor. Not until the twentieth century did there come fundamentally important departures from the past.

This is not the place to go into the history of Chinese political institutions. To do so would require much more space than is here available. Moreover, specialized studies necessary for such an account are still lacking. It is, therefore, best to content ourselves with the description of the main outlines of the government in the first part of the nineteenth century, just before the beginnings of the changes brought by the irruption of the Occident. It was in this form that the state continued, with important modifications, until shortly after 1900.

As has repeatedly been said, since the Han the state had usually been based upon Confucian principles, modified by other schools and to meet the exigencies of changing situations. According to these principles, all civilized mankind was held ideally to be included under one ruler. Human society was thought of as integrated in an all-embracing world empire rather than made up, as in the West in modern times, of reciprocally independent sovereign states. Governments there were, like those in Burma, and Korea, not closely supervised by the Emperor, but all were held to be subordinate to him and were expected to recognize his overlordship by periodical embassies.

Up to the beginning of the twentieth century this theory of universalism was cherished and constituted one of the reasons for the difficulty of intercourse between the Chinese and the Occident. To Westerners the assumption seemed preposterous and bigoted. However, it had something sublime about it, resembling the dream back of the Roman Empire and the Papacy. In China, indeed, the state combined religious and political functions. All civilized mankind was conceived of as having but one organization and fellowship. In principle such religious and political divisions as have drenched the rest of the world in blood were not to be tolerated. More nearly than any other large group of mankind the Chinese approximated to this ideal. In the great periods of their power they controlled most of the civilized world with which they were in close contact.

The state was regarded as an enlarged family and the attitudes of a patriarchal society permeated the whole. The people were to be reasoned

with and educated quite as much as commanded. So, under the Ch'ing, the famous *Sacred Edict* became a means of popular education. Originally sixteen sententious moral maxims from the pen of the K'ang Hsi Emperor, but eventually expanded into easy colloquial, it contained instructions in the duty of Chinese to one another and to the government and was supposed to be read to the public twice a month in every city and town.

### THE EMPEROR

At the head of the state stood the Emperor, regarded as a kind of father of his people. He was declared to hold his office through the Mandate of Heaven. His subjects, and especially his ministers, owed him loyalty. He in turn was believed to be able to retain this mandate only through his own "virtue." In theory he was represented as ruling as much by the influence of his character as by force. If he persistently proved himself unworthy, Heaven might transfer its decree to someone else. A flood, a drought, or some other natural disaster might be interpreted as a sign of Heaven's displeasure. Or persistent tyranny and oppression might be regarded as an offense against the sacred trust. Thus revolt could seek to justify itself: a rebel who succeeded in supplanting the reigning monarch and placing himself on the throne might be regarded as having in turn received the divine commission. No family had ever acquired the throne solely because of its "virtue"—as Confucian theory required it to do. Once on the throne, however, it professed adherence to Confucianism to maintain its power. Within a given dynasty the rulers came from the same family. Under the Ch'ing, the succession was determined according to the special rules of the Manchus. With the exception of the last two Emperors, where the preceding monarch had left no male issue, it was in direct descent in the male line. In only one instance, that of the T'ung Chih Emperor, who was an only son, did the throne come to the eldest. Until the Kuang Hsü Emperor, each of the Ch'ing had been designated by his predecessor. The Kuang Hsü and Hsüan T'ung Emperors had been the choice of the Empress Dowager, although made through a council of the notables of the imperial family and the realm.

The Emperor had many designations, some of them official, some popular. Among them were *Huang Ti* (a title adopted, it will be recalled, by the famous First Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty), *Huang Shang, T'ien Tzŭ* (Son of Heaven), and *Wan Sui Yeh* (Lord of Ten Thousand Years). The personal name of the reigning monarch was never to be mentioned. On his death, the Emperor received a temple name, by which he is usually designated in histories. There was also a *nien hao*, literally "year designation," usually called "reign name" or " reign title," by which dates were reckoned. The custom of employing a *nien hao* dated from early in the

Han. Until the Ming the *nien hao* might be changed, occasionally several times, during the reign of a monarch. Under the Ming, with one exception, and after the Manchus came into power, the same *nien hao* was employed throughout a reign. In Western histories, then, the Emperors of the Ming and Ch'ing are almost invariably known by their *nien hao*. Thus the Emperor whose temple name is Shêng Tsŭ Jên is best known in the Occident by his *nien hao*, K'ang Hsi.

In theory, the Emperor was supreme over all civilized human society. He was the administrative director of the state, and officials derived their authority and titles from him. In him resided the power of legislation, and he was the supreme judge. The religious head of society, he not only performed many ceremonies, either in person or by proxy, as the high priest of mankind, but also appointed or confirmed the chief dignitaries of various cults, such as the Dalai Lama and the Taoist "Pope." He presided over the intellectual world, and certain of the highest of civil service examinations were supposedly conducted by him in person or in his presence.

In practice the power of the Emperor was curtailed. Most of the imperial powers had to be delegated. Precedent, public opinion, custom, the inertia of the vast body of officialdom (particularly of the local authorities), the distances (great if measured by the time required for travel), the elaborate formalities and ceremonial which governed the court and by which even a strong monarch found himself restrained, the moral law as expressed in the Classics of the Confucian school, legal codes inherited from the past, councilors, the official censors, the impossibility, even for the ablest, of fulfilling in person all the exacting duties of the office, and in the case of the Ch'ing, the racial incompatibility between the Manchus and the Chinese—all acted as a check on the Emperor. A man of extraordinary energy and ability, such as the K'ang Hsi Emperor or the Ch'ien Lung Emperor in his younger days, could dominate the entire machinery of state. A monarch of lesser ability could not make his will so effective—as when the Kuang Hsü Emperor failed to carry through the reforms of 1898.

The Emperor had an Empress Consort, secondary wives, and concubines of several ranks. None of them, however, was supposed to have a voice in the government. As we have seen, an Empress Dowager might have immense influence. If the Emperor was a minor, a regent acted for him, and the power of an Empress Dowager was greatly enhanced if she held that office.

The administration of the palace necessitated a vast array of functionaries and servants. The heads of the organization of the imperial household were usually of high rank. Much of the work of the palace was performed by eunuchs, and in the last years of the Ch'ing, as on several occasions under preceding ruling lines, a few acquired much power.

THE CENTRAL MACHINERY

Below the Emperor, in the capital, and acting for him, were numerous bodies through which much of the supervision of the realm was exercised. In practice the highest was the *Chün Chi Ch'u*, usually translated (very freely) as the Grand Council or Council of State. Originated by the Manchus, it dated, at least in the form in which it became the Grand Council, from 1730. It usually met daily, in the very early morning. The number of its members was undetermined, but for many years was four or five, about half Chinese and half Manchus. In it most of the more important affairs of state were discussed.

In theory the highest body was not the *Chün Chi Ch'u* but the *Nei Ko* —literally Inner Cabinet or Hall, but usually denominated in English the Grand Secretariat. This had been created under the Ming, taking the rank but not the power of the ancient premiership. Even after it had been superseded by the *Chün Chi Ch'u* as the active Council of State, admission to one of its ranking posts (there were four Grand Secretaries and two Assistant Grand Secretaries, half being Manchus and half Chinese) was the highest honor which could come to a Chinese official. However, its functions had become almost nominal, and its members usually had other duties, which took them away from the capital most of the time.

In addition to these two councils, numbers of bureaus and boards existed to which were delegated specific portions of the business of state. The chief of these were the "Six Boards": the *Li Pu*, or Board of Civil Office; the *Hu Pu*, or Board of Revenue; the *Li Pu*, or Board of Rites (in Chinese this *Li* is a different character from that for the Board of Civil Office); the *Ping Pu*, or Board of War; the *Hsing Pu*, or Board of Punishments (probably, if its duties are taken into account, more accurately named the Board of Law); and *Kung Pu*, or Board of Works. The functions of these boards were, in general, those indicated by the titles, and in a work of this length require little further elaboration.

The only boards whose designations in English sound especially strange to the ears of modern Westerners were those of Civil Office and of Rites. The Board of Civil Office was charged with the direction of the bureaucracy through which the Empire was administered. In that body appointments, promotions, degradations, retirements, and honors—to both the living and the dead—were made on its recommendation. In a state ordered on the Confucian theory a Board of Rites had an important place. From the standpoint of that school it was essential to the welfare of society that the ritual, both secular and religious, maintained by the government be correctly and regularly performed. Upon it depended the smooth coordination of mankind with the spiritual and material universe which was deemed essential to the happiness and prosperity of men. By it, too, men

were held to be educated and regulated. *Li*, then, is only imperfectly translated as rites. It possessed an ethical meaning. The outward ritual was supposed to be both an expression of and an incentive to morality. The system was not unlike that support of religion by the state which has been a familiar phenomenon in the West. Hence it is not strange that a special and major board in charge of the *Li* was regarded as necessary.

Each of the Six Boards had two presidents, one Manchu and one Chinese, and two Manchu and two Chinese vice-presidents. Each, too, had its staff of secretaries and clerks. Moreover, each was subdivided into several departments, and attached to some were subordinate bodies, such as the Board of Music, to which was entrusted the music of state functions, especially of religious services, and which was under the *Li Pu*.

In addition to the Six Boards there were three other major bodies. One of these—uniquely characteristic of China—was the *Tu Ch'a Yüan*, or Censorate. This institution had its origins at least as far back as the Ch'in, but as was natural, its form and detailed duties changed from time to time. In general, its function was, as its name suggests, to criticize the government. This included such duties as keeping a watch on officials and reporting to the Emperor any delinquencies, taking exception to the acts of the Emperor himself, checking over important state documents for mistakes, assisting in the examination of officials, investigating reports of financial corruption in governmental accounts, keeping watch over state property and the construction of public buildings, supervising the ceremonies on formal occasions to be sure that they were properly conducted, and joining with two others of the central bodies as a high court of review for a large range of cases. Naturally, there was a subdivision of duties among its members.

The censors expressed their criticisms in the form of memorials to the throne. Theoretically, they were given great liberty of speech. In practice they were often fearless. However, censors did not rank very high in the official scale. Moreover, a censor might be punished for his pains. Yet during the Ch'ing dynasty only about half a hundred such penalties are recorded. Timid censors might fear to speak, or occasionally one might use his position to bring embarrassment to an enemy. On the whole, public opinion, as voiced by the articulate classes (usually scholars and officials), rallied to the support of a censor whose strictures were well founded.

Another body was the *T'ung Chêng Ssŭ*, or Office of Transmission, whose function it was to open, record, and transmit memorials on routine business. Still another was the *Ta Li Ssŭ*, or Grand Court of Revision, which exercised a general supervision over the administration of the criminal law. It, the Board of Punishments, and the Censorate were known as the "Three Supreme Tribunals." They met together as a court of appeal, to which all verdicts of capital punishment were sent for review.

These nine bodies, sometimes called the Nine Chief Ministries of State, by no means exhausted the central bureaus in Peking. There was the *Li Fan Yüan*, sometimes inaccurately called, in English, the Colonial Office, which had charge of most of Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang. There was the famous *Hanlin Yüan*, rather freely translated as the Imperial Academy. Admission to it was reserved to those who had stood high in the civil service examinations, and so was esteemed a great honor. It also served to provide posts for some who had not yet been appointed to other offices in the bureaucracy and formed a kind of springboard to desirable posts. Its functions were literary, such as the expounding of the Classics, the preparation of official documents, and the composition and preservation of elaborate records, especially of the words and actions of the Emperor, from which the history of the dynasty would eventually be compiled. Then there was a department charged with the instruction of the heir apparent. During most of the Ch'ing, positions in it were purely honorary sinecures, since very infrequently was the public appointment of a successor to the throne made until the death bed of the Emperor. The list of relatively minor bureaus included one on sacrificial worship (for the dead), one on state ceremonies (for the living), another in charge of formal official banquets, an imperial college (whose students were in preparation for the civil service), and the Imperial Board of Astronomy (connected with the Board of Rites).

The government issued an official publication, the *Ching Pao*—usually called by foreigners the Peking Gazette—in which such documents as decrees and memorials were reproduced. The *Ching Pao* circulated among high officials throughout the Empire and was widely reprinted, in full or abridged form, on private initiative, for more popular distribution.

This structure at the imperial capital had strong similarities, in its general subdivision of functions among specialized boards and its central councils of state, to monarchical states in the Occident. However, some significant differences must be noted. Among them were the absence of any provision for a voice in the government by elected delegates of the more influential classes and the complete lack of any office for the conduct of intercourse with nations of equal rank. At least one recognized means existed by which members of the most powerful group, that of the scholar-officials, could bring pressure to bear—memorializing the throne. Often it was very effective. Yet it differed decidedly from the device which had been evolved in western Europe during the course of centuries—that of a body such as Parliament or the Estates General, representing the weightiest and most vocal groups in the realm, and recruited in part or in whole by election.

The absence of a ministry of foreign affairs co-ordinate in dignity with the other major central boards was but one evidence of a basic conviction

concerning the nature of the Chinese state. Mankind was conceived of as forming a political as well as a cultural unit. It was known that some civilized as well as some barbarous peoples had not acknowledged that ideal. However, the recognition that governments existed which were permanently entitled to deal with the Emperor on the basis of equality, and that there was a body of international law by which such intercourse was to be guided, involved nothing short of a revolution in the existing Chinese theory of society.

## THE OFFICIAL HIERARCHY OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL

The major territorial administrative divisions of China proper were the provinces (*shêng*). The number had been altered from time to time and remnants of pre-Ch'ing units lingered in popular and literary parlance. Under the latter part of the Ch'ing, however, the provinces of China proper totaled eighteen. In 1884 Sinkiang was made a province. Manchuria was divided into three additional provinces, but the machinery and control of these varied from those of the eighteen of China proper. The administration of the outlying dependencies of the Empire was still different.

The eighteen provinces were in turn subdivided into *fu,* or prefectures, *t'ing,* sub-prefectures independent of a *fu, chou* not governed through a *fu, chou* subject to a *fu,* and *hsien,* usually translated as districts, and also subject either to a *fu* or to one of the *chou* which was not under a *fu.* The *hsien* were much more numerous than either the *t'ing* or the *chou.*

The chief officers of the province were usually rather loosely designated in English as the Viceroy or Governor-general (*Tsung Tu, Chih Chiin,* or *Chih T'ai*), the Governor (*Hsün Fu, Fu Yüan,* or *Fu T'ai*), the Lieutenant Governor or Treasurer (colloquially called the *Nieh T'ai*), the Salt Comptroller, and the Grain Intendant. The officers of the subdivisions most frequently mentioned were the Intendant of a circuit (colloquially, the *Tao T'ai*), the Prefect, or head of a *fu (Chih Fu),* the Sub-prefect *(T'ung Chih),* the Magistrate of an independent chou *(Chih Chou),* and the District Magistrate *(Chih Hsien).* There were other officials who did not figure so frequently or so prominently in the administration. Ranks in the hierarchy were indicated by colored buttons on the official caps and by insignia on the front and back of robes of state.

The viceroys outranked all the others. Under most of the Ch'ing there were eight of them. Usually a viceroy was placed over two provinces (Fukien-Chêkiang, Hupeh-Hunan, Shensi-Kansu, Kwangtung-Kwangsi, and Yünnan-Kweichow). In one instance he was placed over three, Kiangsu-Anhui-Kiangsi. Chihli (the later Hopei) and Szechwan each had a viceroy but no governor. Each of the other provinces had a governor. Shantung, Honan, and Shansi were not under a viceroy. In general, the

viceroys were supposed to have the powers of a monarch within their jurisdictions—subject always to the crown. In theory the governor had much the same functions, but subject to the viceroy, except, of course, in the three provinces over which there was no viceroy. In practice the two often conflicted and exercised a check over each other. The functions of the other provincial officers are, for our purposes here, sufficiently described by their titles.

The members of the hierarchy who came most directly in touch with the masses were the heads of the *ju,* the *chou,* the *t'ing,* and the *hsien,* especially the last. They were judges and had charge of the police, of the performance of certain religious rites, and of the collection of taxes, and were charged with other administrative functions that touched the ordinary man. In accordance with patriarchal ideals, they stood *in loco parentis* to the populace and were called "fathers and mothers" of the people within their jurisdictions.

Along with its obvious virtues, the system had many defects. Among the chief was financial corruption. Salaries were small and expenses large, especially as every official had many dependents to support—including relatives and a throng of secretaries and other functionaries necessary to the conduct of his office. He had, moreover, to pay sums more or less substantial (theoretically as gifts) to various officials to obtain appointment and had to be prepared to part with additional sums when he came up for reappointment. To be sure, offices carried with them many emoluments that were regarded as legitimate, but the temptation to gain money in every possible way was very strong.

In effect the country was divided into huge semiautonomous states whose heads were intrusted by the Emperor with almost independent powers. With certain exceptions, each governor and viceroy was supposed to handle the affairs of his own jurisdiction with as little reference to Peking as possible, and in turn was held responsible by Peking for whatever went amiss. This independence of action of the heads of provinces was repeatedly seen in the nineteenth century, and never more vividly than when, in 1900, the viceroys and governors outside of the Northeast chose to disregard the apparent declaration of war on the powers by Peking and remained on friendly terms with the invaders. Local semiautonomy was necessary in a land the size of China in a day when no railways, telegraphs, automobiles, or airplanes bound the country together. If so large an area was to be successfully governed from one capital, it had to be by granting discretionary powers to the highest officers in each major administrative unit.

The danger was that strong officials in the provinces would set themselves up as fully independent monarchs and even make a bid for the control of the Empire. This was heightened by strong local loyalties and

prejudices. The menace was fairly chronic through the entire history of China. Early in the course of the Ch'ing, it will be recalled, the dynasty was almost wrecked by the rebellion of Wu San-kuei and other territorial magnates in the South. Throughout the centuries strong monarchs had tried various safeguards against the danger of such rebellion. Since the Han, government through a hierarchy recruited through civil service examinations had been the most nearly constant and successful. In addition, a number of ingenious devices were employed by the Ch'ing in much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By no means all of them originated with the Manchus, nor is it clear that each was adopted with this specific purpose in mind. The larger proportion of all officials in the hierarchy, even the most humble district magistrates, were appointed from the capital. Their specific local assignments might come from the provincial authorities, and a powerful official might and often did exert pressure to bring about the appointment of a protégé, but Peking did not risk the possibility of any governor or viceroy building up a regional machine. Moreover, no official was permitted to hold a post in his native province. Seeming exceptions were sometimes made when a man was designated as a locum tenens to a position in the province of his birth. Obviously such a procedure rendered it difficult for any official plotting rebellion to appeal to provincial loyalties. Appointments to office were, moreover, only for the term of three years, and while the assignment was often renewed, it seems only infrequently to have been for more than an additional *triennium*. Then, too, both Peking and the provincial authorities sent out messengers from time to time on special errands. Some of the imperial commissioners might even outrank a viceroy. The censors might impeach provincial officials, and the right of officials of certain ranks to memorialize the throne gave a recognized channel for voicing criticisms. An elaborate system of checks and balances existed—of viceroy and governor against each other, and of the other high provincial officials on one another and on the governor and the viceroy. Members of the imperial family could not hold office in the provinces. Peking held the high provincial officials strictly accountable for whatever happened in their jurisdictions. Certain decisions, such as final action on many cases involving capital punishment, were reserved to the capital. These safeguards did not prevent rebellion, but they did much to minimize its frequency and to hold together, with a nice balance between needed local initiative and responsibility to a central authority, the large area that was China proper.

## THE CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS

In theory and to a large extent in practice, the members of this impressive hierarchy of civil officials were recruited through an

elaborate and grueling system of examinations. Three main sets of tests led to what roughly corresponded to degrees awarded by Western universities. The three "degrees" were *hsiu ts'ai, chü jên,* and *chin shih.* In addition to these three, as variations from them or as subdivisions of them, were other stages, each designated by a distinct title.

In every *hsien* and roughly every two years in each *fu,* under the proper official, there was conducted the first set of the examinations. Those who passed them were given the title of *hsiu ts'ai.* This had the effect of recognizing the possessor as qualified to prepare further and to compete in the next stage of the system. The *hsiu ts'ai* had certain privileges. Some of them received a subsidy from the government to enable them to continue their studies; they were exempt from liability to corporal punishment by the magistrates; they were considered members of the local gentry and could be invited to share in the discussion of local affairs; and they were accorded other rights and immunities. Within the ranks of the *hsiu ts'ai* were subdivisions and titles of honor. In general the *hsiu ts'ai* constituted a privileged class to which accrued a good deal of social prestige. Now and then a minor officer was appointed directly from among their number, but they were not eligible to such posts as that of a *hsien* magistrate. To hold their titles, they had to continue their studies and to stand a re-examination every three years.

The next major set of examinations led to the title of *chü jên.* This was held in the provincial capitals, as a rule at intervals of three years (actually, on the average, somewhat more frequently). In each of these cities was a plot of ground on which hundreds of permanent stalls were erected for this purpose. The tests were more formidable than those leading to the *hsiu ts'ai.* They were under the direction of a supervisor and an associate appointed directly from Peking, and much ceremony attached to them. Every examination was divided into three sessions, each with its separate topics. The night before the session the aspirants were led to their cells and sealed in them, and did not emerge until the third day. The mere physical strain was by no means slight, and it was not uncommon for a candidate to die under it. Those who were successful in the ordeal were marked and honored men, especially those who passed at or near the head of the list.

Even the "degree" of *chü jên* did not usually entitle its recipient to hold office. As a rule, a man was eligible only after having passed a third set of examinations, held at Peking. These also were usually at triennial intervals, and in the spring following the examinations leading to the *chü jên.* Only *chü jên* were admitted. Again there were three grilling sessions. The successful examinees were rewarded with the title of *chin shih.* Those emerging with the highest credit were honored by additional designations. Still another examination was held, theoretically in the presence of

the Emperor and on a theme set by him, which resulted in further grading the *chin shih.*

*Chin shih* who passed with the greatest distinction were usually given posts in the *Hanlin Yüan*, in itself no mean honor, and all were either awarded official posts or were placed on the list of "expectant officials" from which appointments were to be made. *Chü jên* who had been unsuccessful in their efforts to enter the ranks of the *chin shih* might either attempt the examination again or be appointed to office after meeting tests which were presumably somewhat less exacting.

The subject matter of the examinations was largely Chinese literature, chiefly that of the Confucian school. Most examinations consisted of composing essays and poems on topics selected from this literature. The essays and poems were required to conform to decidedly artificial standards and were judged by the criteria of style rather than of originality of thought.

The competition was much more keen than any to which we are accustomed in education tests in the Occident. Only a small percentage of the contestants at each of the successive examinations achieved the coveted degrees. Of those who presented themselves for the *chü jên* at any one time, only one out of fifteen or more was successful, and of those who sat for the *chin shih*, usually much fewer than one in ten. The number admitted to the degree of *chin shih* in any one year was seldom more than three hundred fifty and as a rule much less. Candidates often tried again and again, and occasionally a grandfather, father, and son came together. While in many instances younger men attained the rank of *chin shih*, the median age was somewhere in the thirties.

The defects of the system were obvious: the absorption in purely verbal matters, and the premium upon memory and upon ability to write according to the standards of an arbitrary literary style, rather than upon originality or vigor of thought and promise in administrative skill. In many scholars, too, there were fostered an intellectual arrogance, a narrowness of outlook, and a stereotyping of thought which discouraged all progress. Other weaknesses not necessarily inherent in the procedure frequently accompanied it. In spite of elaborately devised safeguards, some men cheated, undetected, or bribed the readers of the papers. From the Sui through the Ch'ing, sons of high officials could enter the bureaucracy either without meeting the ordeal of the examinations or by passing tests which were much easier than those required of others. The right to use the title of the lower degrees was sold by the government, especially in the years of the decadence of the Ch'ing.

Yet over and beyond the weaknesses were values which the foreign observer might easily miss. Even in the worst years of the dynasty only a small minority of the degrees were obtained fraudulently. Titles which had been bought were popularly not regarded as highly as those acquired

by merit. The competition was so exacting that as a rule success went only to men of more than average mental ability and capacity for concentrated application. Possession of the degrees and of a position in the hierarchy was the most coveted honor in the Empire. The examinations, then, brought into the service of society through the state many of the really able men of the country. Even more important was the promotion of cultural unity. All civil officials had passed through the same training in the literature which set forth the ideals of the Confucian school. Not only officials but also the thousands of disappointed aspirants, many times as numerous as the successful, had been subjected to the same regimen. Since the entire formal education of the country was dominated by the purpose of preparing men for the civil service tests and drew its teachers from the ranks of those who had been in training for them, many thousands who had never proceeded far enough with their studies to compete in the examinations had at least a smattering of the standard learning. The educated class, trained in this uniform fashion, enjoyed a prestige greater than that accorded to scholars in any other nation: they dominated society. Their ideals and manners were, accordingly, largely taken over by the masses and tended to permeate the entire nation. The Confucian dream of a society molded by the example of an educated ruling class had to no small extent become an actuality. In spite of its great geographic extent, therefore, China proper was essentially one in civilization and government. Political division was seldom more than temporary and never permanent.

With all its defects, the culture upon which this unity was built was rich and worthy. It inculcated high ideals in the relations of men to one another, so essential to an ordered and prosperous society; it possessed and fostered an extensive and varied literature; and it set high store by good taste and by an appreciation of certain phases of the aesthetic side of life.

The hierarchy and the civil service examinations were among the most notable devices ever originated by any branch of the human race.

## LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Underneath the official hierarchy recruited through the civil service examinations was the local government. Most of it was by units which were largely self-governing, such as the village, the family (including its enlarged form, the clan), and the guild. In a certain sense China was a vast congeries of these all but autonomous units, and the hierarchy intervened only when they failed to function or fell out with one another, or when some crime was committed of which it could not but take cognizance. The picture, too, was complicated by the presence of secret societies, some of them very powerful.

The imperial government acted chiefly as an umpire between interests

which at any time might come into conflict. It provided, too, for the supervision of certain large economic enterprises, such as extensive public works, and for the common defense against external invasion and internal disorder.

The local units were controlled in part on a principle of which much was made in Chinese administration—that of group responsibility. All the members of a family or a village could be held accountable for the deeds of each of their fellows. Pressure was usually brought from above upon the recognized headman or headmen, but might be exerted upon all the individuals in the unit.

Nothing more need be said at this point concerning the family, the guild, and the secret societies, for these are to be described in later chapters. It must be noted, however, that they were very important factors in local and—at times—in provincial and national administration. The village government had as its chief organs a council of elders or managers and a headman, the latter usually termed the *ti pao*. The council of elders was often made up of the leaders of the more important families and of the men who were generally recognized as having the most influence in the village: scholars, and those who had won esteem by their force of character, experience, and administrative ability. In some localities and times, however, these positions went to rich schemers or to men who used corrupt measures to attain them. As a rule, no formal election seems to have been held, although in theory the elders were nominated by their fellow villagers and confirmed by the responsible magistrate, usually the *chih hsien*. Membership appears rather to have come through tacit recognition by public opinion. In theory the *ti pao* was chosen by the magistrate and was the one through whom the village had its communication with the official hierarchy. In at least some villages in the South, the village council was associated with the village temple. To the council of elders and the *ti pao* went such tasks as lighting the streets, maintaining the watchmen, building and repairing dikes, constructing and maintaining the wall (if there was one), supervising markets, approving of all transfers of land, erecting and repairing temples, sinking and cleaning community wells, collecting the taxes and contributions levied by the state, and adjusting disputes between fellow villagers or with other villages. Controversies which could not be settled in this manner might be taken to the magistrate, but such litigation was usually costly and prolonged and was entered upon only as a last resort. In some sections tax collectors constituted an hereditary group, distinct from the *ti pao* and elders.

This organization of local governments was to be found not only in the villages but also in the larger towns and the cities. These were usually divided into wards, each with its council of elders and its *ti pao*, who functioned much as did those of the villages.

It must be added that local institutions varied markedly in the different areas of China. Few descriptions can be written which prove valid for the entire country.

Then, too, the "local gentry," as foreigners sometimes called them, were very influential. Scholars, retired officials, men of wealth, the elders of the leading clans, were much listened to in local affairs and exercised a good deal of initiative in matters affecting the welfare of the community.

In addition to the family, the guild, the secret society, the village, and the gentry, there were many other local organizations that took over some of the functions that in some countries in the Occident are performed by the government. Among them were volunteer fire companies, benevolent societies, groups for watching the crops, and associations for mutual aid. The Chinese have a great capacity and zeal for organization. This was displayed in scores of ways and helped to render them, in their local affairs, self-managing with the minimum of interference from above. It must be added, however, that repeatedly they were hampered by reciprocal distrust and by incapacity for administration. Often individuals, groups, and classes displayed a distressing lack of ability or of willngness to co-operate.

## LAWS AND COURTS

What in the West is called law was much of it in China a matter of tradition and custom. Thanks largely to the common basis of culture insured by the civil service examinations, certain ethical principles were recognized as authoritative throughout the land. This, indeed, was in accordance with the dominant Confucian theory. Life and conduct were supposed to be governed by universally valid principles. These were included, in general, under what the Chinese denominated *li* (not the same character as that employed for ceremonies). Originally quite possibly employed to designate the manners and customs of the aristocracy, in the course of the centuries *li* came to be regarded as binding on all civilized mankind. It was conceived of as conforming to the will of Heaven and was akin to although not identical with the concept of natural law that was present in the Graeco-Roman world and has been transmitted to the modern Occident. In addition, each local unit had its customs. Enforcement of *li* and local customs was chiefly through public opinion, which was very powerful, and by the various local organizations.

There was, as well, a body of statutory law issued in the form of a code. Although much narrower than *li*, it was supposed to conform to it. In a sense the introduction of written law was a departure from strict Confucian theory and, whether consciously or unconsciously, resembled, rather, the concepts of the Legalists. Statutory law was perpetuated by

dynasty after dynasty, like the form of the official hierarchy. For example, the Ch'ing adopted, with modifications, the code in use under the Ming. It was altered from time to time by imperial decree and showed marks of a distinct development.

The code was made up largely of what in the Occident would be called criminal and administrative law. Some items of civil law (proportionately not very numerous) were included in it. The code of the Ch'ing was called the *Ta Ch'ing Lü Li* and was composed, as the name indicates, of *lü* and *li*. The *lü* were fundamental laws based largely upon the Ming code. Promulgated early in the dynasty, in theory they remained unchanged. The *li* seem to have been introduced first by the Ming, and were an attempt to incorporate the results of judicial decisions in actual cases. They were also in the nature of supplementary statutes modifying and extending the *lü* and subject to periodical revision. The *lü* were divided into seven main heads: general, civil, fiscal, ritual, military, criminal, and concerning public works. The general section included principles applying to the whole; the civil dealt with the system of government and the conduct of magistrates and regulated the succession to hereditary titles; the fiscal related to such matters as inheritance and the census; the section on ritual had to do with state sacrifices and ceremonies; the military included the protection of the palace, the guarding of the frontier, and the equipping and provisioning of the army; and the section on public works provided for such undertakings as dikes and the examination and repair of public buildings.

Several features of the criminal law—the bulkiest portion of the *lü*—impress the modern Anglo-Saxon reader as different from the legal system under which he has lived. There was the principle of joint responsibility, by which, for a particularly heinous crime, an entire family might be exterminated, with the mitigation that sons below the age of puberty were merely to be emasculated. Then, too, although no liability attached for an accidental death, the judgment as to what was accidental differed radically at times from that of the West. Persons were often held culpable for deaths for which in the Occident they could have been adjudged free from blame. Even in the case of some fatalities which were decided to have been accidental, those persons who had been the innocent cause were fined or required to make a payment to the deceased relatives. Moreover, the rules of evidence were dissimilar from those in most lands in the modern West, and torture might be used to extract confession from the prisoner—although all but certain forms of it were illegal. From the standpoint of the modern Occident, some punishments were barbarous, such as beating with a bamboo until the victim's back was badly mangled, and death by slicing the culprit into fragments (prescribed, apparently, not so much for the present suffering it caused as for the erasure, so far as possible, of the criminal from the spirit world by the complete dismemberment of his

body). Those condemned to death were sometimes, as an act of clemency, allowed to commit suicide.

Such differences as these were among the causes of friction between foreigners and Chinese officials in pretreaty days and were urged as reasons for extraterritoriality. It should be remembered, however, that the law provided regular schedules by which penalties might be reduced or commuted, that Chinese punishments and torture were not a whit more extreme than those once employed in Europe, and that as late as the eighteenth century Chinese criminal procedure was probably more humane than that of some of the most powerful of the governments of the Occident. Only with the reform of the laws and prisons of the Occident in the nineteenth century—under the influence of the humanitarian movement—did China fall behind.

Precedent played a large part in legal cases, and there were voluminous compilations of court decisions. An extensive legal literature existed, and magistrates, along with their other duties, were supposed to be sufficiently acquainted with the law to act as judges. However, litigants and prisoners did not employ counsel as in the West, and (at least under the Ming and Ch'ing), although the magistrates had jurisconsults, Chinese society partly lacked that learned professional, the lawyer, who has loomed large in the Occident. Perhaps because of the difference in tradition, the educated Chinese thought less legalistically than does the educated man of Europe and America. This also was a cause of friction. Especially in intergovernmental relations between China and the Occident, the latter, accustomed to its own categories, misunderstood and was misunderstood.

Much corruption was found in the courts. The many underlings attached to the magistrates' offices derived their income largely from litigation and criminal cases. The magistrate, even when he himself was honest, was a stranger in his district and so was largely dependent upon his subordinates for a knowledge of the local situation. The function of judge was, moreover, only one of that official's many duties and suffered from divided attention. As a result, entry into the courts usually proved costly in the extreme and the verdict often went to the longest purse.

### TAXATION

The revenue to support the hierarchy of officials and the machinery of district, provincial, and imperial governments came chiefly from four sources: the land tax, tribute, customs duties, and the salt monopoly. The land tax was supposedly fixed according to an assessment made in 1713, but in practice, since the charges for collection were in addition to it and constituted a source of income for some of the officials, it was as much more as the collector could get. Usually the addition seems

to have been from ten to fifty per cent. The tax could be increased in other ways, quite legal and regular, so that in practice the actual sums paid might be twice or more than those authorized in 1713. As assessed under the Manchus, or at least the later Manchus, in most sections the land tax was a combination of several levies of more or less ancient origin: a poll tax, a tax as commutation for forced labor, and another as a substitute for assistance in transmitting official communications.

In addition to a land tax, paid in cash, was a tribute collected in produce, such as silk, copper from mines, and especially grain. The tax in grain, levied on the land, and often compounded by a cash payment, in effect was usually an addition to the land tax. There were many government granaries and much of the grain was transmitted to Peking.

In the days before the treaties and augmented foreign trade and before collection by the foreign-dominated imperial maritime customs service, the customs duties did not loom as prominently as the land tax. They were, however, a considerable source of revenue and were derived from both imposts on foreign trade and domestic commerce.

Salt was, as it had been for centuries, an important source of income. The manufacture, distribution, and sale of salt constituted a state monopoly —although it might be conducted through individuals or firms to whom the government had farmed it.

Several other sources of revenue were regularly tapped, although most of them yielded comparatively minor sums. The sale of office sometimes brought in considerable amounts. Taxes on tea, on fish, and on reeds used for fuel and thatching, mining royalties, fees on the transfer of land and houses, licenses to pawnbrokers and to other financial and mercantile enterprises, a consumption and production tax, and what corresponded to the octroi of Europe—a levy on produce as it entered a town—all swelled the total.

Contrasted with the revenues of governments of the modern West, those of the old China were not large. Compared with the total income of the people, the tax load seems to have been much less than that of most of the major countries of the present-day Occident. This was very possibly true even when the expenses of local governments and the more or less extra-legal "squeeze" of officials were added. Moreover, in times of disaster, such as drought or flood, the government often remitted or reduced the taxes of the afflicted districts. The relative lightness of the imposts was due partly to the comparatively limited functions of the older Chinese state. Many of the tasks undertaken by Western governments of today were left to the initiative of local units or entirely nonpolitical organizations. The members of the civil hierarchy amounted to only a small fraction of the population. The holders of degrees in the service of the state probably seldom if ever exceeded ten or fifteen thousand. Even when the large

number of non-degree holders attached to most offices was added, the percentage of the population deriving its income from the public purse was not nearly as high as that in many Western states of today. Then, too, no huge public debt existed, with heavy charges for interest and sinking funds. Moreover, while the military forces took a large proportion of the revenues of the government, the burden was not nearly as burdensome as is that of the armies and navies of many modern states. The China of the Ch'ing dynasty was by no means a fiscal paradise. It displayed much corruption and inefficiency. However, the financial burden placed upon the realm by the Emperor and the hierarchy, judged by modern standards, appears not to have been particularly onerous.

## THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

After the great revolt during the early part of the reign of the K'ang Hsi Emperor and before the foreign wars and rebellions of the middle of the nineteenth century, the military organization of the China of the Ch'ing was, in its main outlines, about as follows. First of all, there were the descendants of those who had conquered China, now become, in theory, an army of occupation. The original army of conquest had been made up of Manchus, Mongols, and Chinese. This was grouped into what were called "Banners"—of varying colors. Eventually these numbered twenty-four, although often they were called the "Eight Banners," each of the latter being divided into three groups: of Manchus, Chinese, and Mongols. The Banners and the civil service provided posts for most of the Manchus resident in the Eighteen Provinces. At the time of the conquest, the Bannermen amounted possibly to two hundred thousand, a total later raised to about two hundred fifty thousand. Membership was inherited, and eventually the Banners possessed an enrollment of not far from three hundred thousand. About half were stationed in Chihli (Hopei), where they could defend the capital. A large number were in Manchuria, the home of the dynasty, and good-sized contingents were placed in Sinkiang, to hold that turbulent possession, and in Kansu, Shensi, and Shansi, to defend the northern frontier. There were garrisons, but totaling only a small minority of the whole, in other strategic centers of the Eighteen Provinces, notably in a city in Hupeh, in Nanking, and in Canton. The heads of the major divisions of the Banners—commonly known as Tartar Generals—outranked the viceroys, and nominally served as a check on them—part of that elaborate system through which the Ch'ing sought to guard against revolt. As time wore on, the members of the Banners became parasitic pensionaries, totally incompetent as a military force. They proved entirely useless, for example, at the time of the T'ai P'ing Rebellion and in the uprising which ushered in the Republic.

In addition to the Banners was the Army of the Green Standard, made up of Chinese, organized by provinces, and subdivided into land and naval forces. About the middle of the nineteenth century this numbered, in theory, somewhat more than six hundred thousand. The body in actual service, however, was probably very much smaller, for officials padded the rolls to draw pay for as many as possible and increased their own incomes by reducing to the lowest feasible point the numbers of those in the ranks. The units of the Green Standard were so divided under various commands that only with difficulty could they be welded into an effective force on a large scale—an insurance against serious rebellion, but also a severe handicap when a major revolt or foreign invasion had to be faced. Each province had a commander of the Green Standard, but in practice heads of subordinate units were accorded much latitude, and some of the civil officials, such as the viceroys, had contingents directly under their control.

For admission to official position in the army, a system of military examinations existed which corresponded fairly closely in its main stages and degrees to that for the civil service. There were tests in the *hsien* and the *fu* for entrance to the first degree; others, usually every three years, in the provincial capital, for the second degree; and examinations for the third degree only at Peking, and usually also about every three years. As in the tests for the civil service, successful aspirants became expectant officials, and appointment to office generally depended even more upon family connections and discreet gifts to those who could bring about promotion than upon high rank in the competition. The subject matter of the examinations was in part tests in military pursuits, such as archery and gymnastics, and in part essays on military subjects. The profession of a soldier was socially vastly inferior to that of a civil official. Military degrees, therefore, were not nearly so highly regarded as those admitting to the civil service.

It will easily be seen that the military organization of China under the Ch'ing was far from being as efficient as the civil hierarchy. It was too weak ever seriously to threaten to dominate the state, but at times it proved useful in maintaining local order and curbing minor revolts.

## THE GOVERNMENT OF OUTLYING DEPENDENCIES

During the years of vigor of the Ch'ing, before the foreign wars and rebellions of the middle of the nineteenth century, the portions of the Empire outside the Eighteen Provinces were kept, so far as possible, directly under the Manchus. Chinese were seldom appointed to official position in them. Efforts were put forth to exclude Chinese settlers from sections next to China proper, notably Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, and when, as was almost inevitable, these restrictions broke down, attempts were made to prevent Chinese from intermarrying with the natives. The

Manchus looked upon all their empire as a conquest. If they were to continue to hold China proper, they had, perforce, to associate Chinese with themselves in its administration. However, they jealously guarded their other possessions as their own—to be regarded in no sense as belonging to the Chinese. Only in their years of decay did they find it necessary to share them with the latter.

Manchuria was divided into three provinces organized somewhat after the fashion of China south of the Great Wall. Much of the officialdom was military, but the southernmost of the provinces, Shengking, which, because of its proximity to China proper, had increasingly a large settled Chinese population, was given more of a civil administration. In the days of the dynasty's strength, both civil and military officials were Manchus, and a large proportion of them belonged to the imperial clan.

Through the rest of the outlying dependencies, the Ch'ing governed on the principle of disturbing as little as possible the political institutions that had existed before the conquest, but exercised a fairly close oversight by planting Manchu officials supported by garrisons at strategic centers, by keeping up communication with them, and by insisting upon the right to appoint, or at least to confirm, all heads of important local units. Most of the peoples of Mongolia and Sinkiang were allowed to maintain something of their old tribal and family organization, although the Manchus often sought to group them in such a manner as to weaken tribal loyalties. In the attempt to strengthen Manchu control, colonists were brought into some regions. The local unit was usually the Banner, each Banner being composed of about fifty or more adult males capable of bearing arms. In the majority of instances the Banner had at its head a chieftain or *dzassak*. The *dzassak* held his post by virtue of imperial appointment, but generally in practice also by heredity. In turn the Banners were often grouped by tribes. In Inner Mongolia, where the control of Peking was more minutely exercised and the organization had some resemblance to that of China proper, the tribes were organized into leagues. Outer Mongolia was divided into four large regions. At important towns and cities, such as Urga, Yarkand, and Turfan, Manchu officials of varying grades were placed, for the most part supported by troops. The quality of the holders of these positions often suffered from the practice of using many of them as posts to which to exile officials who for some reason had incurred the imperial displeasure. Over the administration of the peoples of Mongolia and of much of Sinkiang was the *Li Fan Yüan* at Peking.

Connecting Peking with the most important centers in the outlying dependencies were post routes, diligently maintained. The submission of the peoples of these regions was further sought by the practice of according titles to influential individuals and by requiring periodical visits to Peking of important natives, either in person or by proxy.

In Tibet the organization was different. Here was a vast region governed

by a political-ecclesiastical machine, the Lama hierarchy. None of the leaders of the hierarchy, either at the capital or at the largest monasteries, could be chosen without the consent of a representative of Peking. At the head of the Manchu administration in Tibet, at Lhasa, was an imperial resident. Major subordinates were stationed at three centers, including Lhasa. All were under the *Li Fan Yüan.*

The system by which the Ch'ing administered the non-Chinese sections of their Empire succeeded fairly well so long as the imperial line remained vigorous. It was, however, foredoomed to ultimate failure, for it was designed to do the impossible—to maintain the *status quo.* No attempt was made to amalgamate the Empire by the extension of Chinese culture outside the Eighteen Provinces. Each major section of the realm was encouraged in maintaining its own institutions in so far as these did not immediately threaten revolt.

## SUMMARY OF THE OLD SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

This, then, was the system of government under the Ch'ing before it was affected by the coming of the Westerner. Like all human institutions, it had its weaknesses. It suffered from corruption and inefficiency, especially from the latter part of the eighteenth century. The large degree of local autonomy in both the civil and the military organization and the many checks and balances devised to prevent rebellion, hindered quick, effective action on a large scale against a foreign foe or a serious revolt. But for these defects, China might not have proved so helpless a victim in her wars with Western powers and the rebellions of the middle of the nineteenth century might not have gained such headway. The civil service examinations, with their concentration on verbal matters and a training to memorize *verbatim* the literature of a particular school of philosophy, nourished a pride of culture which made it difficult for the Chinese to be willing to learn from another civilization. This greatly delayed adjustment to the new conditions brought by the coming of the West and thus heightened the debacle when the pressure of Occidental culture could no longer be resisted. Cultural uniformity through the civil service examinations was a brake on change and possible progress. The lack of honor in which military service was popularly held became a decided handicap in dealing with an Occident armed to the teeth and from which only force could hope to win freedom and respect.

Serious, too, was the dependence upon a hereditary imperial line. In the Chinese system of government the monarch formed the keystone of the arch. The structure had been erected by great autocrats such as Ch'in Shih Huang Ti and Han Wu Ti. The hierarchy was simply hands and feet to the Emperor. Except for a regency in the case of a minor, no method

had been devised, either by custom or formal enactment, for carrying on the government in the name of the prince. When a ruler or a ruling line proved hopelessly incompetent, the remedy most frequently sought was revolt. This in part accounts for the repeated change in dynasties and the much more frequent rebellions. Rebellion was the chief means by which discontent could become vocal. It was usually either a protest or an instrument of the ambitious. Loyalty of a minister to his prince was one of the cardinal Confucian virtues, but accepted political theory also had a place for popular revolt against a dissolute or unjust ruler and recognized in the *fait accompli* of a change in the reigning family the transfer of the Mandate of Heaven. This was in marked contrast to Japan, where loyalty to the throne has been even more a cardinal virtue, where history records only one imperial line, and where at a very early time the tradition was established of having the rule carried on by the most competent, but in the name of the legitimate house. In China, whenever an able and vigorous monarch was on the throne, the system worked well. When, however, as was inevitable under the principle of hereditary succession, a vicious or incompetent heir came into power, the machinery creaked and not infrequently broke down. As we have so often noted, it was this defect which largely accounted for the undoing of China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Empire was headed by a decadent family at the time when it faced the greatest crisis of its history.

Probably the basic weakness lay in the fact that as the theory on which the government rested was carried to its logical conclusion stagnation was unavoidable and decay probable. As the T'ang, the Sung, the Ming, and the Ch'ing perfected that system on which the Ch'in and the Han had begun to organize the state—a bureaucracy dependent on the Emperor and drilled in a particular social philosophy—ossification set in. A system relentlessly applied threatened to ruin a great people.

Significant is the fact that the apex of the system had increasingly been a line of foreign conquerors. Beginning in the thirteenth century, for more than half the time the imperial house was of alien blood. The machinery of the state had been captured by non-Chinese. Although parts of the country had repeatedly been under conquerors whom the Chinese regarded as barbarians, never until 1280 had the entire realm succumbed to them. The eventual breakdown was due to a combination of the incompetence of the Manchus and the unwillingness and inability of the entrenched Chinese scholar class to undertake the drastic reorganization demanded by the new age into which China had been thrust by the West.

The failings must not be allowed to obscure the achievements of the Chinese imperial system. These have been mentioned repeatedly in the preceding pages and do not require reiteration. In spite of its defects, the political structure which so largely disappeared in the first five decades

of the twentieth century was among the most remarkable and successful ever devised by man.

## THE CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT WROUGHT BY CONTACT WITH THE OCCIDENT

Space is lacking to record, even in its main outlines, the history of the changes in the structure of the government of China due to contact with the Occident. Some of the most important have been mentioned in previous chapters. Their course has been kaleidoscopic and confusing in the extreme. The end is not yet. China may be only at the beginning of her political revolution. Any description of the current form of government may be out of date before it can be printed.

Although an historical narrative is here out of place, certain prominent features and trends must be noted. One of these was the attempt of the Ch'ing to guide China through the transition by introducing new institutions and making adjustments while preserving the essentials of the old, such as the monarchy and the hierarchical bureaucracy. Given a dynasty in its prime under such a monarch as the K'ang Hsi Emperor, this attempt, while extremely difficult, would have had a fair chance of success. As it was, we now know that failure was practically certain. At the time of the T'ai P'ing Rebellion, instead of renovating from the ground up or else abolishing the Banners and the Green Standard, these were allowed to go on their somnolent way and a new military force was created. Later came attempts to create an army of the Occidental type, but the most noteworthy result was the forging of a weapon by which the commander of the best units, Yüan Shih-k'ai, was eventually able to dominate the country and for about four years to maintain a certain degree of internal order. A few new central bureaus, such as the *Tsungli Yamen*, were added to the old ones at Peking. New nation-wide services, principally the post office and the maritime customs, were created. A direct handling by Peking of many affairs formerly delegated to provincial and local officials was brought about by pressure from the highly centralized governments of the West. New taxes were levied, especially *likin*—the latter originally devised to help meet the cost of suppressing the T'ai P'ings. Late in the dynasty beginnings were made at bringing the laws and courts of the country more nearly into conformity with those of the West. After the Russo-Japanese War the administration of Manchuria was reorganized and Chinese were given a larger share in it. The reform of the civil service was attempted and (1905) the old system of examinations was abolished. Representative, elective provincial assemblies and a national assembly were instituted, and a parliament promised. The expenses of government increased, partly because of indemnities to the powers, partly because of the greater cost of the new military establish-

ment, and partly because the state was compelled to undertake additional functions. Moreover, the financial stability of the government was threatened by the pledging of some of the major revenues, notably the customs duties, for the payment of sums due foreigners. None of these changes would necessarily have proved fatal to the fundamental features of the old government. It was ineptitude in high places which made impossible the orderly assimilation of innovations from the West.

As we have seen, the old has been progressively swept aside amid repeated disorder and civil strife. The passing of the examination system dealt the death blow to the prestige and dominance of Confucianism, which had been the means of national cultural coherence. In the new educational system, Confucianism retreated more and more into the background. The Communists sought its complete elimination. The abolition of the monarchy cut off the head of the official hierarchy. The demise of the monarchy and of the old system of examinations required radical readjustments in the methods of recruiting and choosing the members of the civil service, and the institution was greatly weakened. The many abortive attempts at national and provincial constitutions modeled at least in part on those of the West were a further cause of disorganization. Of national constitutions at least four were adopted in the twenty years which followed the proclamation of the Republic. Some of them were confessedly temporary, but at least one was hopefully denominated "permanent." Several provinces formed constitutions, usually only to allow them soon to fall into desuetude. Financial solvency was threatened by the pledging of additional sources of revenue to secure foreign loans. New organizations, such as local and national educational associations and chambers of commerce, arose and often had an important voice in political affairs.

The disappearance of the old was hastened by the attempts at introducing the institutions of Communist Russia. For example, the *tangpu,* local committees of the Kuomintang which had Russian prototypes, for a time supplanted in part the village elders and even the *hsien* magistrate. From 1927 to 1945 much of the country was ruled by the Kuomintang. This party, organized by Sun Yat-sen and his colleagues long before the Russian Revolution, later was modified under Russian influence. Eventually it attained a nation-wide organization, in an ascending scale from the *tangpu* through intermediary regional committees and offices to the National Party Congress. The program under which the party operated called for three stages: a period of military operations to crush opposition, one of political tutelage during which the nation, under the control of the party, was to be prepared for self-government, and one of constitutional government in which the dictatorship of the party would end and popular democratic institutions come into being. The first period was officially fixed as ending in 1929, and in 1945 the country was still regarded as in the second.

In 1946 an attempt was made to frame a constitution which would inaugurate the third stage, but it broke down because of the refusal of the Communists to co-operate.

The National Government, established at Nanking in 1927, was in theory organized (1928) on an outline inherited from Sun Yat-sen and had in it many Russian features. It was under the Kuomintang and derived its mandate from the Central Executive Committee and the Central Supervisory Committee elected by the National Congress of that party. In direct control of the government was a Central Political Council of the Kuomintang made up of the membership of these two committees and presided over by a standing committee of the three. This was succeeded, in 1937, by a Supreme National Defense Conference, later the Supreme National Defense Council. The central government had five bodies: executive, legislative, judicial, examining, and controlling (something like the old censorate, for impeaching and auditing), each called a *yüan*.

Marked progress was made in framing codes in accord with the ideals of the Occident, so that there might be no longer any excuse for extraterritoriality. For the time being, an independent judiciary could scarcely be said to exist. The dominance of the military precluded it.

The civil strife and the rule of the military were corrosive forces. Early in the history of the Republic, for instance, the military governor overshadowed and eventually usually entirely displaced the civil governor. The country was largely carved up among military men, often of very humble origin and poorly educated, who rose to power out of the general disorder. Such provincial and local government as survived generally existed on their sufferance. At the head of each province was a kind of committee with a chairman. In practice many of the provinces were controlled by military leaders who were largely independent of the national government. After 1926 these war lords were mostly eliminated. Only the Communists remained fully independent.

Yet remnants of the old organization persisted and it was to these that the country largely owed such order as existed. The provinces continued, and six additional ones were created (usually from existing divisions) on the borders of the original twenty-two inherited from the Ch'ing. The *hsien* survived as a characteristic local administrative unit, and villages, families, and guilds kept up their functions, although often much modified and weakened. There were many irregular tax levies, but the land and salt taxes and the customs duties (sadly diminished after 1937 by the Japanese blockade) continued to be basic sources of revenue. Guilds, clans, and secret societies still played an important part in government. Secret societies, indeed, may even have become more influential under the Republic. A large proportion of the educated belonged to them. Seldom did a man join more than one. While their membership and proceedings were

not public and their activities were only infrequently noted in the public press, they formed extremely important factors in politics. The Control and the Examining *Yüan* of the Nationalist Government were attempts at reviving two of the characteristic features of the imperial system, the censorate and the civil service examinations. After 1949 the Republic of China attempted to carry on this structure on T'aiwan, and Chiang Kai-shek talked hopefully of restoring it on the mainland.

On the mainland, as we have seen, the Communists put into effect a structure which departed even more from the traditions of the past than did the Kuomintang. They sought to profit by the example of the U.S.S.R., but with attempts to adapt the Russian experience to the Chinese situation. Like the Kuomintang, they conserved much of the provincial and local divisions and traditions.

Prophecy is always dangerous and never more so than in present-day China. What the government of China will be, if and when it becomes fairly stabilized, is impossible to predict. That the old can never return seems clear. For better or for worse, the Chinese have broken with the system inherited from the Chou, the Ch'in, and the Han. Some of the spirit of the old may persist. For example, an educational system under the close control of the government and inculcating a uniform culture as a means of national unity has been stressed. Two conflicting tendencies common to most governments and long visible in China are present: the desire for local autonomy and the urge to national unity through some kind of hierarchical bureaucracy. It seems safe—and something of a banality—to guess that, as heretofore, a working compromise between the two will be arrived at, presumably, since this is the trend of modern states, with greater centralization than under the Ch'ing. Western influences and the spirit of nationalism are so strong that it appears probable—and this is also platitudinous—that whatever form or forms of government develop will not be reproductions of the old but will be something new—will possess many features derived from the Occident, and yet will be attempts at adjustment to China's needs and to the genius of the past. It seems clear, moreover, that the nationalism which has been rising so rapidly and which shows no signs of abatement will not permit the Chinese to rest satisfied short of the complete union of all territory traditionally Chinese. If the country is to be permanently unified, the acceptance by the nation, whether consciously or unconsciously, of some sort of fundamental philosophy, doing for the new what Confucianism did for the old, would seem to be necessary. Whether that philosophy will be Communism is unclear. If it proves to be Communism, modifications, eventually drastic, will be made in the Marxian-Leninism which in theory has been orthodox.

It will be fascinating to watch the progress toward the evolution of the new. Certainly, unless the Chinese have lost their remarkable capacity

for government—and this seems entirely unproved—in time they will erect once more a reasonably stable and efficient structure.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

# Economic Life and Organization

Food, clothing, and shelter have loomed large in the objectives of the Chinese. This is of necessity true in any society. Rather more than most peoples, however, the Chinese have been this-worldly in their ideals. In a certain sense they can be characterized as materialistically minded. Certainly interest in the physical basis of life has been prominent in the philosophies on which the state has acted. As far back as we can trace Chinese culture, it was consciously dependent upon agriculture and sought to further it. Most of the great schools of thought of the Chou endeavored to promote man's bodily welfare as an essential condition of all gains in morals and the arts. The Legalists, on whose theories Ch'in Shih Huang Ti unified the Empire, stressed the economic organization of society. Confucianism recognized the fact that if there was to be civilization the masses must not be allowed to go unclad and hungry. Of the indigenous philosophies accorded a prolonged place of honor in Chinese life, only Taoism belittled the striving for bodily comforts and sought to make man independent of the trammels of the flesh.

It is not surprising that, with this background, the Chinese state concerned itself with the economic life of the country, and that it continues to do so. Nor is it remarkable that more than once so thoroughgoing a direction of the production and distribution of the country was essayed by the state that Westerners and modern Chinese have dubbed the attempt socialism. Wang Mang and Wang An-shih were simply carrying out in an exaggerated form the principle of governmental control which seems usually to have been acknowledged as valid by the Confucianists as well as by the ancient Legalists. The Communists could find in China's past a tradition which gave warrant for their program—even though, with the possible exception of the Ch'in, that program was more drastic than any which the country had known.

While something akin to socialism was by no means alien to Chinese thought, under the Ch'ing and many earlier dynasties the imperial policy was very largely that of laissez faire. Here and there the government stepped in. Coinage was in the hands of the state. The salt trade was an official monopoly, although as a source of revenue rather than as a means of reducing the price and improving the quality for the consumer. Close supervision was exercised over foreign trade. State granaries in which was stored the rice collected as one form of taxation could in times of scarcity

be used to equalize prices and relieve distress. Officialdom usually determined the disposition of waste lands, and no title to any real estate was secure without its imprimatur. In the main, however, the imperial and provincial governments exerted almost no authority over the agriculture, business, and industry of the country.

Comparative freedom from bureaucratic interference did not mean that individualism was rampant in the Empire's economic life. On the contrary, the regulation which the bureaucracy did not impose was exercised by local and extrapolitical agencies, such as the family and the guild. The actual situation was almost the opposite of laissez faire. Far from being free to do as he liked, the individual was closely bound by custom and a network of co-operative agencies.

This organization differed markedly from the capitalistic system of the modern Occident. The old China had no huge accumulations of mobile wealth. Great riches were in the form of lands, pawnshops, rich clothing, jewels, and bullion. No stock companies existed, with their facilities for centering in one enterprise the investments of hundreds or thousands of individuals. The partnership, the guild, the secret society, and the family were the characteristic forms of economic combination. Moreover, in contrast with most peoples of the modern Occident, economically China was almost entirely self-contained. Foreign trade never bulked large in the total business of the realm.

An economic history of China should prove most illuminating. A record of the experience of a people which has devoted so much attention to both the theory and the practice of supplying man's physical needs would have much of interest. Unfortunately the story has yet to be written. The available material is enormous, but only the most tentative beginnings have been made toward collecting and interpreting it.

In the main the Chinese were fairly successful in solving their economic problems. Their organization made possible a livelihood for a great number of people. Under such dynasties as the Han, the T'ang, the Sung, the Yüan, the Ming, and the Ch'ing they constituted one of the most numerous and prosperous masses of mankind. In the latter part of the eighteenth and in the nineteenth century the Chinese were the largest fairly homogeneous group of the human race. They still are. The standard of living which they had achieved compared favorably with that of any people before the sixteenth century. It will be recalled with what enthusiastic superlatives Marco Polo, who had traveled in most of the highly civilized sections of the world of his day, described the populous cities and the wealth of Cathay. It was not until the modern age that the Occident, enriched by its geographic discoveries and its industrial revolution, forged ahead of China and set a new standard of comfort for the race.

On the other hand, the majority of the Chinese have lived and continue

to live at an economic level which to the modern Occident seems grinding poverty. Again and again throughout China's history famines have devastated great sections (one estimate shows an average for two thousand years of nearly one famine a year that was important enough to find a place in the records), and at several periods sweeping declines in population seem to have occurred and must have been accompanied by intense physical suffering. Floods and drought, the collapse of dynasties with the attendant civil strife, invasions, high mortality in youth, wasting disease, and a family system which made for the rapid multiplication of population—each had a part. But for defects in the economic structure, however, there would probably have been fewer rebellions, for many of these were in large part induced by the pinch of poverty, and a better organization for a greater control of man's physical environment would have prevented or mitigated the distress due to disasters of nature. It is significant that the mechanical inventions which have made possible the increases both in population and in standards of living in so much of the world during the past century and a half originated not in China but in the Occident. The reasons must be a matter of debate, but the fact is indisputable. With all their devotion to the material well-being of man, the Chinese fell behind the West in achieving it.

## AGRICULTURE

From time immemorial agriculuture has been the major occupation of the Chinese. Most of the Chinese have been and are supported directly by farming and by the occupations immediately connected with it. The devotion to agriculture has been furthered by the natural environment. Much of China's soil is very fertile, especially in the great deltas of the Yangtze and Huang Ho, and in some of the smaller river valleys. Moreover, agriculture was traditionally held in honor. The farmer ranked high in the social scale. The Emperor officially opened the spring by ceremonial plowing, and magistrates throughout the Empire were supposed to perform a similar rite.

The absorption of so large a proportion of the population in the task of raising food and the raw materials for clothing is an indication of the nature of the agricultural methods. These have been marked by the intensive application of human labor and a paucity of machinery. Agriculture has been more akin to gardening than to farming. Machinery there was—simple, from the standpoint of the modern West, and some of it crude—and use was made of draught animals. By far the major part of the work, however, has been performed by human beings. Even on larger farms, where animals can be employed more extensively than on smaller ones, as a rule more than half the labor has been by human hands. As we have

seen, the Communists have endeavored to alter this structure with a greater use of machinery.

Along with intensive cultivation by manpower have been other characteristics. Most of the units have been small. In at least many sections the majority of these were farmed by their owners, and although until the Communists came to power renters were numerous, practically all the laborers were free. Under the Manchus there was very little of slavery or of binding the peasant to the soil in semifree serfdom.

Some of these generalizations require elaboration. The units of cultivation were usually small. No accurate survey has ever been made for all China, and holdings have varied in size with the character of the soil, the kind of crops raised, the water supply, and the human factor which in places amassed large estates. One survey in the 1930's of portions of six provinces in North and East Central China gave the average size of nearly twenty-four hundred farms as a little over five acres, varying from slightly over ten acres in two *hsien* in Anhui to about two and a half acres in one *hsien* in Fukien. Another survey made about the same time seemed to show that in the places examined two-thirds of the farmers in Kiangsu and slightly more than half in Hopei (Chihli) were attempting to make a living off one acre or less of land. It found the average of the holdings in Kiangsu to be about three and a quarter acres, and in Hopei about four acres. As was to be expected, in the North, with its smaller rainfall, the average farm was larger than in the Yangtze Valley or on the south coast, where the precipitation is heavier and the growing season longer and where more than one crop a year has usually been possible.

While the above figures indicate that the great majority of farms were small, there were numerous exceptions. Until the drastic redistribution of land by the Communists, China had many landed estates, some of them family possessions and others endowments of temples or of various philanthropic enterprises. Some were hundreds of acres in extent. These extensive domains, however, were not necessarily cultivated as units. Most of them appear to have been rented to tenants in plots but little if any larger than those worked by their owners. Many of the proprietors resided on their land and so formed in places a kind of country gentry. Title to a considerable proportion of the rented land, however, was held by absentees. This made for a very different kind of rural society than where the owners lived on their estates. When paid in cash, the rent yielded the landlord about eight and a half or even eleven per cent on his investment. When rent was a share of the crop, it took about half of what the tenant produced. The proportion of the agricultural land included in the larger holdings varied from section to section. The percentage of peasant proprietors appears to have been highest in the older provinces of the North, and lowest in Fukien, Kwangtung, and the Yangtze Valley.

In the last decades before Communist domination the exact percentage of farmers the country over who owned the land they tilled is not known. Certainly, however, it was fairly high. One set of figures seems to show that somewhat more than half the farmers cultivated their own land, that about a fourth leased part and owned part, and that only about a fourth were entirely tenants. Many of the tenants, moreover, rented their fields from the communal holdings of the clan to which they belonged. Peasant proprietors acquired their land chiefly through inheritance, although transfer by sale or mortgage was not unusual. The division of ancestral acres through successive generations of heirs made for the smallness of the tracts farmed. Probably much less than half of the work on the farms, on the average, was hired labor, and most of this appears to have been of local origin and not migratory. The rural population, staying by its ancestral acres unless uprooted by some such catastrophe as a famine or a war, had a profound effect on Chinese society. Conservatism and stability in outlook and customs were of its essence.

Not only were the total holdings of any one farmer small, but in turn they were usually made up of still smaller tracts scattered in several places about the village and separated from the farmhouse by a distance of from a third to half a mile. As inevitable corollaries, such farms could not be cultivated as units, it was difficult if not impossible for one peasant to fight plant and animal diseases without the co-operation of his neighbors (often not easily obtained), time and energy were lost in going from one plot to another, and labor-saving machinery could not be employed to advantage. It was an inefficient form of rural organization. Moreover, a large proportion of the farms were too small for economical cultivation. It was the larger farms that were the most profitable.

With these small holdings and the intensive application of human labor, the density of population in some portions of China was almost unbelievable. The survey which showed that farms averaged a little over five acres also disclosed the fact that the average family supported by each was 5.7 persons. The most crowded rural sections had more inhabitants per square mile than Bengal, the most thickly settled part of India, or than rural Japan.

A standard of living inevitably followed which, from the Western standpoint, was appallingly low. To this contributed the fact that, especially in the North, where the growing season is shorter, there are some months when labor cannot be applied to the land. Supplementary industries occupied part of the spare time, but by no means all. A survey, made before the inflation of the 1940's with their skyrocketing prices, indicated that the average yearly income of a farmer's family, excluding any allowance for house rent but including produce raised on the ground and consumed by the family, was $147 (American currency), or only about $2.30 a month per capita. Half even of this distressingly slight sum was taken up by the

costs of farming, so that only about $73 a year was left for the subsistence of the average family. In North China, where the poverty was greater, an investigation showed that the rural population had only about $5 American currency *per capita* a year for food, fuel, shelter, and clothing, whereas a minimum living wage was three times that sum. Only by rigid economy could the masses eke out the barest existence. For most of them the money required for even elementary education was all but out of the question. The rate of illiteracy was correspondingly high and the problem of achieving a democratic national or provincial government was consequently augmented.

Yet in fairly normal times chronic semistarvation was by no means universal. Infant mortality was excessive, but it seems probable from statistics taken from several widely separated areas that a larger proportion of the population attained old age than in rural India, although decidedly less than in France. Moreover, many farmers made an annual profit on their operations. No one who traveled in China in the opening years of the twentieth century, especially in the Yangtze Valley and the South, could forget the comfortable farmsteads he saw, with their air of dignity and peace. Many a well-to-do rural family nourished for generations a tradition of culture and self-respect. As has been suggested, both incomes and profits averaged much less in the North, with its smaller rainfall, than in the Yangtze Valley. In the North, therefore, the standard of living was lower than in the South.

Given the method of cultivation by the lavish application of human labor, it followed that a considerable proportion of the land remained untilled. Only the more fertile soils could be made to yield a sufficient return to justify the investment of labor required by the traditional methods. Much of the unplowed land, to be sure, was not utterly waste. Some of it was utilized for pasturage, usually of a scanty type. Hilly land especially was employed for sheep grazing. It was also largely cut over for fuel—of dried grass, brush, or wood. Cutting off the wood, brush, and grass from the hills, even to digging up the roots (as was often done under the pressure for fuel), hastened erosion. Any humus and most of the tillable top soil were washed away and the land impoverished. Often much of the remaining sand and gravel was carried to the plains by heavy rains and there impeded cultivation.

Even in the fertile plots some of the space, possibly five per cent or more on the average, was taken up by paths and the ever-present graves. In spite of its dense rural population, therefore, China had not extended its farm land to the ultimate possible limits.

Agricultural experts from the Occident more than once remarked on the skill of the Chinese farmer in taking advantage of the materials at his hand. Even to the amateur observer the application of practical agricultural

lore was apparent. The most obvious testimony to it has been the huge population which China has been made to support, a considerable minority of it in comparative comfort. In this, to be sure, the Chinese have been favored by soil and climate, but natural advantages alone would not have accounted for their success. In utilizing their environment they accumulated much experience and displayed no small degree of intelligence. Some of their knowledge was arrived at empirically. Probably most of the Chinese farmers simply followed, with little if any understanding, methods inherited from the past. In this, however, they were not unlike the peoples of other lands. Moreover, superstition rather than intelligence often dictated procedures, as in many other sections of the earth. Yet after all the qualifying deficiencies have been taken into account, the fact remains that the traditional Chinese agriculture had much to commend it.

First of all, the Chinese cultivated a very wide range of plants. This variety was favored by the size of the country and the ensuing differences in climate and soil. Much of it, however, was due to the eagerness of the Chinese to appropriate whatever useful plant came to their attention. To native varieties were added, through the years, many from foreign lands. Some of the most prevalent of the food plants were certain and others were possible importations. The average Westerner thinks of the Chinese as eating chiefly rice. For large portions of the country this impression is not entirely untrue. For most of China proper south of the valley of the Yellow River, and particularly for the lower part of the Yangtze Valley and the provinces on the south coast, rice of many varieties is a major article of diet and the crop most extensively grown. However, scores of millions of Chinese, especially in the North, have never tasted rice. Many other grains have been raised. Wheat is cultivated in Manchuria and is a major crop in the North China plain, in Shantung, Kansu, Shensi, and the northern portions of Anhui and Hupeh. Millet is extensively raised in the North, and particularly in the semiarid portions of Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, and Inner Mongolia. Kaoliang, a kind of sorghum, is widely planted in the northeast of China proper and has formed the staple crop in much of Manchuria. Kaoliang supplies not only food, in the form of grain, but its stalks and leaves have been used for thatching, matting, packing, bridges, and fuel. Rice, wheat, millet, and kaoliang have constituted the chief grains, but others, such as buckwheat, barley, and oats, are to be found in some sections.

Many legumes have been raised. Peas, alfalfa, clover, and beans of several kinds, including the soy bean, are among them and are valuable not only as food but also for maintaining the fertility of the soil. The soy bean especially has been notable (particularly the yellow variety) for the total of its production and its extensive use as a source of oil, sauce, bean curd, soup, and other forms of food, and of oil cake for fertilizer and for

fattening hogs. Root crops, such as peanuts and sweet potatoes, have been very common. Sesamum seed has been cultivated chiefly for its oil. Rape, which ripens before the planting of rice and cotton, has been widely grown, and its seeds supply oil, its new shoots greens, its dried stems fuel, and the refuse fertilizer.

Many vegetables have been raised. Note should be made of the edible water chestnut and lotus roots. Numerous kinds of fruit, too, have been cultivated, although some foreign observers have believed that the Chinese could, with benefit, have given greater attention to them. The very name of tea is of Chinese origin, and the leaf remains, as it has been for many centuries, a staple crop and the source of a universal Chinese drink. Our first reference to the drinking of tea is from the second half of the third century after Christ. Tea drinking was first confined to the South, but during the T'ang it became widespread. By the eighth century even the poor were using tea, and the growth and preparation of the tea leaf had become an important occupation. Melons of various kinds, including especially the watermelon, have been characteristic. Pomelos, oranges, bananas, pineapples, papaws, and lichees have been raised in the tropical and subtropical South, and such fruits and nuts as oranges, pears, cherries, peaches, apricots, walnuts, chestnuts, grapes, plums, and apples in some other parts of the country. The bamboo is grown over much of China, in many varieties, and has almost innumerable uses. Its young shoots provide food, its foliage clothing, and its stalks material for building and for many kinds of furniture and implements.

The raw materials for clothing have been raised by the farmer. From time immemorial the silkworm and its associated mulberry tree have been a chief care of the Chinese. A wild silk, from larvae fed on oaks, has also been produced, especially in Shantung, Hopei and Manchuria. Cotton is the material of the larger proportion of Chinese clothing and has been and is grown in North, in Central, and in South China. It forms a major crop of the lower part of the Yangtze Valley. Ramie has provided most of the material for China's "grass cloth." A number of other plants have been cultivated for their fiber, among them hemp and jute.

It must also be noted that a great deal of tobacco is grown, in which, whatever its solace, there is no food value, and that of late years much land has been given over to the raising of the opium poppy—a serious economic waste, with disastrous moral and physical concomitants.

In addition to producing a wide variety of plants, the Chinese have been noted for their slight dependence upon meat and animal products for food. They appear never to have cared for butter or cheese, and made almost no use of cow's or goat's milk. In the main this has been a saving. To use the products of the field directly for human food without the waste of first passing them through the digestive processes of an intermediary

animal obviously effects an economy in an area needed to support a given number of human beings. The Chinese diet has not been entirely lacking in meat. Most of it, however, has been derived from fish, which take up no land, and from pigs and chickens, which are in part scavengers and hence not a full charge upon food otherwise available for man. In at least one region thrifty farmers have effected a further saving by planting their irrigation pools to fish and gathering their harvest in the autumn after the water is no longer needed on the fields. Ducks and geese have been widely raised. Mutton and beef have been used, but in relatively small quantities. Some animals have been utilized to assist man in his work: the water buffalo in the Yangtze Valley and the South, the donkey, the horse, the mule, and the ox in the North.

In spite of their independence of flesh and animal products, the Chinese achieved a fairly well balanced diet. This was probably not through scientific method but by chance experience. Proteins not acquired through meat have been supplied by vegetable products, such as bean curd. Fats have been obtained in the form of vegetable oils. Roughage and some of the needed salts and vitamins have come through vegetables, a large proportion of them served green and not cooked long enough to destroy their beneficial elements. A laborer with his bowl of rice, his greens, and his bean curd, and perhaps with some tidbit cooked in oil, is not far from a well-balanced ration. The brewing of his tea necessitates boiling the water, and since a large proportion of his liquid is taken in this manner he has a partial safeguard against the infections which lurk in most of the streams and wells.

This diet has doubtless had defects. To obtain the requisite amount of protein the Chinese must often eat a large quantity of grain. The practice of polishing the rice, and the semiwhite condition of much of the wheat flour, has deprived him of some of the salts and the vitamins in the outer covering of the grain. Often the food has had too little variety. The insistence in wide regions on rice as the only grain eaten has meant semi-starvation for some who could procure wheat or sweet potatoes at a lower cost per unit of food value. Much land better suited to other crops has been devoted to rice culture. It seems probable that the average diet has suffered from a calcium content too low for maximum growth. For these reasons, and because of the narrow margin by which even in normal times a large proportion of the population is removed from the starvation level, the bulk of the Chinese appear to have been dangerously underfed.

Not only has the Chinese farmer raised a wide variety of plants and economized on flesh, but he has been noted as well for the pains with which he has sought to keep up the productivity of the land. No natural fertility, even as great as that of some of China's alluvial plains, could have yielded, unassisted, such continuous returns over so long a period as has the soil of China. The fact that today China maintains so large a popu-

lation is due in no small degree to the persistence and the skill with which the farmer has kept his fields supplied with the needed plant food. A chief source of fertilizer has been what the Westerner euphemistically and somewhat squeamishly denominates "night soil." This, which in the sewage disposal systems of the modern Occident is completely wasted, and often does positive harm by polluting the rivers, has been carefully collected and returned to the fields. The laborer carrying pails of night soil from the cities to the country has been one of the most familiar sights—and smells—of China. Legumes, which add nitrogen to the soil, have been extensively grown. In some instances they have been turned under, before ripe, as green manure. Compost piles have been frequent sights. Droppings from animals have been carefully collected and used either for fuel or for manure. Ashes, with their potassium and phosphorus, have been scattered on the cultivated land. Soil from the canals, probably rich in needed minerals, has been placed on the fields, and sun-dried earthen bricks, when past their usefulness in buildings, have been pulverized and made once more to serve plant life. Rotation of crops has been practiced. In many ways the Chinese peasant could give the average Western farmer lessons in conservation.

Some wastefulness there has been. In parts of Fukien, for instance, the rice straw has been burned to get it out of the way. Elsewhere, because of dearth of fuel, straw which otherwise might be put back on the land has been consumed for domestic heating and cooking. The fields must usually provide both fuel and food. Moreover, the comparatively small number of animals has made for a shortage in manure and so for a certain handicap in maintaining fertility.

The Chinese farmer has acquired great skill in handling water. From the dawn of recorded history he has been draining swamp lands, controlling streams, and building canals for irrigation. Today the plains of China proper are usually traversed by a network of canals. Millions of acres of hillside and rolling ground have been carefully terraced, often at great expenditure of labor, both to retain water when flooded for wet rice culture and to prevent washing. Water is usually conveyed to the fields from the canal or pond in buckets carried by men or by pumps operated either by man power or by animals. Hundreds of miles of dikes have been constructed and maintained to keep lowlands from being flooded. Canals, too, are frequently not only an aid to irrigation but also to drainage. The Chinese have learned to keep the surface soil stirred to conserve moisture. This has been of especial advantage in the semiarid regions of the North, and particularly in Inner Mongolia, where "dry farming" extends the area of cultivation beyond what would otherwise be possible.

The Chinese discovered means of fighting some of the pests which attack their crops. Thus in the South they have for centuries introduced

colonies of ants to their orchards to feed on insects that infest the trees.

Force of circumstances and his own intelligence have made the Chinese farmer an expert in economy. Not only has he raised several crops a year on the same field wherever the season is long enough to permit it, but he often has had more than one crop growing on the same land at the same time. For example, while wheat, sown in drills, is maturing, cotton seed is scattered broadcast, and its young plants have made a good start by the time the grain is cut. As many as three crops ripening at different times have been seen at once on the same plot. The Chinese has been adept at conserving fuel. Although through much of the country the winters are chilly and in some sections very cold, rooms are generally heated, if at all, only by a charcoal brazier or, in the North, by a *k'ang*—a bed of brick or earth with flues running through it horizontally. Instead of spending fuel in warming the air of an entire house, the Chinese puts on heavier clothing. For most of the populace this is the form of garments between the two layers of which loose cotton is inserted as winter comes on. In some instances the cotton is quilted. The *k'ang*, often warmed by the flue from the kitchen fire, may, from the Western standpoint, leave much to be desired in the way of comfort and may be plentifully infested with vermin, but it has at least the virtue of getting a good deal out of a given amount of fuel. Much building material has come directly from the farmer's own field. Sun-dried brick and tamped earthen walls, bamboo, and kaoliang are common and relatively inexpensive materials for the house.

While Chinese farm tools have usually been very crude and have had many defects, often they have displayed excellent features. Then, too, in a land where labor has been cheap and the farms small and the fields still smaller, the expensive power-driven agricultural machinery of the United States and Canada would be far from economical. The Communists, as we have noted, have attempted to eliminate this defect. The Chinese have shown no little ingenuity in contriving or utilizing helpful devices. They have hatched eggs by simple but effective methods of artificial incubation. In fishing they have had many types of nets and also have employed cormorants. Their methods of pumping water and of pressing bean cakes for oil are worthy of comment.

Co-operation has obviously been desirable, especially since most of the farms have been so small. This the Chinese were not altogether successful in achieving, but by no means did they entirely fail. In protecting crops, in irrigation, in guarding dikes, to a certain extent in saving or borrowing capital and making loans, and in their villages and family and clan systems and secret societies, Chinese farmers developed organizations for mutual aid and protection.

Deforestation has been regarded as one of the great defects of China's economy. Much of the country once was adequately and in places densely

wooded. The richness and variety of the native flora could be seen where a temple, the remnants of an imperial hunting preserve, or some other protection, artificial or natural, allowed a grove to survive. In many a bare area, where nature was given a chance, young growth quickly sprang up, often of many kinds of plants. Yet centuries of human occupation denuded the major part of the country. In the earlier days much of the forest was probably cut simply for the purpose of fitting the land for tillage or to destroy the coverts of wild beasts. In later centuries the need for fuel and building material kept the hillsides stripped. One result was the carrying away of the soil to the plains. Disastrous floods often occurred because a rain quickly ran off from denuded watersheds. Here was to be found one of the causes of the recurrent famines, especially in North China.

Yet even in the management of their timber resources the Chinese often displayed much skill. Many of the groves of marketable trees were owned by temples and monasteries, and in some an approximation to a scientific procedure of forest management was developed which produced a constant supply of wood for revenue and for the use of the religious community. In at least one section of China private owners had a traditional system of cutting trees for the market and replanting for future crops. The culture of bamboo, in itself a kind of forestry, was very highly and skillfully developed.

Even from this brief description some of the effects of Chinese agricultural economy upon the life of the nation must be apparent. The lack of machinery, the relatively small utilization of draft animals, and the extensive use of human labor meant that in order to produce for the nation the requisite food and materials for clothing and shelter the great majority of the population had to be engaged in agriculture. After the needs of those who tilled the soil had been met, only a small surplus of farm products remained for exchange with the towns. The predominantly rural character of the nation made for conservatism, for old social institutions ever persist longest in farming districts. The presence of so large a proportion of peasant proprietors encouraged sturdy self-reliance and self-respect.

In spite of its virtues, the Chinese rural economy had many defects. The usual means of borrowing capital was costly. Interest rates were high: twenty and thirty and even eighty and one hundred per cent a year. As a result of the small size of the farms, the average peasant had little capital against lean years or unusual expenses, such as a wedding or a funeral. This and the demands of normal farming operations meant that many of the peasants were chronically in debt and burdened by a ruinous weight of interest. Great areas were periodically flooded which could have been completely reclaimed by better engineering methods. In some regions in North China semiarid lands existed for which deeper wells would have provided the needed water. The customary shallow plowing did not ade-

quately utilize the resources of the soil. Roads were atrocious and land transportation costly. Seed selection was lacking or poor. Many plant and animal diseases reduced the return for the farmers' labor. Poor methods of production and marketing were responsible for the loss of foreign markets for silk and especially for tea. Many agricultural implements were needlessly clumsy. Not much was done to develop better varieties of fruit. The many days of seasonal unemployment were not profitably employed. Underlying the pressure of population upon subsistence were social and religious customs and institutions which encouraged early marriage and a high birth rate.

### THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGES IN AGRICULTURE WROUGHT BY CONTACT WITH THE WEST

In the first four decades of the twentieth century some attempts were made to remedy the defects in agriculture and the rural economy. Improvements in transportation were achieved. Railways were constructed. Highways for the use of automobiles were built and busses multiplied. Kerosene and the kerosene lamp were introduced and lighted farmers' homes. Foreign markets were developed for some of the products of the land. A longer staple cotton was brought in and augmented the yield of that widely used fiber. Christian missionaries and foreign famine relief agencies promoted better seed selection and new techniques for fighting plant and animal diseases. The government inaugurated agricultural schools and experiment stations. Rural co-operatives were organized, partly by foreign famine relief agencies. Foreign famine relief funds constructed irrigation canals and sank wells in the semiarid North and Northwest. Various efforts at reforestation were made by the government and well-disposed foreigners.

### THE COMMUNISTS UNDERTAKE A COUNTRY-WIDE RECONSTRUCTION OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL LIFE

When the Communists mastered the mainland they endeavored to eliminate the defects in agricultural life, organization, and methods. Under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung they had long addressed themselves to rural problems. They now seized the opportunity to combat the many evils which handicapped the rural population—that economic foundation of national life. We have already seen (Chap. XIII) the measures which they adopted and here need no more than rapidly summarize them. By "land reform" they eliminated landlordism with its rent-racking. At the same time they liquidated the moneylenders who were battening on the farmers. Through co-operatives, then collective farms, and then communes,

they endeavored to overcome the fragmentation of the peasants' holdings and so to make possible the use of labor-saving machinery, the wide application of chemical fertilizers, improved seeds and breeds of livestock, the control of plant and animal diseases and pests, and deeper plowing. They inaugurated extensive irrigation projects, sank wells, drained marshes, and engaged in reforestation. They improved transportation. They sought to devise industries profitably to utilize the time heretofore lost by the farmers in the North during the slack season in the winter. When these lines were penned the Communists seemed to have pushed ahead too rapidly and not to have succeeded in winning the ungrudging co-operation of the farmers. The agricultural crisis of the early 1960's appeared to have been ascribable partly to the Communist program, partly to natural disasters, and partly to the increase of the population.

### THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAKES AGRICULTURAL ADVANCE ON T'AIWAN

On T'aiwan, the major territory which remained in its hands after 1949, the Republic of China made substantial advances in agriculture and by less traumatic methods than those employed by the Communists on the mainland. They achieved land reform without the mass executions which accompanied the Communist program. Without collective farms and rural communes they attained higher levels of production. In spite of the rapid increase in population, the standard of living rose.

### INDUSTRY

One of the features of agriculture in China was the considerable percentage of his produce which the farmer exchanged for cash. This meant that with all their simplicity and monotony of life and low standards of living farms were not entirely self-sufficient. It also encouraged specialization in industry, no small amount of domestic commerce, and marked development of towns and cities.

Towns seem to have begun in very early historic times. As far back as the Shang dynasty an urban life was appearing. In a certain sense primitive Taoism was a protest against the resulting complexity of civilization. During the Sung large cities based on commerce and industry flourished. Under later dynasties they multiplied. Under the Ch'ing there were great cities and hundreds of smaller towns and villages. Until the modern methods of transportation and agriculture of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries gave rise to the huge growth in the metropolitan populations of the world, the chief cities of China were as large as those anywhere on the planet. This indicates a diversified economic life.

As in practically all the rest of the world before the nineteenth century,

industry in China, on the eve of the changes wrought by the Occident, was in the handicraft stage. Some machinery there was, but it was generally of the simplest, and relatively little application was made of power other than that of men's muscles. In industry as in agriculture one of the outstanding features was the lavish expenditures of human labor.

Similar to what was true in other countries, a tendency existed to specialization by localities. Thus the makers of furniture, the manufacturers of the mock money used in ceremonies for the dead, and the silversmiths tended to group themselves along particular streets of a city. In Peking several hundreds of families that engaged in making artificial flowers lived and worked not far from the market where these were sold. Certain cities, too, were noted for distinctive products. Thus the manufacture of one type of rug centered mostly in Peking and Tienstin, the carving of ivory in Canton, the production of a fine type of lacquer ware in Foochow, and the manufacture of porcelain at Ching-tê Chên. In Shansi each village that engaged in smelting iron concentrated on one type of article. Either the proximity of the essential raw materials, or the creation of a reputation and the acquisition of experience in a famous shop or shops, or possibly a combination of factors, tended to give a city or district a natural monopoly of a certain product.

To attempt any enumeration of the products of industry in China would prolong this chapter unduly. It need only be said that the very length of the list would indicate not only the complexity and variety of Chinese life but the high standard of living of many of the Chinese. The great majority of the population was poor, with little or no means of acquiring more than the necessities for the barest kind of existence. A small house, most of the materials for which came from the farmer's own acres, a few tools, a little furniture, cotton clothing, sandals or shoes and not always these, a simple and not too varied diet, tea as a drink and sometimes that only as a luxury, were as much as the masses could expect. However, the production and exchange of even these would have given rise to a certain amount of specialized industry and commerce. A fairly numerous minority, moreover, utilized the economic, social, and political organization of the land to rise above this level. There were many in comfortable circumstances and still others who were wealthy. They provided a market for more than the necessities, and their demands increased and diversified manufactures. Silk was extensively spun and woven and in many kinds of fabrics. Furniture was often of rare woods elaborately carved and inlaid. The homes of the powerful and wealthy were large, and into them usually went a great deal of labor, both skilled and unskilled. In a land which held literature in high esteem and which early invented both paper and printing, the manufacture of paper and the occupation of the printer engrossed the time of some of the urban population. Barbers,

shoemakers, dye makers, fur dealers, tailors, hat makers, paperhangers, manufacturers of effigies burned for the sake of the dead, and makers of incense and of toilet articles were all to be found. In a land which numbered, in the aggregate, many of the well-to-do, the manufacturers of luxuries found support: goldsmiths, silversmiths, carvers of semiprecious stones, workers in ivory, producers of the more costly types of pottery, weavers of rugs, and the like. Manufacturers of drugs did a thriving business. The list might be continued at great length. To the visitor from the West many Chinese cities presented a fascinating picture of what, *mutatis mutandis*, the industries of western Europe must have been like before the advent of power-driven and labor-saving machinery.

As in medieval Europe, moreover, industry was organized by guilds. China did not invent the stock company with its provision for combining the savings of many individuals into one huge and powerful unit of production. Until the coming of the West, capitalism as it existed in the modern Occident had not appeared. Industrial units were small, owned and operated by individuals or families or in the form of partnerships. These needed protection against ruinous competition and the aggression or oppression of officials or powerful groups. Accordingly they formed guilds.

How far back in Chinese history guilds originated we do not know. Certainly for centuries they were a prominent feature of economic and social life. The Chinese displayed great capacity for extrapolitical organization. The individual who attempted to stand alone found himself at a great disadvantage. Families, secret societies, villages, and guilds of many kinds were long characteristic of Chinese society. The guilds were chiefly confined to walled towns and cities—the larger population centers. They were of many kinds and were formed not only by handicraftsmen but also by merchants, by various occupations and interests, such as the barbers, the beggars, the blind, the masons, the carpenters, the cooks, the storytellers, the actors, the waiters, and even the thieves. Those that for the moment concern us may be called craft guilds, although that classification would probably not have been made by the Chinese.

The craft guilds were usually not as elaborate or as wealthy as the merchants' guilds. As a rule they were purely local organizations and not provincial or national, although there might be affiliations that exercised wider than local influence. Membership was practically compulsory to all those of a particular craft. If an individual refused to join, ways could be found to induce him to change his mind. He might even be visited with personal violence, and government officials knew better than to interfere. It was exceptional, however, for an eligible man to decline to apply. The advantages were so obvious that usually no persuasion was required. The guild, indeed, had as one of its functions the maintenance within its vicinity of a monopoly for its members. It sought to restrain competition within its

ranks. To that end it fixed both the minimum prices of the products and the wages of employees. For the same reason it regulated the hours of labor and the rest periods. A member who refused to conform or who violated the rules was subject to punishment, ranging all the way from fines to death. The guilds performed many services for their members. They helped them collect debts and afforded protection against thieves. They also often assumed the functions of a benevolent society. Some of them had their own cemeteries, and many provided coffins and funeral expenses for the burial of their poor. Numbers arranged for medical care for ill members. Each had a patron divinity or divinities to whom it paid communal worship. For example, in at least one place the tailors had the mythical Emperor Huang Ti as their god. The guilds were also a means of social intercourse. They held periodical meetings, and the guild hall, when such existed, formed a kind of club house.

The craft guild included both employers and employees, although, even before the modern labor union appeared, at times the latter temporarily formed a separate organization to enforce demands about wages. Boys came up into guild membership through an apprenticeship, and after completing the latter, were admitted, sometimes with quite a little ceremony, and at others merely upon payment of an initiation fee. Often the guild regulated the number of apprentices which a member might have, and thus kept down competition. A trained worker on moving to another city might, if local feeling was not too strong, become affiliated with the corresponding guild in his new home upon the presentation of a card from the guild from which he came.

The income of the craft guilds was derived from initiation fees, periodical dues, fines, special assessments, and taxes on sales. The budgets of some guilds needed to be fairly large, for the wealthier organizations owned and maintained guild halls and had secretarial staffs. The head secretaries were often men of some importance, and a few in the larger centers possessed a degree from the civil service examinations—an advantage in dealing with officials. Other guilds were much more modest and met in the shop of one of the members, rented a room, perhaps in some temple, or obtained the temporary use of a temple for worship and the annual meeting. The secretarial staff, too, might be very small or even be dispensed with.

The forms of organization differed widely. There were usually at least a president and a board of directors who generally were elected, although in at least one instance they were chosen by lot. Regular meetings were held, more frequently of the officers, but at least annually of all the members. A guild might employ inspectors to see that its rules limiting competition were obeyed: members found it advisable to keep watch of one another. A guild court might be held to deal with infractions.

In a land in which the struggle for existence was as intense as in China,

and the individual was so greatly in need of protection against the government and various economic and social groups, the craft guilds played a useful function. They regulated competition and were an agency for concerted action. It was customary for a guild to institute a strike or a boycott to obtain its wishes or to enforce its objection to some governmental order. Those who carried away the night soil, for example, might cease work in protest against a police ruling, until the inconvenienced community formed an accommodation to their demand. Butchers united against taxes, and sometimes all the merchants of a community banded against badly controlled troops. The nation-wide boycotts by which more than once in the twentieth century the Chinese expressed their indignation against the Japanese and the British, took their rise in an old tradition of group resistance to obnoxious persons and measures.

Yet the craft guild had its disadvantages. By restraining free competition, it was a brake on improvement both in machinery and in efficiency.

## CHANGES IN INDUSTRY PRODUCED BY CONTACT WITH THE OCCIDENT

Whether the presence of the craft guild in China can be held in any degree responsible for the fact that the Industrial Revolution did not originate there but entered from the Occident, must be a matter of conjecture. Whatever the reason, it was from the West, as we have seen in earlier chapters, that the innovations came. These affected industry much more than they did agriculture. What some of them were have already been briefly recounted. Steam-driven machinery and the factory were introduced. At the outset the manufacture of cotton was most affected. By 1930 the amount of capital invested in cotton mills was about $300,000,000 (Chinese currency) and the number of hands employed about a quarter of a million. Cotton mills were particularly numerous in East Central China, especially in Shanghai, where in 1928 about half the cotton spinning and weaving of China by modern machinery was located. In 1930 the province of Kiangsu, including Shanghai, had approximately two-thirds of the cotton spindles of China. Hupeh ranked next. In the North, notably in Shantung and Hopei (Chihli), cotton mills were found.

While until the 1950's cotton mills outstripped all other forms of the industrialization of China by the machine methods of the West, steam silk filatures were also introduced, and for them, too, Shanghai was the chief center. Some of the other industries in which Western appliances entered were the milling of flour, the manufacture of matches, the smelting of iron, and the manufacture of steel. Among modern factories were listed some for the preparation of albumen from eggs, canneries, bakeries for biscuits, cement works, chemical and dye works, breweries, distilleries, plants for bottling aerated waters, shipyards, electric light and power works (in

rapidly increasing number), glass works, ice plants, leather factories, plants for expressing oil, rubber works—manufacturing shoes, soles, overshoes, and hot water bags—paper mills, rice-hulling-and-cleaning mills, saw mills, soap and candle works, sugar refineries, and woollen and knitting mills. Few of the larger cities were completely untouched by the new processes. The Japanese invasion in the 1930's and 1940's led, after 1937, to the transfer of factories to the West and to the development of new industries in that region. Industrial co-operatives, too, developed under war conditions.

The traditional forms of industrial organization suffered from the entrance of the factory and from competition with products from the West. The guilds did not immediately disappear. In many places, however, they were greatly weakened, and some went out of existence. The passing of the guild was hastened by the advent of the labor union. In March, 1927, one hundred and eighty such unions were reported in the city of Canton, of which at least seventy grew out of guilds. Labor unions began to appear several years before the spectacular advance of the Kuomintang in 1926 and 1927. Indeed, over twelve hundred strikes were recorded between 1918 and 1926, of which about two-thirds were successful. In 1913 a national labor party was formed in Shanghai. An all-China labor congress was held in Canton in May, 1922, and in the preceding months Hong Kong had been paralyzed by strikes of seamen and sympathetic workers. It will be recalled that as the Kuomintang moved northward the radical wing organized unions of laborers and that these made demands, often preposterous, upon their employers. It is significant of the changes in progress in China that some of the new unions were composed exclusively of women, and that women also joined some of the trade unions of which the members were chiefly men. With the reaction of the moderates and conservatives within the Kuomintang against the radicals, and the vigorous action taken against Communists, many labor unions disappeared and others became less vocal. By no means all of them died, however. The strongholds of the labor unions were in Canton, where the radical movement first centered, and Shanghai, which led the nation in the new type of industries.

The labor unions often had ground for legitimate protest. Judged by standards now prevailing in the West, the working day was inordinately long, the hygienic and safety conditions in factories often shockingly bad, and wages low. Usually no effective rules existed against child labor. There were a few humane employers. The more advanced among them had devices for profit-sharing with employees and provided ample light and ventilation in their factories. In 1929 the National Government promulgated a factory law with some enlightened provisions. Some of the Protestant Christian groups had the welfare of the worker at heart, and even the conservative wing of the Kuomintang did not dare to go counter to the

emphatic endorsement of the cause of labor in Sun Yat-sen's *San Min Chu I*. Several local governments and war lords issued regulations for the protection of labor. Although none of these efforts obtained more than comparatively slight results, it is probable that conditions in modern factories, in both hours and sanitation, averaged somewhat better than those under the handicraft system.

### THE COMMUNISTS ACCELERATE CHANGES IN INDUSTRY

The Communist capture of the mainland was followed by profound and drastic changes in industry and the organization of labor. The People's Republic of China embarked on a program which had as its aim the adoption of the machines that had been developed in the West, with the ambition of equalling and eventually surpassing the production levels of "capitalist" non-Communist nations and improving the living standards and the educational equipment of the workers. To this end, as we have seen (Chap. XIII), they stressed the development of heavy industry and constructed many new plants. They rapidly eliminated much of the former private organization. For a time the small handicraft units were brought under strict control or were supplanted by state enterprises. Laborers were given a completely new structure from the local to the national level. They were provided with some of the facilities in housing, health, workers' compensation, and old age pensions that characterized the welfare states of the West.

As we have also noted (Chap. XIII), early in the 1960's agricultural distress led to a slowing down of the advance. More emphasis was placed on consumers' goods and other forms of aid to the tillers of the soil.

### THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AFTER 1949

As in agriculture, so in industry, in the refuge on T'aiwan the Republic of China made noteworthy advances, but by less spectacular methods than those employed by the Communists.

### MINING

The Chinese have long been making use of the mineral resources of their land. From very early days they have known iron, copper, bronze, zinc, gold, silver, and lead. In mining coal they antedated western Europe. Coal was probably utilized at least as early as the fifth century A.D., and as far back as the T'ang was employed in smelting iron. Shansi was the center of iron manufacture for the North, for here are large deposits of coal as well as some iron ore. In Szechwan salt was produced from brine pumped from wells, some of them two or three thousand feet

deep, notable engineering feats bored by a primitive but effective type of the percussion process now widely used in the West. The brine was evaporated either by natural gas obtained from borings in the same region, or by coal or straw. Native suppliers of the precious metals are not particularly plentiful in China proper, but gold ornaments were popular, and silver and copper formed the basis of the Empire's currency. The Chinese probably took more advantage of the available mineral resources than did any other people before the last three or four hundred years.

Yet mining in the old China faced handicaps. At times officials taxed it heavily. *Fêng shui*, that system of pseudoscientific superstition which had a marked hold on the Chinese mind, often discouraged it and even forbade it. It is only in comparison with the small use made of other than the precious metals by the rest of the world before the modern era that the Chinese appear to have learned to take advantage of their mineral deposits.

With the penetration of China by the Westerner came a growing utilization of China's mineral resources. Before the Communist era, beginnings were made, partly by Chinese and partly by foreigners. A major plant for making steel, the Hanyehp'ing Company, was created in the Wuhan center. The Japanese exploited the resources in Manchuria, notably at Fushun, where they had what was called the largest open pit coal mine in the world. In Hopei the joint Chinese and British Kailan Mining Administration produced large quantities of coal. In the twentieth century a large proportion of the world's antimony and tungsten came from China.

## COMMERCE

We have repeatedly seen that from the economic standpoint China was and even still is largely self-sufficient. To this contributed her geographic isolation and her own vast area with its variety of products. Foreign trade there has been, and from early times, but until very recently it was largely in luxuries. Even with the overpassing of natural barriers and the marked increase in foreign commerce in the past few decades, in proportion to her population China's foreign commerce is smaller than that of any other major group of civilized mankind.

This relatively slight participation in international trade does not mean the absence of internal commerce. One of the features of Chinese civilization, indeed, has been the merchant. The scholar might affect to despise him and rate him low on the social scale, but he flourished nevertheless. The many towns and large cities testify to this, for they would have been impossible but for his presence. One of the outstanding characteristics of the Chinese is their keenness as traders. Not only at home but also in foreign countries, especially in the lands immediately to the South, Chinese have proved and continue to prove their skill in business.

Commerce, like industry, was by small units organized in guilds. Firms

were family or partnership affairs, and the need of organization for protection against one another and outsiders forced those of the same trade together into guilds which in their essential features resembled those formed by craftsmen. They had their officers, their membership, their regular meetings, and their rules. Through them were negotiated many of the transactions with merchants of other cities. They fixed the minimum prices which their members could charge and exacted penalties for infringement of these or of other regulations. They served as benevolent societies to assist impecunious members. They tended to be wealthier than the craft guilds and many of them owned sumptuous halls, which were not only places of business but also centers of social life as well. Merchant guilds were often very powerful and even coerced officials and the general community.

In addition to the guilds organized by particular crafts, professions, or types of business there were what are usually called in English provincial guilds. Uniting the natives of a province or city who resided in another city, they were evidence of strong local loyalties and of community discrimination in favor of natives and against outsiders. The provincial guilds provided social and business rendezvous, gave aid to indigent fellow provincials, and at times assisted in promoting the business interests of their members.

So strong was the habit of working through guilds that in some cities an organization like a guild and including most of the merchants of the locality became the governing body of the entire community. Notable instances were seen in Swatow and Newchwang.

Moreover, secret societies entered into commerce. Organizations of that character of more than local extent sometimes brought together members of related businesses and occupations in an entire region—boatmen on the Yangtze, for example, and some of the shippers.

These societies and the guilds were often a force in politics and in international affairs. For instance, the guilds were largely responsible for the boycott on American trade in 1907, which was induced by the ill treatment of Chinese immigrants to the United States by American officials.

Thousands of villages were too small for guilds, or, indeed, to keep alive even one merchant. In many villages and towns a market was held every day and special fairs annually or a few times a year. To them came buyers and sellers, most of them from the immediate neighborhood, but sometimes from greater distances. Often a fair was held under the auspices of a temple, as a means of income. In the larger villages, as well as in the towns and cities, were many shops, each usually specializing in a particular commodity or group of commodities. Peddlers were very numerous. Food shops, too, were multitudinous.

Much commerce was by means of a "middleman." The "middleman"

was of more importance in China than in the West. The purchase and sale of land and the negotiation of betrothals were regularly transacted, and the transfer of goods of many descriptions was often accomplished through him. This did not mean the development of wholesale houses or of the commission merchant on any such scale as in the modern West, nor is any close similarity implied to the jobbers, small dealers, and distributors of the Occident.

Weights and measures were almost as confused and confusing as in medieval Europe. Theoretically the decimal system prevailed—a great aid in reckoning. In practice, however, it was often ignored. Thus while in theory one hundred *catties* (the foreign name for the Chinese *chin*) made one *picul* (the foreign name for the Chinese *tan*), in practice the number of catties to a picul varied from commodity to commodity and from city to city. Moreover, the catty also fluctuated in weight from locality to locality and according to the commodity and the trade. So, too, measures of length differed with the occupation and the trade. A unit with the same name might be one length for the carpenter, another for the mason, and still another for the tailor. Similarly in areas: the *mou*, which was usually roughly reckoned as a sixth of an English acre, in some regions was only about one-twelfth and in others nearly a third of an acre. Here was a hindrance to business on anything more than a local scale.

Uncertainty in commerce was heightened by the absence of fixed prices. As in much of the rest of the world, each transaction was a trial of wits between purchaser and seller, the one offering much less than he expected to pay, the latter asking much more than he hoped to get, and the ultimate transaction involved a compromise.

As an aid in computation the Chinese have employed the abacus. The origin and history of this device in China seems uncertain, but apparently it has been known there for centuries.

In some manner the impression has gotten abroad among Westerners that in business the Chinese merchant of the old school was a model of honesty. This was undoubtedly true of some individuals, and particularly of importers who found a reputation for probity advantageous in dealing with foreigners. A manager of the largest foreign bank in China is said to have declared that he had never known a Chinese defaulter. Chinese, however, labored under no delusion as to one another's complete trustworthiness, but devised elaborate safeguards to protect themselves against the deceitful. Guilds had means of detecting and punishing those who took unfair advantage of their fellow members by disobeying rules designed to give an equal chance to all. The family could be held responsible for the misdeeds of one of its number. The Shansi bankers, to be described in a moment, are said to have held as hostages the families of employees, especially those entrusted with business in other provinces, and not to have released them until the

employee, having discharged his errand, made a satisfactory accounting. Then, too, the plan was adopted of guarantors for the fulfillment of obligations, or for the good behavior of an individual. Moreover, what the Westerner denominates "squeeze" was regarded as normal—a percentage made on purchases by a servant for his master, or exacted by officials. While in theory a tacitly recognized form of commission, and since it was allowed by all parties, being not, strictly speaking, dishonest, in actual operation it was often the means of peculations, from very small to very large sums. A great deal of adulteration of goods was practiced, weights and measures were juggled, and tricks were played on the customer with bad money. All this does not mean that the Chinese have been so very much less upright than other peoples. It does, however, indicate that the current assertion that they were and are extraordinarily trustworthy must be qualified.

## MONEY AND BANKING

From the standpoint of the Occident of the present, and even of earlier days, the currency system of the older China was crude and sometimes chaotic. In very early times various mediums of exchange were in use, including cowries—those shells widely employed as money not only in China but also in many other parts of the world. Cowries, indeed, were in circulation in China as late as the fourteenth century. Coinage began as far back as the Chou dynasty and seems to have been continuous from that time into the twentieth century. It will be recalled that Han Wu Ti made it an imperial prerogative, forbidding the existing method of the issue of money by various local dignitaries. Some of the early coins were in the form of cowries, and others had the shape of swords, knives, or spades. Until a comparatively late date, salt and pieces of silk served as money in at least one province, and their use for this purpose was widely spread and over long periods. For more than two thousand years the prevailing coin was of copper or of copper alloy and had the outline of the *cash* familiar until recent decades—round, with a square hole through the center. A generation or more ago among the cash in daily circulation could be found those issued in the T'ang and the Sung.

The cash were reckoned by strings, or *tiao*, of a thousand each. The number was largely theoretical, for the string was practically always several short of that number. Money-changers charged twenty or thirty cash for their labor and for the cost of the string and by common consent deducted them from the *tiao*. In some districts the *tiao* had only five hundred cash. Cash, too, varied in size and value. The debasing of coinage was by no means unknown.

Individually the copper cash were of small value. At the rates of exchange common during the fore part of the twentieth century an Ameri-

can dollar would buy from two thousand or three thousand of them—and even more. Manifestly they were a convenience only in a land where, compared with the modern Occident, the price level was very low, and where the struggle for existence was so severe that a coin the value of a cash was worth haggling over.

Until the present century, with occasional exceptions the only metal minted in China was copper. Iron was sometimes employed. Silver and gold were practically never coined. This may have been due in part to the comparative scarcity of these metals. The paucity of natural deposits of gold and silver ore within China proper must greatly have limited the supply.

As we have seen, the Chinese had paper money in more than one dynasty, beginning at least as early as the T'ang, and have had sorrowful experience with inflation by the unwise over-issue of it.

Obviously, even in a country with a low price level, units of exchange larger than a cash were needed. The demand was not met by coins. Under some dynasties paper money made partial provision for it. Gold was seldom a medium of exchange but was used only for jewelry and in the arts, or in ingots or gold leaf for hoarding. The customary device was silver ingots. These were not minted by the government, but were issued by private initiative. The unit was the *tael* (the foreign name for the Chinese *liang*). Theoretically a tael was worth a thousand cash, but in practice the actual weight and fineness varied from locality to locality and from agency to agency. At the outset of the twentieth century there were at least seventy-seven distinct kinds of taels—and probably more than twice that number. Thus the Shanghai tael differed from the Hankow tael and that of the imperial Board of Revenue from that of the Maritime Customs. By Western standards, the tael was usually somewhere between five hundred and six hundred grains, Troy measure, of pure silver. (It will be recalled that the American dollar is 412.5 grains in weight, and of .900 fineness.) The Chinese lump silver of commerce was called *sycee* (*hsi ssŭ*) and was made up into ingots of varying fineness and shape, called by foreigners "shoes," a term whose derivation is uncertain. The weight of a shoe also was not fixed, but was usually slightly above or below fifty taels. The Chinese divided the tael according to a decimal system. The foreigner called the tenth of a tael a *mace* and the hundredth part of a tael a *candareen.* In practice, in making payments which required silver of a fractional part of a shoe, a portion of the ingot was cut off. Weighing pieces of silver and testing them for fineness formed a regular part of business transactions and necessitated the assistance of experts.

Naturally all this variation in the currency was a handicap to business, not only within the Empire as a whole but within individual cities and communities as well.

Given this development of commerce and this complexity of the cur-

rency, banking almost inevitably came into existence. Apparently it began at least as early as the T'ang. Its chief functions were domestic exchange. Banks dealt in drafts which made possible the buying and selling of goods between towns and cities of the Empire with the minimum shipment of silver. They assisted in the transfer of government funds. They facilitated change. They issued bills which circulated locally as money. They received deposits from customers, allowed overdrafts, and made loans—although to a smaller extent than do banks in the modern Occident.

On the eve of the modifications wrought by the impact of the West at least four different kinds of institutions conducted a business which may be classed as banking. Many merchants who regularly bought and sold in more than one city dealt in bills of exchange payable in the cities in which they did business. Incidentally they might, as a matter of accommodation, accept deposits from their regular customers, make advances to them, and allow overdrafts. Then there were "cash shops," whose primary function it was to make change from cash into taels or vice versa, or from one kind of tael to another. These too might make small loans or allow overdrafts to shopkeepers who were their regular customers. There were pawnshops, the better of them licensed by the government and often powerful. A large proportion of them were eminently respectable and not only lent money on security of clothing, jewelry, and similar chattels, but also acted as places for the storage of valuables. Then there were institutions more nearly corresponding to banks of Western types, whose function it was to receive deposits, make loans, and buy and sell drafts. They were usually small, rarely having as large a capital as 100,000 taels. They were never stock companies, but were organized by families, by individuals, or as partnerships. Every city of importance had its bankers' guild, but this did not serve as a clearing house.

The most influential of the bankers were mostly from the province of Shansi. The Shansi bankers, indeed, constituted one of the most prominent features of the business and financial structure of the Empire. Just how far back in Chinese history they went is difficult to say. The best Chinese authorities seem to agree that they arose in the seventeenth century. The necessary capital may have been originally derived from the coal and iron of the province. Shansi is especially rich in coal, and for centuries some of it was shipped to adjacent valleys and plains. In Shansi coal was used to smelt iron, and the province was long the source of much of the North's supply of that metal. The system, too, may have arisen out of other forms of trading. Whatever the origin of the business, in the nineteenth century, just before the revolutionary changes induced by the impact of the West, Shansi bankers were a recognized part of the economic life of the Empire and were found in the principal towns and cities. They did not constitute a corporation, for no such device existed, but they co-operated as a close

association of the prominent banking families of Shansi, and most of the agents and employees seem to have been from that province. It was through them that the government transmitted much of its funds, and they assisted the state in other ways, and in turn were accorded official patronage.

In spite of this banking system, credit played a less prominent part in the commercial life of China than of the West. Loans were made, and merchants were often deeply in debt. The New Year's season was famous, among other reasons, as the time by which debts must be met. To a less extent, the fifth-month and eighth-month festivals were a time for paying bills. When loans were needed, they were often obtained through a co-operative effort. Several people clubbed together and contributed equal sums to a common fund. The use of the fund went to each member for a given length of time. When all had had their turn, the organization was dissolved. However, a large proportion of the business of the country was conducted on the basis of cash transactions. Farmers sold to townspeople for cash, and merchants usually demanded cash. The actual exchange of commodities, without money as an intermediary, seems to have been more frequent than in the modern West. There was less advancing of credit by one merchant to another than in the present-day Occident. Interest rates were high, and mobile capital comparatively scarce. Much of the country's wealth was in land, and the majority of the Empire's richest men seem not to have been merchants but officials. The characteristic form of endowment for a temple, or for any other purpose, was not stocks and bonds, as in the modern Occident, but land.

## TRANSPORTATION

The internal commerce of China has inevitably been dependent on transportation. Here the achievement has been decidedly a mixture of success and failure. The Chinese have displayed great skill in utilizing their waterways. Practically every stream that can be considered at all navigable has its boat traffic. For centuries, too, the Chinese have made extensive use of the canal, not only for irrigation but also for transportation. Locks were devised to transfer boats from one level to another. Hundreds of miles of canals were and are in use. They are particularly numerous on the great alluvial plains on the lower reaches of the Yangtze River.

The craft range all the way from great ocean-going junks to sampans, which, to use an Americanism, can "float on a heavy dew." On the upper reaches of the Yellow River rafts of inflated skins have been numerous. Wherever a boat can go, the Chinese have employed it. They have even laboriously pulled them up through the rapids and gorges of the Yangtze and so have made that passage the main route in and out of the Szechwan.

Many boatmen have acquired extraordinary skill in handling craft that, to the inexperienced foreigner, seem clumsy. When oars are employed, as they often are, they are manipulated chiefly by sculling rather than by rowing. It will be recalled that boat traffic, especially when the propelling power is wind or current, is a relatively inexpensive, though leisurely, form of conveying freight.

In land transportation the Chinese have been much less successful. To be sure, bridges are a familiar feature of almost every Chinese landscape and are of many types, such as massive ones of stone in or near some of the chief cities, gracefully arched smaller stone structures, and the ingenious suspension bridges that span the torrents of West China. Great Emperors, notable among them Ch'in Shih Huang Ti and Han Wu Ti, made lavish use of wealth and labor to construct highways throughout their domains. Many of these were paved with huge stones. Officials, too, were supposed to be charged with the care of roads. Great virtue was held to attach to building roads and they were often undertaken at private initiative. However, once constructed, they were usually allowed to fall into disrepair, and the tillers of adjacent fields encroached on them. Through much of China's history they seem to have been very poor. Certainly those which the foreign traveler of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries encountered could seldom be called good.

In the North, land transportation has been partly by crude carts, partly by wheelbarrows (sometimes helped by a sail), partly by donkeys, and partly on the shoulders of men. Camel trains are common in Mongolia and Sinkiang and to a certain extent in the northern part of China proper. In the South, wheelbarrows and men have predominated. Donkeys are utilized, especially in hilly districts. From the Yangtze Valley southward roads have generally been narrow. If paved, it has been with blocks of stone laid end to end and affording a track broad enough only for the wheelbarrow. No foreign resident of China where these older methods of transportation prevailed will soon forget the lavish use of human labor, or the shrill complaint of the ungreased wheelbarrow. Sedan chairs often served for the conveyance of passengers; donkey, mule, and horse litters were known; and travel by horseback was not uncommon, particularly in the North.

Inns were frequent on the main roads, and even on the byways were to be found in many of the villages. Judged by the standards of the present-day West they were decidedly uncomfortable, but they compared not unfavorably with those of the rest of the older Orient or of medieval Europe.

Manifestly, where a district could be reached only overland, commerce in commodities which combined large bulk and weight with comparatively small value proved unprofitable. It is obvious, in the light of these handicaps,

why so often famine wasted one part of the Empire when a surplus of food was to be found in another.

Judged by modern standards, the postal service of the old regime was inadequate. A government post took charge of official dispatches. Many private agencies transmitted letters, parcels, drafts, and specie by couriers and post boats. Few if any of the private agencies, however, extended over more than one or two provinces. Time distances, too, were great.

Given the many handicaps to internal commerce—the varieties of weights, measures, and monetary values, the lack of capital and of stock companies, and the poor transportation facilities—the wonder is that so extensive a domestic trade existed. Obviously anything resembling the standardization of products and the huge corporations of the present-day United States was quite out of the question. The economic organization of China was manifestly in a much earlier stage of development than that of western Europe of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is not strange that the impact of the West produced startling changes.

## CHANGES IN COMMERCE, MONEY, BANKING, AND TRANSPORTATION PRODUCED BY CONTACT WITH THE OCCIDENT

Many of the alterations wrought in recent years in commerce, money, banking, and transportation have been noted in earlier pages and chapters and need not here be repeated. We have seen the growth in foreign trade, together with the fact that the per capita volume is so small that China is still largely self-supporting. We have mentioned some of the innovations in transportation: the railway, the automobile, bicycles, the rikshas, displaced by the pedicabs, the airplane, and steam craft—the latter ranging all the way from ocean liners down through the comfortable boats which have plied the lower reaches of the Yangtze, the smaller steamers with especially powerful engines that have made the dangerous trip through those gorges of the Yangtze which are the chief channel of communication between the inland empire of Szechwan and the outside world, to the steam launches, often very dingy, which have competed with sailing craft on some of the canals and the smaller rivers. We have noted the rise in prices, in general paralleling that in the rest of the world, and the inflation of the 1940's. We have hinted at innovations in commercial organization and in currency. However, some of these changes require slightly further elaboration.

In the organization of the country for commerce the presence of the foreigner initiated modifications, some of them marked. The alien brought some of his own mercantile institutions and customs or worked out others adapted to the Chinese situation, and these made their impression on native practices. For instance, the Chinese became familiar with the stock com-

pany, partly because many of the largest foreign concerns operating in the country were organized after that manner. Accordingly, they formed stock companies of their own, and while many of these had only indifferent success or failed, some made money for their owners.

For many years the usual channel between alien and native merchants was a Chinese middleman, called in Western parlance a compradore. This was a concession to local conditions. The compradore was salaried by the foreigner, and in addition, as his chief source of income, was allowed commissions on transactions made through him. He engaged and discharged the members of his employer's Chinese staff and made all the contacts with Chinese merchants. While his reign endured, direct intercourse between Chinese and foreign merchants was at a minimum. The compradore owed his position to his knowledge of the Chinese language and of Chinese business methods. It was to his interest to see that no change took place in the latter. On the eve of the full-scale Japanese invasion the compradore was declining in importance. Less and less of a foreign firm's business was conducted through him. The merchant from abroad dealt directly with Chinese without his mediation, and the Chinese merchant tended to establish immediate contacts with foreign countries.

Until the Communist domination of the mainland, the characteristic unit of Chinese mercantile enterprise was still an individual, a family, or a partnership. Stock companies, while some of them were important, were in the minority. Merchants continued to be organized by guilds. The chambers of commerce appearing in almost every important city (they multiplied rapidly after 1900 and as long ago as 1914 there were about thirteen hundred of them) seem to have owed much to their Occidental prototypes, but it is probable that the Chinese experience with guilds facilitated their formation. To some of them only representatives of guilds were admitted, and they provided a means, largely lacking under the old regime, whereby guilds could co-operate.

The chambers of commerce became recognized intermediaries between the merchants and the government, and from time to time they were subjected to official regulation and control. It was through them, too, that a conquering general usually made his demand on a city for a financial contribution. Eventually a national organization of chambers of commerce was formed and for a time its annual meetings were of considerable importance.

Although in the fore part of the twentieth century their influence on the government grew, the merchants and bankers of China had no predominating part in shaping the political destinies of the nation. Sometimes through their chambers of commerce merchants had an important role in local politics, and now and then were a factor to be reckoned with nationally. Their financial contributions were essential to the success of many of the

generals and warring factions, notably the National Government, and more than once were granted with conditions attached. More often than not the contributions were forced, a kind of irregular tribute for which the only return was a temporary reprieve from additional exactions or from torture and death.

Western example was largely responsible for a new banking structure. Huge foreign institutions, the chief of which was the (British) Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, played so important a part in financing loans of the government and in overseas commerce that it would have been strange had the Chinese not organized banks of the Occidental type. The Bank of China and the Bank of Communications came into being, both of them originally state institutions, coming down from the last few years of the Ch'ing dynasty. Both had branches in many cities, both had decidedly checkered careers due in part to their political connections, and they were rivals, at times bitterly so. In each the government appointed only a minority of the directors, and both were very prominent in the financial world. In 1928 the National Government brought into existence a new Central Bank designed to be more fully a state institution than either of the others. A good many banks were founded by provincial governments. All too often these were the tools of war lords, who through them issued floods of paper money, much of it worthless but for a time kept in circulation by force. In addition, a large number of banks of a modern Western type were organized by private individuals. Each of several of these had paid up capital stock running into the millions. Some had offices in more than one city. They were indications of a rapid change in the financial organization of the country and possibly were evidence of an increasing amount of fluid capital.

For years old-style banking houses persisted, but in greatly diminished importance. Many of them succumbed under the financial crisis brought by the passing of the Manchus. The end of the Ch'ing dynasty was a particularly severe blow to the Shansi bankers, who had been used to transmit government funds and whose fortunes were accordingly fairly closely identified with those of the old regime. Some of the Shansi banks, however, managed to weather the storm.

The currency of China became even more intricate and jumbled under the influence of the alien. Although partly superseded by dollars and in 1933 officially demonetized, taels continued as a unit of reckoning and in as confusing a variety as ever. For a time *cash* persisted, but, especially during the World War of 1914–1918, when copper was greatly in demand, many were melted down and other forms of currency took their place. Indeed, they almost entirely passed out of circulation. Coined silver first entered in the form of Spanish dollars, brought by Western traders. To them were later added Mexican dollars, and these became so common that prices

were frequently quoted in "Mex." although a native Chinese term, *yüan,* eventually supplanted it. Hong Kong, Straits Settlements, and many other kinds of dollars of alien origin were imported. In time the government began to mint silver, also in the form of dollars (or *yüan*), and these coins were issued by various national and provincial administrations. In the 1930's, following the trend in other countries, silver was nationalized and largely passed out of circulation. A subsidiary currency in silver and copper was minted in quantities. Added to this was the paper money of governments and of native and foreign banks. These mediums of exchange fluctuated in value with reference to one another, and often very markedly and rapidly. The number of subsidiary coins which could be bought for a dollar changed with the locality, the sort of dollar, and the kind of minor coin. Often, too, the coin or bill standard in one city was at a discount in the next. However, notes of some of the larger and more stable institutions, such as the Bank of Communications and the Bank of China, were widely circulated and passed at face value or at only a small discount. To add to the bedlam, China was in effect on the silver basis, and foreign exchange was subject to the fluctuations in the price of that metal in the markets of the world. The rapid shifts in foreign exchange did not greatly affect the prices of domestic products, but since goods purchased abroad had to be paid for in gold, the repercussion upon foreign trade was serious. In the 1940's the runaway inflation that accompanied the war with Japan was the outstanding feature of the monetary situation. It prevailed in both "free" and "occupied" China and upset earlier standards.

In the twentieth century many suggestions were offered for reforming the currency, and now and again a more or less halfhearted attempt was made to put one or another of them into effect.

The coming of the Communist regime brought drastic changes in commerce, money, and banking. Foreign and domestic trade was progressively taken over by the state. Inflation was largely, although not entirely, curbed, and paper money supplanted coins and bullion. Banking was made a government monopoly. Most of the foreign commerce was with countries in the Communist bloc. But for a time in the 1950's spectacular exports were made to South and Southeast Asia of products of the new industries. The huge building of the (Communist) Bank of China in Hong Kong was chiefly for foreign exchange. Early in the 1960's extensive imports of grain were contracted for with Canada and Australia to help meet the food shortage.

After what has been said previously about the innovations in the transportation system, little more need be added. Obviously, marked improvements have been registered. Quite as obviously, however, communication continues to be one of the nation's major problems.

We have previously noted how much the post office and telegraph have

done to tie the nation together. The government postal service of today first arose through foreign initiative under the Maritime Customs. In 1896 it was formally established by imperial decree. It had a remarkable record in maintaining its service throughout the country in the face of the civil disorder that followed 1912. Its agents frequently successfully sent the mails through bandit lines into a beleaguered town. By money orders and parcel post as well as the transmission of letters it contributed to the unification of the nation. By association with the postal system of the world it helped to keep China in touch with other lands. In 1908 the telegraphs of the country passed into the hands of the state. Today a network of lines connects the chief cities and many of the towns. The radio, too, has been developed, both for internal and for international communications. The telephone has been widely installed.

## SUMMARY

Obviously the fate of China is inextricably bound up with economics. No nation in which great areas are overpopulated, in some of whose districts famine has been recurrent, and in which millions are underclothed and undernourished can hope easily to maintain a stable government. Under such conditions there will always be discontented spirits who prefer rebellion to starvation. As we have noted before, China is caught in a vicious circle. Under the great Manchu Emperors population increased rapidly. For more than a century these rulers had so maintained internal peace and order that the margin of subsistence expanded. The introduction of new food plants from the Americas assisted in the growth of population. With the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty and of the old form of government, and with the ensuing political disorder, the margin shrank rapidly. As a result, millions were left stranded. Thousands of these entered the armies and other thousands became bandits. The result was the still further restriction of the margin of existence, more distress, and more fighting and banditry. The political and the economic problem go hand in hand. Both must be solved together.

Yet the Chinese have by no means entirely failed in their economic life. Even to keep alive so huge a population has been and is no mean achievement, and millions, though a minority, have been and are maintained in comparative comfort. In the 1950's the Communists on the mainland and the Nationalists on T'aiwan made valiant efforts to solve the problem.

So huge a mass of mankind on a low standard of living must be a problem not only for itself but for the rest of the world. The world cannot but be interested in watching the outcome of the phase of the present revolution which affects the economic life of China. If the Chinese succeed in regulating their birth rate and in adapting Western machinery and agri-

cultural and commercial methods in such a manner as to raise the average level of subsistence, the rest of the human race cannot fail to benefit. If the standard of living for the masses should fall still lower, not only China but also the rest of mankind will be the loser.

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

# RELIGION

## HISTORICAL SUMMARY

In connection with the chapters on history we have already rehearsed the main outlines of the development of religion in China. We have seen that the nature of the earliest religion of the Chinese is in dispute. There are those who contend that it was monotheism and that it was later corrupted by polytheism and by the worship of ancestors and of spirits residing in various natural objects. Others—and this is the present tendency—believe that the theistic elements in some of the ancient literary remains were late accretions and that the primitive faith was probably a mixture of animism, including the worship of ancestors, and of reverence for forces and objects of nature, such as heaven and earth and some of the heavenly bodies, whose co-operation was regarded as necessary to the well-being of man.

Whatever Chinese religion may have been in its primitive stages, its main outlines in the latter part of the Chou are fairly discernible. There were ceremonies in honor of ancestors. Spirits of varying degrees of potency were believed to reside in many natural objects, such as mountains and rivers, and to demand reverence. Some of the stars, notably those in Ursa Major, were highly esteemed. Heaven and Earth, particularly the former, were held in great veneration and sacrifices were offered to them. One Power was regarded with such awe and to it were ascribed such attributes of personality that a type of theism may be said to have existed. This Power was denominated either *T'ien* (Heaven) or *Shang Ti* (the Supreme Ruler or the Ruler Above). The two terms probably had separate origins and at one time different meanings, but by the latter part of the Chou they had all but coalesced and were declared by some to be identical in the object designated. This theism was not monotheism in the sense that no spiritual beings other than *T'ien* or *Shang Ti* could be worshipped. Moreover, varying conceptions existed of the Supreme Power. By some, probably the majority, it was held to be personal, but at least a few conceived it as entirely impersonal.

The duty owed to the spiritual beings was believed to be largely ceremonial. Ritual correctly performed was regarded as extremely important. Music and posturing, along with sacrifices of food, had their place. At least before the close of the Chou dynasty (whether as a late devel-

opment or as a heritage from the past is in dispute) an ethical element entered and Heaven was believed to be displeased with violations of the moral code.

The correct performance of the ceremonies and other duties owed to spiritual beings was declared essential to the welfare of man. All nature was thought of as an orderly whole, a universe. If this universe was to be kept functioning properly, man must do his part—a part in which both ritual and loyalty to moral obligations were important. If man failed to perform his duty, the machinery of the universe would be disarranged and natural disasters of various kinds would ensue, such as floods, drought, and the failure of crops.

Ceremonies were of many kinds and grades. Each class or group in society had those appropriate to it. No one must infringe upon those of another or the harmony of nature would be disturbed. The head of the state, the various territorial princes, and members of the aristocracy were especially charged, or privileged, with specific religious functions.

Yet no priestly class emerged. There were those particularly well versed in ritual whose function it was to assist in its direction. There were professional diviners, experts in the various methods of discovering by lot or oracle the proper course of action. However, no specialized group existed as in ancient Egypt or India which depended for its prestige and power upon a monopoly of the approach to the spirits, gods, and divine forces. Officiation at religious ceremonies formed part of the prerogative of those charged with the civil, military, and social leadership of society.

We have also seen that in the Chou period various schools of thought developed, all of them taking account of religion and some of them with very strong religious elements. There was what Westerners usually call Confucianism, with its three leading exponents and formulators: Confucius, Mencius, and Hsün Tzŭ. There was Taoism, advocating a type of society so simplified that it approached anarchism, and with speculations concerning the nature of things which ever since have fascinated many and were long both an excuse for and an incentive to the search for a means to immortality. Mo Ti advocated a theory for the organization of society upon the principle of universal love and found justification for it in what he believed to be revealed in nature and in the writings and experience of the ancients—the love of God for men. He was followed by two schools, one of which stressed the religious aspects of his teaching and the other his methods of reasoning. The Legalists, or the school of administration, wished to govern society by drastic regulations strictly administered. Other schools and independent thinkers of the Chou which have been named earlier do not need even to be mentioned here. The era was one of active and creative thought in which religion could not fail to be involved.

The latter part of the Chou was a time of political and social turmoil and transition. When the dust had settled, what were in many respects a new state and a new society had come into being. Ch'in Shih Huang Ti attempted to reorganize China on the theories which had proved successful in his native state—those of the Legalists. When the brief course of his dynasty had been run, leaving behind it momentous permanent results, the Han followed, won for the Empire a comparative stability, and placed an indelible stamp on the institutions of China. Under the Han Confucianism, greatly modified by the influence of other schools, was eventually established as the philosophy of the state. Taoism, however, continued potent and often numbered among its devotees persons high in court circles. It became something quite different from that disclosed in the great classics it inherited from the Chou. The other schools of the Chou gradually died out, but some of their writings survived and were not without effect, often very lasting and profound, upon the subsequent life and thought of the Empire.

When the Han dynasty went the way of all flesh, approximately four centuries of internal turmoil followed, during which a major new religious influence, this time from abroad, made itself felt. Buddhism, it will be recalled, first reached China—at least so far as we are now aware—under the Han. It was, however, in the centuries of the post-Han internal political division of the Empire, when there was no single state organized on an intolerant Confucian theory to offer resistance, that it achieved its large place in the land.

It was under an Empire revived and unified afresh by the Sui and the T'ang that Buddhism reached its apex. The Chinese made it largely their own and most of the sects through which it persisted seem to have been of native origin. A wide range of Chinese life was affected by it. Confucianism, Taoism, folklore, philosophy, popular religious beliefs and practices, and art were never the same after its years of popularity. After the middle of the T'ang Buddhism in China gradually lost in vitality.

Until very recently Buddhism was the only foreign religion which had much effect upon more than a minority of the Chinese. Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam have all been present at one time or another, several of them for centuries. Yet the Moslems are the only group which have numbered much more than one per cent of the population, and even they have been largely apart from the main current of Chinese life and have had but little effect upon it. Of late years, as we have seen, Christianity has had widespread but still a minority influence, which has waned on the mainland under Communism.

Beginning with the Han and especially after the Sui and the T'ang, with the revival and strengthening of the civil service examinations based upon Confucian Classics, Confucianism was, until the twentieth century,

usually the philosophy established and supported by the state. It was, therefore, dominant in the life of the nation. Taoism always had its advocates, frequently including those high in official circles, and at times was accorded imperial patronage. Buddhism often enjoyed popularity at court as well as with the masses. Confucianism, however, was the basis on which the Empire was organized.

It is tantalizing to have to pass over the history of the religious life of the Chinese in the fragmentary manner in which it has been touched upon in preceding chapters and in this brief summary. This is all the more so because no satisfactory account is to be found in any language and the subject is one which invites exploration. If and when such a work is written it will treat not only of religious and philosophic thought, but also of institutions, ceremonies, the relation of religion to the state and to society in general, and the effect of religion upon art and literature. It will pay attention to religion as practiced both by the ruling and educated classes and by the masses of the people, and will record the rise and decline of popular religious cults and the story of the origin and disappearance of the many divinities which for longer or shorter periods were revered by some or all of the Chinese. Whether such an account can ever be composed is uncertain. Obviously it will have to rest upon many preliminary studies in the vast literary remains of China's past, and much, too, must wait upon archaeology.

## GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THE CHINESE

Unsatisfactory though these brief historical notes are, they may render somewhat more intelligible religion as it was on the eve of the revolution brought by the coming of the Occident. They will, moreover, serve to make clear some of the reasons for the religious attitudes of the Chinese.

About these attitudes certain generalizations can be ventured—subject, as generalizations usually are, to exceptions and qualifications. Any picture painted with broad strokes may well fail to portray what religion meant to any one Chinese. To include this would require a large canvas with detailed portraits of a number of individuals of varying types and would far transcend the proper limits of this chapter. Sweeping outlines may, however, possess a certain rough accuracy.

First of all, then, religiously the Chinese have been very eclectic. In proportion to the total population, the number of simon-pure Buddhists, Confucianists, or Taoists has been comparatively small. The average Chinese was an animist, a polytheist, a Buddhist, a Confucianist, and a Taoist, with no sense of incongruity or inconsistency. For example, in the cult of the dead, ceremonies which came down through the Confucian tra-

dition and others of Buddhist origin had their place, and in domestic rites animism, popular polytheism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism were almost inextricably mixed. Other streams that have not been so potent in China have sometimes mingled their waters in the common current. In this eclecticism the Chinese were by no means always critical. The masses particularly often held at one and the same time reciprocally contradictory views.

Associated with this eclecticism was a certain tolerance. The statement commonly made and widely lauded both in China and the modern West, that the Chinese have been a religiously tolerant people, requires qualification. Again and again there were persecutions, some initiated and conducted by the state and others popular in their origin. The state, which, beginning with the Han and reinforced by the T'ang, was until the twentieth century built upon Confucianism, repeatedly sought to stamp out, or at least to restrict, other cults. Thus in the Sacred Edict, which through much of the Ch'ing was officially and widely taught, Buddhism, Taoism, and Christianity were held up to ridicule and the populace exhorted to have nothing to do with any of them. Heterodox faiths and philosophies were condemned, to be sure, not primarily because from the metaphysical standpoint they were deemed false, but because they were believed to be injurious to the political and social structure of the Empire, organized as it was on Confucian principles. At first sight the course of China's history seems not to have been marred by religious wars as has been much of that of Europe. On the other hand, at least most of the so-called religious wars of Europe were waged only in part and usually not chiefly from religious motives: the slogans employed covered personal, dynastic, racial, or national antagonisms and ambitions. In China, too, some of the bloodiest rebellions appealed to religious sanctions, and the frequent sanguinary conflicts between Moslem and non-Moslem portions of the population have been notorious.

When these qualifications have been made, however, the fact remains that in practice there was much of religious toleration in China. Just why this is so must be in part conjectural. It may have been because the practical-minded Chinese were eager to take advantage of every possible benefit from each of the systems that came to their attention. It may have been because of a fundamental religious uncertainty—a lurking suspicion that all religions are at least in part false, a lack of confidence in the finality of any one of them, and yet a fear that each may possess elements of truth. It may have been, too, because of the desire to build a mankind-embracing culture, and of the concomitant talent for absorbing other cultures. It seems probable, for example, that many of the divinities that later appeared purely indigenous were taken over from other peoples as these were conquered and assimilated.

Still another characteristic of Chinese religious life was its optimism. There was little of the despair of human existence, of the pessimism about the worth of human life, and of the desire to be rid of personality that one finds in much of Indian thought. This is in spite of the fact that Buddhism, so influential in China, was originally a means of getting rid of desire, and in the eyes of many interpreters, of the separate entities called persons. It is significant that in Chinese Buddhism *nirvana,* as a place where desire is at last extinguished, largely dropped into the background, and that heaven and hell, where separate personal existences were pictured as continuing, loomed large in popular Buddhist teaching. This optimism, too, was seen in the discussions about the basic quality of human nature, which have been prominent in the history of Chinese philosophy. Orthodox Confucianism declared men to be by nature good. Even those who, like Hsün Tzŭ, denied the truth of this contention usually regarded human nature as improvable. There was, too, a certain confidence in the moral trustworthiness of the universe. Some regarded the universe as beyond human understanding and as indifferent to the fate of men, either collectively or as individuals. Others held that the universe moves according to unvarying law and that nothing like a personal God is at the heart of it. In the main, however, orthodox Confucianism taught that moral law is part of the essence of things, that when men obey it prosperity ensues and that evil-doing is a cause of calamities. To this confidence in the moral goodness of the forces of the unseen world Buddhism contributed, for the many buddhas and the bodhisattvas to whom it taught people to look for help were represented as merciful and loving righteousness and as ultimately more powerful than evil.

Closely allied with this optimistic attitude toward the universe was the strong ethical note in much of Chinese religion. Confucianism emphasizes man's duty to man and praises such virtues as sincerity, kindness, loyalty, filial piety, and not doing to another what one does not like to have done to oneself. The Emperor was supposed to rule because of his virtue. National calamities might come as a result of his misdeeds, and in imperial proclamations public confession of lack of righteousness was not unknown. Protestations of the righteousness of the imperial acts and motives were often made. Buddhism strongly reinforced this ethical note and taught that suffering is a certain consequence of unrighteousness. Popular Buddhism had vivid representations, both in its literature and in pictures and effigies in some of its shrines, of the tortures which were believed to be meted out in the next life for sin, and spoke also of the joys of its heavens in which the good are rewarded. To be sure, much of popular Buddhism held that future bliss may be achieved through simple faith or by the correct performance of ritual acts that possess no ethical significance, but the total effect upon the Chinese of its tutelage was

probably to heighten moral sensitivity and to strengthen impulses toward good. In spite of antinomian features in a stage of its history, Taoism also contributed toward making Chinese religion moral. Some of its treatises, both the abstruse and the popular ones, sounded the ethical note.

It must immediately be said that the Chinese, like many other peoples, had great confidence in ritual and in practice believed it to be quite as important as an ethically good life. For this the Chou tradition as preserved in the Classics and the state cult were to no small extent responsible, for as we have seen, it set great store by the observance of ceremonies. We must, however, add that some of the Confucian writings united ethics and ritual, holding that ceremonies should be performed with a moral purpose and that moral growth is aided by correctly performed ceremonies. Confucius himself, while valuing ritual, placed his major emphasis on ethics. It was, indeed, in this realm that he made his greatest contribution. Buddhism and Taoism, as popularly practiced, confirmed confidence in ritual. The widespread animism nurtured the conviction that the unseen spiritual beings are to be induced to serve man's will by amoral rites.

Along with this confidence in rites was what to the modern Westerner seemed a kind of slovenliness in the temples and in the carrying out of the ceremonies. Numbers of temples and shrines were well maintained, and from time to time some that became dilapidated were repaired. Often, too, a shrine was cleaned in preparation for a major ceremony. However, even before the antireligious wave of the 1920's and after, a large proportion of the temples seemed to be in a state of chronic neglect, and a visit between important occasions would often find courts weed-grown and the great halls dusty and festooned with cobwebs. While ceremonies were supposed to *conform* to *prescribed forms,* and correct posturing, costuming, and utterances of phrases were emphasized, yet, as in the case of funerals when beggars were employed to fill out the procession, the wearers of the elaborate clothing might be unwashed, and in the less obvious corners of the shrine dust and debris might lie undisturbed.

A further characteristic of the religious attitude of the Chinese was this-worldliness. The earliest religion of the Chinese that we know seems to have had as its primary object the material happiness and prosperity of men here and now. It believed that the dead live on, but its concepts of their state were very vague and its chief concern was the welfare of the living. Several of the schools of thought of the Chou period shared and if anything emphasized this tradition. Their purpose, it will be recalled, was the achievement of an ideal human society. Confucianism possessed this attitude very strongly, and since it was long the accepted philosophy of the state, assisted in perpetuating it. Religion, from this standpoint, is a means of keeping the machinery of human society moving smoothly and successfully. In ethical teaching the social duties were stressed. By its rites religion was believed both to help preserve order in the relations

of men to one another and to insure the friendly co-operation with men of the unseen forces, spiritual or otherwise, of the universe. In popular practice this belief took rather crass forms. Men gave to the spirits that they might obtain benefits here and now. The boatman might be seen offering incense to ward off danger, and in at least one city the merchant burned incense and made his *kowtow* or bow at the beginning and end of the day to improve his business. If a god was besought by offerings for a particular favor, such as recovery from illness or success in a business undertaking, and the occasion turned out otherwise than had been hoped, the disappointed worshipper might display an outraged sense of having been defrauded and curse the deity. In time of drought the image of a god might be exposed to the sun to let it feel how hot it was and might even be fined by the magistrate for allowing the calamity, be condemned, and broken in pieces.

Utility was by no means the only motive in Chinese religion. There was much of reverence that had in it no element of self-seeking. Confucius, in extolling awe for Heaven's decrees, touched a responsive chord in the hearts of many of his countrymen. The honors paid to the dead often had in them self-forgetful respect and affection.

Chinese religion displayed much other-worldliness, but akin to utility. Taoism early became a channel for the search for immortality, and across the centuries one source of its appeal was the conviction that through it the desired state could be achieved. One of the chief reasons for the strength of Buddhism was its vivid pictures of the future life and the confidence it created in many that through its agency the faithful could escape the pains and be assured the blessings of an existence beyond the grave.

Another feature of Chinese religion was a credulous superstition. In this the Chinese were by no means unique. However, they were behind no other people in their anxiety to take advantage of lucky and to avoid unlucky days, hours, and places, in ascribing disease to spirits, and in devices for fending off spirits that were believed to bring misfortune.

Yet, as we have seen more than once in preceding chapters, the Chinese could boast of many robust skeptics. Thinking of them, one modern Chinese declared that the Chinese would be the first people to outgrow religion. From at least Yang Chu and Hsün Tzŭ in the Chou there has been a strain of more or less open dissent from currently accepted beliefs. It appears not to have been entirely lacking in Confucius. Certainly some famous passages in the *Lun Yü* have led many of his professed followers to find in him a precedent for their own agnosticism. This skepticism often contained a good deal of what was at least superficially inconsistent. Han Yü denounced most caustically the imperial honors to a miracle-working bone of Buddha and yet wrote an exhortation to a crocodile to depart from the district in which he had jurisdiction. Again and again officials

who privately expressed disbelief in the existence of spirits, in their public capacity led in ceremonies which had as their object the control of these same spirits. In this they were not without precedent in Confucius, for even though that revered teacher may have been agnostic concerning at least some of the beliefs of his day, he strongly advocated the meticulous and reverent performance of the traditional rites.

It must also be said, what must have been apparent from much that has been recorded in the historical chapters, that a great deal of profound thought on some of the ultimate philosophic and religious problems is to be found in Chinese literature, and that by no means all of it ends in the denial of the reality of the objects of man's religious faith. Through the centuries many Chinese have been skeptical of much of the popular superstition and yet have been deeply religious and could give a reason for the faith that was in them.

Chinese religion had both the social and the individual emphasis. According to the Confucian tradition, religion is largely for the salvation of society, for cultivating those relations among men which make for a wholesome social order. Yet Confucianism had much to say about the cultivation of character, and Buddhism and Taoism had as at least part of their aim the perfection of the individual.

One last general characteristic of Chinese religion that needs mention is state control. As far back as the Chou and probably earlier, religion was a function of society as expressed in such institutions as the state and the family. When, under the Ch'in, the Empire was organized, the authority of the state in religion was rigorously exercised. In theory the state remained supreme in such matters down through the Ch'ing. The control of the state was not always vigorously asserted. A good deal of practical toleration existed. Yet the right was always there and from time to time was emphatically exercised. No great religious organization has ever made an effective bid for superiority over the state in the loyalties of the Chinese. The Buddhist monks, although the richest and most numerous of the religious groups, seem never to have been so closely knit on a geographically inclusive scale as has been the Roman Catholic Church in the West. Nor has the doctrine of the complete separation of church and state much precedent in China. Under the Ch'ing, for example, the state exercised a supervision over the Buddhist monastic communities, appointed officials to control them, and designated the monasteries which had the right to admit postulants to the monastic vows.

## THE STATE RELIGION AND CONFUCIANISM

From these general characteristics we must turn to the chief phases of the religious life in China in the nineteenth century on the eve of the changes introduced by the coming of the Occident. In a sense it does

violence to the picture to differentiate the several systems. The eclecticism of which we have spoken made the religious beliefs and practices of most individuals and communities a composite from which only Islam and Christianity succeeded in standing aloof. However, the separation has a certain validity, for historically there have been very diverse religions and philosophies which have by no means entirely coalesced.

It would be difficult to defend the logic of any order adopted in presenting the various religions, but the observances fostered by the state, and Confucianism as the cult officially sponsored by the government, may well be allowed to come first.

Confucianism is largely a Western name, although the Chinese speak of *K'ung Chiao* or the "Confucian Teaching" (or "Religion"). The designation more commonly employed by the Chinese has been *Ju Chiao,* or the "Teaching of the Learned." *Ju Chia* has also been used, but for the Confucian school, or Confucianists. Confucius was revered as the cult's greatest sage, but other teachers and scholars were honored as having shared in its development. To a certain extent, beginning with the Han, Confucianism represented the totality of Chinese philosophic thought outside such special systems as Taoism and Buddhism—and even these strongly influenced it.

The question is sometimes debated whether Confucianism is a religion. The answer depends in part upon a definition. If one calls religion—as does one standard authority—"any system of faith and worship," then Confucianism may be said at least to contain religious elements. As we have repeatedly seen, it was in large part concerned with the organization of the state and of society and with man's relation to man. However, no thoughtful person can meditate long upon either state or society without encountering problems as to the nature of man and of the universe and the relation of the one to the other. Is man by nature good or bad? What are the criteria by which good and bad are to be distinguished? Is the universe friendly, unfriendly, or indifferent to man? Can man believe in a being or beings who in part or entirely control the course of the universe? If so, can he make such an adjustment to them that he will be reinforced in his efforts to achieve what he believes to be desirable goals for himself and society? Chinese both in and out of the Confucian school inevitably raised such questions, and in consequence their thinking and acting showed a religious tinge. Moreover, Confucius, as we have again and again said, set great store by the ceremonial, part of it unmistakably religious, which had come down from the past. The Confucian school, accordingly, was a bulwark of the religious rites that are supposed to have originated in the Chou dynasty or earlier and of certain others that developed from or were akin to them. Confucianism, therefore, can certainly be said to contain religious features, even though it included other elements.

It is the religious rites and beliefs preserved or nourished by Confucian-

ism with which we are here chiefly concerned, and not the political and social doctrines, for these have been or will be considered elsewhere. Through the centuries Confucian scholars differed on the question of the personality of *T'ien* and the existence of spirits, but most of them agreed that the universe favors righteousness in man and all would maintain religious rites. Even though some, like Hsün Tzŭ, declared that these rites could not alter the course of nature, they contended that they were valuable as a means of educating the people, and so as a form of social control.

It is probable that even without the influence of the Confucian school the state would have supported some kind of religion. Most ancient and many modern governments have done so. Had it not been for Confucianism, however, that religion would probably have been very different from what it was. It seems to have been owing chiefly to Confucianism that the Imperial Government sought to maintain the religious ritual of antiquity which the Sage had endorsed. The government also recognized divinities and permitted or actually supported ceremonies which Confucius had never known but which were believed to be consistent with his teaching.

## THE STATE CULT ALLIED TO CONFUCIANISM

The state cult which is often called Confucianism and in which ceremonies in honor of Confucius and his disciples were accorded an important part, had a long and varied history. Confucianism was far from being unchanging. Across the centuries it was altered again and again. Some of this has been hinted at earlier. The resulting product under the later Ch'ing Emperors was a composite of many influences and movements and a large proportion of it would probably have seemed to Confucius and his immediate disciples very strange and quite out of keeping with their teachings.

According to the theory of the Chinese state which was reinforced by Confucianism, the Emperor was the religious as well as the political head of the realm. The Emperor, indeed, was a part of the order of the universe and was commissioned by *T'ien* not only to rule all mankind but also to perform certain religious functions. He was a son of *T'ien* and an associate of Heaven and Earth *(T'ien* and *Ti).* A pantheon with ordered ranks was recognized, and to it the Emperor could admit and in it promote and demote divine beings. Repeatedly he conferred titles, usually very resounding ones, on divinities. To the Emperor was reserved the performance of some of the ceremonies conceived as essential to the smooth co-operation of man and the universe. The chief of these was that at the altar of Heaven. In connection with it was—and is, for it still stands—a group of imposing buildings of varying dates in a vast enclosure on the

southern border of the capital. The altar is a terraced, marble structure, in the open air. It is circular, the traditional form of the symbols of Heaven. Here, on the longest night of the year, the Emperor officiated at a sacrifice to *T'ien.* At the ceremony was a tablet to *Shang Ti,* and tablets to the imperial ancestors, to the sun and moon, the five planets, Ursa Major, the twenty-four constellations, the signs of the zodiac, the God of the Clouds, the God of Rain, the God of Wind, and the God of Thunder. At other times of the year other, less elaborate ceremonies were conducted, in theory by the Emperor. To the north of the capital was an altar to the Earth where the Emperor, in person or by proxy, sacrificed at the summer solstice. Ceremonies were also conducted there at other times. Here the prevailing form was square, the traditional symbol of Earth. To the east of Peking was an altar to the sun and to the west an altar to the moon, the one round and the other square. The Emperor was also supposed to sacrifice to his ancestors and to the spirits of the ground and of the grain. On occasions of unusual importance, such as the accession of a dynasty or a great crisis in the affairs of state or of the imperial family, the Emperor, by special ceremonies, announced the event to his ancestors and to Heaven and Earth, or perhaps merely to his ancestors. Near the capital were temples to some other spirits of natural objects, where the Emperor officiated at ceremonies either in person or by proxy. At one of them he officially opened the husbandry of the spring by plowing. He was also required to sacrifice to a sacred *yo,* or mountain, when he was near it, or to send a representative to do so. Sacrifices to some other spirits and divinities of lesser rank were performed, not by the Emperor in person but by officials delegated by him.

Many members of the official hierarchy on duty in the provinces were charged with the performance of religious rites. Sacrifices to the spirits of local mountains and streams were expected of them. They also took part in such ceremonies as those in the local temples of Confucius and in the temple of the City God. Officials in the provinces were supposed to offer sacrifices at the time of the spring planting to the Gods of the Soil and the Grain. Those of certain grades, including the viceroy, were required to open the operations of the spring by sacrifices to Shên-nung, the ancient mythical Emperor and patron of husbandry, and by plowing. There were also official ceremonies for neglected ghosts, said to have been ordered by the Hung Wu Emperor, the founder of the Ming, who, an orphan of destitute parents, is reported not to have known the burial place of his father and mother. Visits of officials, either in person or by proxy, were expected to be paid to other divinities, some of them local and some revered by the various crafts. In other words, within their jurisdiction officials had it as one of their functions to insure by the performance of the proper rites the same smooth co-operation between men and the

powerful spirits and forces of the universe which, for the entire realm, the Emperor was expected to maintain.

The pantheon of the spirits and divinities recognized by the state cult was grouped into three grades. In the first were Heaven and Earth, the deceased Emperors, and the Gods of the Ground and the Grain. Near the close of the Ch'ing, Confucius was promoted to this rank. In the second were, among others, the sun and the moon; many famous rulers of antiquity, such as Yao and Shun; the chief disciples of Confucius and the leading exponents of his doctrines; distinguished men and women of virtue and learning; and the Gods of the Sky, of the Clouds, of Rain, Wind, and Thunder. In the third were great physicians of the past, the God of War, the Ruler of the North Star, the God of Fire, the City Gods (Gods of the Walls and Moats), and a number of others.

A few of the divinities honored by the official Confucian cult require special mention. One of these, naturally, was Confucius himself. Every territorial division, such as the *hsien,* the *fu,* and the province, was supposed to have what foreigners called a Confucian temple, usually known to the Chinese as the *K'ung Miao* ("Confucian Temple"), the *Wên Miao* ("Temple of Literature," or perhaps "Temple of Civilization"), or *Hsüeh Kung* ("Temple of Learning"). This meant that in some walled cities such as the capital of a province, which might also be the chief city of a *fu* and contain one or more *hsien,* two or more such structures were found. Especially famous temples were at Ch'ü-fou, the home of the Sage, where a lineal male descendant ennobled in recognition of that fact was supposed to maintain ceremonies to him and to care for his grave, and at Peking, where was an unusually large structure. The Confucian temple normally consisted of an enclosure containing several courts and buildings. The southern wall was not pierced by a gate until some student of the district had obtained first rank in the examinations for the *chin shih.* The main building had as its chief features (at its northern end, facing south) a tablet to Confucius, and ranged on either hand, on the eastern and western sides, tablets to the leading disciples of Confucius and to men, like Chu Hsi, who through the centuries had added luster to the Confucian virtues or to the Confucian school. Cloisters connected with the main hall contained tablets to others distinguished for adorning the Confucian doctrine. The tablets of the various individuals were placed according to a fixed order, some being in positions of especial honor. New names might be admitted by imperial decree. In a few temples were images of Confucius. In these the Sage was usually represented as swarthy of countenance and garbed in the dress of his period. In a building or a room near the main hall might be tablets to the ancestors of Confucius. On one side of the temple enclosure, too, might be a shrine for tablets to famous scholars and officials who were natives of the locality. The walls of the temple were red, the

official color of the Chou, and other features of the equipment and ceremonies associated with the place were supposed to date from that dynasty. Twice a year in each temple formal official ceremonies were held, with an elaborate ritual believed to have come down from antiquity and with offerings of food and the burning of incense. They were usually just before dawn (although they might be held during the day), and with the stately hall, the official costumes of the participants, and the posturing, music, and procedure, through which many successive generations had expressed their reverence, could be very impressive. Official visits were supposedly paid to the temples twice each month.

These temples, it may be added, existing as they did throughout the Empire, and being maintained officially, were potent in reinforcing and continuing Confucianism. Added to them were halls to Confucius in at least some of the state schools, which helped still further to preserve for the Sage and his teachings the loyalty of the powerful official-scholar class.

Another shrine connected with the state cult was the *Ch'êng Huang Miao,* literally the "Temple of the Wall and the Moat," but more freely translated as the Temple of the Tutelar God of the City. Each walled city was supposed to have one. Here was an image of the local *Ch'êng Huang*, or god. He was often represented with two assistants, and sometimes with his wife and concubines and sons, and with other gods. While the image remained constant, the god himself was usually thought of as changed from time to time, much as the local magistrates were transferred. Confirmation of the position was theoretically made by the national head of the Taoist cult, subject to the approval of the Board of Rites. He was often conceived of as a deceased official, and in some cities was a deified local hero and remained constantly at one post. The god and his temple usually played an important part in the life of the city. Magistrates were expected to make them official visits. Semimonthly ceremonies were held, and usually twice a year, in the spring and autumn, the image of the god was carried in procession through the streets. The god and his entourage were often cared for by societies, membership in which might carry with it social prestige. The common people said prayers and made offerings in the temple, and to the god was announced each death in the community. The god was expected to protect the city from harm. He was also believed to watch the deeds of the inhabitants, to report them to Heaven, and to turn over evildoers, on death, to the ruler of purgatory. This latter conception was of Buddhist provenance and an illustration of the fashion in which the faiths of China interpenetrated one another.

The Gods of the Soil and the Grain should also be mentioned. The Gods of the Soil were of very early origin. Theoretically each political unit was under the protection of one of them. In theory the head city of each

province, *fu*, and *hsien* had an altar to its local God of the Soil. This was square, the traditional form of objects associated with the cult of the Earth and related deities, and was open to the sky and surrounded by trees. In addition to the large one for the Empire at Peking, the Emperor had an altar of his own in his palace, constructed of earth from various parts of his domains. The God of the Grain was usually closely associated with that of the soil, and throughout the Empire official ceremonies were held and offerings made to the two on the open-air altars at stated times each year.

In many villages, too, was a shrine to the local God of the Soil. The god was supposed to record all village happenings and to report them to Heaven and the ruler of purgatory. Announcements of births and deaths were often made there. The shrine, sometimes very simple, and sometimes in an elaborate building, was frequently very important in the life of the village. Its upkeep constituted a community interest and in it might be images of other gods.

Another deity prominent in the official cult was the God of Literature, Wên Ti or Wên Ch'ang. His worship had a most interesting development, the full course of which seems not yet to have been accurately traced. He is said actually to have lived, perhaps under the T'ang dynasty, but if so, that fact appears to have been accidental. Reported incarnations showed the influence of Buddhism. He was believed to reside in Ursa Major, a constellation which from very early times had been venerated by the Chinese. He was often represented with several attendants. Whatever the origin and growth of his cult, he had numerous shrines where official ceremonies were conducted in his honor. His temples served as clubhouses for scholars.

A deity who loomed very prominently in the state cult was Kuan Yü or Kuan Ti, usually, but not with entire accuracy, called the God of War. The latter designation came from the fact that he was the patron of the military officials, somewhat as Confucius was revered as the sage of the civil officials. The temple in his honor was called the *Wu Miao*, or "Military Temple" (also the *Wu Shêng Miao*—the "Military Holy Temple"). It will be recalled that Kuan Yü was a commander in the memorable period of the Three Kingdoms, a supporter of Liu Pei, and one of the trio who took the "Peach Garden Oath" famous in Chinese fiction and drama. His deification and popularity developed slowly and the honors accorded him appear never to have been so great as under the Ch'ing. In the later years of that dynasty he was much reverenced. In theory at least, a temple was erected to him in every province, *fu*, and *hsien*, and at periodical intervals official ceremonies with sacrificial offerings were conducted, usually led by the chief military official. Yüan Shih-k'ai particularly honored him and ordered the observance of his cult. In the *Wu*

*Miao* were, at least sometimes, tablets not only to Kuan Yü but to other famous generals as well, making it a kind of military hall of fame. Especially associated with Kuan Yü was the name of Yo Fei, the loyal and heroic general of the Sung, who often shared honors with him. Kuan Yü was popular with more than the soldiers. He was believed to be skillful in driving out evil spirits and for this reason was much invoked. He was regarded as a patron divinity of more than one province, was looked upon as a god of literature, and was highly esteemed by merchants.

There were, moreover, temples to the Emperor, *Wan Shou Kung*, where on stated occasions officials were expected to assemble and perform ceremonies.

Possibly also there should be classified under the state religion deified famous men. Some of them were revered only locally, others more than locally. A popular official, a general, or a martyr to a patriotic cause might have a shrine built to him, and there ceremonies would be held in his honor and prayers made to him. In its origin, the cult might be unofficial, but if its hero were to attain full status as a recognized god, an imperial decree would be required ordering his deification and assigning him rank and title.

At least one more type of divinity worshipped under state auspices requires mention—that of the mountains. The spirits of the hills were early revered in China. Early, too, five peaks came into especial prominence, each being associated with one of the five directions: east, west, north, south, and the center. Of these the most notable was for many centuries T'ai Shan—the *Tung Yo*, or Eastern Peak—in Shantung. As the easternmost of the five, it was believed to control the springs of life, to govern man's fate on earth, and to rule the souls of men after death. For a time in its history, T'ai Shan was regarded as an official messenger to *T'ien*, through whom the Emperor offered the special sacrifice *fêng*. As the years passed, its functions were modified, yet repeatedly it was sacrificed to by Emperors and given honorary titles. Important events, such as the birth of a son and the choice of an heir to the throne, were officially announced to it. T'ai Shan was by no means entirely or even chiefly a divinity revered by the state: the spirit or god of T'ai Shan had wide popularity with the masses. The cult of T'ai Shan was, indeed, another example of the way in which originally separate faiths mingled. Both Buddhism and Taoism took advantage of and reinforced it. When Buddhism came with its conceptions of the afterlife, it was not unnatural that T'ai Shan, already regarded as determining the span of men's years and presiding over the spirits of the dead, should be assigned the rulership of one of the Buddhist hells where punishments for certain categories of sins were inflicted. Taoism especially appropriated T'ai Shan, and at least some of the many temples to the god scattered over China belonged more nearly to Taoism than to any other

of the major faiths. The mountain was a favorite objective of pilgrimages. On it were many shrines and through the ages millions have toiled to its summit. As a protection against evil spirits, stones that were said to be from T'ai Shan were frequently placed where one street debouched into another, to frighten away the demons who sought there a thoroughfare.

To many modern observers the features of the state cult which had to do with sacrifices and religious ritual may well seem uncritically superstitious. Alongside them, however, must be set the ethical emphasis of Confucianism. Officials, from the Emperor down, exhorted those subject to them to observe the moral principles of the sages. Much of this, to be sure, was a platitudinous hypocrisy which deceived no one except the very simple. But the sincerity that Confucius stressed was by no means entirely lacking. Even though a minority, there were untold numbers, some of them among the educated and powerful and some of them in the humble walks of life, who embodied to a remarkable extent the virtues which the Sage had emphasized. Throughout the land the Confucian virtues were lauded and set a standard of conduct that exercised a profound influence.

The state had a system of religious and moral education that reached the great bulk of the Chinese. Of this the frequent and regularly performed ceremonies constituted an important part. The preparation for the civil service examinations, based as it was upon the Confucian Classics, directly reached hundreds of thousands in each generation, and by the prestige accorded the holders of literary degrees, invested the Confucian precepts with a halo of sanctity. Official proclamations, and under the later Ch'ing Emperors, the public reading of the Sacred Edict, afforded additional channels for familiarizing the populace with orthodox moral standards. Among the duties enjoined by the Sacred Edict were care for one's parents, harmony and forbearance in the family and clan, reciprocal helpfulness in the community, the assistance of neighbors in a calamity, courtesy, thrift, foresight, the attempt to reconcile disputants and so to allay litigation, the avoidance of talebearing and of pride, assistance to schools, the eschewal of gambling and thieving, and reverence toward Heaven. The motives appealed to, it may be noted, were largely prudential: the present welfare of oneself and of society, and affection to one's parents. There was no threat of punishment or promise of reward in a future life and no especial appeal to the will of Heaven.

### HONORS TO ANCESTORS

It is by no means clear whether what is usually known as the worship of ancestors should be classified under Confucianism. Temples to and ceremonies in honor of ancestors long antedated Confucius. Many ideas and practices far from Confucian in their origin came to be grouped

around conceptions of the future life and ritual for the dead. In this development Buddhism and Taoism had a very large share. Popular superstition and animism made extensive contributions. Yet it is probably due more to Confucianism than to any other one factor that the cult of the dead loomed so large in China. Certainly it was to Confucianism that it owed a large proportion of its ceremonies and characteristic concepts. Many of the rites for death, mourning, and burial, for instance, were taken from the ancient writings which Confucianism regarded as its Classics and which it had no small share in creating and preserving.

No other phase of Chinese religious life was more prominent than the ceremonies for the departed. They constituted, indeed, one of the outstanding characteristics of Chinese culture and were an integral part of that most potent of Chinese social institutions, the family. No attempt to understand the Chinese can be anything but imperfect without at least a brief description of them.

In a country as large as China, variations in practices and beliefs associated with the dead were inevitable and a comprehensive description runs the risk of being partially untrue for a particular community or may be such a combination of what existed in several different localities that it will not give an exact picture of what took place in any one of them.

The dead were supposed to be dependent upon the living for their weal or woe. Ceremonies in honor of ancestors, moreover, had a decided utility in helping to tie together the family and the clan. Their maintenance, therefore, depended upon a mixture of motives: respect and affection for the departed, fear, the desire for the prosperity of the living, and social usefulness. There entered, too, the binding influence of custom and the desire so to conduct the ceremonies as to win the good opinion—or perhaps the envy—of one's neighbors. In the hearts of some, respect and affection for the dead were doubtless the predominant or even the only motive. Possibly a larger number kept up the ceremonies simply from the desire to conform to the customs of civilized society and had no confidence that through them good would accrue to the dead or that the dead would be able to bless or injure the living. Probably the majority, however, were moved by a more or less strong belief that through the prescribed ritual the dead were benefited and were induced to aid the living.

Theories as to the location of the departed were not uniform, but in general it was believed that the soul of the deceased is to be found in three places at once, or, perhaps, more correctly, that each man has three souls. Each of the dead, so it was held, goes to the future world to be judged and is assigned either to a heaven or to a hell—a conception probably of Buddhist provenance, although likewise to be found in later Taoism. Each also is both in the grave and in the ancestral tablet. The popular idea had it that there are many restless spirits who, either because

of ill fortune or crime while still in this life, or through neglect of the living, wander about doing harm to men. The idea of the transmigration of souls which entered with Buddhism was also to be found, but not so much in the foreground as in India.

The ceremonies for the dead sometimes began even before life departed. The dying person might be taken off the bed or *k'ang* on which he was lying, for fear that if this was not done his spirit would later haunt it, and the curtains of the bed might be taken down to prevent his rebirth as a fish. Frequently, too, an attempt was made to call back, viva voce, the soul of the dying. Sometimes a hole was broken in the roof to facilitate the exit of the soul. Notice of the death was placed on the door, and announcement might formally be sent, possibly by a procession, to the local God of the Soil, and the following day the soul of the dead might be brought back from the shrine.

The coffin had perhaps been prepared months or years in advance (although usually so only in case of the rich). Often, indeed, it was a mark of affection to present one's parents with coffins, and so to give them assurance of provision for a worthy burial. The body, properly washed and dressed in mortuary robes, was placed in the coffin with fitting ceremonies and the lid sealed. Near by a temporary tablet was set up.

Buddhist and Taoist priests might be called in to help the soul of the deceased through possible sufferings by chanting from their sacred books, assisted perhaps by a drum or gong or orchestra. Visits of condolence were formally paid by friends and ceremoniously received.

The actual burial might be delayed for months or even years, pending the selection of a fortunate site for the grave and the determination of an auspicious day. Upon these was held to depend much of the happiness of the dead, and in consequence, of the prosperity of the living. The funeral was usually as elaborate as the means and the status of the family allowed, or more so. The funeral procession included the coffin, in some sections a huge image to frighten away evil spirits, Taoist or Buddhist monks, possibly the holder of a civil service degree to conduct the ceremonies, musicians, a tablet for the soul, a large picture of the deceased, mourners, and insignia setting forth the honors of the dead. Attendants might include beggars hired for the purpose. In at least some places this was regarded as a prescriptive right of beggars, and to disregard it might induce violence. Before the procession started, food and incense might be placed before the coffin, and the chief mourners make ceremonial prostrations to the deceased. Along the route of the cortege paper money might be scattered, presumably to keep evilly disposed spirits from snatching away the soul of the dead. At the grave some of the insignia, and a paper house with paper clothes, servants, and other accessories to comfortable living might be burned, the supposition being that these were thus transferred to the spirit world, there

to be at the disposal of the deceased. Ceremonies, too, were conducted at the grave. A dot was placed on the character 王 on the ancestral tablet, making it 主—preferably by some official or holder of a literary degree. The placing of this dot was presumably the act which fixed the tablet as a habitation of the soul. These ceremonies, it will be seen, had their origin in various sources. Some of them, however, were conducted according to the older Confucian works, especially the *I Li* and the *Li Chi.*

Mourning was governed in part by customs handed down through Confucianism. It was also partly determined by later traditions and rules. Its duration and intensity varied with the degree of relationship. For a parent it was theoretically three years, but in current usage a good deal less —running into the third year after death and defined by the *Li Chi* as twenty-five months, but usually in practice about twenty-seven months. For part of this period the hair was allowed to go uncared for, and marriage, ostensibly forbidden, took place only when celebrated with no public festivities. Mourning clothing was worn. Formerly, as a sign of loyalty and grief the widow might hang or drown herself, and this act, possibly carried out with some ceremony and graced by the presence of a magistrate, might be recognized by the Emperor with an honorary tablet or *p'ai lou* (arch). Some of the Ch'ing rulers attempted to discourage the practice, but they were not completely successful.

Prominent in the cult of the dead was the *shên chu*, called by foreigners the ancestral tablet. In the home of the eldest son and usually of the other sons was customarily a tablet to a deceased father, and on it were, as well, the name of the mother and perhaps the names of the sons. There might also be tablets to other near relatives and to the founder and principal member of the clan. For these there might be a special niche, or if the family could afford it, a room or even a building in the home. Sometimes they were in the main reception room. Before these tablets incense might be burned daily and offerings of food placed on stated occasions. Important family events, such as betrothals, were announced to them, and before them, at a marriage, the wedding couple made their kowtow. Prayer might be offered them for help in emergencies and lots be cast before them.

Many clans had ancestral temples. These had their prototypes in the religious practices of very early historic times. Many of them were sumptuous. They were managed by the elders or by a group elected by the various branches of the clan, and they and the ceremonies in them were usually maintained by endowments. These endowments might be used not only for the upkeep of the temple but also for the support of the aged, the poor, and the widows of the clan and for other family purposes. In the temple might be several halls separated by courts and the whole surrounded by a high wall. In one of the halls were tablets to the deceased male members of the clan. These were arranged on steps, those of the same generation

on the same step, the oldest being on the highest with that to the founder of the clan in its center. The temple might also have portraits of the dead. A poorer member of the clan might be in constant attendance to keep incense continuously burning and to light candles before the tablets twice a month. Once a year, at the time of the winter solstice, there was held in the ancestral temple a major ceremony, with a sacrifice. The custom was supposed to go back to pre-Confucian times and its ritual to be of great antiquity. Its perpetuation formed part of the tradition of the Confucian school. A similar sacrifice might be held on the occasion of a funeral. The clan took the opportunity of the annual ceremony to meet and transact business. A hall in the temple might be used for a school, and the temple, too, might become a court of justice in which the clan pronounced judgment on one of its members.

Many other practices were connected with the cult of ancestors. About New Year's time the dead might be welcomed to the homes from the ancestral temples, and then, a few days later, be formally sent back to their customary abodes. At Ch'ing Ming, the great spring festival, the graves were cleaned and repaired and offerings made of food and incense. Other occasions, such as the birthday of the deceased, might also be commemorated by a special ceremony and offering.

It can readily be seen that the cult of progenitors had important social results. It formed a bulwark of that outstanding social and economic unit, the family, it made for the conservation of much of the past, it was a means of moral and social control, and it acted as a check on individualism. As a factor in molding Chinese life and thought, it can hardly be exaggerated.

## BUDDHISM

Beginning in the T'ang, Buddhism in China suffered from a slow decline. However, it continued to have a prominent place in the life of the country. Its monasteries and shrines were numbered by the tens of thousands. In Hangchow alone (one of the strongest Buddhist centers, to be sure, and hence not typical) a survey made in 1930–1931 disclosed the existence of nearly a thousand of them. It was also inextricably intertwined with folklore and with much of literature and art.

Through the interpenetration of religions by one another and the eclecticism so characteristic of China, the Chinese who could be called exclusively Buddhist were almost entirely confined to the ranks of the professionals—the monks and the nuns. On the eve of the Communist seizure of the mainland the monks, known as *ho shang* or, when a teacher of the Buddhist law, *fa shih,* were estimated to number between somewhat less than half a million and a million. The total for the nuns was very much less, probably only a few thousand.

The majority of the monks were from the poorer classes, but some came from well-to-do and educated families. Many had been purchased in childhood by the monastery from indigent fathers and mothers who found thus a small fee for themselves and an assured livelihood for the son. Some entered as the result of a vow made by a parent seeking healing or fearing death. Others were enrolled, as adults, drawn by one or more of several motives: the desire for a livelihood or for protection from punishment for crime, the wish in old age to prepare for death, disillusionment and the consequent longing for escape from the world, or the hunger for peace and for light on the mystery of existence.

The novice was given a course of instruction. If a child, he was usually entrusted to the tutelage of one of the monks, was taught to repeat *memoriter* portions of the sacred writings, and learned the services by participating in them. Insistence upon careful instruction varied with the monastery. The majority of monks were content with knowing greater or smaller portions of the ritual and with being able to repeat some passages from the sacred books. They did not necessarily have much comprehension of the principles of their faith. Many, perhaps the majority, displayed an abysmal ignorance of them. Some, however, probably a small minority, were very learned, and monks of dignity and beauty of character who meditated long and earnestly on the problems of life were by no means completely lacking.

Admission to the monastic community was by three stages. First the candidate was received into the novitiate by simple ceremonies in which he took the ten primary vows, among them the promises not to take life, steal, be unchaste, tell lies, or drink intoxicating liquors. Next he entered, by further vows and ritual, the state of what in Hinayana Buddhism is known as the *arhat* (in Chinese *lohan* or *a-lo-han*), who, it will be recalled, is seeking salvation for himself. Last of all, in accordance with Mahayana conceptions, he assumed the vows of a *bodhisattva* (in Chinese *p'u-t'i-sa-t'o,* or, for short, *p'u-sa*), to seek salvation not only for himself but also for others. Part of this last ceremony was a test of the candidate's ability to endure the suffering which he was supposed to have undertaken for others and consisted of burning cones of incense in rows on his scalp. The scars of this ordeal, plainly visible on his shaven pate, throughout his life afforded tangible evidence of his calling. At least in certain periods of China's history, these ceremonies could be legally administered only by heads of monasteries who had imperial permission, and the latter were comparatively few. The fully qualified monk was given a religious name and a document certifying to his status. The certificate assured him a welcome in other Buddhist monasteries. In addition to the fully qualified monks, the monastic community might include lay brethren who did much of the menial and manual labor.

The monk was supposed to conform to certain standards of conduct.

He was to remain unmarried, was to eat no flesh, and, of course, was to observe the vows taken at the various stages of his admission. His dress was conventional and traditional: gray, orange, or yellowish brown in color, with ornate vestments for some of the services. As a rule, monks were regarded by the populace with mingled fear and contempt—fear because of their supposed influence over the spirit world and the dead, and contempt in part because they had failed to assume the duties of marrying and rearing children so much honored by Confucianism and so necessary to the maintenance of the family and the ancestral cult. The ignorance and idleness of many of the monks accentuated the popular disdain, although the occasional scholar or saint commanded respect. In moral character some were markedly unworthy, but the average appears not to have been much if any below that of the community at large.

A very few monks practiced extreme asceticism, perhaps shutting themselves up for years in a small cell with a minimum of food, or inflicting on themselves such physical mutilation as burning off a finger. The bodies of some of the deceased monks who practiced asceticism or who were regarded as especially holy were embalmed, painted, and gilded, and displayed to be reverenced by the faithful. It may be added that usually the corpses of monks were cremated. With interesting conformity to Chinese usage, ancestral tablets might be set up for the dead members of the community and might be preserved in a special hall.

For support the monks did not depend upon peripatetic begging with an alms bowl as earlier tradition required. Most of them were attached to monasteries, temples, and shrines. Income was derived partly from endowments, partly from offerings, including those of women praying for sons, and partly from fees for the performance of ceremonies, largely for the dead. The endowments were usually in land. Buildings might be erected by gifts from officials and bear the name of the donor prominently inscribed. Collections might be solicited and the name of each giver with the accompanying amount placed on a posted list. The motive appealed to might be merit or fame.

The monasteries were either in towns and cities or in the country. If in the country, beautiful natural surroundings were usually chosen for them—perhaps a mountain valley or a hillside—and trees were encouraged to grow up about them. They varied greatly in size and, naturally, somewhat in interior arrangement. The organization customarily included a head (*fang chang*) who corresponded roughly to the abbot in a Christian monastery, and the division of the monks into two groups, one charged with secular affairs—the reception and care of guests, purchases, and the administration of funds and other property—and the other with the religious duties of the establishment, such as religious instruction and the ordering of the services and of meditation. The daily services were usually two or

three in number—if the latter, one early, one at midday, and one in the evening—and consisted of such features as invocations, praises, and the recitation of chapters from the sacred books, as a rule with the assistance of musical instruments, such as bells, drums, cymbals, and especially the "wooden fish" which was a customary part of the equipment of the worship hall. At appropriate times during the service the participants knelt, stood, and marched in procession. Frequently there were sacrificial offerings of rice and tea. Special services were held on stated days, of which there were several each month. Meditation had its part in the life of the monastery, especially since the Ch'an school remained prominent, and often a special hall was devoted to it. However, although in many instances it was practiced conscientiously, all too often meditation was formal and perfunctory. The dormitories or other sleeping rooms for the monks were sometimes very comfortable, and occasionally, in spite of the rule, the monks had individual possessions.

The number and arrangement of buildings, halls, and images varied from sect to sect and from monastery to monastery. The usual outline of the monastery was a rectangle surrounded by a wall. Along the sides might be cells for the monks, guest rooms, the dining hall, storerooms, and the likė. Crossing the quadrangle transversely and separated by courts might be three halls. In the one nearest the entrance were customarily found four menacing figures, two on each side of the hall, each of a different color, and known collectively as the Four Heavenly Kings (*Ssŭ T'ien Wang*). Each was supposed to govern one of the continents which lie in the direction of the four points of the compass from Mt. Sumeru, the center of the universe. Their fierce demeanor did not inspire fear in the instructed believer, but rather confidence, for they afforded protection to and bestowed happiness upon the faithful. In the center of this first hall was an image of Maitreya (in Chinese, Mi-lo-fo), fat and laughing, and commonly called by foreigners the Laughing Buddha. This statue, it may be noted, was the conventionalized portrait of a Chinese monk of the tenth century who was believed to be an incarnation of Maitreya. He was the bodhisattva who, after the law had been forgotten and the world had become corrupt, was to come and establish on earth the lost truths of Buddhism. Back to back with Mi-lo-fo, usually separated from him by a screen, was Wei-t'o, a bodhisattva, the protector of monasteries, represented as panoplied in full armor and armed with a sword. The worshipper, having passed these encouragements to his faith, proceeded to the second and main hall, where were represented the leading truths and figures of Buddhism. In the place of honor was generally either one great image, usually that of the historic Guatama Buddha (or, perhaps, Kuan-yin, "The Goddess of Mercy," or O-mi-t'o-fo) or a trinity of images called "The Three Precious Ones" (San Pao) or "The Three Great Venerable Ones." If a trinity, the ideas

or persons represented by the images might vary. They might be the historic Buddha flanked by O-mi-t'o-fo (Amitabha, also called A-mi-t'o or A-mi-t'o-fo) and the "Healing Buddha" (Yao-shih-fo) or by two other buddhas or bodhisattvas, or they might be the Buddha, the Law, and the Community. Guatama Buddha was not always a member of the trinity. Behind the screen that backed these central figures might be an image of Kuan-yin, who was sometimes depicted as rescuing people from peril. Lining the wall of the central hall might be statues of the Eighteen Lohans, or Arhats—listeners to and profiters by the Buddhist doctrine. Or there might be statues representing the thirty-two points of personal beauty attributed to the Buddha, or the Twenty Devas (Gods). The main hall might also contain shrines to other gods, some of them Chinese, or to buddhas of bodhisattvas. Ti Tsang, the so-called Lord of Hell, or Ruler of the Dead, might be one of them. Between the first and second halls might be another one containing a statue of some bodhisattva, such as Kuan-yin or Ti Tsang, or, perhaps, images of the Five Hundred Lohans. As a rule the third hall, in the rear, called the Fa T'ang, or Hall of the Law, had only smaller images and was used by the monks for their regular services or for teaching and preaching to the laity. On the altars in front of the images were likely to be candlesticks, incense-burners, flowers, and dishes for the offerings of food. Some monasteries included a hall for meditation and might have separate buildings for the library and for other purposes. Vivid portrayals of the tortures inflicted in the Buddhist hells might be presented. The heavens with their joys might also be depicted. The Wheel of the Law was often featured. Not infrequently there was a pool stocked with fish, to be fed by the pious as an act of merit and as a symbol of their care for all sentient beings. Such animals as pigs or cows might be kept for the same purpose. The monastery, then, was designed not only for the residence and use of the monks but also to present to them and to the laity the main features of the teaching of Buddhism and thus to be an aid to understanding and practicing its doctrines.

As will have been noticed in the preceding paragraph, the beings revered by the Chinese Buddhists fell into several categories. There were gods, some of them of foreign, usually Indian, origin, and some indigenous. They were not as highly regarded as were many other beings, for they had not attained *nirvana* and were still subject to metempsychosis. They might even be reborn into a lower state than man. There were the "patriarchs," notable among them Bodhidharma, the reputed founder of the widely prevalent Ch'an school. There were the lohans. The more honored of them numbered eighteen, earlier sixteen, although the names included in the eighteen varied. As we have seen, however, five hundred of them might be represented in a temple. Those held in greatest reverence and most widely popular were the buddhas and bodhisattvas. It was taught that there have

been many buddhas. Naturally the one most generally represented was Gautama or, more frequently in Chinese Shih-chia-fo or Shih Chia-mou-ni (Shakyamuni), the historic founder of the faith. As a rule he was represented as seated on a lotus in the attitude of meditation, sometimes as recumbent (the "Sleeping Buddha") when, at the time of his death, he was entering *nirvana*, and, less frequently, as an ascetic, emaciated and unkempt. Probably even more popular was the Buddha Amitabha (O-mi-t'o-fo), through faith in whom, according to the widely prevalent teachings of the Pure Land (Ch'ing t'u) sect, entrance was to be had at death into the Pure Land, or Western Heaven. The repeated invocation of his aid was supposed to be efficacious in the achievement of this desired result, so that his name has probably been uttered in China more often than that of any other honored by Buddhists. P'i-lu-fo (Vairocana), the incarnation of Buddhist doctrine, and early connected with the T'ien T'ai school, was often represented. Yao-shih-fo, revered as the God of Healing, was popular. Kuan-yin, the "Goddess of Mercy," was probably the most widely worshipped of the bodhisattvas. Originally a male figure, an Indian god, Kuan-yin was almost always represented as female, although the male form survived. Mythical stories were told of her life. She was regarded as the embodiment of womanly virtues, of beauty, mercy, and gentleness. Frequently images placed a child in her arms. She was especially revered by women, and her statue was often in women's apartments. She was thought, for example, to grant children. Those of any age or of either sex sought from her deliverance from danger and she was much honored by mariners as their patroness. Representations of her often showed her rescuing those in peril—from the sea, from wild beasts, or from other distresses. Ti Tsang, rather incorrectly called the God of Hell, was in reality a bodhisattva who delayed entering *nirvana* that he might deliver souls from the torments of hell. He was, accordingly, much prayed to. It may be noted in passing that what are called Buddhist hells might better be denominated purgatories, for residence in them is not necessarily permanent, even though prolonged, and souls, having passed through their punishment, might have deliverance from them. The Bodhisattva Wên-shu (Manjusri) was regarded as the embodiment of wisdom. P'u-hsien (Samantabhadra), the "all gracious," usually depicted as riding on an elephant, is a bodhisattva who was highly thought of. The list might be much lengthened.

Both of the two main divisions of Buddhism, Hinayana (Chinese *Hsiao Shêng*) and Mahayana (Chinese *Ta Shêng*), made their influence felt in China and more or less coalesced. Mahayana predominated. The Chinese enumerated ten schools or sects of Buddhism which either originated or gained a following in the country. However, in the twentieth century at least four were no longer to be found in China, though their

influence was supposed to persist, and no new one had come into existence for centuries. Those that remained had partly interpenetrated one another and have had some of their lines of separation blurred. Professed adherents of more than one school might be found living peaceably together in the same monastery. This failure to produce new divisions and this dimming of distinctions were due chiefly not to carefully reasoned tolerance but to haziness in thinking and flabbiness of conviction and were further evidence of the decay of the faith. In monasteries the Ch'an was the most widespread. A large majority of the monks belonged to it. Among the monks T'ien T'ai was probably next in importance. Among the laity the Pure Land school was by far the most popular.

Buddhism in China has had a vast literature. Its canon is called in Chinese the *San Tsang* (*Tripitaka*). In the standard collections are both Hinayana and Mahayana works. It is divided into *Ching* (*Sutras*); *Lü* (*Vinaya*), largely on asceticism, ritual, and monastic discipline; *Lun* (*Abhidharma*), largely philosophy; and *Tsa*, miscellaneous works. The *San Tsang* ought probably not to be called a canon in the strict sense of that word, but rather a collection of standard works. Twelve collections were made by imperial order, the last in the eighteenth century, and each differed somewhat from the others, either through the addition or through the compression or complete deletion of works, or both. The *San Tsang* contains over a thousand works. In addition there has been an extensive literature, most of it for popular consumption and much of it ephemeral.

Buddhism owed part of its appeal to its use of specific mountains as objectives for pilgrimages and as monastic centers. Many mountains and hills were thus utilized by Buddhism, some of them, like T'ai Shan, regarded as peculiarly sacred long before the coming of Buddhism. However, four centers especially were occupied by Buddhism and were par excellence its holy places. These were Wu T'ai Shan, in Shansi, Chiu Hua Shan, south of the Yangtze in Anhui, P'u T'o, an island off the coast of Chêkiang, and Omei Shan, in Szechwan. On Wu T'ai Shan Lamaism was conspicuous, for Mongolia, a stronghold of that cult, is not far away. Wên-shu was the patron Bodhisattva. Chiu Hua Shan was sacred to Ti Tsang. On Omei, the highest of the four, P'u-hsien was the most prominent bodhisattva. On one side the summit of Omei breaks off into a precipice thousands of feet deep and from its edge a circular rainbow, the "Glory of Buddha," could sometimes be seen, most impressive to simple pilgrims. P'u T'o is a very attractive mountainous island, held sacred to Kuan-yin.

Buddhism exerted its influence upon the laity in a variety of ways and touched their lives at many points. That it had such a hold is obvious, for the support of the large body of monks and the erection, maintenance, and repair of the shrines depended ultimately upon them. There was a good deal of education of the laity in Buddhist tenets, partly through popular

literature, partly through stories that gained currency as folk tales, and partly through pilgrimages and religious ceremonies.

One source of Buddhism's power was the belief that through the friendly offices of Buddhist divinities present evils could be avoided and desirable goods of this life could be obtained. Such blessings as sons and recovery from illness were prayed for. Another source of its hold was the determining influence which it was held could be exerted upon the soul's lot after death. The reincarnations and especially the heavens and hells in which popular Chinese Buddhism believed were made graphic to the multitude through literature, pictures, sculpture, and ceremonies, and found their way into folklore.

The incentive to the conduct which Buddhism lauds was largely found in the effects of good and bad deeds upon one's state in a future existence. The acquisition of merit which might later be effective was one of the strong inducements to the founding and maintenance of the many charitable organizations so characteristic of Chinese life—for supporting nurseries, building bridges, repairing roads, giving medicine to or providing coffins for the poor, and the like.

Assurance of a happy state in the life beyond the grave was obtained by repeating prayers and observing vegetarianism. Certificates—passports to heaven—could be purchased from Buddhist clergy by those who performed these acts of devotion. Souls of the dead could be assisted by the living. Thus services believed to be efficacious in hastening the delivery of the dead from torment were conducted by the monks on payment of a fee. One of the most picturesque of Chinese festivals, that of care for departed spirits, had an especially Buddhist flavor. The belief was that once a year, in the summer, on the first day of the seventh month, souls are released from the Buddhist hells or purgatories and come back to earth. In private homes food and paper money were provided and incense and candles burned for them and public ceremonies on their behalf were conducted by the monks. The festival culminated fifteen days after its beginning, when the spirits were supposed to return to whatever abode might now be appropriate for them.

Many homes had a shrine or shrines to Buddhist divinities. Pilgrimages to Buddhist sacred places were popular, especially to the sacred mountains. Printed directions existed for comportment while engaged in them, a special garb might be worn, incense-burners might be carried, songs might be sung, and in some instances the pilgrim might prostrate himself at every step. Societies existed for the conduct of pilgrimages, aiding and directing the pilgrims and sometimes supported by what in effect was compulsory taxation. By a pilgrimage properly performed special merit was believed to be acquired or a vow fulfilled for the healing of the participant or one of his kin.

Many of the numerous religious associations of lay people to be mentioned later had a partially or even purely Buddhist character. Some were vegetarian, requiring their members to abstain from the taking of life, and as a corollary, from eating meat. Some burned incense. A few enjoined celibacy, and others were for the reading of a particular Buddhist writing or for the repetition of a prayer or prayers or of the name of some divinity.

It was, then, not only among the monks and nuns that Buddhism had an influence, but also upon a large proportion of the masses of the nation. Even those who never supported its ceremonies or read its writings were more or less unconsciously influenced by it—possibly in their conceptions of the life after death or in their ethical standards.

## TAOISM

In many ways Taoism was not nearly so vital in the China of the Ch'ing dynasty as was Buddhism. Its organization was not as strong, it was much more encumbered by unintelligent superstition, and there was not as much scholarship in the ranks of its devotees. In many ways it was a slavish imitation of Buddhism. In its priesthood, its canon, with hundreds of volumes written in the form of Buddhist sutras, and in its acceptance of the idea of transmigration and of karma, Taoism had copied the foreign faith. For all that, however, Taoism had a profound influence, an influence which its embodiment of popular superstitions probably strengthened.

As in the case of Buddhism, the only ones who could in the strict sense be termed Taoists were the professionals, or *tao shih*. Some were anchorites who through meditation and ascetic practices sought immortality. Others were celibates living in monastic communities. The number of the latter was much smaller than that of the Buddhist monks and nuns. Like Buddhist monks, they might have entered the community either as children through purchase or the donation of parents, or as adults from weariness of the world, or from the hope of escaping the consequences of a crime, or from the desire for an assured livelihood, or from the longing for immortality and a solution of the riddle of existence. Much more numerous than the celibates were those who married and did not live in communities but in their own homes and who supported their families by fees received for saying services for the dead, writing charms, communicating with the dead through automatic writing, or exorcising evil spirits. Entrance to the ranks of the professionals seems usually to have been through an apprenticeship to some accredited member.

The *tao shih* had a kind of national organization. At its head was one whom foreigners usually called the "Taoist Pope" but who to the Chinese was known by titles sanctioned by the former Emperors—*T'ien*

*Shih* (Heavenly Preceptor), *Chên Chün*, or *Chên Jên*. The *T'ien Shih* claimed descent from Chang Tao-ling, a worthy of the Han dynasty reputed to have been an outstanding expert in Taoism and a master of its alchemy and magic. To the *T'ien Shih* was attributed, among other things, great power over evil spirits, and charms from him were regarded as having extraordinary efficacy in expelling them. The guardian deities of the province and prefecture were supposed to receive their appointment from him. It is said, too, that in each province the *tao shih* had a head man.

Sometimes classified with the Taoists were witches, *wu*, called among other designations *tao nai nai* and *hsien nai nai*, both showing a possible Taoist connection. They were believed to be possessed by familiar spirits, to fall into trances in which they held communication with spirits, and to be able to cure disease by charms or other devices. It seems probable, however, that they had an origin quite independent of and earlier than Taoism and that they ought not strictly to be thought of as belonging to it.

One of the characteristics of Taoism was the means which it prescribed for the achievement of immortality. Here Taoism was much like Buddhism. Primitive Buddhism could hold out hope for salvation only to those who followed the rigorous road of the arhat. Taoism, too, in earlier days offered blissful immortality only to the select few who were willing to pursue the exacting course necessary to its achievement. Even up to the twentieth century there were those who sought to follow this way. The regimen consisted in meditation on Taoist truths, the cultivation of such Taoist attitudes as inaction and placidity, said to be characteristic of the Tao, carefully regulated breathing, diet, discipline, moral living, and partaking of substances supposed to prolong life, such as seeds and resin of evergreens like the pine and fir, products of such other trees and plants as the plum, and certain minerals and jewels: gold, jade, and the pearl. Yet along with the achievement of immortality went a belief in hells, derived from Buddhism. The hells, usually closely resembling their Buddhist prototypes, were often vividly depicted in Taoist temples, and the ceremonies of the *tao shih* were supposed to be potent in obtaining the release from them of luckless souls.

Taoism, too, had its gods. It shared many of them with the state cult, partly because some of them came down from the remote past of China out of which both Taoism and the state religion arose. Its pantheon and iconography were profoundly influenced by Buddhism. The Taoist gods might be honored in temples, the latter probably originally suggested by Buddhist shrines. The highest god of Taoism was usually said to be Yü Huang ("The Jade Emperor" or, less accurately but more commonly in English, "The Pearly Emperor") or Yü Huang Shang Ti. He was, indeed, thought of by many of the masses as the supreme god of all the universe.

The Taoists also had a trinity, the San Ch'ing ("The Three Pure Ones"), possibly suggested by the Buddhist trinities. The persons in this trinity might vary, as they have in those of Buddhism, being sometimes Lao Tzŭ, Yü Huang, and the ancient mythical ruler P'an Ku, or some other combination. Another Taoist trinity called the San Kuan ("The Three Rulers" or "The Three Officials") was variously said to be composed of Heaven, Earth, and Water, and of the three famous legendary (or perhaps mythical) rulers Yao, Shun, and Yü. A god sometimes ranked by the Taoists as the Supreme Being was Yüan Shih T'ien Tsun ("The Original Heavenly Revered One"). There was many another god, sometimes a personified idea, such as T'ai I ("The Great Unity") to whom temples were erected, sometimes a purely mythical being, such as the Goddess of the North Star, and sometimes a deified human being. Then, too, the Taoists talked of Shêng Jên, or Holy Men, who inhabited the highest heaven, of Chên Jên, or Ideal Men, who dwelt in the second heaven, and of Hsien Jên, or Immortals, whose customary home was the third heaven. The Hsien Jên were also said to live in remote corners of the earth, especially on the K'un Lun—in Taoist teaching the central mountains of the world. They were represented as having once been real men, and were supposed to appear at unpredictable intervals to perform deeds of mercy, such as the healing of disease. Eight of the Immortals, the *Pa Hsien*, the lists of whose names varied, were held in especial honor and provided favorite subjects for stories and representations in art.

Taoism possessed a voluminous literature from which extensive selections were published, corresponding roughly to the Buddhist *San Ts'ang*. The *Tao Tê Ching* continued to be a favorite object of study and meditation. Another widely revered work, of which copies were often gratuitously distributed, was the *Kan Ying P'ien* ("Book of Rewards and Punishments"), although it must be added that many Chinese did not connect this with Taoism. In some of this literature a standard of morality was taught which reinforced much of that inculcated by Confucianism and Buddhism.

### THE RELIGION OF THE MAJORITY

The great majority of the Chinese, as we have repeatedly seen, were not exclusively Confucian, Buddhist, or Taoist. They were influenced by all these systems: in ethical standards, in conceptions of the universe and of divine beings, and in beliefs about the future life. However, there was much more than Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism in the religious ideas and practices which prevailed among the majority: the religion of the masses was not just a composite of these three faiths. The additional elements had in them a great deal of animism. Indeed, more than

one foreign observer declared animism the basic and characteristic religion of the Chinese. The religion of the majority also contained much of polytheism—a polytheism augmented by the state cult and by Buddhism and Taoism, but which in its list of deities was much larger than the sum of all three of the other pantheons. There was much of divination and of the observance of lucky and unlucky days. It may also be proper to classify with popular religion the pseudo science, *fêng shui*, although the correctness of this can be challenged.

The belief in spirits, and the attempt to propitiate them or in other ways to control or ward them off, was of great antiquity in China, as in so many other parts of the world. In popular belief *kuei*—evil spirits or demons—are all about us and are of many kinds and shapes. They may have eyes on the tops of their heads. On occasion they may take the forms of animals or even of men and women. A *kuei* may be in a man-eating tiger. Great numbers of stories were told of animals—*kuei*—who could take at will the body of a man or especially of a beautiful woman and in that guise work harm. *Kuei* may be in old trees, or in clothes, in objects of furniture, or in mountains or stones. Leaves driven before the wind may each be a *kuei*. *Kuei* are responsible for all sorts of evils and misfortunes. They lurk in ponds and rivers to draw people in and drown them. Indeed, one theory had it that the *kuei* of a drowned person remains in the place of the tragedy and can obtain release only by luring some hapless wight to a similar fate. The *kuei* of a mother who dies in childbirth, so it was believed, wins surcease from anguish by bringing on some other woman the same demise. Insane persons are controlled by *kuei*. An epidemic of *kuei* may visit a city—in the old days cutting queues and striking people on the streets. By committing suicide a man might, as a *kuei*, haunt the person whom he believed to have hounded him to the act. *Kuei* might be responsible for illnesses of various kinds. They might bring bad crops and famine.

*Kuei* were associated with the *yin* principle of the universe. It will be remembered that for many centuries—just how long is uncertain—the Chinese identified with the *yin* and the *yang* the two elements of the dualism which they regarded as running through all nature. The *yin* and the *yang* pervaded much not only of popular lore but also of the philosophy of the learned. The *yin* stood for Earth, the moon, darkness, evil, and the female sex. On the *yang* side were Heaven, the sun, light, fire, goodness, and the male sex. *Kuei* were, accordingly, supposed to be *yin*. *Kuei* were opposed to *shên*—the latter a name which included the gods—and *shên* were supposed to be associated with the *yang*. According to a widely prevalent conviction, every man, or practically every man, has in him both a *kuei* and a *shên* corresponding to the *yin* and the *yang* which pervade men as they do the rest of nature. At death, so at least one

conception had it, the *shên* goes to the skies while the *kuei* remains earth-bound—patently a source of vast numbers of *kuei.*

Since popular belief insisted that all about us are these *kuei,* usually invisible, but always a potential cause of all kinds of misfortune and evil, it became of the greatest importance to discover and utilize means for warding them off or expelling them. For this there were many devices. Buddhist monks and especially *tao shih* could be called in to exorcise them. For that same purpose the images of gods, particularly of some gods, being *shên* and *yang,* might be carried in procession through the streets or brought to a house. Some of the processions were community undertakings, the cost being defrayed by popular subscription which custom made obligatory. Anything associated with *yang,* or in which the *yang* element is strong, had potency. Firecrackers and gongs could be employed. The cock, as the morning herald of the sun, was regarded highly and his blood and head were utilized. The peach, as one of the earliest trees to bloom in the spring under the impulse of the returning sun, was also esteemed as *yang.* Strong and good men were regarded as full of *yang,* and their pictures or images were believed to put the *kuei* to rout. Officials were supposed to embody the *yang.* Good deeds were a safeguard and passages from the Classics might be recited. Charms might prove effective. Among the latter were papers inscribed, often by a *tao shih,* with magic characters or symbols. They were to be affixed to a door or to some other part of the house, or they could be burned and the ashes mixed in water and drunk. Amulets were carried, perhaps made of the stone or wood of the peach, and in manufacturing beds peach wood was often employed. Mirrors could be worn on the forehead, especially of a child, the theory apparently being that a *kuei,* approaching with evil intent and seeing the reflection of its own ugly face, would be frightened away. Copper cash strung together in the form of a sword might be effective. Certain written characters were supposed to be particularly efficacious in insuring well-being. Among those frequently employed were *fu,* which may be translated as happiness or good fortune, and *shou* (longevity).

The customs concerned with the *kuei* might be described at great length, for they entered extensively into the folklore and life of the masses. For the average man they were probably fully as important as the more highly rationalized and organized systems of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism.

A belief in certain mythical creatures had a large place in the popular mind. These did not belong exclusively in the field of religion but at times were objects of reverence and even worship. The *Lung,* or "dragon," was the most familiar. He was regarded as benevolent and was associated with the *yang* and with rain, clouds, and water. As the *Lung Wang,* or

"dragon king," the *Lung* was very widely worshiped and temples were built to him. There was also the *Fêng-huang (Fêng* being the male and *Huang* the female), usually called in English the phoenix, a creature some times described as having the head of a hen, the eye of a man, the neck of a serpent, the viscera of a locust, the brow of a swallow, the back of a tortoise, and a tail like that of a fish but with twelve feathers. It was said that from time to time in Chinese history it had shown itself, usually as the harbinger of some political event. It was full of *yang*. Then there was the *Ch'i-lin, Ch'i* being the male and *Lin* the female. Like the *Fêng-huang,* in appearance it presented a somewhat bizarre composite of several creatures. Because of its single horn, it is generally called in English the unicorn. It was believed to be gentle by disposition and as a rule to be seen only in times of good monarchs. With the *Fêng-huang* it was held to have a good deal to do with the coming of children and the popular regard for it rested largely upon this phase of its activity. All three—the *Lung,* the *Fêng-huang,* and the *Ch'i-lin*—came down from very early historic and possibly from prehistoric times and so were long intimately connected with the Chinese mind.

The Chinese had a great many divinities which did not, strictly speaking, belong to any one of the three major cults, although, with the eclecticism and syncretism so characteristic of China, they could be appropriated by any or all of them. Some were probably of purely native origin, others were possibly importations, and still others probably were originally local gods in non-Chinese territory but were adopted by the Chinese as the latter extended their domains. Their name was legion, and even to attempt to enumerate them all would not only prolong this chapter unduly but would result in an incomplete list. Many of them had only a local vogue, and the representations of and stories about others varied from place to place. Paper representations of them were popular and had an extensive sale. Among a few that may be mentioned were the Kitchen God (practically universal in the home), the Fire God, the God of Wealth, the God of Medicine, the Goddess of Smallpox, gods adopted as patrons by various crafts and guilds, and a god who was supposed to protect fields against insects, and who, accordingly, could be invoked to drive away locusts. Many of them were represented as historic personages, deified in the course of later generations. In some parts of the country peculiar trees or stones were worshiped.

This account may leave the impression that the religion of the majority was chaotic, uncritical, and an inconsistent jumble of beliefs and practices of varying origins. This is in part correct. Along with all the diversity, however, went a widespread feeling of unity—that the world, both seen and unseen, is after all a universe, and that there is one Power or Being who ultimately controls it and to whom appeal may be made. In the will of

this One, conceived of as righteous, there was a good deal of quiet trust. This One was believed, in the long run, to even up the inequalities of life, in an individual or group, averaging the bitter with the sweet. For example, the High God of the people, known and revered all over China as *T'ien Lao Yeh,* or *Lao T'ien Fo Yeh,* or *Lao T'ien Yeh,* personalized Heaven, God, or Providence. Moreover, there was a good deal of determinism in the popular mind, a kind of fatalism which bowed calmly to the inevitable, conceived of more or less dimly as the will of the inscrutable Power which governs the affairs of men.

FÊNG SHUI

Whether, as has been said, the set of beliefs and practices called *fêng shui*—literally, wind and water—should be classified under religion may be a matter of debate. Whatever its pigeonhole in an orderly account, it played an important part in Chinese life.

*Fêng shui* was based upon the belief that in every locality forces exist which act on graves, buildings, cities, and towns, either for the welfare or the ill of the quick and the dead. The object of *fêng shui,* therefore, was to discover the sites where the beneficent influences predominated, or so to alter, by artificial means, the surroundings of existing sites that the same happy results could be achieved. To attain these ends advice was sought from specialists in *fêng shui.*

Among the factors with which *fêng shui* reckoned were the *yang* and the *yin;* the *ch'i* (sometimes translated breath) pervading the universe and of which there might be two divisions, the *t'ien ch'i,* or *ch'i* of Heaven, and the *ti ch'i,* or *ch'i* of Earth; the four creatures—the azure dragon, the white tiger, the black tortoise, and the red bird—associated with the four quarters of the heaven; wind (bearing water or drought); and the five traditional elements (metal, earth, fire, water, and wood), especially water. When it came to the actual choice of a site, experts in *fêng shui* often differed widely as to the worth of a particular locality—a lack of agreement which the skeptical held up to derision. There appear, however, to have been some general principles upon which the decision was supposed to be made. An ideal site is protected on the north (from which the *yin* comes), is open to the south (associated with the *yang*), has water flowing in such a way as partly to encircle it but not so directly away from it as to drain off the good influences, and possesses some natural feature, such as a hill or hummock, in the direction of the dragon (on the east or left) stronger than that of the tiger (on the west or right). Some natural object, such as a hill, or some building, especially a high building, in front of a site—even some distance away—could do serious damage. A straight road, such as a railway, could work much harm by permitting

the good influences to drain away. On the other hand, an otherwise unpropitious site could be improved by such devices as a pool, a hummock of earth, a pagoda, charms, or the picture of a dragon.

*Fêng shui* was especially used in determining the locations for interments. Stories abounded of families that had been ruined because the grave of an ancestor had an unfavorable *fêng shui* and of others that prospered because of a fortunate location of ancestral remains. Whole cities, too, were said to have had their fortunes improved by the construction of a pagoda on expert advice, and a neighborhood to have been badly damaged by some high building or flagpole, such as Westerners were wont to erect.

## DIVINATION AND FORTUNE-TELLING

It is probably also debatable whether such activities as divination, fortune-telling, and the discovery of lucky and unlucky days should be grouped under religion. Here, again, whatever their relations, they were long prominent in Chinese life.

Each individual was supposed to have his fate in part determined by the year, month, day, and hour, or simply the year, month, and day, on which he was born. Each of these was indicated by a certain combination or one of the ten "heavenly stems" and the twelve "earthly branches." The result was either eight or six characters which must be consulted by the fortune-teller in determining such matters as betrothals. There were lucky and unlucky days for marriages and funerals, for commencing building operations, or for beginning a journey. Among the many factors that could be taken into consideration in determining whether and when to enter upon a particular course of action were the five elements, the animals supposed to be identified with the twelve "earthly branches," and combinations of the two, the calendar with its lucky and unlucky days (formerly published by imperial authority), the *pa kua* (eight trigrams) which form the basis of the *I Ching* and which from prehistoric times had been utilized by diviners, and the *I Ching* itself. There were many ways of fortune-telling —among them the inspection of the physiognomy, the choice of a slip of paper by a bird and the interpretation of the picture or characters on the slip by the soothsayer, and the casting of lots by any one of several devices.

## RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES

Societies with a religious purpose were one of the most interesting features of Chinese life. Often they were secret—partly because proscribed by the state—and many had a political or social objective in

addition to their religious purpose. Some were very widespread and powerful and broke out into violent uprisings. They were often syncretic, combining Buddhist, Taoist, Confucian, and occasionally in later years, Christian elements. Some of them insisted upon a high standard of morality for their members, and often those in which Buddhism predominated required vegetarianism and were the expression of an earnest religious quest. Among the many societies were the *Pailien Chiao,* or White Lotus (or Lily) Society, which incorporated religious elements but was primarily political and repeatedly gave rise to rebellions; the *Tsai-li Chiao,* which forbade to its members opium, wine, and tobacco, but not meat, and which took over many Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian features, but was also suspected of being the *Pailien Chiao* under another name; the *Hsien-t'ien Chiao*, or Preceding Heaven Society, which discouraged ancestor worship and idolatry, exacted of its members a pledge to keep the five commandments of Buddhism, including that against the taking of life, and met in small groups for the reading or recitation of Buddhist texts; the *Chin-tan Chiao,* which made much of universal love and the immortality of the soul; and the *Shên Chiao,* also called the *Wu Chiao,* or Sect of the Magicians, which sought to expel *kuei* and to perform acts of magic. Some of them endured for centuries and others had a very short existence. In the fore part of the twentieth century a good many were founded, flourished for a time, and then waned. Among them were the *Tao Yüan*, for the cultivation of the inner life, the reception of messages through the planchette, and philanthropic activities, and the *Tao-tê-hsüeh Shê,* which sought to unify all religions, revered the God of All Religions, and met weekly for worship and lectures.

## MOHAMMEDANISM

Outside the main stream of Chinese religious life, forming separate religious communities, are the Moslems. In previous chapters we have seen something of the history of Islam in China—that it first entered in the T'ang but made a very slight impression, and that it became much stronger under the Yüan, thanks largely to foreign soldiers and commanders of that faith who were introduced by the Mongol rulers. During the Yüan it established itself especially in Yünnan, through Moslem commanders. It came in from two directions—brought by way of the sea by merchants to the coast ports, particularly in the South, and overland through the Northwest by Moslems from Central Asia and Sinkiang. Moslems increased greatly under the Ch'ing, perhaps because of the conquest by that dynasty of so much of the West, where they abounded.

Just how many Moslems there are today in China is uncertain. Conjectures have ranged all the way from three to eighty millions. What

appear to be conservative estimates place the total somewhere between four and ten millions, the true number seeming to be more nearly the latter than the former figure. Moslems are to be found in every province, but are most numerous in Sinkiang and in the North and West of China proper, particularly, as might be expected from their history, in Yünnan, Sinkiang, Hopei, and Kansu.

By their fellow Chinese, Moslems are regarded as a distinct and separate group, like the Mongols or the Manchus. They are most frequently called the *Hui-hui,* a name of debatable origin, but possibly derived from Uighur. This classification as a distinct race is not without justification. Some of the Moslems show clearly in their features their non-Chinese ancestry. The majority speak Chinese, but often with some dialectical differences from non-Moslems. Some, too, have followed distinctive occupations. Butchers and leather-workers have often been Moslems. However, the cleavage is by no means always distinct. Many converts have come from among the Chinese, partly through the adoption by Moslems of Chinese children, partly through intermarriage, and partly through adult Chinese entering the faith under the influence of Moslem officials and of army officers who had command over them. Nor are occupational and dialectical differences always apparent. The process of assimilation by which the Chinese have absorbed so many other alien elements has been at work.

In religious practices Moslems largely preserve their separation from those of the Chinese about them and maintain those common to their fellow believers in other lands. Usually they do not use pork and tend to abstain from opium, and probably to a less extent, from alcoholic drinks. They repeat the creed, fast during the month of Ramadan, give alms to their own poor, and some few of them make the pilgrimage to Mecca. They refrain from the use of idols and maintain their own worship, in Arabic (although occasionally in Chinese) in mosques. The mosques show the influence of Arab architecture.

Yet even in their religious life the Moslems show marked effects of their Chinese environment. Usually they are not at all fanatical. As a rule only their religious leaders and teachers pray five times a day. Generally, too, it is only those who understand Arabic. In many Moslem families abstention from pork remains the one distinctive practice. A large proportion of the mosques are without minarets and as a rule the public call to prayer is omitted. Occasionally Moslems have made contributions to pagan observances, such as community processions in which images are carried through the streets. They may use incense in their services. Those who served under the old regime often participated in the religious ceremonies of the state cult which formed part of the duties of their office. Even Mohammed was represented as a sage of the Confucian type and as conforming to the Confucian virtues.

CHANGES WROUGHT BY THE COMING OF THE OCCIDENT

These, then, are the main outlines of the religious life of the Chinese on the eve of the impact of the Occident. That impact produced profound changes.

Very important was the growing influence of Christianity. The presence in China of thousands of Christian foreign missionaries, Roman Catholic and Protestant—with a very few from the Russian Orthodox Church—was one of the outstanding features of the invasion of the West. In every province missionaries were to be found, and in almost every important city and in many villages churches were erected, schools organized, and hospitals or dispensaries maintained. Manifold philanthropies were undertaken and Christian literature was broadcast. In 1949 the number of professed Christians, while above the three million mark, was less than one per cent of the total population and was not an adequate measure of the effects of the missionary enterprise. On the eve of the Communist mastery of the mainland the percentage of Christians, especially of Protestants, prominent in the life of the nation, particularly in politics and education, was far out of proportion to the size of the Chinese church. Through men like Sun Yat-sen, educated at the hands of missionaries and an avowed Christian, in the shaping of the new China Christianity exercised an influence which was impossible to measure accurately and yet was certainly very great. The new medical profession owed its foundations chiefly to Protestant missions, and leadership in modern education, especially higher education, was long largely in Christian hands.

Yet upon the religious life, in the strict sense of that term, of the great masses of non-Christians, Christianity made but slight impress. Here and there a society which sought to syncretize the various faiths included Christianity in its purview. In Shansi an organization officially sponsored by the "Model Governor," Yen Hsi-shan, as a substitute for the former state cult as a means of inculcating virtue, strikingly displayed the influence of Christianity. The New Life Movement, endorsed by Chiang Kai-shek, arose in part at Christian suggestion. Some of the methods of the Kuomintang youth corps were taken over from Christians. The impact of Christianity was to some degree responsible for the decay of the older forms of polytheism and animism. Undoubtedly there existed imponderable consequences of Christianity which defied measurement. But the fact remained that Christianity did not have such large results in religion outside the boundaries of its organization as it had in some other phases of China's life. In these other phases—education, philanthropy, public health, physical education, medicine, and moral and social reform—Christianity was probably the most potent of the religious factors in China at the time of the Communist conquest.

Another result of the coming of the West, as we have seen, was that the state religion and with it Confucianism disintegrated. Within the brief compass of less than a decade the abandonment of the civil service examinations, followed by the collapse of the monarchy, removed two of their strongest supports. Various attempts were made to bolster the old system. The new curricula for the schools, adopted by the state under the Republic, included attention to the classical books on Confucianism. For a time sporadic attempts were made to revive the state sacrifices that had lapsed. Yüan Shih-k'ai, for instance, resumed the annual ceremonies on the Altar of Heaven in Peking. For a time, too, much was made of Kuan Yü by the military authorities. For several years private associations of scholars maintained the accustomed ritual in many of the Confucian temples. Vainly as it proved, an effort was made to win for Confucianism adoption as the official cult of the Republic.

Buddhism showed some resilience. Thanks partly to impulses from Japan, where Buddhism was not so nearly moribund as in China, for a few years Chinese Buddhism displayed movements which sought to purify and revive it. Many monasteries and temples were renovated; Buddhist societies were organized; much effort was expended in circulating literature; the ordination of monks was continued; and popular lectures were delivered. The outstanding leader was the able and earnest T'ai Hsü.

With the coming of the Republic, China experienced a widespread movement away from religion. Some of this was due to a general reaction against old forms and beliefs, which is inevitable when a great group of mankind departs from its past. Much of it was to be accounted for by contacts with the religious skepticism and indifference of the modern Occident. Among its leading exponents were returned students from the West. Some of it was a continuation of the native religious skepticism which had such a long history. Much of the neglect of religion was due to the disintegration of the social and political institutions and the intellectual patterns with which religion had been associated. Some was a concomitant of the destruction wrought by civil strife and foreign invasion.

Opposition to religion came in waves. One of these, at the inception of the Republic, was directed primarily against the native cults. Another, in 1922, was chiefly anti-Christian. Still another came with the rise to power of the Kuomintang, was especially sponsored by the radical elements of that party, and was prominently but by no means entirely anti-Christian.

More subtle than open opposition but no less destructive to religion was an indifference which arose from the tacit assumption that the real goods of life are to be won by other than religious means. In this again China was conforming to the climate of opinion in much of the modern West.

The movement away from religion affected all faiths, although in varying degrees. During the fighting of 1926 and 1927, troops occupied many of the buildings belonging to Christian missions. Most of these were later evacuated. The physical equipment of other faiths did not fare so well. Beginning at least as early as the Revolution of 1911–1912, religious properties of various kinds were secularized. The diversion of temples to nonreligious purposes greatly increased with the political disturbances and antireligious movement of 1926–1927 and the years immediately thereafter. Some temples simply disappeared. Others were used as schools or barracks. Still others became apartment houses, rice markets, rickshaw stands, or auto terminals. In many the images of the gods were allowed to remain with a few priests to serve them, although most of the building was secularized. In one provincial capital, by 1931 out of one hundred seventy-five temples examined only three were being used exclusively for worship and only one temple had been erected within three years. In some other sections a revival of religious interest came after 1927 or 1928 and expressed itself in part in the repair or building of temples. In many districts most of the customs were observed much as they have been for generations. The traditional religious practices persisted, especially in rural areas. It was in the cities and among the intellectuals that they were most weakened.

*Fêng shui* suffered with the influx of Western ideas and practices. Railways and highways were constructed, streets widened and straightened, graves removed and placed in common cemeteries, and telephone and telegraph poles placed and high buildings erected in utter disregard of its principles.

The Communist domination of the mainland hastened the retreat of traditional religion. Although in theory the People's Republic of China tolerated religion so long as it did not interfere with the Communist program, Communism was frankly atheistic and regarded religion as "the opiate of the people." More and more the Communists sought to weaken and ultimately eradicate religion. We have seen (Chap. XIII) its determined effort to cut off all ties between Christians and their fellow believers in the non-Communist world. When these lines were penned the Communists were apparently intent on slowly strangling the Christian churches. To them Confucianism was "feudal" and anathema. They confiscated the endowments of Buddhist and Taoist temples and of the ancestral temples, for in the old China these had customarily been in land. Like the possessions of the landlords, they were distributed among the farmers. Some of the land was given to monks to cultivate. Monks and nuns were required to take up what the Communists defined as useful labor. A few Buddhist temples in Peking and elsewhere were maintained and even repaired, presumably in an effort to ingratiate the Communists with the Buddhist

peoples of Southeast Asia. Some effort was put forth to preserve and restore ancient Buddhist shrines and structures as cultural monuments. In 1953 the Chinese Buddhist Association was organized as a means of remolding Buddhism to conform to the government's program and to obtain the co-operation of Buddhists. Buddhist welfare enterprises were taken over by the state. Buddhist periodicals were greatly reduced in number and circulation. The state cult had disappeared before the Communist stage of the revolution. The Communists discredited the popular cults and the latter withered. Islam proved more resistant and survived.

In the territory held by the Republic of China and in Hong Kong some of the older religious beliefs and practices survived, but in weakened remnants. Christianity made gains, but only among minorities.

Both in pre-Communist and Communist stages of the revolution brought by the impact of the West the Chinese seemed to be moving away from religion.

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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

# Social Life and Organization

One of the outstanding characteristics of Chinese civilization has been its emphasis upon social relations. Chinese philosophy, as we have seen, had as a leading objective the achievement and maintenance of an orderly society. Confucianism, so long dominant in the state and in the intellectual and moral life of the Empire, laid great stress upon right relations among human beings. In the course of the centuries the Chinese developed many institutions and customs to conserve and perpetuate society, to give protection to individuals, and to facilitate the intercourse of the many millions who have formed the population of the Empire. The most extensive of these organizations, the government, has been described in a previous chapter. Some others, especially the guilds, have also been portrayed. It remains to give an account of institutions which thus far have been only mentioned. It would also seem to be in place to associate with these some of the customs and principles of social intercourse and some of the features of collective life, such as recreation and holidays, which are not readily grouped elsewhere.

It must be said at the outset that it is difficult and in many instances quite impossible to formulate generalizations that will prove applicable to all China. In spite of the tendency to uniformity throughout the country, amazing for so huge a mass of mankind, almost any statement may prove to be untrue for a particular locality. This is especially the case today, for one must reckon not only with the variations that formerly existed but also with the changes induced by the coming of the Occident, and which have by no means uniformly affected different districts and classes. What, therefore, may be a correct description of one community may not fit elsewhere and what may be an accurate picture of one class or individual may be quite inappropriate for another.

## THE FAMILY

The basic and most characteristic Chinese institution has been the family. The family constitutes an outstanding feature of the life of every nation. Among the Chinese, however, it has been emphasized more than among most peoples. Until the Communist triumph, it had a leading part in economic life, in social control, in moral education, and in government. The members of a family were supposed to stand by one

another. The indigent and the aged were expected to be cared for by their more prosperous and younger relatives. To a greater or less extent the family performed the functions which in the modern Occident are associated with sickness and unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and life insurance. Magistrates held the entire family responsible for the conduct of its members. The family was looked upon as a model for the government, and the state was thought of as a large family. Moral education was given largely through the family, and the leading although not the only motives appealed to were family affection, loyalty, and pride. Through the rites in honor of ancestors the family was an important religious unit.

This emphasis upon the family went back to remote ages. In historic times much of it was due to Confucianism, for this school made much of the institution and of the duties of relatives to one another. The organization of the family, however, did not remain constant through the centuries, but underwent important modifications, apparently in pre-Han times especially, before Confucianism became dominant. We can take the space only to describe the main outlines of the family system as it was on the eve of the great changes brought about by the Occident.

Under the term family were included various types of organization. There was what might be called the small family, made up of husband, wife, and children. In the fore part of the twentieth century it was not much if any larger than the corresponding unit in the Occident. Also as in the West it was not uncommon for such a group to live by itself as a distinct household, although perhaps with one or more servants and relatives as additional members. More generally than in the Occident, however, the family was much larger. Several smaller families might dwell together under one roof or in one enclosure and have a common life. Here four generations could sometimes be found: great-grandparents with their sons, daughters-in-law, grandsons, granddaughters-in-law, and great-grandchildren. In this case each of the smaller units might preserve a certain amount of individual identity, with its own bedrooms and kitchen, but inevitably there was a degree of community life, with a head of the whole, possibly a common ancestral hall, and—although this was not uniform—a common purse. The head of such a family might have autocratic power. The leadership normally passed to the eldest son, but by common consent it could be entrusted to the son adjudged most worthy. Elders, including a widowed mother or grandmother, could exert marked influence. Such large family groups were found especially in rural areas but were by no means unknown in towns and cities. Frequently a whole village was made up of those claiming descent from one male ancestor, and its members bore the same surname.

In a community composed of blood relations the village government

might be purely a family matter, the family elder being the chairman of the village assembly, and other offices going to various branches of the family in turn. In these circumstances the public endowments used for such objects as the maintenance of roads and schools were to all intents and purposes family possessions.

Moreover, still larger groups existed, made up of those tracing their descent from one progenitor, having a common patronymic, perhaps united through an ancestral temple, but not necessarily living in one community or even in the same province.

The two latter types, and especially the last, were sometimes denominated clans, but from the standpoint of scientific exactitude the definitions of this term differ so greatly that the word must be used with caution. Each "clan" was, in turn, made up of smaller family groups.

The cohesion of the groups usually varied inversely with the size, but even in the largest there was often a strength of co-operation, social control, and community feeling unknown in the corresponding units of the modern West.

Of the three characters which usually make up a Chinese name, the one designating the family was written first, the second was frequently identical for all cousins of the same generation, and the third was peculiar to the individual. Sometimes the third character rather than the second was common to the same generation. Not infrequently the individual had only a second character in addition to his patronymic. It may be added that a Chinese male generally bore a cognomen given him in infancy and a number of other designations, bestowed on him or assumed by him from time to time in a manner often most confusing to the foreigner. Placing the family name first, rather than the "given name" as in the West, may indicate the manner in which in the old China the family was exalted, in contrast with the individualism of the Occident.

It must also be noted that a large number of terms were in use corresponding to uncle, aunt, cousin, and the like, for the many degrees of relationship. These likewise are often most mystifying to the Westerners.

The family was not of uniform strength throughout China. Nor were the forms and customs associated with it everywhere the same. In the North, for example, the "clan" was not, on the whole, as powerful as in the South. Then, too, even before contact with the Occident brought the startling changes of the past decades with their many variations from older mores, some other differences existed. However, while uniformity was not complete, customs and ideals tended to be the same the country over. The almost universal acceptance of Confucianism operated powerfully in this direction, for Confucian standards of family ethics and relationships were regarded as authoritative, and customs contained in the classical books which Confucianism so highly esteemed were thought of as normal.

The ties binding the family together were many. So numerous and so strong were they that it is not strange that the family was prominent. First of all, the family exercised certain important functions. Through it were perpetuated the honors to ancestors stressed by Confucianism and ancient custom. Upon the maintenance of these ceremonies was believed to depend the welfare of the dead and the living. The family, too, constituted a kind of mutual protective association. China has been a nation in which the individual has found it difficult to stand alone. In a keenly competitive society organized by groups the man who attempted to make his way unassisted was more likely than not to be crushed. The family was the most widely spread of these groups. It was especially adapted to rural areas and to the villages and small towns whose affiliations with the soil were very close. Since China was predominantly agricultural, it is not surprising that the family was prominent. In the larger cities it was not so outstanding, and other forms of association, such as the guild, tended to take over some of its functions. When, as was often the case, a family rose to importance in an urban center, not infrequently it continued rooted in the soil through membership in a "clan" whose seat was in the country, or through possession of the favorite form of investment, farming lands. In the North, where the larger family, or "clan," generally was not as prominent as in the South, secret societies—another form of mutual protection—flourished. The family also often exercised some of the functions that in the modern Occident are performed by the government, such as the settlement of disputes among its members, relief of the poor, and the maintenance of schools. In many instances, as we have said, the village government itself was a family affair.

Ethical concepts contributed to the strength of the family. Of the five relations emphasized by traditional moral standards and reinforced by Confucianism—those between prince and minister, father and son, older brother and younger brother, husband and wife, and friend and friend—three were in the family. *Hsiao*, usually translated as "filial piety," was exalted by Confucianism as one of the cardinal virtues. While it included much more than the family, loyalty to one's parents was part of its essence. *Hsiao* seems not to have been stressed in early Confucianism. It came to prominence in the Former Han and was given currency by examples in widely told stories and in art. Older brothers had obligations to younger brothers, and younger brothers owed deference to older brothers. That official Confucian tract of the Ch'ing dynasty, the so-called *Sacred Edict,* was true to tradition when it made family duties primary and urged, as a motive toward self-control and a righteous life, not allegiance to God but to one's parents.

In such a society, the institution of marriage was of major importance. Sons were so indispensable in carrying on the family line and in maintain-

ing the honors to ancestors that failure to have them was regarded as a serious offense against filial piety. Without sons the rites to parents could not be continued, and not only would the living be disgraced, but the spirits of the dead, deprived of such service, would be in misery. Marriage, accordingly, was practically universal except for a few of the very poor and such special groups as Buddhist monks and nuns and Taoist ascetics. Even some of these had been married before entering the religious life. As soon as possible, sons were supposed to beget sons to maintain family honor and assure parents of a continuation of the line and of proper reverence to themselves after death.

Since marriage was so largely for the purpose of perpetuating the family and the ancestral rites, the mating of couples was regarded as a concern of the elders and of the family even more than of the two most immediately involved. Betrothals were arranged by the head or other members of the family, perhaps the oldest brother, and not infrequently as a result of consultation among the more influential relatives. Generally the prospective bride and groom had no voice in the arrangement and had not even seen each other until the wedding day. Betrothals were often made when the children were very small, and they could not easily be broken. They were almost as binding as marriage. In the majority of instances they were negotiated through go-betweens. As a rule they were contracts with provisions about property, such as the gifts which were to pass between the two families, and the amount of furniture and clothing which the bride was to bring with her. Usually, too, the gifts from the groom's family were supposed to pay for the bride's equipment. A wealthy father might refuse gifts from the groom's family and send his daughter to marriage with property which her husband was to manage but which was to be used toward the support of her children, and the unconsumed balance of which was to go to them after her death. In the case of the poor, the betrothed girl might go to her future husband's home as a servant, her parents being thus relieved of her support. A marriage could not be contracted between persons of the same surname, even though no blood relationship existed. Provided patronymics were different, a marriage could be entered into between near relatives—for example, between a girl and the son of her father's sister. Some types of consanguineous marriages, however, were forbidden. For instance, even distant relatives could not marry if they belonged to different generations. Often two influential families were allied to each other by marriage generation after generation. Usually parents attempted to obtain for a son a wife from a family of equal or superior social standing and wealth.

Through marriage the bride became a member of her husband's family. She was taken to her husband's home for the wedding ceremony, and part of the rite consisted in an obeisance by the two before the groom's ancestral

tablets. The two made a return visit to her home where they did reverence to the tablets of her family's ancestors, and soon after the wedding she made a ceremonial visit to her old home. Her relatives, too, might bring pressure to bear upon her husband's kinfolk if she was treated with marked injustice. For better or for worse, however, a wife was linked with her husband's family. She was especially subject to her husband's mother. While that rule might prove salutary, particularly in view of the immaturity of the bride, her need of guidance and control, and the necessity of having a recognized arbiter in households that might include the wives and children of several sons, mothers-in-law could be tyrannical and make bitter the lot of their daughters-in-law.

A husband might divorce his wife for certain specific causes: failure to bear him a male heir, neglect of his parents, a shrewish tongue, theft, jealousy, an incurable disease, and adultery. But restrictions placed by law made divorce, in practice, very rare. A wife could not divorce her husband, and divorce by her husband was regarded as deep disgrace. In case she had living blood relatives with considerable influence, they might prevent a divorce—perhaps often more from the fear of loss of "face" or of having to support her than from affection. The divorced husband might remarry, but the divorced wife seldom if ever could do so. Both widows and widowers might remarry, but it was considered a virtue for a widow not to do so. Then, too, a widow with sons occupied in the household a position of especial importance and usually was not tempted to sacrifice it, except because of poverty, by venturing again upon matrimony.

A man could have only one legal wife. However, he might take as many concubines as he wished and could afford. Concubinage was, therefore, frequent among the well-to-do. It seems to have been most common in the families of merchants, at least in some localities. On occasion officials were dismissed for concubinage. One of two motives were usually responsible for the acquisition of a concubine: a man might take one in case his wife failed to bear him a son or in case his wife's sons died, or, his marriage having been a matter of family convenience and having failed to result in binding love, he might acquire concubines because of their personal attractiveness. Sometimes a husband took one or more of his wife's sisters as concubines. As a rule, however, concubines were from families socially and economically inferior to that of the wife. Many had been prostitutes and in that capacity first attracted the attention of their future spouse. Sometimes a concubine might be held largely as a servant. To prevent the coming of a rival, a wife without male children might bring about the adoption of a son. However, concubinage, while by no means uncommon, was practiced only in a small minority of families. The approximately equal number of men and women in the population and the poverty of the vast majority would have militated against it even had

public opinion been altogether favorable. Promiscuity was far more common among all classes—among the humbler with women of neighbors' families, among the prosperous with paid prostitutes.

The dissensions and jealousies that frequently accompany concubinage were familiar features of Chinese households, even though the first and legal wife was recognized as mistress. However, a man might maintain entirely separate establishments in different places for his wife and each concubine, and if all were housed within one enclosure each woman usually had her distinct apartment and perhaps a separate menage. An able concubine could exert a good deal of influence, especially if she bore a son and if she had her own establishment in which she was undisputed mistress. Usually, however, she was regarded by the community with a certain amount of contempt, and often there was a feeling that apology must be made for her. Concubinage was often regarded as the result of moral weakness on the part of the husband or as a misfortune.

As has been suggested, adoption was frequently practiced as a means of continuing the family line and perpetuating the honors to ancestors. A device by no means unknown was to take a male child into the family after the death of an unmarried son, to go through the form of marrying the deceased son to a living bride, or perhaps to a dead bride, and then to regard the adopted child as the son of the departed. In this manner the family line could be maintained unbroken and the deceased be provided with an heir to carry on the rites in his honor.

As in all other nations, family life in practice had both its lights and its shadows. In many homes the pressure of convention and the fear of public opinion kept an outward semblance of unity, but no love existed between husband and wife, the husband was tyrannical and the wife a dispirited patient drudge, or the wife was a termagant and luckless daughters-in-law led a life little better than slavery. There were homes into which the husband brought concubine after concubine, adding a fresh one as his passion cooled toward the last, where children grew up undisciplined and high ideals were ignored. The arranging of marriages by the elders without consultation with the couple immediately concerned led to unhappy situations in which the husband and wife at best never more than tolerated each other and at the worst lived continuously at swords' points. The practical universality of marriage forced some, as an alternative to an unhappy and socially maladjusted celibacy, into an unfortunate union, perhaps with a physically or mentally defective mate. The communal holding of property by large families often led to continuous friction, and the division of the property, when finally effected, frequently left an aftermath of bitterness. When families made up of several smaller ones lived together in one homestead, friction between brothers, between sisters-in-law, and between children was almost inevitable. Moreover, not

infrequently filial piety was scarcely rendered even lip service and parents were neglected. The family was by no means always stable. In the case of the very poor, a famine or some other economic calamity might scatter its members. Civil or foreign war might lay waste whole provinces and annihilate or break up homes. The death of a parent, especially of the father, could have something of the same effect. Among poorer families, daughters might be sold into what is little better than slavery, or even into prostitution.

On the other hand, there were many homes in which husband and wife held each other in profound respect and deep affection. In a society in which boys and girls were prepared by their rearing to expect their elders to arrange for their mating, and in which education, especially of the girl, fitted each to fulfill his or her part in wedded life, the existence of happy homes is not surprising. Moreover, parents with the affection for their children which has existed in China, probably more frequently than otherwise sought suitable and happy matches for their offspring. Filial piety, too, had innumerable worthy exponents. The loyalty of sons to parents and their solicitude for them in times of adversity—as, for example, when a humble peasant, a famine refugee, was found carrying an aged father or mother on his back, wandering from *hsien* to *hsien* in search of food—was fortunately a commonplace. In normal circumstances parents enjoyed a serene old age, honored by all, with their descendants about them, and tenderly cared for as declining years brought physical weakness. In many a homestead successive generations cultivated or supervised the cultivation of the broad acres of a landed estate, children were taught to obey the Confucian standards, and intermarriages made ties with similar families on neighboring estates. From these homes for generations sons went forth into the public service, winning degrees in the examinations and achieving creditable official careers, and to them they retired in old age for a few quiet years before they were gathered to their fathers, confident that their memory would be kept green by their descendants and their record emulated. In these households choice libraries were gathered and transmitted and works of art were collected. Frequently they had establishments in the city, shut off by high protecting walls from the noise and dirt of the narrow streets. Often such a family for a century or more maintained traditions of scholarship and refinement, combined with devotion to the welfare of the Empire and of the local community.

Some urban families largely lost direct contact with rural life, but the majority kept their roots in the soil. The Chinese family seems to have been made possible largely by settled agriculture. Certainly it owed much of its strength to the fact that China's economy was predominantly rural. The sentimental tie to the ancestral seat was very strong: in thousands of instances those whose immediate progenitors had lived for a generation

or more in another province still reckoned themselves as belonging to the province and the *hsien* of their forefathers.

It must not be thought that even the best Chinese families escaped entirely the vicissitudes which in other lands have brought sorrow and disintegration. Here, as elsewhere, sons proved unworthy of the high traditions of their line, families with honorable records died out through the vices and dissipations of younger members, financial and political reverses came, and the storm of domestic or foreign war uprooted, pauperized, and swept away the substantial elements of whole districts. The family, however, displayed a remarkable ability to survive. Where else in the world is there a grave like that of Confucius, dating back into the middle of the first millennium before Christ and through the centuries cared for by one claiming lineal descent from that far-off ancestor? Probably in no other country did so large a proportion of the population take pride in maintaining its genealogical records and profess to trace them from so remote an antiquity.

Manifestly an institution as strong and universal as the Chinese family could not fail to influence profoundly the ideals and life of the nation. As we have seen, the state was in part molded by it and was itself regarded as a huge family, with the Emperor and his officials *in loco parentis* to the multitude. In theory the people were to be treated by their political superiors as children in a well regulated household whose bonds were those of affection and duty, were to be reasoned with, and were to have force applied to them only as a last resort. The family made for the rapid multiplication of the population. The premium on male progeny, universal marriage, and early wedlock, with the corresponding short interval between generations, encouraged a high birth rate. Given the absence of modern sanitation and medicine and the frequency of wars, this was probably an advantage. Population tended to come back quickly after an epidemic, a famine, or a war. With the removal of any one of these checks, however, the high birth rate could become a distinct disadvantage. The family, too, was a conservative institution. Ruled by its elders, it upheld the ideals of the past and tended to transmit the customs and standards of former generations. Manifestly this had both advantages and disadvantages. It was a safeguard against disintegration and decay, but it discouraged change, even when change meant improvement. Along with the political organization of the Empire and its maintenance of Confucian orthodoxy, the family was a chief factor making for a relatively static civilization. The family, moreover, discouraged individualism. Chinese life, as we have seen, was in groups of many kinds, each of which exercised a restraining influence upon its members. Of these none was quite so strong the country over as the family. The contrast between the individualism of the modern Occident and the lack of it in the old China is striking. In China the individual did not

make his own decisions. With so much of life confined to and controlled by the family, adjustment to the established group and to its opinion was the supreme requirement. It was not abstract right, of which the individual was the judge and for which he was ultimately responsible, but expediency which governed action. The family was a major obstacle in adopting and making effective in China some of the institutions of the modern Occident. For example, loyalty to the family stood in the way of operating efficiently such typical Western devices as the stock company and a strong government. The traditional ethics which stressed devotion to one's family often made it seem natural and moral for an official in a business concern to bring into lucrative positions as many of his relatives as possible, regardless of whether they were fitted for them. It also made it seem right to use public office to restore the family fortunes and appoint relatives to public posts, even when to do so jeopardized the well-being of the state.

## THE POSITION OF WOMEN AND RELATIONS BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN

Closely associated with the family system, and possibly as one of its corollaries, have been the relations between men and women, and the position of women. The ceremonies in honor of ancestors constituted a cornerstone of the Chinese family. Male progeny was necessary if these were to be continued. For this reason boys were regarded as more valuable than girls. To the high esteem for men other factors contributed. From the economic standpoint boys were preferable. Remaining in the family as they did, they were producers who throughout their working lives aided its prosperity. On the other hand, after marriage a girl was lost to the family which had been to the expense of rearing her. The centuries-old doctrine of the *yin* and *yang* made for the higher status of men, because the *yang*, associated with good fortune and all that is desirable, was identified with the male, and the *yin*, the element of darkness and evil, was female. Confucianism tended in the same direction, for in addition to its emphasis upon the rites to ancestors, its world was one which men controlled. To be sure, Confucius paid great honor to the memory of his mother—a precedent which helped to accord to motherhood and especially to those bearing male children a dignified status. However, his example made for a separate social life for men and women and for confining to men public offices and the type of education which he gave to his disciples. It was not that he felt women to be necessarily inferior to men, but that, conforming to the existing practices of his times, he thought of the sexes as moving in quite different realms.

Social life knew no free mingling of the sexes on the basis of equality and respectability. After early childhood, boys and girls did not play together or have an opportunity to meet in any recognized and proper

way. As a result, prostitutes were the only women with whom men could have free and easy social intercourse.

Girls were generally regarded as much less valuable than boys, and sayings in common circulation appraised sons as infinitely preferable to daughters. One such proverb stated in effect that the most beautiful and gifted girl is not so desirable as a deformed boy. Boys, as children, were sometimes given girls' names to protect them from evil spirits, who, thereby supposedly deceived into believing that the child was actually a girl and less valuable, would pass him by. Among the very poor, the killing of female infants was by no means unknown. Girls were formerly given a type of education very different from that of boys. Only relatively infrequently were they taught to read. In some families with scholarly traditions and social and official standing a tutor might be employed for the girls and a father might take pride in the literary attainments of a daughter. Schools, however, were for boys. This was only natural, for they had as their primary objective preparation for the civil service examinations, to which girls were ineligible. The education of the daughter was given in the home, usually, if there was time, by the mother, and consisted of such matters as the management of a household and the duties owed to a husband, a mother-in-law, and others of the husband's relations. Often a girl was permitted to grow up with but very little care, and such training as she had, even in her essential domestic duties, was acquired casually and incidentally, through hard experience, or under the tutelage, often harsh, of a mother-in-law. In theory the husband was the head of his wife and the master of the home. The wife had no property of her own, except, perhaps, some which had been assigned to her by her family at her wedding, and even that was for the support of her offspring, was managed by her husband, and on her death went to her children. In practice a wife of vigorous character was often dominant. By bearing a son a woman acquired greater importance, and when in the normal course of events she became a mother-in-law and a grandmother, she was regarded as being of more and more consequence and was treated with increasing respect. After death she shared with her husband the honors paid by her sons. A woman without a son, however, was a reproach among her neighbors and to her husband, and often without honor or provision for support in her old age. In ordinary homes, especially of most of the farmers and of the poor, girls and women led a life of hard labor. In such households—the vast majority in China—from their earliest possible years children, both boys and girls, were trained to work at such tasks as watching the cattle and gathering fuel. To her duties of bearing and rearing children and caring for the home the wife often added those of helping in the heavy labor in the fields. The wives of the well-to-do led an easier and even luxurious existence, but were not therefore necessarily happier. Their seclusion and

idleness encouraged them to seek solace in gambling, opium smoking, and other vices.

A custom of the old China was binding the feet of women. The practice was almost universal, although the Hakkas, the Manchus, non-Chinese tribes, the boat population in the South, and some of the very poor did not conform with it. The requirement was in no sense religious but was purely a matter of social convention. A woman without small feet was regarded as disgraced and it was impossible to get a desirable husband for her. The process of binding the feet was very painful, involving as it did the compression of those members by tight bandages into as small a compass as possible. Infection and gangrene might set in and the girl might even lose her life. When the binding had once been completed the pain largely ceased, but walking was difficult, especially for those with very small feet, and the general effect upon the health was deleterious. At least one of the Ch'ing Emperors tried to stop the practice, but without avail. It was not until the disintegration of old customs wrought by the coming of the West that the foot-binding was given up.

## SECRET SOCIETIES

In the old China the family was the strongest universal social unit. However, as we have seen, it was but one of several types of units. Another was the secret societies. These played a very important part in the life of China, much more so than do the numerous fraternal organizations in the United States. Often they were active and influential in politics. It was estimated that as late as the 1940's about half the adult males who could lay claim to any influence were members. Almost everywhere the secret societies had to be reckoned with by those who would understand the life of a community. Some of them claimed to have been in existence for hundreds of years. Certainly organizations of this general type long had a share in Chinese life. The Red Eyebrows and Yellow Turbans, prominent in civil wars in Han times, appear to have been fraternal bodies. Repeatedly in seasons of disorder others came to the fore. Since the societies were secret, it is impossible to give a full and satisfactory account of them. Sometimes they had religious features. Often they had solemn and binding vows of brotherhood, and they might have secret codes. Frequently, too, their discipline was very severe, exacting of members strict obedience to the commands of their officers. Some are still to be found among the Chinese abroad and fill a prominent role in the lives of the emigrants.

One of the most famous and powerful of the secret societies was the *Ko Lao Hui*, or Association of Elder Brothers. It was said to have had an elaborate ritual and its members were reported to have taken an oath of

brotherhood. It was believed to have been responsible for numerous outbreaks and riots. It was much feared, and revenge visited for any violence to its members added to the dread felt for it. Chapters of another, the Red Spears, were often started as a farmer's protective society. Then ruffians frequently obtained the weapons and the power, and compelled all residents to join and pay fees or submit to their demands; struggles ensued with adjacent groups or with the authorities, and disorder was accentuated. Still another was the Triad Society (*San Ho Hui*), also known as the *Hung* Society and the Society of Heaven and Earth. How far back it went is uncertain, but it was implicated in more than one rebellion and probably appeared under various guises and aliases. It was organized by individual chapters as well as by a general brotherhood. Opposed to the Manchus, it was associated with the beginnings of the T'ai P'ing Rebellion. The White Lily and the White Cloud Societies were also famous. Both probably originated near the beginning of the twelfth century. Both appear to have been founded by Buddhist monks and were originally religious and Buddhist in character. Both repeatedly fell afoul of the state and were responsible for outbreaks, some of them of serious dimensions.

Secret societies played an important part in politics. In the 1930's and 1940's it was said to be impossible for an aspirant for power in the state long to be successful without membership in one of them. As a rule a man joined only one. A connection with more than one was said to work disadvantageously for him.

At the outset numbers of the societies possessed no political purpose. They were religious associations, or business or benevolent organizations, for the benefit and reciprocal protection of their members. Inevitably, however, many were sooner or later drawn into politics—perhaps captured by an ambitious leader who wished to use them for his ends, or regarded with suspicion by the state and proscribed and so forced into revolt, or, wishing to protect a member or members, compelled by force of circumstances to exert political pressure.

### OTHER FORMS OF ASSOCIATION

There were associations which remained largely or entirely nonpolitical in character. Such were the many societies where the religious purpose continued dominant, the guilds, the groups for the co-operative saving and lending of money (in which every member put in a sum—perhaps in monthly installments—and the total principal was loaned to each in turn, the order being often determined by lot), the clubs whose purpose it was to make pilgrimages to sacred mountains and to accumulate funds to make these pilgrimages possible for their members, the widespread organizations of farmers for the protection of growing crops, the associa-

tions by which farmers aided each other in the irrigation of their fields, the co-operatives formed to assist their members in financing and performing the rites connected with death and burial, and the benevolent societies of many kinds—for maintaining soup kitchens and lodging houses for the needy, for providing coffins and burial for the very poor, for resuscitating drowning people, and for the relief of indigent widows. The benevolent societies were largely, although by no means entirely, of Buddhist origin. For instance, the Shanghai General Benevolent Society, run by Buddhists, at one time had an annual budget of about 500,000 *yüan* each year, buried about 30,000 bodies found in the streets and the river, and maintained "homes," hospitals, and schools.

The Chinese have had a traditional capacity for organization and mass action. Dissension there might be and often was in their many associations, but co-operation was long the rule and they acted almost instinctively in that manner. Even the thieves and the beggars possessed their groupings. Officials, through their underlings, kept in touch with the thieves' "guild" in each community and were able, on occasion, to exert sufficient pressure on it to bring about the restoration of stolen property. Sometimes beggars picketed and so prevented customers from entering a shop which refused to contribute the customary fee to their guild. On at least two occasions the fishermen of Ningpo were able, by blockading the river and cutting off all entrance and egress by water, to compel the officials to withdraw a tax to which they objected. Several times a guild used a strike or a riot to force the public authorities to rescind a regulation or an assessment which it believed was unjust. Group opinion, often general enough to deserve the title of public opinion, repeatedly brought irresistible pressure upon the individual or the government. At times even the throne had to bow to it.

Clearly, therefore, the individual who attempted to stand alone found his path thorny. Chinese society was an interplay of groups, some of them united by blood, some by economic ties, and some by political, professional, or religious interests. By the custom of "sworn brotherhood," men not otherwise bound to each other pledged reciprocal fidelity, perhaps professing to hark back for a precedent to the famous "Peach Garden Oath" taken during the Three Kingdoms by Lui Pei, Chang Fei, and Kuan Yü. It is believed that it was such a relationship which in 1898 led Yüan Shih-k'ai to reveal to Jung Lu the Kuang Hsü Emperor's plan of action and so precipitated the fateful *coup d'etat* of September of that year.

All these many kinds of associations made Chinese society extraordinarily complex. They are one reason why the uninitiated foreigner found particular problems and situations in politics and business so difficult to understand. Even an intelligent Chinese frequently failed to know all the elements involved.

Marked skill was developed in effecting compromises and adjustments

among the many groups, and secret parleys and intrigues flourished. Not only must the individual, if he were to succeed and often if he were even to survive, associate himself with as strong a group or groups as possible, but he had frequently to be an adept at playing off one against another and at diplomacy, perhaps underhanded and tortuous. This may help to account for that foreign policy for which the Chinese Government was noted in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—of seeking to save itself by pitting powers against one another and entering into secret treaties. It was part of the struggle for survival in which the Chinese had been drilled from infancy. In such a society, moreover, the forthright person was often at a disadvantage, and he who would stand against convention and the group might be given short shrift.

Still another side of the picture must not be forgotten. Many, both foreigners and Chinese, regarded the Chinese as unsuccessful at co-operation. They pointed out that much of existing concerted action was under the pressure of strong necessity, that in such matters as schools, bridges, and roads co-operation was either weak or entirely lacking, that many associations were inaugurated only to disintegrate almost before they had begun, that reciprocal distrust existed, that most Chinese found it impossible to believe that the organizer was acting from sincere public spirit, that joint action was fully as often for destruction or self-protection as for public welfare, and that stable working-together for purposes of public value was discouragingly rare. However, successes in co-operation were also facts. The Chinese, like other peoples, often displayed contradictory traits.

## THE STRATIFICATIONS OF SOCIETY

In spite of the strength of the family tie and of all these many organizations, Chinese society was characterized by a remarkable minimum of hard and fast class divisions. The sharp distinction between the aristocrat and the commoner which seems to have existed at the dawn of China's history largely disappeared—possibly shattered in the prolonged disorders which brought the Chou dynasty to an end and further erased by the autocrats who built the Ch'in and the Han. An hereditary aristocracy was manifestly an obstacle to the absolutism which the latter sought to establish. The bureaucracy of the Ch'in displaced the old hereditary particularism. Semi-independent states tended to appear once more during the initial years of the Han, but the creation by the monarchs of that dynasty of a ruling bureaucracy, appointment to which was on the basis of worth rather than birth, checked the movement. The continued development under later dynasties of a system of choosing officials from those who had proven their worth in the free competition of the public examinations militated against the formation of an hereditary ruling caste. At least under the Ch'ing

these tests were open to the majority regardless of birth. Only members of a few occupations, such as actors, were excluded. Admission to the aristocracy of intellect, which so dominated the life of the nation, could be had by rich and poor alike. The entire family and even the city of a successful scholar shared in his fame. Under a system by which—in theory—wealth, social position, and power went to the ablest, a certain amount of fluidity existed and a general and continuous leveling process was seen which discouraged class lines. Even when, as was usually the case, the relatives of the Emperor formed a privileged group, the whirligig of time displaced them with another governing line. The rebellions and civil strife so characteristic of Chinese history provided an additional avenue by which men of force could come to the front, regardless of birth and even of education.

The system did not entirely eliminate the divisions wrought by heredity. Many families possessed traditions of education, good breeding, inherited wealth, and devotion to public service from which their scions derived a decided advantage in the competition in the examination stalls and in obtaining office. Members of these houses naturally were inclined to intermarry. Under the Later Han, it will be recalled, certain powerful families, rooted in the Confucian tradition and interlocked by marriage, for a time formed a kind of ruling class. A somewhat similar aristocracy arose in the period of division between the Han and the T'ang. Apparently through the centuries almost every community had its "first families" who were looked up to and accorded leadership in local affairs. This fluctuated, as in all countries, and it was an exceptional district or town which had not known instances of the rise and fall of a great house. Indeed, it was so usual as to become proverbial. On the other hand, a few paternal lines were accorded recognition over the course of the centuries. Such was that of Confucius. Moreover, the Han and succeeding dynasties did not entirely abolish all hereditary rank. For example, the Ch'ing, although it made a fairly clean sweep of claims to titles existing at its accession, had its own nobles. A large proportion of them were Manchus, but some were Chinese. However, apparently as a safeguard against sedition through an hereditary caste, only some of the titles were granted in perpetuity, and most of these were held by Manchus. While as a rule high offices in the Empire carried with them a title or titles, and in some instances the recipient's forefathers were made to share in the award by the posthumous grant of rank for several generations back, the honors usually did not descend to the sons. The heirs either were commoners or were given titles of progressively lower degree for each succeeding generation until the family found itself once more among the undistinguished.

Major occupational groups were accorded a traditional gradation. Scholars came first, as might be expected in an order whose theory it

was that society should be controlled by those educated in the lore and the virtues of civilized humanity. Teachers were regarded as one of the five objects of worship, the others being Heaven, Earth, the Emperor, and parents. Next came the farmers, for they produced the food upon which mankind depended for sustenance. Third were the artisans, for they also were producers. Merchants were classified as fourth, for they made their profits by exchanging the fruits of other men's toil. Officials belonged to the scholar class and often felt it beneath them to intermarry with families engaged in trade. A bourgeoisie did not develop from merchants and employers, as in the Occident. A merchant class arose during the Sung, especially during the Southern Sung. It seems to have been stimulated by the opportunity for trade given by the wide-flung Mongol Empire. In Ming times the eunuchs appear to have sought allies among the merchants to offset the scholars who fought the control of the throne by eunuchs. Merchants also formed connections through marriage with scholar-officials.

The population that lived in boats on the south coast, actors, prostitutes, eunuchs, the underlings or "runners" in official yamens, and slaves were held to be markedly inferior socially. Eunuchs fared badly at the hands of the scholars, who were their rivals and who wrote the histories. Many eunuchs were highly educated and schools for them existed.

Slavery was never as extensive or prominent as in the Roman Empire. Few if any great estates were cultivated by nonfree labor. Slaves were used, if at all, chiefly in household service. Moreover, slavery was not associated with a racial distinction, as in the case of the American Negro. Most of the slaves seem to have been individuals of Chinese stock who through some misfortune, usually economic, had fallen to that status. The poor, for example, might sell their daughters, especially in time of famine. Household slaves were predominantly women and girls. It was because girls were regarded less highly than boys that they were the members of the family sold first. They led a hard life, but public opinion generally acted as a restraint on excessive cruelty. Slave girls might be taken as concubines, or more frequently be married off to poorer men of the neighborhood.

Beggars were a numerous and well recognized portion of the community. People were driven into mendicancy by a variety of causes. In the case of many, illness or an accident incapacitated the sufferers for ordinary employment, and in default of friends or family who could give financial support the beggar's life offered the only escape from starvation. The blind were peculiarly unfortunate. No public institutions cared for them and no schools existed where they could be taught to read. It was not until Christian missionaries devised a system for them that they could read at all. At best they could only eke out a precarious existence as public entertainers, storytellers, or musicians. Many beggars became such

because of the famines prevalent in China. Sometimes mendicancy was only temporary. In other instances it became permanent and professional.

Some other divisions there were. We have seen the distinctions between the Hakkas and their neighbors, between Moslems and non-Moslems, and between the Chinese and the aboriginal tribes. A great deal of local feeling existed. Natives of one province living in another were often regarded almost as foreigners.

In spite of all these divisions, the Chinese, as we have said more than once, never developed such hard and fast caste lines as existed in India. Intermarriages occurred between many of the groups. Even from the most despised classes escape was sometimes achieved.

Some public and private attention was given to the unfortunate members of society, but philanthropy did not construct such large institutions as in the modern West or even as in the Europe of the Middle Ages. In a good many cities there were hospitals for foundlings, some of them supported both by private subscriptions and by state funds. Soup kitchens were frequently maintained for the destitute. Famine relief was carried on both by private agencies and by the government. The state granaries especially were long a means of relieving acute distress. Some refuges were maintained where lepers could be segregated and given care. Beggars were recognized as possessing a claim on the community, and custom accorded their organizations a right to regular contributions from such property-holders as shopkeepers.

On the other hand, a great deal of callousness to human suffering and much cruelty existed, reminiscent of the West before the humanitarian movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The motives impelling assistance in relief activities were mixed: in part the native milk of human kindness, in part the hope of accumulating merit in a future life (a Buddhist importation), in part the standards inculcated by Confucianism, and in part (as in the case of payments to the beggars' guilds) the desire to be relieved of further requests from the unfortunate.

## RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL INTERCOURSE

The Chinese, like every other civilized people, developed conventions for social intercourse, for easing the jars that are inevitable where human beings have to live with one another, and for promoting those amenities which are among the marks of culture.

Underneath the many conventions were certain principles. One of these was an emphasis upon correct form. We have seen that from very early times the Chinese stressed ceremonies. Confucianism especially made for the perpetuation and strengthening of this tradition. The *Li Chi,*

or Book of Rites, was one of the five *Ching,* or Classics, most honored by the Confucian school, and other ancient collections on ritual, the *I Li* and the *Chou Li,* were highly esteemed. *Li,* which included not only religious ceremonies but also many social conventions, was regarded as one of the distinguishing characteristics of civilization. Right motives in carrying out the *li* were looked upon as important, but careful observance of form was valued fully as highly. The correct performance of the *li* was believed to have important moral values and to be an indispensable feature of education and social control. The disregard of Westerners for Chinese *li* and the differences between the conventions of the Occident and China were long among the major factors making for irritation in official and unofficial intercourse between Westerners and Chinese.

Another important principle was "face." "Face" in the Chinese sense was not always easy of definition. It could best be described through specific illustrations. A servant in a foreign household was told that the sugar under his charge was disappearing rather more rapidly than it ought. He saw that he was being accused, very indirectly, of appropriating it. He suggested a device for safeguarding it against possible intruders from the street, although he knew that his master was aware that no such pilfering by strangers was possible. Both he and his master, however, acted as though the suggestion was made in good faith, and the desired results were accomplished. The sugar no longer disappeared and the servant's face was saved. In one of the kaleidoscopic political changes of the twentieth century the personnel of a committee in charge of a public fund became objectionable to a new government. To save the face of its members, the committee was induced to meet and to offer its resignation. Then, in open session, the official most responsible for the resignation presided and urged the members to reconsider and retain their posts. They insisted on adhering to their original decision, and with outward reluctance, their resignations were accepted. Every one recognized that the procedure was staged to save the face of those dismissed, but the amenities were observed. A distinguished Chinese who spoke no English was unavoidably placed at dinner next to a foreign host who knew very little Chinese. The host did his best to maintain a conversation. The Chinese, without giving the least appearance of amusement, annoyance, or condescension, quickly adjusted himself to his host's limited vocabulary and spoke slowly. An intermittent if somewhat restricted conversation was carried on, an embarraising situation was eased, and the host's face was saved. None of this was so very different from what is repeatedly done in other lands. It arose in part from a respect for personality and from the principle that an essential of good manners is sparing one's neighbor from injured feelings and public humiliation. In the old China, however, "face" was carried to a greater extreme than in some other countries. Certainly it had to be

reckoned with as a prime factor in the intercourse between China and the Powers. In the long controversy in the last century over the reception of foreign envoys at court, the Chinese were chiefly concerned that the appearance should be preserved of the traditional superiority of the Emperor over all other monarchs, although all informed officials knew it to be a fiction. In the conflicts over the "unequal" clauses in the treaties, especially extraterritoriality, it was the loss of face involved that was most galling to the Chinese. If only face could be preserved, all sorts of adjustments and compromises could be privately and unobtrusively agreed upon.

This emphasis on the face of the nation was accentuated by the intense pride of the Chinese. They long regarded themselves as the dispensers of civilization and most of the rest of mankind as barbarians. It entailed much humiliation to confess, even tacitly, that the old culture had to be modified or abandoned. Even among Western-trained men there remained some contempt for the Westerner and a feeling that the latter could never fully understand or rightly interpret the Chinese civilization that was passing.

The emphasis on face may be due to the fact that the Chinese, even more than some other peoples, have had the attitude of actors. The theatre has long been one of their favorite recreations, and even the humblest laborer has been skilled in assuming a role. Two laborers might have an altercation, storming at each other and seemingly intent on flying at each other's throats, and yet allow the bystanders to hold them back and eventually to make peace between them.

Another possible reason for face was the fact that in a crowded society such as was the old China a man's future depended on preserving a satisfactory station. It was not easy for him to go elsewhere, as he might in a fluid frontier society, to make a new start. Moreover, his family shared in any disgrace that might come to him.

The importance given to face may have been in part the result of the sensitivity of the Chinese. Some observers have declared that Chinese men seem to have many of the temperamental qualities which in the Occident are deemed feminine. However, this distinction may not be so great as appears at first sight. After all, Westerners attach an immense amount of importance to what they call "honor."

In such a society the place of the middleman was important. A neighbor or a group of neighbors might tender their good offices in adjusting a quarrel in which each antagonist would be sacrificing his face by taking the first step in approaching the other. The wise intermediary could effect the reconciliation while preserving the dignity of both.

It is obvious, too, that compromise had to be a major feature of the social relations of such a people. In any dispute the reputations of both parties must, if possible, be preserved. Public opinion would regard unkindly

a contestant who caused an adversary too great loss of face. To bring a difference into court would prove expensive and might be ruinous to both litigants. If possible, then, a settlement had to be reached by private, extralegal means. Several peacemakers might offer their services and the final adjustment would probably be a modification of the original demands, with some reward for the middleman, possibly in the form of a feast at the expense of one of the parties.

The regard for face may have been responsible for the dislike of the Chinese for the use of physical violence. Such violence was by no means unknown, but it was not held in the honor that it has been in some countries of the Occident. Dueling was not a polite art. Boxing and fencing existed, but rather as forms of physical exercise for one person and as gymnastic exhibitions than as real fighting. A man gave great offense by laying hold on another with the object of exerting force. Two members of the lower classes might revile each other publicly for half an hour or more, and even spit on each other, without coming to blows.

While the Chinese regarded the use of physical violence in a quarrel as a breach of good breeding, they thought of suicide as an honorable means of protest. By committing suicide an aggrieved party could bring opprobrium upon his enemy and cause the latter costly embarrassment with officials and neighbors.

Dignity was regarded as one of the marks of a gentleman. Rapid walking, loud talking, and violently abusive language were thought of as derogatory to it. A Chinese might be bland and affable even to a person whom he heartily disliked, and it was often difficult to know from his calm or even genial exterior what were his real thoughts. However, in this, it may be noted again, he was no different from cultivated members of other civilized communities.

The Chinese are, as has been suggested, extremely sensitive. There are, to be sure, phlegmatic souls. Foreign physicians in China have testified to the relative insensitivity and physiological-neurological stolidity of the great majority of their patients. Much cheerfulness exists, even among the very poor, and an immense amount of patient persistence in the face of hardship and discouragement. A vivid illustration of this has repeatedly been seen in the return of farmers to fields wasted by flood, drought, civil strife, or foreign invasion, and the resolute resumption of the normal processes of cultivation. Particularly in the South, however, and among the educated, there has been much quickness of response to an emotional stimulus. A keen sense of humor gives a hearty reaction to the funny or the ridiculous. There has been, also, an equally strong dislike of a loss of face through seeming to be ridiculous. Many Chinese, moreover, have been subject to spasms of anger. The educated might keep these under control, but those without the restraints of convention and training not infrequently gave way to them. Such a seizure usually vented itself in

violently pouring forth voluble and explicit denunciations and characterizations of the morals and qualities of the offending party and of his or her ancestors, and in calling down on the head of the offender the unhappiest and most lurid fate which the imagination of the injured could invent. Two women or two men might thus berate each other until each was exhausted.

Chinese have been extremely subject to mob psychology. Mass feeling could develop very quickly—fear, hostility, or mere excitement. Individuals have often found it difficult to stand out against the crowd. Chinese, indeed, have sometimes been accused of cowardice. However, many exceptions to the rule could be instanced by any experienced observer. So far as failure boldly to dissent from the group exists—and it has been very common—it may in part arise from a lack of individual self-reliance, from habituated fear of collective social pressure, and from the absence of strong motives apart from conventional ones.

It may have been due to this regard for face and this sensitiveness that another characteristic of Chinese intercourse developed, a dislike for bluntness and abruptness and the consequent indirect approach to a subject. A caller coming with a request to prefer or an awkward subject to broach might talk at length about entirely irrelevant matters before stating the main object of his visit and then perhaps leave it to be inferred by more or less delicate hints. Or an educated man, feeling it to be beneath his dignity to show anger at an offense, might express his displeasure or return an insult through an obscure literary allusion. All this could prove costly in time, but that was regarded as of small consequence. The foreigners' directness of speech and anxious economy of hours and minutes seemed to the Chinese crude and curious Westernisms, unless he himself had become so Occidentalized as to have acquired them.

The etiquette which the Chinese developed for social intercourse was, as it existed before the changes by contact with the West, elaborate and intricate. To the uninstructed foreigner it was often bewildering. There was the custom of speaking deprecatingly of anything connected with oneself and in praise of everything belonging to the person with whom one was talking. Thus in meeting a stranger it was proper to ask his "honorable name," and in response to a similar inquiry to apprise him of one's "unworthy name." In addressing a superior or one older than oneself, it was good form to remove one's glasses. One did not shake hands with those whom he met, but clasped his own hands, possibly shaking them and making a bow—more or less profound as the occasion demanded. The Chinese bow, especially of the more profound kind, required practice and was a work of art. In offering or receiving objects it was proper to do so only with both hands. The seat of honor was on the left of the host, but he who was asked to take it, especially if others were present, did so, if at all, only after protesting his unworthiness and after one or more refusals.

So with going through doors: it was proper to urge the other to proceed first. Affability and genial good temper were expected in social intercourse and any departure from them was considered boorish. Self-control was highly esteemed, even though temperamentally many of the Chinese have been excitable. The serving of tea was part of the ritual of every call, whether for business or pleasure. Usually a request from one's host to drink one's tea was a sign that the interview was at an end. Certain inquiries were considered proper which in the Occident are usually thought of as impertinent, such as one's age and income. In meeting a friend or acquaintance in the street, if he was mounted or in a sedan chair, courtesy required that recognition be avoided. Otherwise good form would necessitate his stopping, dismounting, and going through the greetings which convention prescribed. The giving and receiving of presents were regulated by conventions which indicated when a gift should be offered or accepted, and if accepted, how much of it should be sent back and what should be given in return. In eating, spoons and what the foreigner calls chopsticks were used and the food brought on in such a state that it could be easily handled by these implements. To the Chinese of the old school the Western custom of bringing meat to the table in great lumps and then dismembering it with knife and fork must have appeared quite barbarous. Calling cards were much larger than those now in use in the West. The possession of one by a person other than the owner was supposed to be evidence of authorization to act as a messenger or agent. Dress was carefully regulated, various forms of garb being prescribed for different occasions. Some of the customs were confusing to the foreigner and even amusing, but they were means, as are polite conventions in all lands, of keeping society moving pleasantly and with the minimum of friction.

Perhaps here should also be mentioned the custom of gratuities to servants and to those in other positions who had been of use to one. Such gifts were expected. It was customary for servants and others to take a proportion of what passed through their hands—"squeeze," as the foreigner denominated it. The proportion was not always standardized, and the practice easily admitted of abuses. Squeeze, however, was esteemed a legitimate perquisite of position, from that of a servant to that of an official high in the public service, and unless excessive was not regarded as in any way dishonest.

### RECREATION AND AMUSEMENTS

Closely associated with social intercourse and, indeed, often as phases of it, were recreations and amusements. They profoundly affected the characteristics of the nation—or, perhaps, they were expressions of those characteristics or were both cause and effect.

One of the features of the life of the China of the nineteenth century

which impressed the Westerner was the slight emphasis upon athletics. Archery held a recognized place, especially in the preparation and drill of the soldier. Hunting had its devotees. There were professional acrobats. Shadow boxing was much enjoyed. Many boys displayed skill in keeping a shuttlecock in the air with their feet, and engaged in swimming, wrestling, boxing, flying kites, and fishing. However, archery was regarded as primarily an occupation of the warrior. Hunting as a vigorous sport was largely confined to the Manchus—a heritage from energetic days before their conquest of China—and died out among them as the influence of sedentary life and of the Chinese environment progressively became more potent. For the great majority of the Chinese physical exertion was associated with labor, and escape from it was deemed desirable. Games involving vigorous physical effort were not widely approved. Sports which in the Occident have been thought of as befitting the aristocracy—such as hunting, football, cricket, and tennis—would have been frowned upon in China in recent centuries. This had not always been true. In more than one dynasty hunting constituted a favorite diversion of the court and aristocracy. Polo, of foreign origin, in T'ang times was followed ardently in imperial circles by both men and women. However, by the latter part of the nineteenth century interest in such strenuous diversion had largely died out even among the once hardy Manchus. The passion for such spectacles as the Olympic games of Greece, the gladiatorial contests of ancient Rome, the tourneys of the European Middle Ages, and the bull fights and the football and baseball matches of modern Europe and America were quite alien to Chinese custom.

The contrast between China and the West may have been due in part to a difference in the ideals of the dominant classes. In the West the aristocracy has traditionally been the military. Preparation for fighting and the bodily skill and fitness derived from appropriate sports have been accepted as an essential part of the training and life of the gentleman. The lower classes have naturally taken their cue from the aristocracy, and the tradition has passed over to the influential middle classes and the democracies of recent years. In China, on the other hand, it was the Confucian scholar who set the standard, and the fighting man and his works were at best regarded as necessary evils. By tradition the Confucian scholar did not take kindly to vigorous physical exertion, even though Confucius himself practiced archery and is said to have hunted. The scholar usually confined his exercise to a slow, dignified walk, or he might engage in such an unenergetic diversion as taking a pet bird out for an airing, possibly throwing seeds for it to catch.

With this kind of example set from above, the amusements of the populace tended to be of the same sort. Flying kites was popular, at least in certain places and seasons. Crickets were induced to fight one another.

Gambling provided one of the most prevalent forms of diversion and for it many devices existed. The contests between the gladiatorial crickets usually had wagers placed on the outcome. There were many games of chance. Counters or cards roughly resembling dominoes in size were used for several of them. In the Occident a few decades ago, one, *mah jong,* enjoyed a sudden popularity and suffered almost as sudden a demise. Sets of cards were employed for centuries and were of several varieties. *Fantan* was played with coins. A pile of them was covered with a bowl and the participants registered wagers on the remainder —three, two, one, nothing—which would be left after the whole had been divided by four. From time to time the government attempted to stamp out gambling, but its efforts were in vain. All classes, from the highest official circles to the poorest laborers, indulged in it.

A center of gossip and a place for spending the idle and lighter hours was the tea shop. Here, over a cup of that innocuous beverage, neighbors or casual acquaintances exchanged news. Here, too, came the professional storyteller with his entertaining narratives.

It may be noted that the Chinese have not been so addicted to the excessive consumption of alcoholic drinks as have been some of the Northern European peoples. Fermented liquors have been used widely and for centuries. That most generally seen was derived from rice and was distilled—once, and for stronger brands twice and even three times. Drunkenness has been by no means unknown. There even seem to have been periods, as under the T'ang, when it was fairly prevalent. In the nineteenth century, however, it was not nearly as common as in the England or the United States of that time. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries opium played a part in China somewhat like that which liquor has had in Anglo-Saxon lands. Its moderate use was very widespread and excessive indulgence in it was all too common—to the moral, physical, and financial undoing of its victims and the sorrow and suffering of their relatives and dependents. As has been noted in earlier chapters, the rapid rise in the consumption of opium was due in large part to trade with Westerners and was associated with the commercial invasion of the Occident. Opium has been produced extensively in China, however. The reason for the popularity of opium in China—greater than in any other large nation—is not entirely clear. Obviously it is at least partly because it provides a temporary escape from unpleasant realities and a surcease from care, much as alcoholic beverages do for many other folk.

Tobacco was extensively smoked. The familiar Chinese pipe had a very small bowl, holding only enough of the weed for a whiff or two. Men and women, especially elderly people, formerly sat by the hour alternately filling their pipes (or having it done for them by servants), lighting them, smoking, and then knocking out the ashes.

Still other types of recreation have been feasting (an accompaniment

of many social events, such as weddings, and of many business transactions), watching processions, reading novels and stories, singing with or without the accompaniment of musical instruments, retailing and exchanging gossip, resorting to clairvoyants, watching marionettes and jugglers, attending village fairs (at which plays have often been shown), visiting temples, automatic writing through what corresponds to the planchette, and simply frequenting crowded places.

### THE THEATRE

The drama has had a great fascination for the Chinese and has been and is a familiar feature of their life. We have already seen something of its history. Pantomimes with music were in existence in early historic times as a means of commemorating the deeds and the memory of ancestors. There were plays in the Han, probably of a simple type, and a further development occurred in the T'ang and the Sung. A noteworthy and rather sudden flowering of dramatic genius came under the Mongols. Both under the Ming and the Ch'ing new styles of plays and of the accompanying music appeared. In the nineteenth century a very large number of plays were written.

The theatre was one of the most potent agencies for popular education. To the masses, almost or entirely illiterate, as the large majority of them were, the written character could not provide a direct medium of instruction. Every one, however, could see a play. In the cities and large towns buildings were constructed specifically for the drama. These, however, were not as numerous as might be supposed. In Nanking, for example, in the twentieth century before the days of the cinema, only two theatres existed and these were not regularly open. Temples were often used for dramatic performances, even when the plays contained little or nothing immediately connected with religion. Frequently a raised platform over a street or in a field served for a stage. At the periodical fairs in market towns and on other special occasions a performance or series of performances by a dramatic troupe was a usual part of the program. Since many of the plays had historical themes, and the great virtues, such as filial piety, were often extolled and vividly illustrated, and vice was represented as punished, the populace obtained some idea, even though in distorted and more than semifictional form, of their country's past, and saw orthodox morals held up for praise.

The main features of the theatre can be fairly quickly described. The buildings designed especially for the theatre were Elizabethan in their simplicity, except when, as in some instances in recent decades, they were affected by the modern West. At one end of the building was a raised platform for the stage. In front of this was the main floor, with

benches, or with backless chairs clustered around little tables, and on three sides a gallery, also with seats. Formerly men and women were usually, although not always, in different parts of the house. During the progress of the play attendants moved about the audience with tea and food or with towels wrung out of hot water, with which hands and face were wiped. Individuals entered and left at will and carried on conversations during the performance.

Very little scenery was employed—perhaps a table and a few chairs and at times a rude painting of a city wall and gate. Much was left to the imagination of the audience, assisted by conventional and therefore well understood motions of the actors. As the actor stooped, the audience perceived that he was entering a door, even though no building was apparent. Certain gestures indicated that he was mounting his steed, although no horse was there. In contrast with the scenery, the costumes were often rich and elaborate, and masks were much in evidence. Here again convention was followed. A character carrying a wand tipped with white horse-tail hair was known to represent a supernatural being. A red mask proclaimed the wearer to be of an upright character and a black one was worn by those of cruel and severe dispositions. The painting of faces was closely governed by custom and the audience resented any departure from what was expected in the make-up of a particular character. During the course of the play attendants moved about the stage rearranging the chairs and tables and perhaps serving the actors with tea. Much of the acting consisted of postures and gestures which again were governed by convention. To perform them correctly and gracefully in a manner acceptable to a critical audience required both ability and practice.

The themes of the plays varied greatly. They included comedy and tragedy, avowed fiction and historical episodes. A favorite period from which to draw stories was the Three Kingdoms, perhaps in part because of the popularity of the famous novel with that title. Some of the plays were long but others were very short. Performances might be given afternoon and evening and might last for six or seven hours. In both, however, it was usual to present several plays, or, perhaps, famous scenes from some of the longer ones. In a play singing, spoken dialogue, and dancing (or posturing) might all be found. There was, too, a type of acrobatic posturing representing fighting.

Some of the theatrical troupes were large, with fifty or a hundred members. Others, usually itinerant, were small, sometimes with only two members. Although actors were regarded as socially inferior and were usually recruited from the lower classes, some achieved great popularity. The training was prolonged and exacting. Usually it began in early youth, and those who took it served a kind of apprenticeship. At least during

the nineteenth century women did not customarily appear on the stage—a ruling which was said to date from the time of the Ch'ien Lung Emperor—and men took women's parts. Some men became extraordinarily skillful in female roles. In the twentieth century there were companies made up entirely of women, in which the members displayed marked talent in portraying men.

There was a kind of little theatre in the form of puppet shows, in which marionettes were moved about by the operator and the various parts were spoken by the same expert individual. Some marionettes were controlled by strings, some were costumed dolls, and others were translucent and painted, a kind of "shadow doll."

The theatre has been immensely popular, and while in other days an occasional magistrate attempted to prohibit performances, presumably because he believed the money spent on them might more profitably have been invested elsewhere, such efforts seldom if ever received the support of the public. Perhaps as a result Chinese have seemed to take almost instinctively to acting a part in social intercourse, and have had a penchant for dramatizing themselves and incidents in which they have been vitally concerned.

With all this emphasis on the theatre, it must be noted that drama in China appears never to have risen to the heights in the portrayal of character and in dealing with some of the persistent problems of human life and destiny that it did in ancient Greece and that it has in some countries of the modern West. The Chinese have not been blind to these questions and have thought on them profoundly and with acumen. For an expression of their meditations and conclusions on these issues, however, they have chosen other vehicles, notably philosophy. Drama, therefore, did not occupy the prominent place in serious Chinese literature that it has held in some lands of the Occident. In China the theatre remained more exclusively a diversion.

Closely akin to the theatre was the professional storyteller. For many centuries his was an accepted occupation. He found his audience at tea shops, where the proprietors paid him for his services as a means of drawing patrons, and in other places where people congregated in streets, on market days, and in opium dens. His themes were often taken from the famous historical romances, such as *The Three Kingdoms*. Indeed, some of the greatest novels appear to have grown out of these narratives as they were told for generations by these experts in popular entertainment. The storyteller might accompany his recital with a musical instrument. Along with the theatre, he was a potent if unintentional agent of popular education in the history—highly colored and in semifictional form—and in the folklore of the nation.

Somewhat akin also to the theatre were jugglers and acrobats. The

Chinese rejoiced in them and produced unusually skillful ones. Then, too, the processions which were so important in funerals, weddings, and religious festivals both gave expression and provided incentive to the passion for the dramatic.

A regular part of the equipment of the theatre was the orchestra. There were a number of instruments, among them flutes, balloon guitars, drums, gongs, cymbals, one resembling a violin with two strings, another a clarinet, still another a castanet, and pieces of hollow wood beaten with sticks. Usually an orchestra was made up of eight or ten instruments. Singing had a large place on the stage, for many of the parts were sung rather than spoken. The songs heard in the theatre often caught the popular fancy and could be heard on the streets for days after. The singing was in a high or falsetto voice.

## FESTIVALS AND SPECIAL DAYS

Before the impact of the Occident Chinese life was entirely lacking in the week with its recurring day of rest, although the seven day week was not unknown. Chinese routine, however, had its alternation between days of recreation and rest and days of work. This was largely because of the standard festivals of the Chinese year.

The most important festival was the New Year. This event did not fall regularly on the same days with the Gregorian calendar, for the older Chinese measurement of time was both by the lunar month and by the solar year, and to make the two nearly coincide—since the lunar year of twelve months is only 354 days—some years were regarded as made up of twelve months and to others an additional or intercalary month was added. The date did not fall earlier than January 21 or later than February 19. A few days before the New Year the Kitchen God was supposed to return to heaven to report the conduct of the members of the family since the last anniversary. This was signaled by burning the image of the god, perhaps after smearing his lips with molasses—to insure that the deity carried with him a final good impression of the household. On the last day of the old year he was welcomed back and a fresh picture of him was pasted above the kitchen stove. The New Year was the time for the settlement of debts, and it was considered bad form to enter it without having paid them. The day itself and the several days following were devoted to feasting and visiting, and all but the most necessary labor ceased. Honors were paid to ancestors and there were family reunions. Children made their obeisances to their parents, pupils paid their respects to their teachers, and friends called on one another and exchanged good wishes. With the anniversary, another year was added to the reckoning of the ages of all members of the family. While birthdays were observed,

according to Chinese reckoning a child was one year old at its birth and two years of age after it passed into its first New Year. Thus an infant born in the last month of the year was in the succeeding month said to be two years old.

For the very poor, and perhaps for the majority of the population, the New Year's celebration lasted but three or four days. Theoretically, however, and practically for many, the period was regarded as ending on the fifteenth day of the first month with the Feast of Lanterns. In some parts of the country this was a very gay occasion. Huge paper dragons were carried about the streets, each draped over several men. In the evening lanterns of many shapes and kinds were displayed by the populace. There was also the inevitable firecracker, so widely employed on occasions of jollification and worship.

Ch'ing Ming was the chief spring festival. It was especially a time for commemorating the dead—a sort of "Memorial Day"—by repairing and cleaning graves and placing offerings before the ancestral tablets and on the tombs. It was also incidentally for picnicking and feasting.

What was regarded as the opening of summer was observed, although not so prominently as some of the other great days of the year.

The Dragon Boat festival, on the fifth day of the fifth moon, may originally have been associated with the summer solstice and have been for the purpose of obtaining rain. It certainly had for one of its objectives assistance in harmonizing the *yin* and the *yang*. The *yang,* it was believed, increases between the winter and the summer solstice. With the advent of the latter, the *yin* begins to grow in power. Precautions were therefore taken against evil spirits, particularly those which cause disease, by cleansing the home, especially by hanging up herbs and by drinking a specially prepared wine and sprinkling the house with it. In many parts of the country a favorite public event of the day was races between "dragon-boats." The craft were long and narrow and at the bow each had a dragon's head. In theory the contests were commemorative of the search for the dead body of Ch'u Yüan, a statesman, it will be recalled, of the third century before Christ, who is reputed to have committed suicide by drowning. But it seems highly probable that the custom had its origin independently of that event.

On the seventh day of the seventh month was the festival of the weaver maid and the herdsman. The story told in connection with it was that the weaver maid (identified with Vega and two other stars) and the herdsman (identified with three stars in Aquila) so neglected their respective duties after their marriage that they were separated by divine decree, but that once a year, on this night, if it does not rain, magpies build with their wings a bridge across the Milky Way, and over it the weaver passes to her spouse and spends a day with him. It was peculiarly a woman's festival.

Also in the seventh month was the festival for the departed spirits, mentioned in the preceding chapter.

The harvest festival was celebrated in the eighth month and culminated on the fifteenth day of that month, at the full moon. It was a time when debts were supposed to be paid, although this was not so necessary as at the beginning of the New Year. It was sometimes called the moon's birthday and at least in some parts of the country moon cakes were made, with a crescent on them and perhaps the image of a pagoda or an effigy of the rabbit which to Chinese imagination was supposed to be seen on the face of the full orb. It was a time of rejoicing and feasting for all ages and was very much a children's festival. Many quaint and pretty customs were connected with it.

Confucius's birthday was observed, especially by the schools, on the twenty-seventh day of the eighth month.

A festival on the ninth day of the ninth month may represent the coming of the first frosts in the North, where the custom seems to have originated. As a precaution against calamity (so at least some believed) people betook themselves to a high place—the top of a hill or the city wall. It was a time of happy excursions and picnics.

The last great festival of the year was the winter solstice. It was devoted especially to family gatherings and honors to ancestors. It was also the occasion for the major one of the annual sacrifices at which the Emperor officiated, that on the Altar of Heaven.

In addition to the holidays in which the majority of the population participated, other events brought diversion into the routine of life: birthdays, religious pilgrimages, market days in towns where these were customary, and festivals peculiar to a particular religion, especially those of Buddhism.

In spite of all the many forms of diversion, for a large proportion of the masses life was fairly circumscribed and monotonous. Particularly was this true of women and girls, to whom many of the amusements open to men were not available. For the farmers an interval occurred between the harvest and the spring planting—a hiatus which was longest in the North—when there was a good deal of enforced idleness. The monotony was augmented for the artisan, merchant, common laborer, and many others by the steadiness of toil. Some knew of no release from work, not even (as in the case of food shops) on New Year's Day. Many had off only four or five days a year. The hours of labor were usually long, and while the pace was slow, little leisure existed for genuine rest or recreation. For instance, hand looms could often be heard going at almost any hour of the day or night.

To the Westerner of the modern rushing age much of the life of the farm and village and even of the towns seemed peculiarly drab and lacking in variety. It must be remembered, however, that such an observer

would probably have made the same comment on rural life in Europe in the eighteenth and even in much of the nineteenth century. Moreover, foreigner after foreigner commented on the cheerfulness of the Chinese masses, and on their ability to find joy in little things, to laugh in the face of hardship, and to be patient under crushing natural disasters.

## CHANGES WROUGHT BY THE COMING OF THE WEST

The West with which China has come into collision in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries differs radically in social organization, ideals, and customs from the Middle Kingdom. Since the Occident has been the aggressor, it is China that has been most affected. The change in China has been all the more violent because the West with which the Orient has collided in the past two or three generations is itself in rapid transition, with institutions and customs in which every decade sees striking and bewildering alterations.

The contrasts between the two cultures in the phases of life dealt with in this chapter have been especially great and the results of the collision correspondingly disruptive. The Chinese large family, with its early marriages arranged by the elders, has been brought into touch with a family that is small and in which the young people choose their own mates. Moreover, the family of the Occident is itself being dealt staggering blows, particularly by the mechanization and urbanization of modern life. Divorce has rapidly increased, and contraceptive practices and devices are widely, even if surreptitiously, employed. The restraint exercised on children by elders has sharply decreased, and the family as a social and economic unit is threatened. It is a family life with such characteristics that has impinged upon China.

The West that China has known is one in which the relations between the sexes are not only strikingly different from those insisted upon by older Chinese custom, but have also been rapidly changing. Men and women have traditionally mingled freely. There has been added in the course of the past hundred years or so the feminist movement, with much greater liberty for women. This has been in startling contrast with the separation of the social life of the sexes in the traditional China and with the subordination of women to men and the sharp occupational divergences between them.

The sacrifice of the individual to the group in the older China was quite the opposite of the individualism of the Occident of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century. That individualism is now threatened by such systems as communism and socialism, but it still characterizes much of the West.

Moreover, the differences between the relative social status of classes in China and the Occident has been very great. In the West, as has been remarked, by tradition the soldier has been the ruler, and the aristocracy has been militaristic in its traditions and moral ideals. At times that supremacy has been challenged and modified by the Church and of late years by democratically elected civil authorities and by merchant and industrial magnates, especially in such newer countries as the United States, Canada, and Australia. It still remains, however, even though shaken. In China, in theory the scholar was the most highly esteemed and the soldier was tolerated only as a necessary evil. It must be added, however, that practically all Chinese dynasties were founded by successful warriors, and that repeatedly the military were supreme.

In recreation the Occident—especially the Anglo-Saxon portion of it—has stressed athletics, and the recent historic China did not. Western forms of amusement in which both sexes participate, especially dancing, are quite alien to the Chinese tradition, and to old-fashioned Chinese even seemed immoral. Such recent Occidental inventions as the "movie" and the "talkie" are also a marked innovation.

This Western social life, so different from that of the Middle Kingdom of the nineteenth century, poured into China through many channels. For more than a century foreign merchants, consuls, diplomats, and members of the customs service lived in the great ports and in some of the smaller ones. Christian missionaries were widely scattered, not only in the cities but also in the towns, and in the interior as well as on the coast and along the main rivers. In the twentieth century Chinese students went abroad by the thousands and a large proportion of them saw Occidental life, not in smaller university centers, where the changes affecting the West were not so obvious, but in such cities as New York, Paris, Berlin, London, and Moscow, where the new forces affecting the Occident are the most powerful. It was this ultra-modern Western life which they tended to reproduce when once more in China. Chinese emigrants to America and to the lands to the south of China returned with new ideas. Their influence was felt most markedly on the south coast. The "movies," especially those of American origin, with their bizarre exaggeration of certain phases of Western life—usually the less desirable—became immensely popular and were an agency for the spread of Western ideals and institutions in badly distorted forms. Translations of foreign literature of many types were issued in quantities. Some of the large cities are centers from which the new forces have streamed out into the surrounding country. This has been particularly true of the commercial and financial metropolis, Shanghai—that hybrid of the West and China, with the Occidental elements obvious and dominant—and latterly of Peking. The result of these varied influences from the West has been that China has been brought in touch with many

different types of Occidental life, including, and often especially, those in which the recent changes have been most apparent.

The revolution in Chinese social life has been hastened by the introduction of many of the mechanical devices that have had so large a share in altering the West. The factory has made its appearance and industrialism has been especially pushed by the Communists. The candle or crude oil lamp has been widely displaced by the kerosene lamp and the electric globe. The automobile, by drawing towns and villages nearer together, has worked some of the alterations which rapid transportation has wrought in the West, including the breaking down of the relative isolation and economic and social self-sufficiency of the village and small town and the spread of customs and ideas from the urban centers.

In view of all these factors it is not surprising that Chinese social life and institutions have been largely overturned. Some of the innovations have been mentioned. For the sake of a complete picture, however, the entire range must here be summarized.

By the 1930's and 1940's marked changes were in progress in the family. In some districts the large families, in which three generations or even four had lived together in one compound, diminished in number, and the small families, made up of a husband and wife and their children, increased. The religious functions of the family were in places disappearing, the old forms connected with it falling into desuetude. In the cities the economic ties that once held the family together were being dissolved. The authority the family had over its members was also weakened.

In the 1930's and 1940's even more radical were the innovations in the institution of marriage. Many young people insisted upon arranging their own engagements, although probably in the large majority of instances these were still negotiated by parents. The object of modern youth in marriage, moreover, was less and less the continuation of the family line and the succession of male heirs to perpetuate the traditional honors to ancestors and was more and more their own happiness. There entered as a controlling factor for many the romanticism so prevalent in the modern Occident, with its idea that marriage should be based upon reciprocal attraction and the ability of two souls to supplement each other, that its primary object is to satisfy the desires, both physical and spiritual, of a man and a woman, and that children and the family line are quite secondary and perhaps even unwelcome. Marriage ceremonies were often altered by "modern" young people. It must be noted, however, that with all his talk of romantic love, the young man, when he came actually to the choice of a wife, based his selection upon such grounds as education, earning capacity, and the ability to run a house—much as his parents would have done.

Also in the 1930's and 1940's the relations between men and women

were modified. The sexes enjoyed much freer social intercourse. The Western dance came into some advanced groups—usually centering in "returned students." Among students particularly a great amount of interest in sex was displayed, with much discussion and no little experimentation. The assertive individualism which was one of the outstanding concomitants of the disintegration of the old order insisted upon the right of each, whether man or woman, to consult first his or her personal interests.

Especially were women declaring that they have a right to their own careers and to a share in occupations and diversions formerly monopolized by men. Coeducation became the rule in higher education. The feminism of the Occident made itself felt.

The extent of these innovations in the family in the 1930's and 1940's, in the relations of the sexes, and in the position of women could easily be exaggerated. Students were usually the ones most deeply involved and they formed only a minority even of the sections of the population within their own age groups. Factory workers were affected, but the industrial revolution had touched only a small proportion of the Chinese. Among the masses, particularly in the country, the old family and the old customs and ideals were fairly generally maintained. China was still predominantly rural, and in Chinese farming communities there remained most of the economic, social, and religious factors which had given strength to the traditional family. In many cities the innovations, while coming in rapidly, had not prevailed. Even in the cities on the coast and on the main rivers and railroads, where the changes were most marked, and among those with a modern education, there were conservatives who clung to the old ways.

It was inevitable that the introduction of the new mores should be accompanied by much maladjustment and unhappiness. In breaking with the old some men and women came to moral and physical shipwreck. Many marriages were made unhappy. In numerous instances a boy who received a modern training was betrothed or married to a girl who had been reared in the old manner, and the two not only had little in common but failed to understand and help each other. Some such couples succeeded in making a satisfactory adjustment and achieved a happy family life. Others simply endured each other. Some women with a modern training failed to find a man whom they were content to marry and lived a celibate existence—although that was still very much more rare, even among the most Westernized, than in the Occident.

By the 1930's and 1940's the individualism of the nineteenth century Occident had entered China. It was accentuated by the weakening of many of the old forms of social control and of traditional moral standards, and by the political and economic distress which set many adrift from their

former moorings. The sudden release from these restraints, and the collapse for many of the former methods of obtaining a livelihood, led to much exaggerated and unregulated individualism. At the same time and in contradiction to this individualism new forms of mass action emerged. Anti-foreign boycotts were nation-wide and very effective. Labor unions and the strike appeared.

Following the Revolution of 1911 a modification came in the traditional relative social standing of the various occupations. Under the Nationalists the military authorities were usually dominant. Military drill was given a place on the school curriculum and in some instances was demanded by the students. Many students and educational authorities, seeing their country prostrate before a militarized Occident and Japan, and being intensely nationalistic, were convinced that salvation could come only as China adopted the methods of the Occident and Japan and defeated her oppressors with their own weapons.

By the 1930's and 1940's the characteristics of the intelligentsia were changing. Scholars trained by the old methods passed off the scene and were replaced by those educated in the Occident or Japan, or in China by Western or semi-Western methods. Students were actively interested in politics, both national and international. Repeatedly they joined in boycotts directed against an obnoxious nation, especially Japan. In most of this political activity students were manipulated by skillful agitators of more mature years. With the decay of Confucianism, and with the smaller part occupied by the older literature in the curriculum, the moral standards of students tended to vary from those of earlier years. The influence of Confucianism waned.

In the 1930's and 1940's the old forms of etiquette were passing. Those who adhered to them were at the best thought of as gentlemen of the old school and at the worst as hopelessly out of date. Less respect was shown for age and for teachers. Hand-shaking after the Western fashion became good form, and the old profound bow was replaced by a more moderate one. The elaborate polite terminology was abbreviated. In the transition some individuals displayed an absence of any kind of good manners and a good deal of rudeness.

There was widespread adoption of Western dress among the upper economic and social groups, especially for school uniforms and by the military, although with waves of nationalism, occasional reactions toward Chinese costumes were seen. The queue began passing before 1911, and after the revolution of that year it rapidly disappeared. Women and especially school girls bobbed their hair. The custom of binding the feet of girls ceased.

By the 1930's and 1940's marked innovations came in recreation. Athletics became good form, particularly in the schools. Such games as

tennis, requiring quickness and accuracy, were popular. Soccer football and basketball were played by even a larger number. Active sports were taken up in the schools for girls, and the contrast was almost bewildering between many of the young women who were the products of the new education, with their skill in tennis and swimming, and their mothers and grandmothers, swaying painfully along on their bound feet.

Moving pictures achieved popularity. With their passion for the theatre, the Chinese took quickly to the cinema. Western music came in somewhat through the churches but chiefly through "brass bands" which often formed a prominent feature of processions and of the entourage of high officials. The phonograph was widely used. The Chinese themselves produced extensively for the cinema and the phonograph, and the radio became popular.

The old-style tobacco pipe was supplanted by the cigarette, and the consumption of tobacco in this form enormously increased.

Change came in the rhythm of vacation and work. The Western Sunday was usually observed as a day of rest by government offices, by some government institutions such as post offices and state banks, by schools, and by a few private business houses. This was not because of the religious significance of the day, but must be ascribed to Western secular practice. The government, too, adopted the Western solar calendar and endeavored to discourage and even to forbid the observance of the old New Year. But the attempt did not meet with universal success. New holidays were brought into the calendar, such as the observance of the "Double Tenth"—the anniversary of the first Revolution (October 10, 1911)—and of Sun Yat-sen's death (March 12). Certain "Humiliation Days" were observed, chiefly by students, notably those in May commemorating the forcing on China of the Sino-Japanese treaties and notes of 1915 and the shooting of students in Shanghai on May 30, 1925. Some of the old festival customs fell into abeyance—for example, the dragon-boat races on the fifth day of the fifth moon.

Dislocation was brought into the routine of Chinese life by Western mechanical inventions, such as the electric light, the automobile, the kerosene lamp, and modern water systems, with their conveyance of a larger supply of that commodity than formerly and by pipes and faucets rather than by the water-carrier and his pails. The wider and straighter streets driven through many of the cities in imitation of the Occident, and the removal of some of the city walls, tended to produce changes in urban customs.

The mastery of the mainland by the Communists added speed to the changes and rapidly erased most of such remnants of the past as had survived the earlier alterations. As we have seen, the Communists attacked the Confucian family. They pushed industrialization. They employed the

theatre, the cinema, the press, and the radio for propaganda and the effort to further the adoption of their ideology. Dress of a utilitarian Western kind was the fashion. October 1, as the day of the inauguration of the People's Republic of China, was substituted for the "Double Tenth." The change in the status of women was accelerated. The old individualism was denounced as bourgeois and regimentation became the rule. Strictness in sexual relations was encouraged. Service to the people and the nation was inculcated. Travelers noted a prevalent courtesy to one another among both children and adults. Prostitution and begging were for a time markedly reduced and in some places seemingly eliminated. Yet early in the 1960's they were again appearing.

On T'aiwan and in Hong Kong some remnants of the old China were seen, but these, too, were passing.

SUMMARY

The social institution and the customs of the China which entered the twentieth century had not been static. Across the centuries they had again and again been modified. But at the close of the nineteenth century they were the product of a long evolution and were integral parts of the civilization of the Middle Kingdom. In the twentieth century the impact of the West worked on accelerating revolution. By the time of the Communist mastery of the mainland the old was rapidly passing. The Communists stepped up the pace. They were intent on creating a new China and were impatient with remnants of the old, which seemed to them to impede their program. Something of the old persisted under the Nationalists on T'aiwan and in Hong Kong under the deliberately neutral British administration. But even there it was passing.

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CHAPTER NINETEEN

# ART

Contrary to an impression widespread in the West, China is a land of beauty. Hills and mountains, valleys and gorges, some of them of surpassing grandeur, characterize much of her landscape. For those who have ever felt her charm, China holds an inescapable fascination. In spite of the gray, dusty plains of her North, the dirt of many of her streets, the poverty of her masses, and the disrepair into which the relics of her past have often been allowed to drift, she casts her spell over those who are long within her borders and are at all sensitive to beauty. No one who has traveled much in China can easily escape the haunting memories of sights and sounds that have stirred him to the depths: the glow of the sunset on distant bare peaks, thundercaps over mountains and fertile plains, evening twilight on a pagoda-crowned hill above the quiet reaches of a river, the antiphonal, wordless chanting of laboring coolies in the drowsy heat of a summer afternoon, the sweep of the Yangtze, the charm of an old painting which a succession of faithful hands now long since gone have handed down through many generations, the well-proportioned contours of a garden, or the impressive courts and magnificent, time-mellowed colors of the palaces of Peking.

## HISTORICAL SUMMARY

In earlier chapters we have recorded something of the history of Chinese art and have noted how varied and rich has been that phase of the culture of the Empire. We have seen, too, that art has by no means been uniform either in quality or in characteristics, but that it has had distinct periods. Here, as in so many other respects, over the course of the centuries the civilization of China has exhibited anything but a uniform or monotonous aspect.

There is the pottery of prehistoric times with its markings and colored surfaces. From the Shang are "oracle bones," the writing on which shows skill and taste, and some jade. From the Shang are also bronzes—weapons and vessels of various kinds—and a few marble figures. While obviously archaic, they possess vigor as well as grace of outline—the bronzes with geometrical designs and more or less conventionalized animal forms. They bear witness to a civilization that was no longer primitive. Under the Shang the casting of bronze reached a level that was never surpassed.

From the Chou, with its long duration and lasting into the third century B.C., a large number of objects remain. Bronze weapons, vessels of many shapes, and bells are fairly numerous. On some is seen the favorite design of an ogre, or glutton, the *t'ao t'ieh.* There are pieces of jade, many of them symbols of Heaven and Earth. For centuries the Confucian Temple in the capital housed the famous ten stone drums, boulders roughly hewn and bearing inscriptions in archaic characters. Much of the early art of the Chou was a continuation of that of the Shang, but with modifications. Toward the latter part of the dynasty new influences entered, possibly Scythian, from that great region in Central Europe–Asia with which the Chinese have through many centuries been in touch, even though usually indirectly, and from which have repeatedly come contributions to Chinese culture. Late in the Chou a wide variety developed in the many states. Bronze casting again became superb and jade was skillfully worked. Many luxury items have been brought to light.

Artistically the Ch'in was in large part an extension of the latter part of the Chou, but with increasing liveliness of style and a certain exuberance and flamboyance, which may have been due in part to the general temper of the times and in part to contacts with the outside world. Influences may have entered through the conquest of Ch'u, whose culture in some respects differed from that of the North.

With the Han great changes occurred. A simplicity and severity of decoration and of outline were often seen. A tendency was displayed to return to the styles of the Chou, as was to be expected from the revival and study of ancient literature. At the same time there entered much more of movement and of the attempt to portray life and the forms of animals and men as they really were. More was made of man than in earlier art, possibly as a result of Confucianism. Stories of examplars of Confucian virtues were depicted. Surviving stone sculptures portray battles and scenes at court, hunting, processions, and animals, men, and gods in groups or singly, with a naturalness and a freedom of action which are in striking contrast with the work of artists of preceding centuries and which still help to make vivid the life and the mythology of the age. A similar naturalness and delight in action are seen in the figures on bronzes and jades and in terra cotta funerary figurines. Marked development was registered in ceramics, both plain and glazed. A few examples of the lacquer ware of the dynasty survive. Painting and its closely allied art, calligraphy, were represented. We begin to get some clear ideas of architecture, partly from contemporary terra cotta models, partly from sculptures on the walls of tombs, and partly from a few extant examples, such as walls and forts on the western frontiers.

Some of the artistic developments and innovations of the Han can be proved to have been due to stimulus from the outside. Certain Han motifs,

for example, are similar to those in the central and western Asia and in the Europe of the time. What are known as Scytho-Sarmatian influences were present. Much of the Han artistic novelty, however, was due to that new burst of life and that prosperity which characterized so much of the China under the Han.

In the period of disunion and civil strife that intervened between the Han and the Sui, art by no means disappeared. No sudden break occurred, and it is often difficult to know whether to assign surviving objects to the Han or to the immediate post-Han centuries. However, modifications and innovations were made. In the states ruled by the barbarians from the north and west it was to be expected that new influences would be at work. Buddhism especially brought with it much that was revolutionary. With Buddhism came many buddhas and bodhisattvas and new gods. With it, too, entered vivid ideas of the future life, of heavens and hells, and many stories of the worthies of the faith, which inspired images, carvings, and paintings. Moreover, with the foreign religion came exotic artistic traditions and techniques. We have seen that much of the early Buddhist iconography—the Gandhara School—that evolved under the influence of Greek art was transmitted to China. Other, more distinctly Indian, influences also entered—notably that of the Gupta era (fourth and fifth centuries). Statues and frescoes, some of gigantic proportions on cliffs and in grottoes, and others smaller and even in miniature, were produced. Especially notable were the sculptures of the Northern Wei, that state founded by the T'u Pa (or Toba) conquerors. One of the greatest of Chinese painters, Ku K'ai-chih, belongs to the period, and the canons of Chinese pictorial art as then defined long remained standard. Lay as well as religious subjects were portrayed. New forms of architecture appeared in monasteries and pagodas.

Buddhism was by no means the only foreign influence that entered during the centuries of division. In that Central Asia with which China was in touch were other currents. For example, Persia, through the powerful Sassanid rule, was making itself felt. While these varied strands are seen most distinctly in remains disclosed in recent decades in the ruins on western frontiers of the then China, in what is now Sinkiang, at least some are distinguishable in China proper.

With the unification of China under the Sui and the T'ang, the Empire entered upon a new period of artistic development. Again no sharp break severed the old from the new. The T'ang saw Chinese Buddhism reach its apex and begin its decline. The Chinese soul, stirred profoundly by the Indian faith, expressed itself aesthetically to no small degree in Buddhist forms, although the older Chinese tradition, represented by a vigorous Taoism and a revived Confucianism, remained strong. Much of the impulse seen in the Northern Wei carried over into the Sui. Chinese pilgrims, re-

turning from their pious journeys, helped to keep their native land in touch with the religious art of India. The wealth and power of China under the T'ang naturally favored extensive artistic production. T'ang conquests in Central Asia strengthened contacts with the diverse artistic traditions and movements of that region. There was much Buddhist sculpture. The realistic reproduction of movement and of the human form contributed to the distinctiveness of the work of the era. The depiction of actual life was very marked in such kinds of objects as were becoming emancipated from religious influences, notably funerary earthenware figures. From them, so full of expression and of pulsing action, it is possible to reproduce much of the customs and the dress of the period. Bronzes continued to be produced, among them, as under the Han, decorated mirrors. The traditional popularity of jade persisted, and many were the forms in which this semiprecious stone was painstakingly carved. Painting flourished, with religious (chiefly Buddhist and Taoist) and secular subjects. He who is sometimes regarded as the greatest Chinese painter of all time, Wu Tao Tzŭ, belongs, it will be remembered, to the T'ang. Marked development was made in pottery: glazes were more skillfully used than heretofore, there was an improvement in the forms of vases, and true porcelain appeared.

Under the Sung sculpture declined, but painting, and especially landscapes, attained new heights. In an earlier chapter we have noted some of the reasons for the emphasis upon this type of painting and have noticed that the landscapes of subsequent periods have never surpassed and have seldom if ever equaled those of the Sung masters. We may add that among the reasons for the popularity of landscapes was the desire to escape from the urban life that was burgeoning under the Sung and to find surcease in mountains and streams. We have also seen that porcelains of fine quality, predominantly with monochrome glazes, were produced in great quantities.

The Yüan dynasty, being that of Mongol conquerors who furthered contacts with aliens, brought a fresh influx of foreign impulses. These were especially seen in a reaction from landscapes and in a vivid portrayal of action, notably in the horses which the Mongol riders of the steppes and deserts so much admired. Persian influences were also present. As was to be expected, however, older forms and schools persisted, for the rule of the Mongols over all China spanned scarcely two generations.

Under the Ming it was secular art in which the greatest achievements were registered. Religious art continued, but the fervor and vigor of both Buddhism and Taoism were declining, and inspiration and creative genius were disappearing from the portrayal of religious subjects. Painting remained popular, with landscapes, flowers, birds, animals, and scenes from everyday life among its leading subjects, but while it was often elaborate and painstaking, with a highly developed technique, it did not equal the best of the Sung. Porcelain was made in large quantities; polychrome decora-

tion, often rich and varied, predominated. Articles of luxury—rugs, embroideries, bronzes, jades, lacquers, ivory, and the like—were produced for the wealthy and powerful often with cunning and a lavish expenditure of time and labor, for under the Ming and the Ch'ing, except for the disorders of the seventeenth century and the latter half of the nineteenth, China was as prosperous as it had ever been. The Ming, too, was an age of building, when many of the walls, bridges, and palaces were constructed which constituted the chief architectural features of the China of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Ch'ing made no marked departure from the Ming.

This brief sketch, inadequate though it is, will at least show that the course of Chinese art has been marked by great periods, each with its distinct characteristics.

Yet through all the centuries ran a continuity. With their admiration for the past, the Chinese loved and tended to reproduce the forms of the earliest ages. In the bronzes of the Ch'ing are objects which obviously took their inspiration from those of the Chou and the Shang, and the porcelain and pewter of the Ming and the Ch'ing often showed respect for antiquity. The architecture of the Han, as we see it depicted in grave sculptures and pottery, was obviously in the ancestral line of the palaces, walls, and temples of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. When, as often, the Chinese accepted foreign contributions, they were seldom slavish imitators but placed their own stamp upon them. The Chinese artistic genius has had distinct features and characteristics.

If, as some maintain, art is the expression of a people's soul, and if a civilization can be epitomized in its aesthetic forms, then Chinese culture has been most varied. The magnificence of its imperial ideal—a single state governing all mankind—has been set forth in the imposing walls and impressive palaces of its capital. The long struggle to defend the prosperous plains from the barbarian is pictured by the Great Wall. The sense of moderation, so prized in its Confucian philosophy, has been given concrete expression in the repose of well-proportioned courts and buildings. The desire to be at one with the soul back of the visible universe is seen in the landscapes of Sung masters. The vision of a life beyond the grave as given by Buddhism and Taoism is made vivid in many paintings and sculptures. The delicate, almost feminine sensitiveness of the race may be divined in many a picture of flowers and animals and in intricate carving. In some of the temple representations of hell is the coarse vigor of Chinese popular life.

To do as we have done in several of the immediately preceding chapters, and describe this phase of Chinese life as it was in the nineteenth century on the eve of the great change brought by the impact of the Occident, would scarcely be adequate. The decadence of the Ch'ing, which helped cast a

blight over much of Chinese genius, was reflected as clearly in art as in any phase of culture. We must, rather, attempt to show the main characteristics and the total achievement of the Chinese in the chief divisions of art and then indicate something of the effect of the West upon them.

## ARCHITECTURE

Although for more than two thousand years the Chinese have been erecting buildings and walls, some of them of gigantic proportions, surprisingly few of the existing structures are very old. A comparatively small number go back as far as the T'ang and the Sung or even to the Yüan. Most of those which can boast of more than a century of age were put up, at least substantially as they are now, only in the Ming or in the prosperous first century and a half of the Ch'ing. To be sure, some walls of the Han are extant, largely because they have been preserved in the desert air of the western frontiers. There are many tombs from the Han and even earlier. A few rock-hewn temples have come down from T'ang and even pre-T'ang times, and a number of pagodas built under the Sung and T'ang can still be seen. Here and there are a very few temples that were probably erected before the T'ang. So, too, there are ancient stone bridges. Compared with the extent and richness of Chinese culture, however, the archaeologist interested in architecture has available much less surviving material than in such sites of old civilizations as Mesopotamia, the Nile Valley, and the shores of the Mediterranean.

This dearth of structures of pre-Ming times is not due to the absence of building in these centuries. From books and paintings we know that the land had palaces and temples, some of them as huge as could be found anywhere in the world of their time. The great wall built on the northern marches by Ch'in Shih Huang Ti must have dwarfed the seven wonders of the Mediterranean world, and the imperial residence which he erected at his capital was enormous. So, too, the palaces of Han and the T'ang must have been very extensive. At the height of the T'ang, Ch'angan was unequaled by the other metropolises of that era in the number of its dwellings and in the spaciousness and dignity of its walls and palaces. Marco Polo, who had been in many of the great cities of his day, saw Hangchow only a few years after it had ceased to be the capital of the Sung and described it as pre-eminent "to all others in the world, in point of grandeur and beauty." From the extent of its walls, which can even now be traced, from the accounts of contemporary travelers, and from such a surviving monument as the Drum Tower, we can form some conception of the extent and architectural magnificence of Cambaluc under the Mongols.

The lack of buildings and walls from ancient times is due largely to the

perishable nature of the materials. Wood has been extensively employed. As a rule, indeed, it has been the chief reliance for the framework not only of private houses but also of palaces and temples. Brick has been utilized to fill in walls or for supporting platforms, and not to hold up roofs. Stone appears chiefly in ornamental trimmings. Since the great frontier ramparts and the walls of cities have usually been of rubble lined with brick, and sometimes even of tamped unbaked earth, they have not stood up as well as they would have if they had been of stone.

In spite of the paucity of ancient monuments, it is possible to learn a good deal of the architecture of pre-Ming centuries and to know something of the main stages of its development. Japan possesses very old wooden buildings which have escaped the ravages of fire and war, and since some of these caught their inspiration from Chinese models, we can form an idea of what the latter were like. Wall sculptures from the Han and later dynasties not infrequently portray buildings, and paintings of the T'ang and Sung of which we have either the originals or copies often include pictures of buildings, from simple huts to palaces and temples. The great wealth of Chinese literature that has come down to us from previous centuries contains useful information. There is at least one detailed treatise on architecture from as early as the Sung.

We cannot here go into this history. It must be noted, however, that non-Chinese influences entered, with marked results. Buddhism particularly brought new forms, some of them Indian or of other provenance. Yet, although factors from abroad were often potent, architecture remained distinctively Chinese. Alien patterns were altered to fit the national tradition.

Without attempting to arrange them in any logical order, the main characteristics that have run through most of Chinese architecture may be enumerated about as follows. First may be mentioned the desire to make the works of man accord with the universe. From early times it was felt that if man is to prosper he must not antagonize or even strive to master the world about him but must seek to put himself in harmony with it. This conviction was expressed in part in *fêng shui*. As we have seen, *fêng shui* often determined the location of houses and especially of tombs, and the arrangement of the units of these structures.

Walls have been prominent. Every city has had one. The passion to conform to Western example has torn down numbers of them, but some survive. Their primary purpose was defense. Even villages might be surrounded by mud ramparts as a protection against robbers. The city walls were often imposing. They were usually, as has just been said, of clay or earth faced with brick and in some instances were trimmed with stone. Many averaged twenty-five or thirty feet in height and at the top were twenty feet or more in breadth. A circumference of five or six miles was not unusual. In some of the chief cities, such as Peking, the walls were

higher and enclosed a larger area. City walls have been pierced by gates which usually were closed at nightfall and opened at dawn. Over the gates rose towers, many of them several stories in height, and in front were sometimes secondary, curtaining walls, with a gate or gates entering obliquely. The wall was often surrounded by a moat, and its top was crenelated.

As we have seen, the Great Wall, called by the Chinese the *Wan-li-ch'ang-ch'êng,* "the Ten Thousand Li Long Wall," along the northern frontier of China proper, has a long history. Sections of it were in existence before Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, and that great monarch completed the barrier. It was repaired and rebuilt again and again, sometimes not on the original course of the old. As it exists now it dates from several periods and is of more than one type of construction. The latest thoroughgoing repairs seem to have been given it under the Ming, and two hundred miles or more were added under that dynasty. The Ch'ing were masters of Manchuria and Mongolia, against inroads from which the wall had been designed. Accordingly, they did not have as much need for it as did the Ming. The Wall stretches from Shanhaikuan into Kansu, a distance, with all its windings, of over fifteen hundred miles. In several places it is double and even triple, thus affording more than one line of defense. Sometimes the successive barriers are many miles apart. Built with an eye for strategic positions, the Great Wall follows mountain crests and takes advantage of narrow gorges. In height it ranges from fifteen to fifty feet, with towers rising at intervals above it. At its base its width is from fifteen to thirty feet and at its top twelve feet or more. On its outer side, for much of the distance, is a moat. The material varies. On the eastern reaches, where it has been in the best repair, the Wall usually has an earth or rubble core faced with either brick or stone, bound together by an excellent mortar. Many of the stones are huge hewn granite blocks, some of them fourteen feet long and three or four feet thick. In the western sections the Wall has often been carved out of the loess and faced with stone, or made of loess watered and tamped into wooden forms. In much of Kansu it has been simply an earthen bank. Behind it at intervals were permanent camps for the garrisons.

Walls have been used not only for cities and for imperial defense but also to enclose temples, palaces, and private homes. From the outside, nearly every such Chinese structure presented the aspect of a blank screen, at proper places pierced by gates which in turn were often shielded by curtaining walls. The wall might show a little variation and some of the interior buildings might rise above the parapet, but the exterior frequently gave little clue to the quiet courts and gardens within.

Another feature of Chinese architecture has been the enclosed court. In temples, palaces, and dwellings of any size the individual units have as

a rule been grouped about quadrangles, sometimes square and sometimes elongated. Most buildings have been one or two stories in height, and more space was usually obtained, not by adding stories, as is so often done in the Occident, but by adding courts. The best of Chinese buildings preserved a proportion between the width of courts and the heights and forms of buildings that was both impressive and restful.

A characteristic already hinted at has been the extensive use of wood. A few buildings have had stone pillars, but in the vast majority the framework has been timber. Wooden pillars have been used to support the roof, and the entire structure has been tied together by beams of the same material. The walls—of brick or wood or sometimes of plastered wattled or tamped earth—have been simply for purposes of enclosure. In this respect the typical Chinese house has resembled the steel construction of a modern Occidental office building.

Many of the beams have been left exposed. The walls might be built around the inner row of pillars, and the outer row be left unenclosed. The supporting pillars might be painted or coated with lacquer and the beams carved or painted in conventional designs of various colors. In this manner the exposed wooden framework became an ornamental feature, and the view upward, toward the beams and rafters that support the roof, could be made very attractive.

Chinese pillars have been without capitals, in the Western sense of that word. Often wooden brackets at the top have given the appearance of helping to support the beam above and so prevent the transition from seeming abrupt. Usually, too, there have been pedestals, some of them small, but many of them large and highly ornamented.

As a rule, important buildings have been placed on platforms faced with brick or stone. Some of the platforms have been low, requiring only one or two steps to mount them. Many, however, have been quite high, necessitating a dozen or more steps. The platforms and the stairways have often been set off by balustrades of stone, brick, or wood, in numerous instances elaborately carved. The stairways themselves might be broad, and frequently two rows of steps have been separated by an inclined face displaying an elaborately carved dragon. There might be three sets of steps mounting the platform, especially if the surmounting building had three doorways, as was so often the case.

One of the most prominent features of a Chinese building has been the roof. It is possible that the platform was designed to preserve a balance and to keep the roof from seeming out of proportion. Sometimes roofs have been double or even triple, the eaves of the second and the third being set back from the one below, and each upper one being raised above the one underneath by a wall or a kind of clerestory with supporting pillars. They have usually been tiled, although thatch was often employed in poorer

houses. In many instances, especially in such structures as temples and palaces, the tiles have been covered with a colored glaze. No one who has seen them can forget the yellow roofs of the imperial palaces of Peking or the blue of the Temple of Heaven. Often the main lines of the roofs have been emphasized by tiles curiously shaped in conventional geometric patterns or in the form of dragons or of other animals mythical or real. Sometimes the decorations have been in bronze or iron. Often the crown of the roofs has been mounted by especially elaborate decorations of designs of varying history and origin. The eaves have usually been prominent and terminated by ornate tiles. The curved eaves are familiar to all who know anything about Chinese buildings. The origin of the curve is uncertain. The surviving representations of Han buildings do not have it, and it seems not to have entered until the first millennium of our era. It may have been adopted to afford relief from the severely straight lines which the heavy projecting roof would otherwise present, or it may have been devised to let in more light.

Not much has been made of the gable ends, although these have often been decorated. Most Chinese buildings have been elongated rectangles and have been intended to be viewed from the side rather than the end. It was the broad façade in which the door or doors were placed and from which the sweep of the roof could be seen to best advantage.

Much color has been employed, and generally, even to the uninitiated Westerner, with pleasing effect. When it is said baldly that the roofs of some buildings have been yellow and their walls red, and that the timbers have been ornamented with elaborate designs in bright and variegated colors, to one who had never seen them the results might be thought rather bizzare. When actually viewed, however, they usually seemed eminently fitting and in excellent taste.

Many buildings have had a great deal of lattice-work, some of it elaborately carved. Chinese construction lent itself to this, for since the weight of the roof was carried by pillars the walls did not need to be substantial but could be perforated as much as the architect desired.

Chinese buildings have displayed more variety than the preceding account with its impressions of rectilinear courts and flanking structures might indicate. The Chinese have often employed the octagonal pavilion, generally for decorative purposes. Even walls of cities and rectangular courts and buildings lend themselves to many combinations.

The architecture of much of the Yangtze Valley and the South differed in part from that of the North. The former showed a greater tendency to flamboyance and to exaggerated curves in the roof.

The pagoda has been prominent. As we now see it, it is a Chinese development. It came, however, from Buddhism. It appears to have taken its inspiration, at least in part, from the stupa, a structure which seems

originally to have been for the housing of relics of Buddhist saints, and it is of Indian provenance. Pagodas began to be built in China not long after the introduction of Buddhism. Several can still be seen that were erected during the T'ang and the Sung. Pagodas seldom have more than fifteen stories. The total is always uneven, for popular Buddhism set more value by odd than by even numbers. Pagodas may be very high. One is known which towers to three hundred and sixty feet. The material varies. In some instances it has been wood, but, naturally, the structures which survive are mostly of brick or stone. Often they are octagonal and frequently they are square, but the shape and size vary greatly. The pagoda largely lost its close connection with Buddhism and came to be associated with *fêng shui.* It was generally under the guidance of this pseudo science and to insure good fortune to a city or a site that the pagodas—at least the later ones—were erected. While very few, if any, were built in the twentieth century, hundreds of those constructed by earlier generations are still to be seen, picturesque features of many a landscape.

Bridges have been another characteristic work of the Chinese builder. A large proportion are of stone. Many have a single arch, some of them, perhaps for the purpose of allowing boats to pass, made high and ascended by steps. Others have several arches. Many are constructed of huge stones laid longitudinally and supported by piers. There have been some suspension bridges, but these have usually been over the mountain torrents in the West.

A familiar feature of Chinese cities is the *p'ai lou* or *p'ai fang*, the memorial arch. At least under the Ch'ing, these could be erected only by imperial permission. They were in honor of distinguished officials, of local worthies noted for their virtue or learning, for centenarians, for families who had lived together for several generations, for women who won celebrity by a life of virtuous widowhood from youth to old age, or for those memorable for other meritorious action. Sometimes they have not been commemorative but simply decorative. As a rule they have consisted of four pillars supporting transverse stones and presenting three passages, the central one wider than the others. Often, however, they have had only one passage, and a good many have had five. Some have been of wood.

Graves are inevitable concomitants of a Chinese landscape. Some are quite elaborate. Imperial tombs generally cover a fairly large area. With their great courts, their avenues, their numerous buildings, and their sense of dignified repose, they are very impressive, even in decay.

Many travelers declare Peking to be achitecturally the most majestic city they have ever seen. That is not solely or perhaps entirely because to the Westerner it appears exotic. It is rather because it is so fittingly constructed for the capital of an Empire that professed to rule all of civilized humanity. Its high walls with the higher towers above the gates have

seemed in themselves symbols of dignity and power. Its distances and its broad main streets, some of them straight, so in contrast to many of the other old cities of the world, give a sense of spaciousness. Its temples, especially that constructed for the worship of Heaven, bespeak an order which sought to harmonize the forces of all nature for the welfare of all mankind. But especially do the imperial palaces, including their present use by the Communists, create the impression of empire. Placed in the center of a city which in itself is imposing, they symbolize a power to which all the rest is but ancillary. In dynastic days, to the envoy bringing the homage of a tributary state, the entire setting must have inspired awe: the entrance through the towering city wall, the broad avenue leading to the Imperial City, progress through an imposing gateway which formed the main entrance to the imperial precincts, then a succession of great courts flanked by well-proportioned buildings, resplendent in their yellow tiled roofs and highly colored walls, and at last, after passage across a huge court, the imperial throne room and the imperial presence. It must all have been most telling, especially when, as on important occasions, the courts were the scene of stately ceremonial and were flanked by the many dignitaries in their gorgeous official robes and by uniformed servants and soldiers. Through centuries of experience the Chinese learned to construct a capital to conform to their vision of a world-embracing rule and civilization.

### GARDENS

With the Chinese, the art of garden planting has been closely related to architecture. Not only have buildings often been designed to fit into rather than to dominate nature, but through gardens that adjustment has been furthered. Buddhist and Taoist monasteries and temples were often placed in mountain valleys. Trees and shrubs were encouraged to grow about them so that the buildings were half hidden and harmonized with their natural surroundings. Paths made accessible the chief beauty spots of the grounds. The Summer Palace outside Peking, although built in the years of the decay of the Ch'ing, displays remarkable success in the arrangement of buildings to fit in with the landscape and in the alteration of the landscape by roads, bridges, trees, and bodies of water in such fashion that, without seeming to do violence to it, it was made to contribute to the buildings and to the pleasure of the Court. So, too, the imperial palaces and their grounds in Peking, with their pools and artificial hills and their planting of shrubs, are examples of harmonious planning. The way in which the builder utilized the West Lake at Hangchow with its guardian hills is still another instance of Chinese skill in taking advantage of attractive scenery and enhancing its beauty and accessibility.

Many a private home had its gardens. These were usually formal and numbers of them had artificial rockeries which to the uninitiated Westerner seemed bizarre and grotesque. The garden was a miniature landscape, with hills, grottoes, crags, streams, trees, and lakes. Frequently doorways, some of them circular, afforded vistas of other sections of the garden. Walls with or without lattice work were added to the picture. Water was essential and was directed into pools, often lotus-covered, or into running streams. The Chinese gardener was a master of the art of dwarfing trees and of training them into shapes to suit his purposes. He rejoiced, too, in little hills crowned with small pavilions. Summerhouses, rustic bridges, and walks laid out in zigzag or winding designs were customary.

The range of flowers and decorative shrubs and trees utilized by the Chinese has not been as wide as the rich flora of the country would give reason to expect. However, the Chinese have cultivated a fairly large variety. Even in the poorest homes a flowering plant or two could often be seen, and the courtyards of inns and shops frequently had one or more of them. Avenues of trees were often planted as an approach to a tomb or a temple, many a tree was protected from the woodsman's ax by a wayside shrine, and, as we have seen, Buddhist and Taoist monasteries were usually embowered in groves. The Chinese have had floral calendars and have watched eagerly for the appearance of the first blossoms on certain trees and shrubs and might go in parties into the country to see them. Flowers have been favorite subjects for poems and paintings.

## SCULPTURE

In China sculpture has not usually been regarded so highly as have been some other branches of art—for example, painting. Few names of sculptors have come down to us, unless they are famous for other reasons. Yet much of Chinese sculpture, even though the work of unknown artisans, has been noteworthy, and the total quantity is enormous.

Chinese sculpture, as we have seen, reached its apex in the T'ang, under the inspiration of Buddhism. However, it was not confined to Buddhist subjects nor was it entirely a Buddhist creation. It was found at least as early as the Shang and a good many examples have survived from the Han, before Chinese art had been much affected by the foreign faith.

In themes Chinese sculptors have shown a great variety. They have not been much interested in the human form as such. They have depicted it extensively, and there have been many portrait statues. However, they have taken no such joy in it as did the artists of the ancient Graeco-Roman world and of the European Renaissance. As a rule the human body has been for them simply a means of expressing action or an idea or has been an object on which to drape clothing. Many Chinese sculptors, however, have re-

joiced in depicting animals. They have shown them in motion and at rest and have delighted in their play of muscles.

Some surviving examples of ancient sculpture are connected with graves. From the Han we have pillars that once formed a kind of entrance to the tomb enclosure. We have huge stone animals that were associated with tombs, vivid carvings on the walls of the tombs themselves of scenes from real life or from mythology, and earthen figures, some of them shaped in molds and others fashioned directly by the hands of the craftsmen. These general types were not confined to the Han, but persisted through several dynasties. Such were the terra cotta figurines, of which we have particularly beautiful examples from the T'ang. Such, too, were the monolithic figures, of animals and men, arranged in pairs on either side of a "spirit way" leading southward from the tomb. Apparently they were for the purpose of protecting it from evil influences, including malevolent spirits.

Some of the motifs of early tomb-statues were clearly foreign importations. Prominent among them was the lion, a beast which seems not to have existed in China, at least in large numbers, for some were sent as tribute, obviously as rarities. The idea of depicting the lion in stone appears to have been of non-Chinese origin. There were some winged beasts, reminiscent of the great figures in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, and very possibly historically connected with them. Central Asiatic influences, perhaps Iranian and Sarmatian, entered. We hear of huge bronze statues under the Chin, and the Han, but all these seem to have disappeared.

Most of the greatest Chinese sculpture was produced under the inspiration of Buddhism. That faith, as we have repeatedly seen, first made itself powerfully felt in the period of disunion between the Han and the Sui. With it came a rich iconography—of buddhas, bodhisattvas, gods, the lotus, and many another symbolic design. The impulses under which this Buddhist art had taken form were, as we have seen, varied. Some, notably those adopted on the northwestern borders of India, were Greek. Others were more fully Indian. Persian art, through the Sassanian Empire, made its influence felt, especially on minor decorations. Buddhist iconography had conventions—among them draperies and symbolic gestures and postures—which were rather inflexible and allowed the craftsman less freedom for the expression of individual genius than have some other artistic traditions. Yet the Chinese sculptor took over these alien forms and at his best improved them. Often he seems to have been a lay artisan who worked from a description rather than a model. Certainly he sometimes took liberties with tradition. He more nearly humanized the revered figures and gave them greater variety. In time, too, he made the mantle folds on the images more flowing and graceful. At its highest, Chinese Buddhist sculpture was of a better quality as an expression of artistic genius and even of

religious feeling and conviction than were Indian prototypes. The characteristic Buddhist statue shows repose, relaxation, meditation, and unperturbed calm. Into it could go much of the idealism and aspiration which Buddhism fostered.

Chinese Buddhist sculptors ventured on innovations. The stelae, for example, which they executed either were Chinese in origin or had been Sinicized in form and design. Memorial stelae seem first to have appeared in Han times and were elaborated in subsequent centuries. They bore inscriptions and sometimes figures, and often were mounted on tortoises and crowned with entwined dragons.

Since the greatest of Chinese Buddhist sculpture was executed in the first century of the T'ang and in pre-T'ang times, most of it has perished There remain, however, numerous examples, notably on cliffs and in grottoes. Prominent among them are the ones at Ta-t'ung, in Shansi, once a capital of the Northern Wei, at Tun-huang, in Kansu, and at Lung Mên, in Honan. Through extant specimens experts trace various periods. In the sculptures of the Northern Wei the Hellenistic influences which found such marked expression at Gandhara are strong. Into a transitional period shortly before the Sui and under the T'ang a new wave from India entered. The early years of the T'ang are characterized by a strength and a richness and exuberance of decoration in keeping with the vigorous years of that dynasty.

By the close of the seventh century Chinese Buddhist sculpture was declining in both quantity and quality. This is probably attributable in part to the fact that Chinese Buddhism was itself passing its zenith. Secular influences began to make themselves felt. More portrait statues appeared, among them those of monks and some of them obviously excellent likenesses. Even bodhisattvas were more humanized.

Under the Five Dynasties and the Sung, painting reached its greatest heights and absorbed much of the artistic genius of the Empire. Sculpture responded to the change and showed the effects of the popularity of the rival art. The sculptor worked less exclusively in stone and bronze, used more wood, clay, iron, and lacquer, and tended to treat his images with color. Kuan-yin, originally male, became female in form and acquired her now characteristic expression of womanly mercy and compassion.

Under the dynasties that conquered the North during the later centuries of the Sung a revival of Buddhist sculpture occurred—from what cause is uncertain. The Yüan brought modifications but no marked development or improvement.

Under the Ming quantities of religious figures were produced, for Buddhism was still popular. Probably because the faith was largely dependent on the momentum acquired in earlier, more pious generations and no longer attracted genius or quickened the imagination as it had in its years of greatest prosperity, most of the Buddhist images were now the

uninspired reproduction of stereotyped forms. Ming sculptors seem to have become enthusiastic only when they dealt with real life—as they did at times in a rather incidental fashion. They devoted much energy to the carving of columns and of architectural details, and usually were here at their best. Ch'ing Buddhist sculpture was chiefly a continuation of that of the Ming.

It must again be noted that, great as was its debt to Buddhism and the foreign influences of which Buddhism was the vehicle, Chinese sculpture, even in the most flourishing days of that faith, was by no means exclusively Buddhist. Secular monolithic figures were still carved to adorn tombs. Memorial stelae were erected for non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist purposes. Taoism, heavily indebted to and often slavishly imitative of Buddhism, evolved its own more or less stereotyped iconography. Statues of Confucius were produced. Purely secular sculpture increased with the waning of Buddhist vitality. Naturally it never attained to the spiritual qualities of the best of the Buddhist statues, nor did it loom so large in creative art.

Buddhist and Taoist images, at least in later centuries, were usually in much more perishable material than stone or bronze. Chiefly of clay, they were molded and then painted or gilded. Moreover, as was to be expected, even at the period of richest genius many examples of crude and uninspired craftsmanship were perpetrated. Certainly this was true in the centuries of decadence. For instance, the Buddhist and Taoist "hells" whose tortures have been presented in such stark realism in some late temples seldom display much true artistic feeling. Yet in the twentieth century Buddhist shrines survived whose images showed religious conviction and gave even to the non-Buddhist visitor something of an inkling of the calmness, the repose, and the serenity which are part of the Buddhist ideal.

Closely related to the work of the sculptor was that of the craftsmen who carved wood or ivory. Since the supporting timbers of a Chinese building have been so largely utilized for decorative purposes and have often been incised as well as painted or lacquered, the Chinese wood carver found much occupation and developed not a little skill. He had many designs—from the flora and fauna of China, and from mythology and religious symbolism. Wood has been carved, too, for furniture and for ornamental objects. From early times ivory has been prized as a material in which the skilled craftsman could work.

### PAINTING

If sculpture has not been ranked high by the Chinese as an art, that is not true of painting. The Chinese judge painting to have been

among their greatest forms of artistic expression. In this appraisal Western connoisseurs are more and more concurring. In the last few decades especially, the Occident has been discovering Chinese pictures, and notable collections have been gathered in both Europe and America. Many experts freely assert that at its best Chinese painting is one of the outstanding expressions of man's ability to create beauty.

Yet most of the best paintings have long since been lost. This is partly because the most famous artists lived centuries ago, under the Sung, the T'ang, and even earlier. It is partly, too, because the materials employed are extremely perishable. Silk has been the favorite, although paper has also been used, and frescoes have not been uncommon. It is also partly due to the many wars that have swept China. Frail pictures, usually housed in the almost equally inflammable palaces, temples, and private homes, have been calamitously subject not only to the ordinary vicissitudes of fire but also to the destruction wrought by civil strife and foreign invasion.

Yet in spite of the perishability of Chinese paintings and the many dangers to which they have been exposed, numerous examples are extant of Sung, T'ang, and even of pre T'ang masters. A very few are original productions of these periods. Their preservation is due to the high esteem in which they have been held and the care bestowed upon them. More are copies, or copies of copies, for the works of the leading painters were reproduced again and again. The copy seldom quite equals the original and in quality is often far below it, but at least it transmits something of the conception of the initial creator. Since the Japanese have been warm admirers of Chinese art, many examples have been preserved in the Island Empire, some of them originals, but more of them copies, or themes treated in the spirit of the great Chinese artists.

This is not the place to attempt a history of Chinese painting. Several of its epochs have been noted in our narrative chapters. It is possible, however, to give some of the outstanding characteristics of the art, together with the names of a few of the greatest of the masters.

Painting is with a brush and in ink and watercolors, and by the Chinese has been regarded as closely akin to calligraphy. Since the invention of the brush pen many centuries ago, painting and calligraphy have moved hand in hand. The brush strokes are thought of as producing the framework of the picture and are viewed as of fundamental importance. Perfect control of the brush combined with lofty and discerning thought are held to insure a good picture. Skill in wielding the brush is generally acquired only through prolonged practice. The correct use of the wrist is essential. This is usually a free movement, a support being employed only for the finer strokes.

Before the T'ang, painting was largely by artisans rather than by

artists and its strokes lacked variety. However, some great painters emerged, and it was in the sixth century that Hsieh Ho laid down the famous canons which have been supposed to govern the art. Under the T'ang both calligraphy and painting developed markedly. All the principles of calligraphy were applied to painting and many types of strokes were evolved. It was after the T'ang that the widest variety of strokes appeared. Especially were the artists of the Ming and the Ch'ing masters of technique. They lavished time and energy on it, and developed many schools of employing the brush. The Ming and the Ch'ing painters are, it must be confessed, usually adjudged to have been more expert as technicians than great as artists. In the latter capacity they are commonly said to have been outranked by their predecessors of the Sung and the T'ang. But they were numerous, and many of them unquestionably deserve to be remembered.

There have been many mural pictures, but as a rule the work of the Chinese painter was not intended to be displayed continuously in the home or in a public place. It is often in the form of a scroll, which is meant to be progressively unrolled and rolled bit by bit, and so not to be viewed in its entirety at once. Even though many paintings have been designed to be seen as a whole, they are usually mounted—on heavy paper—in such a way that they can be rolled up and brought out for display only on occasion. Often the scroll bears the seals of the various owners and perhaps a poetic comment on the picture or a note attesting its authenticity. In some older works of art the seals and the comments occupy more space than the picture itself. These seals, it may be added, are obviously one way of tracing the history of a painting, although they are not always genuine and may deceive even the experts.

The subjects of Chinese paintings have been many. The Chinese were the first to paint landscapes extensively. Religious themes have been favorites, notably in the heyday of Buddhism, and both Buddhist and Taoist figures and mythological and historical incidents have been frequent objects of representation. Flowers and trees have been used again and again. Especially has the bamboo been regarded as the test of an artist's ability. The bamboo is at once so employable by man in a wide variety of ways, so common a feature of the Chinese landscape, and so graceful, that it has made a marked appeal to the painter. Depicting the bamboo calls for the utmost skill in the application of the brush strokes that are the basis of Chinese pictorial technique. Only the master can do it well, and naturally many have made it a starting point of their endeavors. Birds, insects, fish, and animals have often served as models. Many, too, have rejoiced in portraying scenes from court life, famous historical incidents, and views of the life of humbler folk. There has been a marked recurrence of themes: artists have often tested themselves by treating famous subjects and scenes.

The purpose of the Chinese artist has not been to give a photographic reproduction of a landscape or an object. In China poetry and painting have been closely associated. A painter often wrote poetry, and a distinguished poet was also often a painter. Buddhism and Taoism, both of them largely subjective in their effects, have profoundly influenced painting. Perhaps it is for these reasons that the Chinese artist has attempted to give his own interpretation of what he has seen—to catch the spirit of his subject and to reproduce it, or to seek to put down the impression which has been made on his soul.

Perhaps because of the Chinese philosophic attitude, man has been subordinated to nature, or rather, he has been conceived of as part and parcel of the universe—not as dominating it but ideally as harmonizing with it. Many portraits have been made, and human figures have often been introduced into landscapes. Religious pictures have included man. However, the attitude toward man has been quite different from that of the art of the ancient Graeco-Roman world and of European humanism of the Renaissance and modern times.

To some Westerners Chinese paintings at first sight seem lacking in perspective. Judged by Occidental standards this impression is largely justified. Any attempt to represent three dimensions on a two-dimensional surface must have recourse to conventions. The Westerner has accomplished this in part by reproducing lights and shadows and in part by the use of lines. A landscape or object is represented as viewed by an observer from a particular point. By lines and the use of shading and colors, the attempt is made to reproduce what the eye has seen from that point. The Chinese have not been unaware of the problem. One of the famous six canons of Hsieh Ho was that proportion (or what may perhaps be translated "perspective") should be correctly conceived or observed. The Chinese painter has employed several devices to convey perspective. Apparently he has often wished the observer to look at his landscape from several angles. In many instances he has thought of the observer as viewing a landscape from a height. At his best the Chinese painter has succeeded in avoiding flatness and in conveying a sense of distance. This he has achieved partly by his use of colors. Often he has done it by reproducing the mists which in the Yangtze Valley and the South are so frequently seen.

Color has played a large part in Chinese paintings. To be sure, there has been much use of monochrome, but in many paintings two or more colors have been employed, often with delicacy and feeling. One of the six canons of Hsieh Ho was that the tints should be suitable.

Chinese paintings, like those of any other people, must be seen to be appreciated. The best of printed reproductions cannot do them full justice. Fortunately many examples are now in the galleries and museums

of Europe and North America. Even the amateur cannot fail to be moved by the best of them and finds himself returning to them again and again. Though Buddhism and Taoism are alien to his own spiritual experience, he is impressed by the buddhas, bodhisattvas, and immortals, or perhaps especially by the pictures of a hermit in meditation in a mountain fastness. The landscapes move him. The flowers, the trees, the horses, the birds, and the other living creatures in which the Chinese artists rejoice speak a universal language. So, too, the scenes from the life of court and of commoners are often so full of action and so obviously have caught the spirit of the original that the Westerner to whom the civilization depicted is exotic finds in them the appeal which, when it is well portrayed, human character in its varying moods always makes.

## CALLIGRAPHY

As we have seen, the Chinese have thought of calligraphy and painting as closely allied. The two have been regarded as branches of the same art. Expertness in the use of the brush pen is basic to both. It has been maintained that it can be better seen in calligraphy than in painting, for in the former it is not modified or obscured by the necessity of portraying objects. Calligraphy has been highly honored, perhaps as much as or more so than any other branch of art.

Examples of calligraphy are more widespread than paintings. In the old system of education specimens of the work of noted calligraphers were reproduced in the form of copy books. Inscriptions were and are to be found almost everywhere: in tablets over city gates, in temples, as shop signs, on the honorary arches of *p'ai lou,* on votive or memorial tablets, on the supporting pillars of a building, and in homes. Scrolls—to be hung in pairs and bearing inscriptions which match each other—have been almost universal. They have been customary forms of gifts and could be purchased, or, if he was a skilled calligrapher, written by the donor himself. The famous or the powerful might honor their friends by presenting them with scrolls or tablets written by their own hand.

There have been many noted calligraphers. Probably as distinguished as any was Wang Hsi-chih (A.D. 321–379). Much attention was paid by T'ang scholars and artists to calligraphy, but the dynasty did not produce as many outstanding masters of the art as did some others, notably the Sung. Probably the ranking Sung experts were Su Shih (1036–1101) and the eccentric painter Mi Fei (1051–1107). To mention even the most noted calligraphers of the various dynasties, however, would prove tedious.

The best examples of the calligrapher's work have been treasured as carefully as have been great paintings. Like paintings, they have been

copied again and again. Moreover, they have been mechanically reproduced. The Chinese form of block printing has allowed them to be multiplied. Some of the most famous have been transferred to stone, and can thence be almost endlessly copied by rubbings—a practice much employed by the Chinese.

Also, as in the case of paintings, certain themes have been treated many times. One of the most popular has been the Thousand Character Classic *(Ch'ien Tzŭ Wên).* It is attributed to a scholar of the sixth century A.D. and contains a thousand different characters, no one of which is repeated, arranged four in a line in complete sentences. It was long used as an elementary text in the schools. Still another has been a famous example of Wang Hsi-chih's penmanship, the Orchard Pavilion of Ting Wu *(Ting Wu Lan T'ing).*

Again as in the case of painting, canons have been laid down for calligraphy. Probably sometime in the Sui or T'ang—although they were attributed to a famous calligrapher of the Han—eight rules were set forth, illustrated in writing the character *yung.* Under later dynasties these were multiplied and elaborated.

Many styles of writing have been developed. At least ten have been recognized, and in recent times at least six were in use—some of them for special purposes only. The four styles most frequently seen include that which is usually adopted for books, with each stroke clearly written, the "pattern style" for formal and official documents, a running hand, and the *ts'ao* or "grass" hand, which is even more abbreviated than the latter.

With their emphasis upon calligraphy, the Chinese have naturally given a great deal of attention to writing material: paper, pen, ink, and inkstone. Paper is of several grades and is made of a number of materials. Rice straw, rags, bamboo, what is sometimes known as "paper mulberry," and at least two other plants have been employed. In each case a different kind of paper has been produced. Several grades are entirely of plant fiber. Others are treated with sizing—perhaps impregnated with starch. Some, in spite of their apparent fragility, have been very enduring. Not only have specimens of Han times been preserved in the dry desert air of the western frontier, but entire printed books have come down from the Sung, and there are examples from earlier dynasties. The ink is made from soot resulting from the burning of pine, fir, or oil, mixed with one form or another of glutinous substance, beaten fine and then put into molds. The better kinds might be scented and have gold leaf mixed in them. Ink has been put on the market in cakes or cylinders inscribed with characters, usually in gold. To prepare it for use by the writer it is rubbed with water on a stone. Some of these stones have been regarded as very valuable. Pens are made from the hair of various animals and in such form that when moistened they can be easily pointed.

## JADE

What is collectively called jade by Westerners and *yü* by the Chinese comprises more than one kind of rock. It includes nephrite and jadeite, the former a silicate of calcium and magnesium and the latter a silicate of aluminum and sodium. Many peoples have regarded jade as valuable, but it has been especially prized by the Chinese. Under the Chou and part of the Han it was quarried in what is now Shensi and perhaps was found in other parts of the older China. As the domestic sources became exhausted it was imported from Turkestan and later from Yünnan and Burma.

Jade has served many purposes. Jade implements, apparently for secular occupations, have come down from the Chou and perhaps from earlier times. Out of it ceremonial utensils have been made. Under the Chou special kinds of insignia of power were carved from it. In ancient times, too, it was frequently employed in the worship of Heaven, Earth, and other divinities. For instance, a circular jade disc pierced by a round hole was a symbol of Heaven. Tablets of jade have been utilized for writing—but apparently only for imperial purposes. They were used in the ceremonies of *fêng* and *shan,* and even in the Ch'ing dynasty some important documents were incised on them. Jade has been employed for amulets, and jade objects have been buried with the dead, partly because they have been supposed to protect the body from decay and partly because they have been believed to promote immortality. Jade, it has been held by Taoists, is the food of spirits, and at one time it was believed that one's chances of immortality could be improved by eating from jade bowls. Jade has been extensively employed in the manufacture of ornaments of many kinds: earrings, hairpins, pendants, clasps, buckles, and the like. From it have been carved vases, bells, resonant stones, ornamental screens, and artificial flowers.

Chinese lapidaries have shown marked skill in working in jade. They have also applied their art to agates, rock crystals, and other stones.

## CERAMICS

Another characteristic feature of Chinese aesthetic life has been ceramics. In one form, porcelain, China long led the rest of the world, and in common parlance China and porcelain ware have been almost synonymous. Yet, compared with the Occident, the Chinese potters did not become masters of their craft until comparatively late. Not before the T'ang and Sung did they deserve high rank as artists. In this phase the ancient Mediterranean civilizations were far ahead of the contemporary China of the Chou and the Han.

Something of the history of the potter's art in China has been narrated in earlier chapters. Since, however, it there appeared in piecemeal fashion, a brief recapitulation may help to show the main features of the development and the outstanding characteristics of Chinese ceramics.

What is probably the earliest extant pottery known in China belongs to the Yang Shao and related cultures—that neolithic civilization which was on the edge of the bronze age. What may be the oldest of this earthenware is well shaped, thoroughly baked, and painted in various designs and colors. It is quite impossible yet to determine exact dates, but one estimate declares that it cannot be later than 3000 B.C. Along with this painted pottery are remnants of a gray ware of coarser texture and less skilled workmanship and of a type which persisted into the Han. There is also a hard, black pottery. Fragments of a white, hard, carved pottery have been discovered which probably belong to the Shang. The surviving pottery of Chou times is not of particularly high quality.

With the Han, glazed ware began to appear. The art of manufacturing it may have been transmitted from the Western world. Moreover, a good deal of attention was paid to ornamentation of other kinds, and there are vessels whose forms show no inconsiderable taste. Most of the examples of Han pottery which we know have been obtained from graves. As we have seen, some of this funerary ware pictures in most interesting and informing fashion the architecture, costumes, and customs of the time. Men, animals, houses, implements, and even fortresses were reproduced in miniature.

In the interval between the Han and the T'ang, pottery of Han types persisted, much of it for funerary purposes. New designs entered, some of them possibly of Hellenistic provenance. There appeared, too, a hard ware which is a kind of protoporcelain. It is within the realm of possibility that true porcelain was developed some time between the Han and the T'ang.

It is certain that under the T'ang porcelain was being manufactured, and from fragments discovered in western Asia we assume that it was being exported. Moreover, in the T'ang not only were lead glazes in vogue, but marked development was also registered in the harder, feldspathic glazes, whose firing requires higher temperatures, and which had begun to appear in pre-T'ang times. Glazes of more than one color were sometimes applied to an object, and paint might be used. Under the T'ang several colors were employed. Improvement was made in the artistic forms of earthenware. Numerous figures of burned clay, akin to those of preceding centuries, have been recovered from T'ang tombs. Some of them are glazed and many show marked artistic feeling and skill. The grace and lively vigor of statuettes of dancing girls and of horses are unforgettable.

The political turmoil of the five decades that immediately followed the downfall of the T'ang did not prevent improvements in pottery. Chinese

literature tells of a remarkably fine ware manufactured for a few years in the present Honan and of a "secret color" made in the present Chêkiang.

The Sung period, so noted for its achievements in painting and in other refined forms of culture, is also distinguished for its ceramics. Sung ceramics, not unnaturally, is of varying quality. Some is heavy stoneware, some semiporcelainlike, and some the most delicate and beautiful porcelain. A number of different types were produced. Several are peculiar to the Sung and some were made as well under other dynasties—earlier or later, or both—so that even experts are often at a loss to know whether a particular specimen is of Sung or of earlier or subsequent origin. Both state-directed and private potteries existed. Each important center of manufacture produced a distinct type. Among the most noted of the Sung types is a pure white, somewhat translucent porcelain, often with carved or incised designs, and with a cream or ivory tinted glaze. Frequently the rim of the mouth is not covered by glaze but by a band of copper or silver. Another class with many subdivisions is celadon. Celadon is porcelain or porcelaneous ware, usually with a gray or grayish-white body, covered heavily with a translucent glaze of varying shades of green: bluish, grayish, and even grass green. Sometimes the celadon ware has carved or incised designs, sometimes designs in relief, and sometimes figures that were purposely left uncovered by the glaze and so in baking turned red or reddish brown. These celadons were widely scattered by commerce and either in Sung or in later times made their way to Mesopotamia, the Near East, and even to western Europe and as far south as Zanzibar. There was also crackle ware, although this was by no means confined to the Sung. By it is meant objects whose glazes are a network of cracks, sometimes accentuated by coloring. While the cracks were probably at first accidental, Chinese potters learned how to produce and control them, chiefly by modifying the components of the glaze and by methods of applying it. Still another type of ware was characterized by rich and varied colors, which were due to the changes wrought by the fire of the kilns in the copper oxide and in the trace of iron that entered into the composition. These by no means exhaust the kinds of pottery and porcelain of the Sung, but they are outstanding.

In general, and somewhat regardless of the particular centers in which they worked, the Sung potters tended to simplicity and yet elegance of form and decoration. Occasionally they departed from these standards, especially when copying old bronzes, but in the main they held to them. The shapes of the vessels were graceful or at times sturdy without being elaborate. Often only one color of glaze was used. Such figures as were painted, incised, or embossed on the surfaces were also usually far from being complex or multicolored. In this the Sung potters formed a striking contrast to many of their successors of the Ming and the Ch'ing.

The Yüan dynasty made no noteworthy contribution to ceramics. The

Sung models and techniques were continued, but with diminished vigor and skill. The Ming, however, witnessed distinct innovations and ushered in a new period. The industry tended to center at the vast imperial works at Ching-tê Chên, in Kiangsi, not far from the P'o-yang Lake. Here was an extensive supply of the materials most needed for the manufacture of porcelain—kaolin and petuntse—and a cobalt-bearing manganese ore which provided the blues in which the Ming potters delighted. Moreover, Ching-tê Chên was conveniently located for the transportation and distribution of its wares. It was on a stream which communicated with the P'o-yang Lake and thus had easy access to the Yangtze and the vast network of China's waterways. The porcelain characteristic of Ching-tê Chên possessed a white body, and since the output was enormous and was at the maximum in the years when the Occident was making its first extensive contacts with China, it was this which was most widely distributed, and which formed, moreover, an important item in the trade of China with its Asiatic neighbors.

In their designs the Ming craftsmen tended to depart from the restrained yet elegant simplicity of their Sung predecessors. Monochrome wares were still produced—pure white, blues, celadon green, and red being among them, and it is not always easy to tell whether a particular specimen is of Sung or of Ming origin. However, the potters of the Ming delighted in cobalt blue, a color which would withstand the high temperatures needed to melt the porcelain glaze. They also paid much attention to elaborate scenes and designs in more than one color. Some of their colors were applied as a kind of enamel to the surface of the glaze and were fixed by refiring at a low temperature. In this richness of painstaking and elaborate decoration Ming potters were but giving expression to the artistic spirit of an age which reveled in details and technique in painting and in ornate sculpture of the pillars, beams, and balustrades of buildings.

The great Emperors of the Ch'ing continued the patronage of Ching-tê Chên. Never did Chinese potters have better command of their materials than in the latter part of the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth century. Originality may have been sacrificed to mass production. Certainly no revolutionary departure was made from the Ming traditions and there was some continuation of Sung forms. However, toward the latter part of the eighteenth century new colors were introduced and with them came new types of decoration. Many pieces and sets were produced for the Occidental trade and often had Western designs. With the decay of the dynasty in the nineteenth century the artistic quality of the porcelain ware declined, as did so much else of China's culture. The rebellions of the middle of the century dealt ceramics a blow from which it never recovered. Ching-tê Chên especially was ravaged by the T'ai P'ings and its famous works were not fully restored. By no

means all the porcelain of the Ch'ing period was produced by Ching-tê Chên. There were potteries in a number of other places, and in some of them work of excellent quality was done. However, Ching-tê Chên was the main center and with its decay ceramics fell to a low level.

This sketch of the history of the work of the Chinese potter has incidentally included several of the main characteristics of the more artistically meritorious portions of Chinese ceramics. It must be added that pottery and porcelain have been employed in enormous quantities and for a great variety of purposes. Utensils in daily use for common purposes have been of earthenware, and their production has consumed much of the energy of the potter. The prevalence of the tiled roof has given work to many thousands of craftsmen. Most of the tiles have been of undecorated baked clay, but those for the more important structures have usually been glazed, and the highly ornamental ones, some of them with grotesque figures, used to accentuate the more prominent features of the roof, have given opportunity for the craftsman to express himself with originality. The funerary earthenware figures of earlier centuries, and especially the porcelains, afforded scope for artistic expression which was often of a very high order.

The work of the potter, like that of other artists and craftsmen, has had its conventions. Folklore, mythology, and religion have had marked effects. Designs are often highly symbolic and frequently have given opportunity for that delicate expression by a donor of wishes for good fortune in which the Chinese have been adepts. Pottery and porcelain, therefore, have combined utility with opportunity for aesthetic and even religious feeling and have occupied a large part in the life of the Chinese.

## BRONZE

Rather more than in most peoples, among the Chinese bronze has had an important role as a means of artistic expression. In this there may be additional evidence of Chinese conservatism. Under the Shang and the Chou, when bronze was the metal most commonly in use, it naturally loomed large as an art material. Inevitably, moreover, a larger number of objects of bronze survived than of those made of more perishable substances. The Chinese, therefore, with their admiration for antiquity, highly prized the bronzes of their early centuries, devoted much study to them, and continued to employ the metal for many of their art objects. In numbers of these they copied ancient designs, either with a good deal of fidelity or with more or less freedom in detail, and in others they branched out into new forms. Artistically China continued in no small degree to live in the bronze age.

Even in the Han the chance exhumation of an antique bronze vessel was considered a notable event. Many books on ancient bronzes were

written, and valued collections of the original objects were made. The Sung is the first dynasty in which these treatises seem to have been composed in fairly large numbers, but we know that one was written as far back as the sixth century of our era, and in still earlier works on ritual the names and dimensions of many bronze vessels were carefully noted. Chinese prized their older bronzes not only for their age and their beauty but also because many contained inscriptions. The reverence for the written character and the zeal for discovering its earliest forms enhanced the value placed upon inscribed vessels.

Recent archaeology has disclosed bronzes which are indubitably from the Shang, but many specimens attributed to that dynasty do not certainly go back that far. Undoubtedly, however, many of the objects now in Chinese and Occidental collections are of at least as early origin as the Chou. These include weapons, the trimmings of chariots, and ceremonial utensils. The vigorous, massive, dignified, and often graceful and well-proportioned lines of many of the vessels are indicative of skill and taste of no mean order. Shang bronzes especially give evidence of superb workmanship. Under the Han new designs entered, both in form and decoration, and many of the surviving examples display artistic merit of a high level. In bronzes, as in so many other phases of Chinese art, Buddhism was the vehicle for new motifs which were of foreign origin or showed alien influence. Many Buddhist images, large and small, were cast in bronze, and the metal was used in numerous objects connected with Buddhist worship. Bells were cast, not only after the advent of Buddhism and for Buddhist uses, but centuries earlier. The Sung workers in bronze rejoiced in copying archaic designs, but also created forms of their own. Under the Ming and the Ch'ing, as in so many other phases of art, the bronzes were often characterized by elaborate decoration. Some of them, even though huge, were vastly inferior aesthetically to the best products of earlier dynasties. There was, too, much imitation of antique forms. The bronzes which were being made when contacts with the West first became important were usually much below the level of those of many of the preceding centuries.

Bronze is not the only metal in which Chinese artistic feeling has expressed itself. Silver has been widely used, not only for jewelry but also for other objects. Gold has been employed, although not as lavishly as in some other lands—perhaps because it has been relatively scarce. Pewter has been much utilized, and iron objects have sometimes shown aesthetic taste.

## LACQUER

Lacquer was early seen in China. Examples have been found which date from the late Chou. Because of its perishability, lacquer

has not stood the ravages of time as well as has bronze or jade, but specimens of T'ang origin are preserved in Japan and we have descriptions and specimens of it as it was handled under the Sung and know that by then much care and artistic skill were being devoted to it. We know, too, that it was extensively produced under the Ming and the Ch'ing.

The lacquer of China is prepared from the sap of a particular kind of native tree. The sap is collected from incisions, darkens with exposure to the air, is strained, and then is ground to improve its grain and to give it uniform consistency. It is colored by mixing it with various substances.

Lacquer is applied with spatula and brush to the article to be decorated. Several and sometimes many layers are spread, each being allowed to dry before the next is put on. The base to be covered may be wood, metal, porcelain, or cloth. The objects generally need preparation for the lacquer, and the entire process, if well carried out, requires marked skill. Succeeding layers may be of varying composition, consistency, and color, and the drying and polishing demand experience and care. The surface may be decorated in a number of ways, and the designs may be very elaborate: landscapes, groups of figures, mythological and religious incidents or symbols, or flowers and trees. The surface may be painted, often with gold or silver gilt; it may have the pattern placed on it in relief; it may be inlaid with mother-of-pearl or semiprecious stones; or it may be carved, sometimes very deeply. For carved objects, layers of different colors may be applied and the carving done in such a manner as to bring out the colors. Or the lacquer may be mixed with fine particles of gold, and the polished surface left with no other ornamentation. Many different objects have been lacquered: boxes, screens, fans, trays, ewers, vases, chairs and thrones, and even the pillars of buildings, large as well as small.

There have, too, been many different centers of manufacture. Often each has been noted for a particular kind of workmanship and type of decoration.

### ENAMELS

The art of applying enamels appears to have been of non-Chinese origin. It may have come in both by the sea and by the overland routes. Certainly we do not hear of it much if at all before the Yüan. Beautiful enameled ware was produced under the Ming and the great Ch'ing Emperors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, some of it in imperial workshops at Peking.

Chinese have utilized enamel in three processes: cloisonné, champlevé, and painting. In cloisonné the pattern is outlined by thin metal strips which are soldered upon the surface to be decorated. In the cells thus formed the powdered enamel is placed and then the entire object is fired. After firing, the surface is smoothed and polished. In champlevé

the pattern is incised, the resulting depressions are filled with the enamel, and the whole is fired and later smoothed and polished as in the case of cloisonné. In both cloisonné and champlevé gilding has often been applied to the exposed metal. Enamel may be spread, like paint, either on metal or on porcelain and the whole be then heated. The Chinese have used porcelain more than metal for this purpose. Probably the most nearly perfect technique was attained under the Ch'ien Lung Emperor, but somewhat at the cost of vividness in coloring and vigor of design.

### GLASS

Glass is not certainly a native invention. It was imported as early as the Han—from Ta Ch'in, as the Chinese then denominated what we now with equal inexactness call the Near East. It was manufactured in China as early as the fifth century and a good many artistic objects have been made from it. The Chinese have not esteemed it as highly as porcelain and so have not devoted the same amount of skill to its production. They have, however, long known and practiced the chief processes by which it is manipulated in the Occident, among them blowing, casting, and molding. It has generally been for smaller objects that the Chinese have employed glass. Often they have made it imitate jade. They have known and utilized a good many colors. It is in carving that the Chinese have been at their best in their use of glass; for this they have brought the technique acquired in the cutting of the stones and gems with which they have long worked. Here they have shown craftsmanship equal to the best of its kind in any other part of the world.

### JEWELRY

Like other civilized peoples, the Chinese have developed jewelry. Jewelry has been, naturally, chiefly for purposes of ornamentation, but, although by no means to the same extent as in India, it has also been a means of saving capital against the proverbial rainy day. In its manufacture, Chinese craftsmen have developed no little taste. It is interesting that some of the stones regarded as most precious in other parts of the world, among them the diamond, have not been esteemed very highly.

### TEXTILES

It is not surprising that a people who have used silk for so long have developed marked skill in the manufacture of textiles. Certainly for many centuries the Chinese have been producing silk cloths of many different kinds. They have made brocades, they have interwoven silk with gold threads, and they have manufactured velvets and satins. They

have incorporated many designs into their cloth: flowers, birds, elaborate geometrical patterns, and even landscapes and scenes from life or from mythology and religion. Embroideries, large and small, have been produced, some of them for clothes and some for screens and hangings. Portraits and congratulatory inscriptions may be embroidered. Many beautiful garments have been made, for, if they could afford it, both men and women have worn silk, often of varied colors and of exquisite design. Official robes for state occasions were especially ornate, and a formal court gathering was gorgeous in its dress. Tapestries have been produced, although the art of weaving them seems to have come in from abroad. In the case of at least some kinds of carpets and rugs the methods and models appear to have been of foreign origin.

Silk was by no means the only material utilized for textiles. The fibers of several kinds of plants were employed. The nankeens much prized by our great-grandparents were cotton fabrics imported from China. Wool, too, has been woven, much of it going into rugs, and camel's hair has been used for the same purpose. The "Peking rugs" so popular among Westerners of late years are of wool. Peking has been a center of the industry, but they have also been produced elsewhere.

## MUSIC

The Chinese, like other peoples, have found in music an expression of their aesthetic sense. Music in China has had a long history and into it many influences have entered. It dates from at least as early as the Shang. We hear a good deal of the music of the Chou. Some of it accompanied worship, and the instruments employed in certain religious ceremonies of later times, notably in Confucian temples, were supposedly modeled on those of that period. Confucius himself is said to have been particularly interested in music. Buddhism has its special compositions. There are folk songs. Traveling minstrels have sung their rhymes to the accompaniment of an instrument. Singing and an orchestra are features of the universally popular theatre. There are, then, several kinds of music, and some of them are either of foreign provenance or show foreign influence. Many different types of instruments are or have been in use—among them drums, flutes, reeds, a variety of strings, metal bells, and resonant stones. A number of different scales have been known. The pentatonic, which is much heard in Chinese folk music, is only one of several.

## CHANGES WROUGHT BY THE COMING OF THE OCCIDENT

Artistically, contact with the Occident has been disintegrating and disruptive, as in many other phases of Chinese culture. Also as in

them, the disorder has been accentuated by the fact that the Westerner came in force at a time when, because of the decaying vigor of the ruling house, the processes of creative civilization were in decline.

The Occident has proved disturbing in many ways and for a number of reasons. Several Western products have displaced those of domestic manufacture in part or entirety. Thus cotton goods from Lancashire, Japan, and the new factories in China have tended to drive out some of the native cloths, and cups from Japan and teapots from Birmingham partially superseded the corresponding indigenous earthenware. The political chaos resulting from the impact of the West and the collapse of the Ch'ing weakened or eliminated several of the centers of the production of artistic objects. Added to this was the demand in the West for certain types of Chinese products. To meet it the handicraftsman often yielded to the temptation to hurried and therefore careless work or to use cheap materials. Probably even more devastating has been the undiscriminating popularity in China of things Western. Thus the Chinese, and especially the educated Chinese, has abandoned his old costume for Occidental garb, studies Western music, attempts to paint in European fashion, and discards his older forms of architecture for those of the West or attempts to combine the two in strange hybrids which violate the canons of both.

The advent of Communism has hastened the disintegration of the older art and architecture. Additional city walls have been torn down. Those of Peking have been pierced in several places to give access to the burgeoning suburbs of that rapidly growing capital. The new structures erected, notably the factories and large apartment houses, have usually been purely functional, with severe lines. Simple dress of Western origin has become the pattern for all classes and both sexes. Yet the Communists have also shown zeal and skill in preserving and restoring ancient buildings, notably the temples and imperial palaces of Peking.

Reconstruction has only barely begun, but here and there have been encouraging movements. Among the educated, for a time, nationalistic spirit brought sporadic waves of return to native garb. It has also stimulated attention to the remains of the older culture. It has accentuated an interest in archaeology and led to the collection of some of the folk songs. The Communists especially have patronized archaeologists. Their removal of old tombs and buildings, and their excavations for industrial purposes and road-building, have revealed much of antiquity and they have encouraged archaeologists to study what has been disclosed.

In no other realm of contemporary Chinese culture is it more difficult to forecast the future. The old traditions are being so weakened and such scanty beginnings are being made toward something new that the friends of China can only be patient and hope. Whether the Chinese aesthetic sense will in time be stimulated to fresh creative expression of a high

order no one knows. Still less ought one to essay the role of a prophet in predicting the forms which, if it appears, the renaissance will take. One can only express the wish that the heritage of the past will not be completely abandoned and that it will form the basis and provide much of the inspiration for whatever is to come.

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CHAPTER TWENTY

# LANGUAGE, LITERATURE, AND EDUCATION

One range of topics remains to be treated in our survey of Chinese history and culture—namely, language, literature, and education. Part of the proper contents of this chapter has been included earlier, under other subjects. More than one phase of literature has already been discussed, and education has been touched upon both in the chapter on government, where the civil service examinations, the goal of much of the educational system, were described, and in that on religion, where the preparation given Buddhist monks was briefly summarized. The present chapter, therefore, will describe only those features of the subjects that head it which have not been covered elsewhere.

## THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE

The Chinese language is the mother tongue of more people than is any other on the face of the earth, and, indeed, of more than have spoken any other language at any one time in the history of the race. Even its most prevalent form, Mandarin, probably surpasses all other tongues in the number of those who employ it in the daily affairs of life. English, French, and possibly Russian have a wider geographic spread, but none is the primary language of so large a proportion of the world's population.

To the Westerner the Chinese language is at the outset most disconcerting, for it does not fit into many of the patterns to which he is accustomed. One of the most striking of the dissimilarities is that which exists between the spoken and much of the written language. The vernacular may be and more than once has been reduced to writing. Interesting and influential movements of the present century, as we have seen, are toward the production of a literature in a standardized form of the most widely spoken of the colloquials. On the other hand, since some time before the Christian Era most of that which has been esteemed of high quality has differed markedly in style from ordinary conversation.

Chinese is often regarded as one of a group of which Siamese, Tibetan, and Burmese are other important representatives. However, today Chinese differs so greatly from these other tongues that if it was ever identical or nearly identical with them the separation must have occurred very long ago.

The history of the Chinese spoken language cannot be clearly traced, partly because of the fact that during most of its course, due to differences

between the usual written and spoken forms, it was not reduced to writing. However, a good deal of evidence has been amassed which gives either clues or exact information about it in various stages of its existence. Some of the dialects now spoken in the South are usually considered to be more archaic than those in the North. The Japanese have taken over many words from the Chinese. There were periods when this borrowing was on a larger scale than at others. Chinese entered by various routes, so that the two major forms in which its pronunciation survives represent chronological and regional variations. Japanese is fundamentally different from Chinese, and Chinese words were modified when spoken with the inevitable Japanese accent. However, the alterations are often detectable. Korean and Annamese, too, borrowed wholesale from Chinese and are of help to the philologist who wishes to reconstruct earlier stages of the colloquial. Moreover, the Chinese sometimes wrote in the vernacular. Pre-Sung examples of the colloquial are rare, but we have a few from the T'ang. The rhyming dictionaries, as they are called, give important information. A famous one, surviving only in fragments, was composed in the sixth century of our era, and another in the eleventh century. Characters were grouped according to the sounds with which their pronunciations began and ended. By comparison with modern pronunciations of the same characters it is possible in many instances to know what values were given them at the time the dictionaries were compiled. The transliteration of Indian Buddhist terms and names, a large amount of which was made in T'ang times on a large and accurate scale (and previously somewhat casually), also affords useful evidence.

It is clear that extensive changes have taken place in the colloquial. In many instances final consonants have been elided and initial consonants altered. It is possible, too, that at one time the Chinese language possessed some inflections, at least with differences in case.

The causes for the changes are at least four. Chinese has not been recorded by a type of writing fitted to preserve existing sounds. The invasions which periodically overwhelmed the North and left more or less permanent deposits of immigration led to the kind of alterations that occur when foreigners acquire a new tongue. The migrations of the Chinese themselves, principally southward, made for variation. For instance, the Hakkas, settlers in the South from the North, have kept themselves distinct in dialect from those around them. Then there are the modifications which the years seem always to bring in a living language, just from the fact that it is being spoken.

It was to be expected that a language used by so many people over so wide an area and over so many centuries would develop dialects. Chinese has a great many of them, of which numbers are mutually unintelligible. They are especially prevalent in the coast provinces from Shanghai south. A man from Canton, for example, who knows only his own dialect, cannot

understand a man from Peking or Nanking. The dominant form is that called Mandarin by foreigners and known in Chinese as *kuan hua*, literally "the official speech." Technically *kuan hua* is the language of the court and its capital—Pekingese under most of the Ming and all of the Ch'ing. However, while the Peking dialect was long standard, variations of the Mandarin are spoken over the major portion of China proper and Manchuria and by a large majority of the Chinese. While some of the patois, especially in rural districts, may be almost or entirely incomprehensible to one who knows only the standard Pekingese, most of its forms are mutually intelligible—at least with a little practice. A foreigner who learned spoken Chinese toward the extreme south-central limits of the Mandarin area, could understand and make himself understood as far east as Nanking and even in Hangchow (but not in the rural districts around Hangchow), as far west as the western borders of Szechwan or Kansu, and as far north as Heilungchiang. It is a form of Mandarin, (utilizing expressions from a number of Mandarin-speaking areas), the *kuo yü*, or "national speech," it will be recalled, which the Chinese have recently been trying to make standard and to spread throughout the country, especially in non-Mandarin speaking sections.

We have said that the Chinese spoken language differs in several ways from the tongues of the Occident. In addition to the sharp distinction between it and what until recently was the most esteemed and generally used form of the written language, and to the fact that it is without inflections of case or tense, it is without words formed by derivative affixes, such as *teach-er, coward-ice,* and *strict-ness.* In a sense it is monosyllabic. The number of vocables, moreover, is greatly limited. There are no consonant groups, such as *scr* in *screech,* but only single consonants. Moreover, in Mandarin words can be ended only with vowels and a limited number of the consonants—roughly, *n*, *ng*, and *r*. This means that the number of vocables is very small—in Peking Mandarin only about four hundred thirty and in other forms, such as the dialects of Canton and Amoy, where a wider range of final consonants permits a greater variety, less than a thousand.

With this exclusive use of uninflected monosyllables and this paucity of available vocables, it is obvious that much confusion might arise, for many quite diverse objects and ideas must be represented by the same vocable. Precision is sought by several devices. Auxiliary words, both in the written and in the spoken language, when added to other words, make clear the case or the sense and so give the effect of inflection. Sentences have a fixed word order, such as subject, verb, and object. Then there is the use of tones. Peking Mandarin has four, some other types of Mandarin five, and other dialects still more—Cantonese nine. A given syllable may be pronounced in any one of the tones permitted by the particular dialect of the region. This, therefore, at once multiplies by four or more the number of vocables.

Moreover, any given meaning has only one appropriate tone (although in speaking, the sound may, in actual practice, be varied) and the tone is an integral part of the word. Here, however, room exists for confusion between dialects: although the Chinese have names for each of the tones and a given word is pronounced with what the Chinese call the same tone, even in different varieties of Mandarin the musical representations (so far as that is possible) of the four or five tones differ.

Another effective device for avoiding confusion—as in many other languages—is the context. Still another is the use of what are sometimes known as classifiers. Thus in Mandarin one never speaks of "a man" as *i jên*, but as *i ko jên*, *i* being "one," *ko* the classifier, and *jên* "man." There are a number of classifiers, often a special one being inseparable from a certain type of object, somewhat as we say "a strip of paper" or "a chunk of wood." The classifier frequently gives a clue to the nature of the noun which follows. Thus *k'ou*, or "mouth," is used before words meaning "well" and "pot" and some other objects having a round opening.

The Chinese often use together two words of approximately or exactly the same meaning. Thus, *k'an*, meaning "see," and *chien*, also meaning "see," are combined into *k'an chien*. While *k'an* and *chien* each has several meanings, there is slight likelihood of ambiguity when the two are joined. Little misunderstanding arises if the phoenix is called *fêng huang*, *fêng* being the male and *huang* the female, for while *fêng* and *huang* separately have several meanings, the combination is not likely to be mistaken for something else.

A descriptive word may be prefixed. Thus a tiger is not called simply *hu*, for many meanings attach to that vocable, but *lao hu*, an "old tiger." Or a descriptive word may be added. Thus *shih*, meaning "stone," could be very readily confused with several other widely different meanings for the same vocable and tone. To it, however, is added *t'ou*, meaning "head," and one has *shih t'ou*, which is less easily mistaken. "A stone" in translation becomes *i k'uai shih t'ou, i* being "one" or "a" and *k'uai* the classifier.

The Chinese employ what in effect are compound words. For example, this is seen when, as in late years, they have been under the necessity of finding terms for new ideas and objects. Thus electricity is *tien ch'i*, the "breath of lightning," an electric car *tien ch'ê*, "lightning carriage," an automobile *ch'i ch'ê*, "breath carriage," and a steamboat *huo lun ch'üan*, "fire wheel boat," or "fire turn boat." Indeed, a case has been made by an eminent expert that Chinese is polysyllabic.

## THE WRITTEN CHARACTER

If the spoken language of China is, as we have said, the native tongue of more people than any other used by mankind, the written

language is the acceptable literary medium of an even larger proportion of the world's population. It is employed not only by the Chinese but also by the Japanese and Koreans. The Japanese have, to be sure, usually put into it only their more erudite productions, but even in such ephemeral publications as newspapers they resort to Chinese characters to express part of their ideas. The Koreans, too, although they have their own phonetic form of writing, until the close of the nineteenth century thought of the Chinese character as the only dignified literary medium. Geographically some other written languages have been more widely spread, notably Latin and English, and the forms of the alphabet used most generally in the modern Occident are probably understood by more millions of people—although this may be debatable. However, measured by the population for whom it is the sole literary vehicle, the Chinese written language outranks all others.

Moreover, as we shall shortly see, both in quantity and in quality the literature produced in the Chinese written character stands well when compared with that in other languages. In sheer bulk it is possible that in 1700 and even in 1800 more pages, written and printed, existed in Chinese than in all other languages put together. For grace and skill in literary expression the choicest of Chinese poetry and prose can be placed, unashamed, beside the rest of the world's best.

The Chinese characters seem to have been an indigenous invention. Certainly in spite of theories to the contrary, no conclusive proof has yet been given of a foreign origin. We have seen that primitive types were in use as far back as the Shang and that the precursors of these characters have been found, and as purely autochthonous.

It is usually impossible to ascertain the most archaic form of a given character, for in the early days of the script a character was often written in a variety of ways and it is not feasible to determine the original with certainty. However, at least some of the methods in which characters were created seem clear.

A number of characters are conventionalized pictures of objects. It is not difficult to see in the present 日 and an older predecessor ⊙, a portrayal of the sun, and in 月, in an older form 𝅗𝅥, the moon for which it stands. So, too, 魚 is not unlike a fish, 馬 formerly 𩰫, suggests a horse, and in 羊, earlier 𦍌 and 𦍌, meaning "sheep," the horns and legs of a ram are clearly seen. 田 is a little less obviously a field, and even the present character for door or gate 門 shows the two leaves and posts of that useful object. Some hundreds of characters could and did come into existence in this way.

Some are attempts to put ideas into picture form. Thus 中 is a convenient representation of "middle" or "center," and 三 is obviously the numeral "three." Often abstract ideas were presented to the eye by

combining characters which originally were pictures of objects. Thus the verb "to sit" is written 坐, which is probably two men 𠆢 on the ground 土, although in some early forms this is not indisputable. 明, "bright" or "brilliant," is a combination of characters for the sun and moon. Sometimes the scribes employed the picture for an object with which the abstract idea was associated. Thus "high" is 高, apparently in an early form meant to portray a tower. It seems probable, too, that in some instances the spoken word for an abstract idea which had the same sound as a word for a concrete object might be written with the character which had been devised for the latter. Thus one authority accounts for *wan* 萬, meaning "ten thousand," on the theory that the character was originally the picture of a scorpion (one older form being 𦍌, a picture of that troublesome insect) and that the word for scorpion once had the same pronunciation as the present *wan.*

While by these methods many characters could and did come into existence, the majority were brought into being through a form of phonetic writing. This at once took advantage of the fact that Chinese possesses many words having the same sound but different connotations and framed a device for preventing confusion between the written representations of these words. Thus in the early days there were a number of words with quite diverse meanings which have come down to us under the common pronunciation of *fang.* There is an ancient symbol 方, apparently once a picture, meaning "square" and now pronounced *fang.* When one wished to write the word *fang* meaning "to ask" it seemed simple and logical to preface 方 by a character for "words," 言 and so to obtain 訪. When it was desired to write the name of a particular kind of wood pronounced *fang* it was not unnatural to prefix 方 with the character for tree 木, which in an early form was 𣏟 (the picture of a plant with its roots and branches) and so to obtain 枋. *Fang,* meaning "kettle" was written 鈁, which is 方 prefaced by 金, an ancient symbol for "metal." Similarly, "spin" was written 紡, a combination of 方 and 糸, meaning "silk." It it clear that in this fashion one part of the character gives a clue to the pronunciation and another to the meaning. One Occidental terminology calls the former the "phonetic" and the latter the "radical."

Is is on this principle of the composition of characters by phonetics and radicals that some Chinese and many Western dictionaries of Chinese have been compiled. The Chinese have enumerated and placed in a fixed order, in accordance with the number of strokes of the pen which it takes to write them, two hundred fourteen radicals. Theoretically each character in the language either is a radical or contains a radical. Each character, therefore, is listed under its appropriate radical in the order of the number of strokes of the brush pen required to write it. It must be noted that the number of radicals has not always been the same. The earliest etymologi-

cal dictionary, the *Shuo Wên*, of the Han, had five hundred forty. In the sixth century there were over five hundred, and later three hundred sixty. It was not until the latter part of the Ming that the most frequently used present list of two hundred fourteen was established.

It is not always that the phonetic gives so exact a clue to the modern pronunciation as in the case of the various characters for *fang*. This may in part be due to failures to abide by the principle when the characters were first formed and so at times to use a phonetic to write sounds that were similar but not identical. It is certainly largely attributable to the fact that in the course of the centuries words once identical in pronunciation have come to differ, in some instances only slightly but in others almost past recognition.

The changes in pronunciation result to no small extent from an outstanding feature of the written character—its appeal to the eye rather than to the ear. While a phonetic quality entered into the origin of most characters, it is not inseparable from the character. A given character may be pronounced in any one of many quite different ways and its meaning be unaffected. It can thus be used to write dialects and even widely different languages. For example, the character 山, in any early form (apparently the picture of three peaks) may be called *shan*, as in modern Mandarin, or *sang* as in Foochow, or *sa* as in Wenchow, or *san* and *yama* as in Japanese, without altering the meaning which it conveys to the eye. Similarly the 方 mentioned a few lines above has the same connotation to the eye whether it be called *fang* as in Mandarin, *hwong* as in Foochow, *foa* as in Wenchow, or *ho* as in Japanese.

Given the various ways in which characters can be created, it is not strange that the number has been greatly multiplied. The *Shuo Wên* contains slightly over ten thousand, and the *K'ang Hsi Tzŭ Tien,* the dictionary compiled by order of the K'ang Hsi Emperor, and long standard, has about forty-nine thousand. A large proportion of these, however, are mere variants of other characters, for it must be noted that many can be written in more than one way.

Reverence for the classical literature and for the characters in which it was written discouraged for many centuries the creation of fresh characters. New ideas and objects have been customarily represented by what are in effect compound words.

The burden imposed on students by having to learn the characters may seem unnecessarily onerous. However, the task is by no means so formidable as at first appears. Only slightly more than four thousand characters are in common use; few scholars are said to cumber their memories with more than six thousand; radicals and phonetics afford mnemonic assistance; and even the uninitiated foreigner can, with diligence, commit two or three thousand to memory in the course of a year's time.

THE WRITTEN LANGUAGE

The characters can be used to write any of the dialects of the vernacular, although in some of the latter are words for which no special written equivalents exist. However, the larger proportion of Chinese literature has been composed in what may be called the classical style—that which foreigners, with scant Chinese precedent, denominate *wên li.* It is not certain that this ever exactly reproduced any form of the spoken language. Some maintain that, for the sake of economy in the labor of writing, especially before the days of the invention of paper and the brush pen, it was always more condensed than the vernacular. There seems to have been a time in the Chou when it at least approximated to the colloquial. Even today it is obviously related to the vernacular in structure and form. It has greatly influenced the latter, especially by contributing to it in quotations, words, and phrases. But it has marked contrasts with the speech of every day. Several of its auxiliary words differ from those of Mandarin, some of its characters, among them the pronouns, are not the same as those commonly used to write the vernacular, and the two are often at variance in the rules of composition. The most striking dissimilarity is in the fact that the literary language employs fewer words to express the same thought. It can do this because it is meant for the eye and not for the ear. While it may be and is read aloud, even a scholar usually cannot understand an unfamiliar passage when it comes only through the ear.

It may seem that so artificial a language has been an unmitigated handicap and that the Chinese would do well to abandon it for one more nearly in accord with the colloquial. However, much can be said for it. Being independent of any one form of the vernacular it has been understood by scholars all over the country and so has helped to give unity to the Chinese. Then, too, although "classical style" should be written "classical styles," for there have been various forms of it, a scholar who has mastered it has opened to him all the literature of past generations. It has not changed as rapidly as have the vernaculars.

Still, the Chinese classical language presents difficulties. It is highly artificial. It is often replete with allusions and quotations, and to appreciate and even to understand much of it the reader has to bring to it a vast store of knowledge of existing literature. Many individual characters have several widely different meanings, and frequently in a particular passage only the context determines which one is intended. Although there are initial, terminal, and transitional words and phrases, the paucity of other punctuation in most of the texts is often confusing. The presence of proper names with nothing to distinguish them as such except the context and the knowledge of the reader not infrequently leads to ambiguity. The confusion

is heightened by the fact that a Chinese often has a number of given names or designations. It is only by going through a prodigious amount of literature and especially by memorizing quantities of it that the scholar obtains a kind of sixth sense which enables him to divine which of several readings is correct. The perusal of the classical language, therefore, requires long preparation.

Composition is an even greater task. Few Occidentals have achieved an acceptable style, and many a Chinese who has been the finished product of recent curriculums has been far from adept. Composition in the literary language is so difficult partly because of the skill required in the use of the various auxiliary particles, partly on account of the fine distinctions which must be made in the choice of words and phrases, partly because of the wealth of quotation and allusion which it has been necessary to have at one's command, and partly by reason of the requirement that the accepted order of words be followed intelligently and with taste. To achieve a worthy style it has been necessary not only to possess a certain amount of native ability but also to have mastered the needed technique. This latter could be acquired only through long and concentrated practice and discipline. In the new age, when the Chinese student must familiarize himself with so many different fields of knowledge, very few if any find the time to become really proficient in the older methods of writing. The literary language, except in vastly simplified forms, must inevitably pass out of general use even by scholars. The modern emphasis on literature in the vernacular is the logical and unavoidable concomitant to the influx of Western branches of learning.

It may be added that the different styles in which the literary language has been written number about thirty. One group is denominated the *ku wên*, or "ancient literature." In general it has sought to follow the terse, antithetical models found in the Chou Classics. Han Yü of the T'ang was a master of it and it was used extensively by the great authors of the Sung, although possibly with less originality than under the T'ang. It was also employed in other dynasties. As it came from the pens of its most distinguished exponents it had vivacity, brevity, energy, and grace. Another group of literary forms includes what may be called rhythmic prose—from the Western standpoint about halfway between poetry and prose.

## LITERATURE

The greater part of the voluminous literature in Chinese has been written in the classical style. Literature in the vernacular has not been lacking. Not only has a good deal of it appeared in print, but there has been much of what may be called unwritten literature, in the form of folklore and multitudinous proverbs. Until the twentieth century, however,

composition in the speech of every day was considered beneath the dignity of scholars. When men of scholarly training wrote in the colloquial they often did so anonymously or pseudonymously lest their standing in the world of letters be impaired. Until after 1911, any work that would lay claim to serious consideration as a piece of literature and worthy of any other purpose than of whiling away a leisure hour or of educating the masses had to be in *wên li*.

This literature dealt with many kinds of subjects and can be placed under several headings. First in order of esteem by the Chinese have been the classical books. They are popularly supposed to come down from Chou and pre-Han times, although, as we have seen, large portions of them originated in the Han. The list of those regarded by Confucianism as of highest worth—to which the term "canonical" may be applied—varied at different times. Beginning with the great neo-Confucian scholars of the Sung the Classics par excellence were nine in number and in two groups. The *Wu Ching* or Five Classics were the *I Ching*, or Classic of Changes, the *Shu Ching*, or Classic of History, the *Shih Ching*, or Classic of Poetry, the *Li Chi*, or Record of Rites, and the *Ch'un Ch'iu*, or Spring and Autumn (Annals). All of these, it will be recalled, were described in the second chapter. The *Ssŭ Shu*, or Four Books, the second group, were the *Lun Yü*, or Analects, containing many of the sayings attributed to Confucius and his immediate disciples, the *Ta Hsüeh*, or Great Learning, ascribed to a disciple of Confucius, the *Chung Yung*, or Doctrine of the Mean, supposedly by a grandson of Confucius, and *Mêng Tzŭ*, or the discourses of Mencius. Both the *Ta Hsüeh* and the *Chung Yung* are sections of the *Li Chi*, but were singled out from it by the Sung scholars of the dominant school as of especial importance.

In addition to these, other early works were highly regarded. Some of them were included in the canonical lists of pre-Sung dynasties. The most important are the *Chou Li*, or Rites of Chou, the *I Li*, another collection of rites, the *Êrh Ya*, an early dictionary, and the *Hsiao Ching*, or Classic of Filial Piety, held to be the record of a conversation between Confucius and one of his disciples.

We need not enter into the moot question of the authenticity, dates, and authorship of these various works. Something of that has been touched upon earlier. Here it need only be said that none of the Classics has escaped searching critical tests and that the traditional ascriptions of authorship and accounts of composition or compilation have all been challenged, some of them successfully.

As we have noted, numerous dictionaries have been compiled and under various dynasties. In some of them the characters are classified according to their initial and final sounds, in others according to radicals, and in still others by subjects. The Chinese have devoted much attention

to philology, including the study of ancient pronunciations and forms of characters.

The Chinese have been historically minded. Indeed, no other people in the history of the human race has over so long a period displayed so much zeal for recording in detail the events which it has deemed important. As a result, no other nation possesses such voluminous records of so long a past. We have seen something of the dynastic histories, which, beginning with the *Shih Chi* of Ssŭ-mu Ch'ien, continued the chronicles of the Empire through the Ch'ing. In a certain sense, each is a continuation and is built on the general plan of Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien's magnum opus.

The *Ch'un Ch'iu*, including the work traditionally associated with it, the *Tso Chuan*, provided the model for another type of history, largely in the form of a chronicle by years. This was in large part due to the prestige which its reputed Confucian authorship gave it. Perhaps the most famous of the group is the *Tzŭ Chih T'ung Chien*, by Ssŭ-ma Kuang, of the Sung, with supplementary compilations by the same author. It covered the course of China's development from late in the Chou to the beginning of the Sung, and, condensed by Chu Hsi and his disciples as the *T'ung Chien Kang Mu* and continued by later pens, became the best known and most highly esteemed single history of the Empire. The *T'ung Chien Kang Mu* was the subject or the incentive of a number of studies, some of them supplementary and some critical. There have been many scores of other historical studies, a number of them extensive and displaying a high order of ability and originality of plan and conception. Some cover long periods and others only a comparatively brief time. Many specialize on particular phases of history. Collections have been made of state papers, among them compilations of memorials to the throne. There are hundreds of biographical works, some of them of single individuals, others bringing together the lives of several scholars and statesmen, and still others travel diaries and journals of thrilling events. Accounts have been written of particular sections of China, especially of the states that have been more or less independent of the dynasties considered legitimate. Of these states there have been a large number. Some, as we have seen, were very important.

China possesses an extraordinarily voluminous group of what may be called local histories or gazetteers. A few of them cover the entire Empire and are in the nature of descriptive and statistical geographies. More treat of special sections of the Empire. Each of the major subdivisions of the country—the provinces, the *fu*, the *hsien*, and the main cities—has normally been provided with a work that is both a local history and a description, often very minute, of the region as it was at a particular time. Many of the chief hills, mountains, and monasteries of the country have been made the subject of similar works. There are accounts, too, of some of the main rivers and of the engineering measures that have been taken to con-

trol their waters. Treatises exist on the outlying dependencies of the Empire, on several of the non-Chinese peoples within the Empire, and on what the Chinese of a particular time knew of one or more of the foreign countries. Of the gazetteers about five thousand are still in existence. Many of them are very detailed and extend to large dimensions.

China also has numerous descriptions of her governmental machinery. Some portray the entire imperial structure by which the country was ruled and others only certain phases or functions of the state. Some are historical and others are chiefly or entirely devoted to what was contemporary with the author.

The Chinese have long been attracted by certain phases of archaeology. Inscriptions have absorbed much attention, and numerous collections of transcriptions or exact reproductions of them by rubbings have been compiled and treatises written on them.

There have, too, been essays and more extensive treatises of what may be called historical criticism, a large proportion of them dealing with individual works or series of histories. The Chinese have also written a good many books in which prodigies and the marvelous have held the chief place and which to the modern historian are of interest mainly because of the light they shed upon the beliefs of the writers and their contemporaries. Many catalogues of existing works have been produced, usually in the form of lists of private or imperial collections, which possess great value for the historian.

Much of the historical writing of the past was of excellent quality, even when judged by the exacting standards of modern scholarship. On the other hand, a large proportion of it was of lesser worth. The student of China's history, therefore, is confronted by an embarrassment of riches. His plight is made worse by the absence of adequate guides through the huge maze. Indices and other implements indispensable to him who would find all the material pertinent to a given subject are largely lacking. Since each generation tends to write history from its own standpoint, to a historiographer of our times much of the information contained even in the standard works seems trivial and uninteresting, and the number of volumes which must be gone through to glean what is germane to one's special interest is often discouraging. To huge masses, too, must be applied the tests for accuracy and dependability without which no writing can be done that will satisfy the historical conscience. All this prodigious body of records, then, is at once the despair and the joy of the scholar.

The Chinese have what they call *lei shu*, often rather loosely translated as "encyclopedias." Some cover only a limited range of subjects, such as the origin and history of family names, and others embrace the entire scope of Chinese knowledge. Usually, instead of being, like Western encyclopedias, made up of articles written especially for them, the *lei shu*

are composed of longer or shorter excerpts from existing works. Some *lei shu* have attained huge proportions. The largest was the *Yung Lo Ta Tien,* although it is said not to fall under the *lei shu* in the strictest sense of that term. It was compiled by order of the third Emperor of the Ming, ran to nearly twelve thousand volumes (each, moreover, in two separate fascicles), and since the expense of printing was discouraging even to the exchequer of one of the most powerful and energetic rulers of China's history, it existed only in three manuscript copies, now represented by a few widely scattered folios. Others of the *lei shu* were printed, and some were very voluminous. Often they have preserved more or less extensive fragments of works which except for them have entirely disappeared. The *Ssŭ K'u Ch'uan Shu*, compiled under the Ch'ien Lung Emperor, existed in seven manuscript copies. It was utilized in the compilation of the *Ssŭ K'u Ch'uan Shu Tsung Mu, Ch'in Ting*, an important annotated bibliography. The latter also included thousands of titles not represented in the former.

The *ts'ung shu* must also be mentioned. The term does not exactly fit into any Western category but it may be translated as "collectanea." *Ts'ung shu* are made up of works, usually on several subjects and by several authors, some of which may have appeared elsewhere and others of which were here printed for the first time. The effort was made to cover the entire range of knowledge treated by them: geography, philosophy, agriculture, medicine, history, et cetera.

So much has been said in earlier chapters of the development of philosophic and religious thought that not much space need be given to it here. Each of the great schools produced a literature. Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism were responsible for adding thousands of volumes to the libraries of the land. All three treated of morals, and Confucianism naturally also spread into the field of political science. Buddhism developed its own logic and technical terms. Its literature, therefore, is one through which only the expert can hope to thread his way with any assurance of understanding. This is particularly so since there have been many Buddhist schools, some of which have delved with profundity and acumen into the issues that perennially perplex the thoughtful mind, and since a knowledge of Indian thought and some of the Indian languages is prerequisite to a full comprehension of them. Much of Taoist literature, too, cannot be understood without a knowledge of Buddhism, so that any extended research in it is not for the amateur. In spite of much which is shallow and trivial, in these three great philosophies the Chinese at their best displayed a variety and a quality of thought and insight which can be compared without apology with the intellectual product of any other people.

We have also spoken so frequently of poetry and have given the names of so many of the chief poets that this important branch of literature need here be but little more than mentioned. It must be noted, however, that

from the earliest times the Chinese have been greatly interested in verse. Some of the resulting collections are those of a particular author. Others are anthologies of the poems of many writers.

What we in English would classify under poetry occurs in Chinese under many forms. Ballads have been multitudinous. Much of the text of plays for the theatres is in what we would call verse. Many historical romances, some of which run to great length, are in rhythmic style. Mosaics of characters have been put together in such fashion that when read in different directions they form poems. The characters contained in the Thousand Character Classic have been arranged into verse by several different authors. There is rhythmic prose which from the Western standpoint is really poetry, and a whole division of literature is made up of poems of irregular lines and of many patterns.

What the Chinese themselves have included under *shih*—usually translated as "poetry"—is much more limited. It has embraced, however, a number of forms. Some of these, in the so-called "ancient" style, have allowed a good deal of latitude. Others, in what has been denominated the "modern" style—really many centuries old—has been more fixed. In poems of the "modern" style the length of line, the arrangement of characters by tones and rhymes, and the parallelism of characters have followed strict conventions, although even here many patterns have been used. The "modern" style, for instance, has permitted verses of four lines of five characters each, of four lines of seven characters each, of eight lines of five characters each, and of eight lines of seven characters each. In this style characters must be made to fit particular tone patterns—that is to say, only characters of a given tone can be put in a particular place in a line, and must be matched by the tones of the characters in the succeeding line. For this purpose the five tones of Mandarin have been divided into two groups, the first two being called "even" and the other three "uneven." An "even tone" in one line must be countered by an "uneven tone" in the corresponding character in the line with which it is paired. Rhymes must also be observed, a frequent rule being that the final characters of every other line must match. They have been regulated by a standard rhyming dictionary, compiled more than a millennium ago, so that, owing to changes in pronunciation wrought by the centuries, according to the present pronunciation rhyme may often seem absent. Then, too, another form of parallelism must be observed, by which parts of speech—adjectives, verbs, and nouns—must be matched by the same parts of speech in the next line. Moreover, a given character must not be used twice in the same poem. Obviously such forms are much less elastic than those of most other peoples. A genius is able to express himself through them with beauty, but for the majority who have conformed to them—as have a large proportion of Chinese scholars—they have led to somewhat mechanical results.

Fiction has been mentioned more than once in preceding chapters and, accordingly, requires here no elaborate description. Since stories were usually written in the vernacular, the Chinese scholar, with his exclusive esteem for the classical style, formerly did not regard them worthy of admission to the ranks of literature. Of late years, however, with the use of the vernacular for all literary purposes, an increasing interest has developed in fiction and its history, especially since in some of it are to be found examples, rare elsewhere, of the colloquial of past centuries. At least as early as the Sung stories were being composed in the language of every day. Under the Mongols what are usually called novels were written in large quantities, and the output continued under the Ming and the Ch'ing. Some fiction is made up of short stories. Much of it, however, is in long narratives. Part of it is in the form of historical romances, of which the *San Kuo Chih,* or the "History of the Three Kingdoms," is probably the most famous. The *San Kuo Chih* arose out of tales which must have been related for centuries, somewhat like the Arthurian legends, before they were put in their present standard literary dress. Historical romances have been made the basis of many plays and from them was drawn much of the repertoire of the strolling storytellers. Several of the novels, among them the *Hung Lou Mêng,* are of high literary quality, with excellent delineation of character and with intimate and informing pictures of Chinese life and customs. Fiction was sometimes made the vehicle for portraying utopias and advocating reform. It also contained much of the supernatural, with a good deal about the actions of spirits. The love that was exalted was usually extramarital. Some stories belonged as much to pornography as to fiction, but that criticism cannot be leveled against most of the best novels. To the Westerner one of the great values of Chinese fiction is the insight which much of it gives into the folklore and mores of the days of its composition.

### SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE

One of the interesting characteristics of the older Chinese culture was the rudimentary nature of most of the knowledge that was accumulated in the field of mathematics and the natural sciences. The hypothetical visitor from Mars might well have expected the Industrial Revolution and the modern scientific approach to have made their first appearance in China rather than the Occident. The Chinese long directed so much of their energy toward this-worldly ends, have been so industrious, have shown such ingenuity in invention, and by empirical processes have forestalled the West in arriving at so much useful agricultural and medical lore that they, rather than the nations of the West, might have been looked to as the forerunners and leaders in what is termed the scientific approach toward the understanding and mastery of man's natural

environment. It is little short of amazing that a people who pioneered in the invention of paper, printing, gunpowder, and the compass—to speak only of some of their best-known innovations—did not also take precedence in devising the power loom, the steam engine, and the other revolutionary machines of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The reason for the failure to achieve this priority must be in large measure a matter of conjecture. It may have been because under the Confucian state, with its system of education and its civil service examinations, the best of the trained minds were absorbed in government, ethics, history, and belles-lettres. It may have been that China failed to develop a system of logic the equal of that which Western Europe owes to the Greek mind. The cause may need to be sought in obscure and debatable climatic factors or in biological and racial inheritance. It is conceivable that it can be discovered in differences of religious background. One suggestion has it that the Chinese are practical and that science is first of all theoretical, as in Copernicus and Newton. One thoughtful modern Chinese attributes it to the fact that, under the influence of Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, especially as seen in the Sung philosophers, Chinese thinkers devoted their attention to developing techniques for knowing and controlling the mind—in contrast with the West, which has sought techniques for knowing and controlling matter. To this generalization exception can easily be taken, but it may well be that in the subjectivity of so much of Chinese philosophy, particularly after the advent of Buddhism, is to be found the secret of the arrested development in the mastery of nature.

An important question is not, why did the Chinese not develop science as we know it today, but, why did the West create science and inaugurate the Industrial Revolution? Not only the Chinese, but also the Indians, the Arabs, and other highly civilized peoples failed to be pioneers in these phases of civilization.

Whatever the cause, the backwardness of the Chinese in the mathematical and the natural sciences and in mechanical devices when compared with the western Europeans and Americans of the past century and a half is indisputable. In mathematics, astronomy, and in some mechanical appliances, indeed, China was notably behind the Europe of even the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Quite a literature was produced on mathematics and astronomy, but much of the knowledge that lies back of it originated in other peoples. This was true before the great enrichment which came through the Jesuits in the late Ming and the early Ch'ing. Moslems were responsible for some of it and there may have been importations as early as the Chou.

However, in some phases of what may be called scientific literature there was a large output—apparently chiefly and perhaps almost entirely independent of stimulus from abroad. This was particularly marked in agriculture and medicine. Agriculture has a very extensive literature: some

of which survives dates back as far as the T'ang. Many phases of the subject have been dealt with, such as the implements utilized, fruits, vegetables, bamboo, plowing, sowing, hydraulics, the planting of mulberry trees, the rearing of silkworms, and the breeding of cattle. The Chinese had here acquired a vast amount of information and had developed many ingenious devices.

We know that medical literature existed as early as the Han, and it is probable that some was written before that time. The *Nei Ching,* said to be the oldest Chinese medical classic, is ascribed to the end of the Chou or the beginning of the Ch'in, and some other works are reputed to be fully as ancient. A number of extant treatises were composed by Sung physicians, a voluminous literature, including a famous materia medica, dates from the Ming, and Ch'ing physicians were prolific authors.

The traditional Chinese medical lore compares favorably with that of the pre-nineteenth century West. In it has been much of superstition, but that was also the case in the Occident. Charms have been extensively employed and gods have been asked to indicate which of several medicines should be taken. Dissection was not practiced, at least of late centuries, and the knowledge of anatomy was correspondingly imperfect. Anesthetics are said to have been used in surgery as early as the Han. For centuries, what is known as acupuncture was widely applied—a procedure by which the flesh was pierced with needles for many different illnesses. Massage has long been employed. Inoculation against smallpox (not vaccination) is said to have been known as early as the Sung. The *yin* and the *yang* permeated both theory and practice. So also did the theory of the five elements. Much, too, was made of the pulse in obtaining a diagnosis, the belief being that by taking it in different ways the state of the principal internal organs of the body could be determined. Certain readings would be taken from the pulse in the left wrist and others from that in the right wrist. At least in the Sung and the Yüan imperial medical colleges were conducted. As a rule, however, medical education was by apprenticeship, and no state or privately administered examinations existed to standardize the profession. Practitioners, accordingly, varied widely in preparation, traveling quacks abounded, and the patient often suffered more from the treatment than from the disease. The pharmacopoeia included many remedies which depended for their supposed efficacy upon thoroughly fanciful theories. It is highly doubtful, for example, whether the much esteemed ginseng had any value beyond that of mental suggestion. But for the fact that the Chinese, by long contact with many virulent diseases, had developed a partial immunity to some of them, the death rate would have been much higher than it was. Yet when all is said which can be brought as an indictment against the traditional medical practice, and it is much, the fact remains that the Chinese acquired and transmitted a great deal of valuable lore. Their pharmacopoeia contained many

useful drugs, and their methods of treatment not infrequently produced excellent results. It was not uncommon after the introduction of modern Western medicine for the Chinese to acknowledge the superiority of Occidental surgery, but for internal remedies, to prefer practitioners trained in the native fashion. Western physicians reported remarkable cures wrought by old-style Chinese physicians.

In other phases of science the Chinese could point to major achievements. Among them were recording astronomical phenomena and forms of animal and plant life, cartography, and mineralogy.

## PRINTING

For centuries the normal process by which literature has been reproduced in the Middle Kingdom has been printing. We have seen that this epoch-making invention was developed in China hundreds of years before it was known in Europe. Indeed—although as yet this is unproved—it may have been transmitted from China to the West. Printing from movable type was known, but the preferred method and the one most extensively employed was by incised wooden blocks. These blocks or plates were usually the size of two pages. The surface was prepared by smoothing it and then spreading over it a paste. While this surface was still moist there was placed on it, face down, a sheet of thin paper on which had been previously written the passage to be reproduced. The paper was rubbed off, leaving, in reverse form, the ink of the text. An artisan with a sharp tool cut away all the surface but that marked by the characters, and the result was a woodcut of the double page. Ink was then applied with a brush; a piece of paper was placed on the block, was made to lie smoothly and take the impression by the application of a dry brush to its back, and was removed; the block was re-inked, and the operation was repeated. The paper was usually thin and printed only on one side. In binding, the leaves were folded and stitched together. The process could be very rapidly carried out, and the most skillful products have been beautiful examples of the printer's art. A cheaper form of block printing was the use of clay or wax blocks, on which the text was incised. The clay or wax could be remolded and used again and again. The resulting product was artistically less desirable than that of the wood blocks and so was used chiefly for inexpensive editions of the Peking Gazette and the corresponding provincial sheets, and for placards.

## LIBRARIES

The Chinese have valued books very highly, and libraries, some of them of vast extent, have been assembled. The largest have been

collected under official auspices. We have repeatedly seen how the destruction of successive imperial libraries in the vicissitudes of civil war and foreign invasion has been one of the main sources of loss to scholarship. Buddhist monasteries often had considerable libraries, but these specialized in the literature of that faith. Many private collections were also assembled and some of them handed down for generations. Again the hazards of war and of changing family fortunes sooner or later led to their destruction or dispersion. But for the art of printing, which made possible the production of many copies of a single edition, most of the ancient books would long since have disappeared. Even as it is, a large proportion of the literary treasures of the past have vanished in whole or in part, leaving at most no traces but a title and perhaps a few quotations. However, fragile though Chinese paper may appear to be, Sung editions are by no means unknown, and many examples have come down to us of the work of Yüan and Ming printers.

## EDUCATION

Before the close of the nineteenth century formal education in China was dominated by the preparation for the two chief learned professions: the service of the state and the Buddhist priesthood. The training for the latter was conducted only in monasteries and for the novitiate which led to membership in a monastic community. Except indirectly, through the instruction which the monks gave the laity and through Buddhist services and literature, it exerted no influence upon the life of the Empire as a whole. On the other hand, the type of education which in theory led to the civil service examinations, and which was controlled by the requirements for these ordeals, was entered upon by many who either did not aspire to compete or who were never successful. The large majority of those who received some training in the elementary schools remained outside the charmed circle of the holders of degrees.

It would, however, give an incomplete picture of the older educational system of China to focus attention exclusively on the instruction imparted in monasteries and schools. Much was acquired in other ways. Guilds, through their apprenticeships, conducted a good deal of what would now be called vocational education. It was largely thus that skill in handicrafts and in commercial methods was transmitted. In the course of their training apprentices often picked up a knowledge of the written characters most necessary to their occupations. Farmers passed on to their sons such lore in agriculture as they possessed. Women, although not eligible for public office and hence not admitted either to the civil service examinations or to the schools that prepared for them, were by no means always uneducated. Illiterate most of them were, but in better families a very

considerable number were initiated by private tutors into the mysteries of the printed page. China was not without women who were noted for their literary attainments. In well-regulated homes, moreover, the daughters were given a careful education by their mothers in the management of a household, in courtesy and the ceremonial and proprieties that helped to make Chinese society run smoothly (if and when it did), and in their duties toward their future husbands and parents-in-law. Woman's sphere was believed to be the home, and the training deemed proper for that sphere was often very conscientiously conducted.

The schools that led to the civil service examinations had a long history and may go back to Chou or even Shang prototypes. It is clear that schools existed in Chou times. Certainly, too, in the Han there were schools, both government and private. Institutions for the study of the recognized classics were an essential corollary of the Confucianism then being adopted by the state, for if, as it demanded, the Empire was to be governed through educated men, centers must be maintained where this training could be given. Han Wu Ti did much to inaugurate an imperial system of education, and government schools were multiplied under the Later Han. In the years of disunion between the Han and the Sui mention is made, at intervals, of government schools in some of the states that flourished in that kaleidoscopic era. Under the Sui the imperial system was renewed and under the T'ang it was reorganized and greatly extended. It is not surprising that during the Sung, with its Confucian revival, a structure existed which constituted—at least on paper—a kind of pyramid beginning with a school in each administrative subdivision and culminating in institutions in the capital. Private schools exerted much influence. Even under the Mongols there were government schools. The Ming, with its emphasis upon Confucianism and its thoroughgoing strengthening of the civil service examinations, not unnaturally still further elaborated the educational program. In theory its system contemplated a school in each village, *hsien*, *chou*, and *fu*, and a national institution in the capital. Some of the students were to be subsidized from the public revenues. The Ch'ing followed the Ming, with modifications, and had a paper plan which called for schools of several kinds in the capital, including those for the Manchu nobles and Bannermen and what might loosely be termed a national university, a college in each of the provinces, and a school in every *fu, chou, hsien,* and village.

In practice the system outlined by the Ch'ing was only imperfectly put into operation. To be sure, several schools existed in the capital. There were, too, provincial and some prefectural colleges. The majority of the students in these institutions were supported at public expense, the income to maintain them coming from endowments or from official subsidies. Village schools were largely left to local initiative. For the most part the

Imperial Government contented itself with conducting the civil service examinations and with maintaining a few schools in Peking and the provinces (often halfheartedly), and left the student, with such aid as the local authorities or the village or family might give him, to obtain his preparation where and as he could. The high esteem in which degrees were held prevented any dearth of candidates for the examinations. The central and provincial governments could be sure that an ample number of aspirants would appear, well equipped in the type of education demanded by the tests, without much, if any financial aid from imperial officialdom. At least under the Ch'ing, and possibly through most of China's history, primary education was left to local and private initiative.

When they could afford it, families seem usually to have employed private tutors for their children. Often, too, a scholar father or grandfather himself undertook the task of guiding the studies of the youths of the household. Almost if not quite invariably, however, this was only after the primary stages had been passed, for classical precedent frowned upon a father teaching his own son. Often a large family or clan maintained a school for its boys, housing it in the ancestral temple. Frequently several families in a village joined in hiring a teacher, or a benevolent person or persons of means financed a free school. Almost never was a building erected for the purpose, but a temple or the room of a house was borrowed or rented.

The teacher had no special training in pedagogy. Books existed which held up standards for the conduct of the pupil but the instructor received no formal preparation in his art. He tended to follow rather slavishly the methods by which he himself had been taught. In theory teachers were highly respected, but in practice the majority suffered from poor pay and precarious tenure. Often they were recruited from among the unsuccessful aspirants for the civil service examinations, and the training of many had not proceeded far enough to warrant even the attempt to compete in them. Here and there, however, men in the profession could show respectable scholarly attainments or display skill in instruction.

The method of the primary school consisted largely of committing to memory texts that were beyond the comprehension of the child, and which were not explained to him until after the process of memorization had stored his mind with quite an array of literature. Even then the interpretation vouchsafed was either in the form of traditional commentaries or in a style more calculated to display the teacher's erudition than to enlighten the student. The pupil repeated aloud after the instructor the text to be learned. Then, at the top of his voice, he went over the passage again and again until he had fixed it in mind. He was tested by being required to recite the lesson with his back to the teacher and without looking at his book. Thirty or forty boys thus engaged sounded

like bedlam. The student was also taught to write characters. The hours were long, from early morning until late in the afternoon, and the intermissions were not for recreation of even unorganized forms. Discipline was supposed to be strict and the teacher was generous in his use of the ferule.

The texts memorized were designed to fit the pupil for the state examinations. For the beginner they included first the *San Tzŭ Ching*, or "Three Character Classic," a short compendium in rhymed lines of three characters each of standard Confucian philosophy and ethics and of Chinese history, concluding with incentives to study in the form of noteworthy examples of past ages. Then followed the *Pai Chia Hsing*, or "Hundred Family Names" (in reality more than four hundred surnames), the famous *Ch'ien Tzŭ Wên*, or "Thousand Character Essay," in which none of the thousand characters occurred twice, a series of "Odes for Children," and the *Hsiao Ching*, or "Classic of Filial Piety." These were succeeded by the Four Books and Five Classics of the Confucian Canon. Poetry might also be studied, perhaps as copy for learning to write the characters.

By no means all who entered the elementary schools remained long enough to complete the curriculum. The majority usually dropped out after a year or two. They had acquired the ability to read and to write a number of characters and returned to the fields or went into a store or a handicraft. It was only the rare lad who possessed the ability or whose family could provide the means to pursue the course long enough to be prepared to compete in the state examinations.

The secondary schools gave their students additional training in composition and literature and in the study of essays selected from those which had won recognition in the civil service examinations.

In addition were higher schools. In some dynasties these proved very influential as centers of constructive or critical thought.

The faults of the system are obvious. A curriculum designed to prepare applicants for the government examinations was pursued by all, even though only a minority of those who began it had any serious thought of qualifying for these tests. It was confined to limited phases of human knowledge. The lack of physical education and of training in hygiene took a heavy toll in life and health. The method of instruction emphasized memory and discouraged independent thought. Even the finished products were very limited in their range of information and were inclined to be blind to the existence of other realms of knowledge and to have a bigoted pride in their own attainments and in the finality and sufficiency of the literary culture of their class. Little or no preparation was given for meeting the problems with which most of the pupils would later be confronted. Many were actually unfitted for life and eked out an

uncertain living, too proud to demean themselves by manual labor and unadapted to most remunerative occupations. The program had glaring deficiencies even as a training for the task of the government administrator—the profession to which it was supposed to lead. Much of the political weakness of China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be traced to it.

Yet the system also had its virtues. Although the majority of those who entered upon it never reached the examination stalls, a fairly large proportion of the male population acquired through it some knowledge of the written character. No comprehensive statistics for literacy are available. The proportion varied between town and country and from district to district. In some cities, however, nearly if not fully half of the adult men could read some characters. Although in other places, particularly in rural sections, the proportion was very much smaller, it was a rare community which did not contain some one who could read and write. The emphasis upon memory had its faults, but at least it supplied those who had gone far in the course with the command of the text of a large body of literature, much of it of high quality, and so helped to maintain standards of taste. Even though the system did not give direct training in the technique of government, it grounded future officials in the principles which Confucianism held to underlie ordered society, and trusted the individual, with the assistance of laws and precedents, to apply them. Its purpose was the growth of men and not the impartation of information. Its aim was cultural, not utilitarian—the self-development of the individual, who was supposed to set an example. Then, too, education of the traditional type proved of immeasurable assistance in perpetuating Chinese culture and in promoting the unity of the Empire. We have repeatedly seen that the remarkable coherence of China and the ability of the country to come together after periods of civil strife and division were due not primarily to force, although that nearly always was an important factor, but to a uniformity in social institutions and the general acceptance of basic ethical, political, and social ideals. This universality of cultural forms and principles must be ascribed largely to an education which inculcated a common body of literature and a particular philosophy of life. The establishment and maintenance of the system, chiefly through the device of the civil service examinations, constituted one of the most noteworthy achievements of the Chinese.

## CHANGES WROUGHT BY THE COMING OF THE WEST

In no other phase of Chinese life has the revolution wrought by the impact of the Occident been more thoroughgoing than in what may be called the realm of the intellect: language, literature, and education.

The old depended for its continuance upon a type of political organization that could not survive in the modern world. When the Confucian imperial state system collapsed, as it did early in the twentieth century, its associated institutions and ideals were dealt a staggering blow. Moreover, under the new circumstances the specialization and rigidity that were part of the strength of the accepted forms of literature and thought proved a weakness. The Chinese had to acquire competency in fields of learning in which the Occident led and through which it had overwhelmed them. To do so they were compelled to give over concentrating on their older literature and to reorganize their education entirely. Many of the resulting changes have been recounted earlier. They must, however, be summarized here, in somewhat different form but with a certain amount of repetition.

The language has undergone great modifications. The many new ideas and objects introduced in the past generation have had to be named. Usually this has been done by coining compound words out of existing vocables and characters—a process to which Chinese readily lends itself. Thus a telegram is *tien pao*—"a lightning report." In this the Japanese led the way. Many of the new terms, indeed, were made in the Island Empire, where Chinese characters have been used for centuries and where the wholesale adoption of Western culture preceded the corresponding movement in China by a generation. Some terms were taken over almost bodily from foreign tongues by transliteration. English was long the chief source of such loan words, for until the Communists took possession of the mainland it was the Western language most widely studied. So many educated Chinese used it readily and so much of the teaching in higher schools had English as a medium and employed English texts that it was not surprising to find English words in Chinese speech. Such terms as "democracy" and "dictator" were among them.

That strange hybrid, "pidgin English," which arose as a lingua franca for foreign commerce, gradually disappeared. It was made up largely of English words arranged in the order of Chinese idiom.

Although the taboo was removed from the invention of characters, not a great many new ones appeared. It was simpler and less confusing to make compound words or to transliterate foreign terms than to devise characters. However, a few were coined. For instance, the pronoun of the third person was formerly written by a character which did not have any variation for gender. New ones were framed to make possible a differentiation between "he," "she," and "it." So, too, punctuation was more freely used than formerly: several marks of Western origin were adopted.

Attempts have not been lacking to do away entirely with the old written characters and to substitute for them a small number of phonetic

signs. Some of these experiments were by Protestant missionaries in their zeal to teach Christians to read—a desire actuated by the purpose of making the Bible an open book to every church member. Missionaries often employed the Roman letters and in a few instances invented new scripts. Their use did not extend outside the Christian communities or beyond those who otherwise would be illiterate. A few phonetic systems were devised by Chinese, but these met the fate of those originated by foreigners. Any attempt to substitute a phonetic script for the time-honored forms must face the fact that the larger part of the existing literature would be unintelligible if transcribed in an alphabet or syllabary. If one were ever adopted by the entire nation, most of the literary treasures of the past would be closed to all except a few specialists. Yet the Communists sought to introduce a phonetic alphabet using Roman letters. Under Communist auspices simplified forms of the traditional characters were devised and propagated.

We have noted that about 1917 a dignified form of the Mandarin, as the *pai hua,* began to be prominent. It was written with the old characters, but it much more closely approximated the speech of every day than did the classical style. Such a change was obviously necessary. Imported Western political and social ideals and the progress of industrialization demanded that the masses be educated, and this would be impossible if all scholarly writing were to continue in *wên li.* Moreover, with the many new subjects with which youth had to become acquainted, for most students time did not permit the attainment of a facility in the classical forms of composition. It was a choice between a debased or greatly simplified *wên li* and a worthy vernacular. The latter alternative was chosen.

If, however, this *pai hua* was to be easily intelligible throughout the nation, it was obvious that there must be a general understanding of the vernacular upon which it was based. It was clear, too, that this type of linguistic unity would have to be achieved if that reinforcement to cultural and national unity heretofore given by the Empire-wide use of the classical language was not to be lost. Accordingly a vigorous effort has been made to have a form of Mandarin adopted as the *kuo yü,* or "national speech." It has been taught in the schools and has made headway in the non-Mandarin speaking areas on the south coast. The local dialects persist, but the standard national vernacular is spreading.

In literature the changes wrought by the coming of the West have been especially marked. Not only has it become good form to write in the *pai hua,* but the scope of literature has been modified and widened. In scholarly circles historical criticism became popular. The Han School of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with its courageous and original investigation of the authenticity of the accepted texts of the

ancient Classics, once more came into vogue and was reinforced and enriched by contact with the historical methodology of the modern West. Aided by the tools thus made available, stimulated by the efforts of Western Sinologists, and freed from the shackles of the older state-supported orthodoxy, Chinese scholars eagerly investigated afresh the records of antiquity. Much attention was devoted to the Chou and pre-Chou period, and the books ascribed to those centuries were subjected to critical scrutiny, with conclusions that were often very skeptical. A record of the Ch'ing was compiled on the general pattern of the other dynastic histories. As was natural in a time of energetic agitation to rid China of the "unequal treaties," much attention was given to the history of the nation's diplomatic relations with the Occident.

Under the Communists the study of China's past was made to conform to Marxist interpretations of the past. Western imperialism was bitterly denounced. Some revolts of the past were declared to be popular uprisings against "feudalism." The T'ai P'ing movement was viewed as an early stage of the proletarian revolution which culminated in the triumph of Communism: methods of land reform which it projected were praised.

The range of Chinese literary forms was extended by contact with the West. Poetry, drama, and fiction often showed the effects of Occidental influence. Newspapers and magazines were issued in great quantities. Perhaps in part as a development from the placards that for years were employed to arouse public opinion, propagandists, notably the Communists, made extensive use of cartoons and printed slogans, which, often in glaring colors, were affixed to walls in public places.

The scope of Chinese thought was broadened. Western books covering a wide range of subjects were translated in large numbers. Natural science especially became popular. At first sight it may seem strange that the Chinese, who for a highly civilized people were long so backward in mathematics and the natural sciences, suddenly adopted with enthusiasm scientific processes and results. Indeed, large numbers of the younger men quickly displayed marked skill in scientific research. However, the this-worldly attitude encouraged by Confucianism, the practical outlook of much of Chinese philosophy, and the ingenuity long displayed in the invention of mechanical appliances were a preparation for the scientific approach. The Communists greatly stimulated it, but it had begun independently of their regime.

Printing was more and more by movable type. Great publishing houses arose, the Commercial Press being long the most notable. The Communists nationalized publishing, as they did other aspects of economic and intellectual activity.

In an earlier chapter something has been said about the history of

the education of the new type. It will be recalled that Protestant missionaries were its leading pioneers. Before the China-Japanese War of 1894–1895 their schools enjoyed no wide patronage, for they were not of the kind to which boys would go for preparation for the civil service examinations. Their students were recruited largely from church members or from those too poverty-stricken to afford an education elsewhere. Their graduates usually found employment either in the service of a Christian mission or in business houses engaged in foreign trade. With the "reform movement" which began about 1895, mission schools, as the best places in China in which the new, highly desired Western education could be acquired, rose quickly to popularity. In the twenty-five years after the defeat of China by the Powers in 1900 they had a very rapid growth, for in mental and moral discipline, and as a place in which to acquire Western learning, the best of them, especially the secondary and higher institutions, were equal and usually superior to the non-Christian ones in their communities. Private and government schools of the new type increased even more rapidly. The growth was retarded by civil strife and foreign invasions, but it had a phenomenal expansion in "free" China. The Nationalists continued it on T'aiwan. On the mainland the Communists gave it major attention. After 1949 new Christian schools were begun on T'aiwan. But on the mainland the Communists took over all the plants of the Christian institutions of learning. As we have seen, the Communists have stressed education and have multiplied schools of all grades.

It will be recalled that thousands of Chinese youth studied abroad—in Japan, Europe, and America, and latterly in Russia—as large a student migration from any one country as the world has ever seen.

It will be remembered, too, that students took an active part in politics, sometimes as the tools of older manipulators, and more than once prominently and decisively. On the mainland that was ended by the Communists, for with the exception of the brief "blooming of the hundred flowers," they insisted that all students and other intellectuals conform to the party line.

Associated with the extension of formal education to groups for which it was not traditionally designed has been the inclusion of girls in the schools. The beginnings must be ascribed to the Protestant missionary, as must so many other features of education and social reform. In government schools coeducation of the sexes has become common. The Communists especially have promoted it.

The curriculum has been broadened. Not only does that of ordinary primary and secondary schools include many subjects undreamed of two generations ago, but technical schools have been founded to give the training which, if available at all, was formerly to be had only through the apprentice system or in the home. All this, it will be observed, is of

Occidental provenance. So, too, is the idea of a university as known among European peoples. Numbers of institutions have been founded which seek, some of them with increasing success, to be true universities in the Western sense of that term. Such Western devices as laboratories and playing fields have been installed.

The intellectual atmosphere of China has, then, been profoundly altered. The scholar of the old school, thoroughly drilled in the Classics but knowing little else, has all but disappeared. The product of the new education knows much less of the ancient literature than did his predecessor. At his worst he is shallowly trained in Western subjects as well. At his best he has at least some familiarity with the older literature of his country, uses easily one or more foreign languages, is acquainted with the broad range of ancient and modern Western knowledge, and is a specialist in some one segment of it. The typical product of the new age is intensely nationalistic and has an almost naïve confidence in the findings of modern science and in the scientific method. More than in any other time in recorded history, the Chinese educated classes have moved out of one age into another.

Nowhere has the sharp transition been more vividly seen than in the realm of fiction. The writing of fiction became a major occupation of many of the intellectuals. For the most part they were rebels against the existing social order, including the family and the sex mores. A pioneer, Chou Shu-jen, who wrote under the pen name of Lu Hsün, had wide popularity and eventually was lauded by the Communists. After the Communists became masters of the mainland they constrained the writers of fiction to become propagandists for their ideology, and originality declined. Some authors were highly critical of Communism and took refuge in Hong Kong or T'aiwan or became silent.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

# By Way of Summary

The outstanding characteristic of the China of today is, as we have seen, the clash of two cultures, with the partial and progressive disintegration of the one which we think of as traditionally Chinese.

The civilization which at present seems in process of disappearing was the product of a long evolution. Its development was marked by great stages, each with its distinct characteristics. In spite of the fact that certain features occur again and again through much of its course, Chinese history is by no means, as some would have us think, a repetition of movements identical except for the names of the actors.

As is the case with most cultures of ancient origin, the beginnings of that of the Chinese are veiled in obscurity. We first catch glimpses of its outlines sometime in the second millennium before Christ, in what is known as the Shang dynasty. There was then living on the fertile plains of North China, on the lower course of the Yellow River, a race whose blood appears to be the dominant strain in the population that still inhabits that region. It had written characters (an archaic form of the present script), depended upon agriculture for subsistence, used bronze for some of its weapons, implements, and utensils, had a vigorous and by no means crude art, and already possessed a political organization of some complexity. How much of the culture was autochthonous and how much an importation from the west or south is still a matter of conjecture and debate. We know that many centuries and perhaps millenniums before the Shang, primitive man inhabited what is now North China, and that at a time not very remote from and contemporary with the Shang, men on the edge of the bronze age and using polished stone implements and pottery of various kinds lived in the valley of the Yellow River and in Manchuria.

The Shang was replaced by the Chou. The latter triumphed in a trial of arms, the traditional date being toward the close of the second millennium before the Christian Era. The Chou was possibly a new invader from the west, seeking control of the fertile North China plain and differing somewhat in culture from the Shang. Apparently the advent of the Chou was accompanied by no marked revolution in culture. However, in the course of the centuries in which the Chou supplied the titular rulers, striking developments occurred. The area within the purview of the Chinese political organization expanded, reaching south into the valley of the Yangtze and north into the highlands of Shansi. The authority of the Chou monarchs

diminished almost to the vanishing point, although long after they ceased to have an effective military control those who inherited the Chou title of *wang* continued to hold a religious pre-eminence and by a convenient fiction were still the fountain of titles and of legitimacy. The actual power passed more and more into the hands of a varying number of territorial magnates. Much of the time the rival magnates waged war on one another and on the neighboring non-Chinese peoples. There were cities, commerce, money, art, and a certain degree of luxury for the ruling classes. A sharp distinction existed between the aristocracy and the proletariat. Original thinking emerged, some of it profound, and the second half of the first millennium before Christ spanned one of the most creative periods in the intellectual history of China. The philosophers centered their attention chiefly, but by no means exclusively, upon the achievement of an ideal human society. Political and economic theories were, accordingly, warmly debated. The chief schools were four in number. The Confucianists insisted upon the maintenance of the traditional religious and political ceremonies and organization, but purified and kept just, through the example of educated and righteous rulers and officials who had the welfare of the populace at heart. The Taoists believed in having mankind conform to what was denominated the Tao. The Tao, as they conceived it, may be defined as the way of the Universe. This they thought to be simplicity itself. Accordingly they wished to reduce government and economic organization to the minimum. To them the elaborate ceremonies and meticulous ethics of the Confucianists were anathema. Then there were the Mohists. Mo Ti, their founder, was intensely religious. He believed that *T'ien,* or *Shang Ti,* the traditional Supreme God of his day, loved all men. All men, therefore, so he held, should love one another and should seek one another's welfare. He condemned aggressive war as contrary to love and held that costly funerals were wasteful of materials needed for the living and should be discouraged. His followers divided into two groups, one emphasizing his religious views and the other stressing his dialectic. A fourth main school, the Legalists, or Administrators, sought to create economically self-sufficient states with autocratic monarchs—each a centralized fighting machine in command of a ruler who strictly controlled his subjects through impartially administered law. In and out of these four schools a good deal of religious and metaphysical speculation went on, some of it marked by daring and acute skepticism and some of it by reasoned faith.

In the fifth century before the Christian Era the wars between the states that made up the then China increased in intensity. Eventually, out of the sorrows of these years, in the middle of the third century B.C. a decisive transition occurred. The old order passed away and a new China emerged, more widely extended, but with a culture largely based on that of the past. Ch'in, with its seat in the valley of the Wei in the Northwest, conquered

its rivals and founded the Chinese Empire. Its great leader and autocrat, Shih Huang Ti, extended his rule over the major portion of what is now China proper, sought to stamp out the remnants of the decentralized particularism of the Chou, and administered his realm through a centralized bureaucracy, which, under rulers and ministers who had adopted the Legalist theory, had been developed in his native state of Ch'in. To make his power secure, Shih Huang Ti endeavored to curb the non-Legalist philosophic schools which criticized the political theory and the attendant organization on which he depended.

The structure through which Ch'in Shih Huang Ti governed was disrupted shortly after his death. A successful warrior, however, soon succeeded in founding a new dynasty, the Han, under which, with one interruption about the time of Christ, the Empire was ruled from the close of the third century B.C. to the beginning of the third century A.D. While for a time the Han reverted in part to the decentralized forms of the Chou, it increasingly governed through a bureaucracy, some of whose main principles it derived from the Ch'in. Instead of Legalism, the Han eventually adopted Confucianism as the theory on which to build the state. The Confucianism that prevailed was a syncretism in which the Confucianism of the Chou was the dominant element. It was on the basis of the Confucian principle that the realm should be governed by the ablest and the best, regardless of birth, that, after the first few reigns, the Han rulers more and more recruited the members of the bureaucracy. To this end they established educational institutions in which Confucianism was dominant and instituted the beginnings of a system of civil service examinations through which some members of the bureaucracy were chosen. The structure so erected provided machinery by which autocratic Emperors could govern their vast domains without recourse to an hereditary nobility and the consequent threat of decentralizing particularism. This Confucian state system, elaborated and modified by later dynasties, persisted until in the twentieth century it collapsed under pressure from the Occident.

The other main philosophic schools of the Chou left their impress on the dominant school and did not immediately die out as separate entities. Taoism, greatly changed, continued popular. Some Legalist measures of state control of phases of economic life were warmly debated and adopted, and the Mohists did not at once disappear. Yet philosophic speculation became less original and the debates over it less marked. The intellectual ferment of the Chou was passing.

Territorially the Han was characterized by expansion. The Han arms were carried southward into the present Vietnam, northward into the present Korea, and westward into Central Asia into what is now Russian territory. Contacts with foreign peoples multiplied, and more or less indirect intercourse was had even with the Roman Empire. Art was profoundly

altered, in part because of influences from abroad. Its figures became more lifelike and showed more vigorous action. There arrived, too, the first waves of Buddhism—that faith which was to be the vehicle for more profound foreign influences on the Chinese than came from any other single source in historic times until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

With the end of the Han, in the third century A.D., a period of political disunion began which lasted for not far from four centuries. During much of this time non-Chinese peoples from the north and west ruled great sections of the North. Numbers of families claimed imperial power, but no one of them was able to command the allegiance of as much of the country as had acknowledged the Han, although in the third century one nearly succeeded in doing so. Most of them ruled over what were only fragments of the former Han domains. Thanks in part to the weakening of the administrative system inherited from the Han and the consequent feebleness of its accompanying Confucianism, Buddhism made great headway and established itself as a major religion of the land. With it came new and varied art forms, some of Greek origin, and it inspired marked artistic and literary activity. By the end of the period the Chinese had begun to make Buddhism their own and to think it through in terms of their experience. The result was Buddhist schools of thought and practice which, although some claimed Indian nativity, usually displayed marks of the Chinese environment. Yet the older religious systems—Confucianism and Taoism—did not disappear, even though both, especially Taoism, were profoundly modified by competition with their rival.

In spite of the nearly four centuries of division, the dream of political unity for all the inheritors of Chinese culture did not die. At the close of the sixth century it was once more realized by the Sui dynasty. The Sui was quickly followed by the T'ang. During the T'ang, which led China from early in the seventh to early in the tenth century A.D., the Empire reached a new level of power and prosperity, but with a culture which in some respects differed decidedly from that of its great predecessor, the Han. Like the Han it extended the geographical boundaries of the Empire toward the south and north, and especially toward the west. The outer limits of the two were not far from the same. Like the Han it built its political structure on the Confucian theory. Indeed, it carried still further the system which the Han had originated of recruiting the staff of its bureaucracy through civil service examinations based largely although not entirely upon Confucian literature. To prepare for these examinations it expanded the state system of schools. Under the T'ang Confucianism revived and once more became powerful. Taoism, modified by Buddhism, was popular. Yet the T'ang showed marked contrasts with the Han, and under it fresh advances were made. In its later years China entered upon a new cultural era. Chinese Buddhism attained the height of its vigor and entered upon

a slow decline. Sculpture reached its apex and there were noted painters. Many of the art motifs were very different from those of the Han. Subsequent generations regarded the poetry and the calligraphy of the T'ang as the finest the Chinese have produced. Printing and porcelain appeared, probably for the first time. Other foreign faiths—Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, and Islam—entered, and one of them, Islam, persisted. More than at any previous time, Japan was brought within the circle of Chinese cultural influence.

Following the T'ang, after a half-century or so of disorder, came the Sung. During much of its course the North was ruled by aliens, but the native culture of the period was rich and had its distinct developments. For many years debate over a political experiment somewhat akin to the modern state socialism of the Occident disturbed the realm. Buddhism, while still strong, gave additional evidences of decay. Confucianism, although more than ever the accepted philosophy of the educated and ruling classes and enforced through a further development of government schools and civil service examinations, was extensively modified. It was thought through afresh and restated, and much of Taoism and Buddhism were more or less consciously incorporated in it. The form then given it remained orthodox until the twentieth century. Landscape painting was the crowning achievement of the art of the Sung, and the best of it has never been equaled in China before or since. Printing and porcelain were improved. Sung editions are valued for their beauty as well as their antiquity, and Sung porcelains, largely monochrome and simple of design, are highly esteemed. Cities based on commerce and industry multiplied and urban life became prominent.

In the fourth quarter of the thirteenth century the last of the Sung Emperors succumbed to the rising tide of foreign conquest, and for nearly a century all China submitted to the Mongols. However, the latter did not seek to displace Chinese culture and ruled largely under the accustomed machinery and in the guise of Chinese Emperors, with the dynastic name of Yüan. Many foreigners entered China as merchants, soldiers, and officials. Western Europeans reached the Empire for the first time, most of them as merchants and missionaries, and carried back glowing reports of the wealth and culture of Cathay. Novels and the theatre became prominent.

In the second half of the fourteenth century Chinese armies drove out the Mongols, and one of their generals placed his family on the throne as a dynasty, the Ming, which ruled the Empire until the middle of the seventeenth century. The Neo-Confucianism of the Sung remained the official philosophy in which the educated were drilled and on which the state continued to be based. The administrative machinery and the civil service examinations, which had come down from the Han, were further elaborated and strengthened. Yet even the Ming, which sought earnestly to restore

the traditional culture, saw distinctive developments. Buddhism became more somnolent, and art, deprived in part of its inspiration, grew more secular. Landscape painting declined in quality, but the technique was elaborated. Porcelains were enriched by the use of more colors and polychrome designs. There were even revolts (although affecting only a few) against the dominant Neo-Confucianism of the Sung, partly in the school of Wang Yang-ming and partly in the beginnings of the attempt to get back of the interpretations of the Sung philosophers to the primitive documents of the accepted Classics before they had been altered by the Han editors.

In the seventeenth century the native Emperors gave way before another group of foreign conquerors. These, the Manchus, established the Ch'ing dynasty and held the throne until 1912. Under the rule of the greatest of the Ch'ing, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the territory controlled reached the widest extent in the history of the Empire. Population attained new high levels and the Chinese race spread over a larger area than ever before. In culture, however, the Ch'ing era was almost entirely a continuation of the Ming. Important innovations from within in art, literature, religion, philosophy, and political organization were lacking. To be sure, the Han school of literary and historical criticism came to fruition, but it had begun in the Ming. Until the Ch'ing the course of Chinese cultural development, while marked by certain fairly constant factors and characteristics, had shown progressive change. One dynasty was by no means a complete repetition of its predecessor. Within some dynasties important transitions were seen. Ever since the Yüan, however, creativity and originality had been slowing down and the Chinese were more and more content to repeat old customs and forms. For this the enforced conformity to Sung Neo-Confucianism and the lack of stirring contacts with other cultures seem to have been at least in part responsible.

Under the Ming and the Ch'ing those intimate contacts with an expanding Occident began which in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were to have revolutionary sequels. The comparatively brief touch of a few Europeans with China under the Yüan had its main permanent results in kindling in the hearts of adventurous Westerners the desire to reach the rich and populous Cathay of which Marco Polo wrote. Not until the sixteenth century were those relations established which have continued and grown. Moreover, not until nearly the middle of the nineteenth century was China seriously affected by them. The collapse of the structure of Chinese life before the invasion of the West was more overwhelming than it otherwise would have been and the ensuing chaos more marked because the increasing pressure of that invasion synchronized with the decline in vigor of the Ch'ing rulers. It was a China with incompetent and decadent leadership at the top which had to face the most serious combination of crises in its history.

The contrasts between the Chinese culture whose disruption the present generation has witnessed and the civilization of the West which brought about the revolution are numerous and striking. Both are notable achievements of the human genius and it would be difficult to decide which is the more admirable. However, since it is the West which has conquered, Chinese rather than Occidental civilization has suffered, and the disintegration in the former is greater than would have been the case had the background of the two been more nearly similar. On the one hand was a culture where changes, once frequent, were occurring more and more slowly. On the other was a civilization in which a machine age and applied science were working alterations with constantly accelerated speed. New social theories, including especially communism, were becoming widespread. The Chinese idea of the state was that of an empire embracing all civilized mankind, owing allegiance to one sovereign Son of Heaven, and governed through scholars trained in the Confucian theories of life. Unity was as much cultural as political and wide variations from Confucianism were decried. The Western conception has been a commonwealth of nations, each theoretically sovereign in its own territory and guided in its relations to others by an international law. This difference was the cause of frequent misunderstandings and friction. For instance, the signature of a treaty did not have the same connotation to Chinese as to Occidentals. Such political theories as democracy and latterly socialism and communism have transformed political institutions. In China a people that has been culturally but not nationally self-conscious has collided with a West in which the tides of nationalism are running strong. Chinese currency had not been uniform throughout the country and had been based on copper and silver. Western currencies usually employed the gold standard and the central government established uniform measures of fineness and weight. Chinese industry was in the handicraft stage. By the time it began seriously to affect China that of the Occident had been made over by the Industrial Revolution and had entered the factory era. The transportation of China had been by the sailing craft, the wheelbarrow, the cart, and on the backs of men and beasts of burden. That of the West is by the steamship, the railway, the automobile, and the airplane. The Occident which has forced itself on China is in possession of the ocean cable and the telegraph and of nationally and internationally organized postal systems and has added the radio and the cinema. A China primarily agricultural and rural has been forced into a world which is increasingly industrial and urban. Religiously China had been Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist, with strong admixtures of animism and polytheism and with occasional skepticism. It has had to face an Occident which in philosophy and religion is the heir of Greek, Hebrew, and Christian traditions, and which at present displays a strong tendency to discredit and discard all religion. A people organized in part on the

patriarchal basis, and in which the individual and even the state have been subordinated to the family, has been invaded by mores from a huge section of the world where the individual has been exalted, where the family is disintegrating, and where subordination of the individual, when it occurs, as it does increasingly, is to the state. An intellectual culture of a very high order, but in which literary form, ethical and social content, and a subjective philosophy—which looks within to the human spirit—have been the chief preoccupations, has had to face a world which has created the scientific method, is in possession of an amazing and rapidly growing knowledge and control of its physical environment, and in which the premium is upon discoveries in the natural sciences. A people among whom the education of the schools was the privilege of the few and was primarily for the purpose of training state officials has been thrown into competition with a world in which the ideal is education for all. Artistic traditions hallowed by centuries of development and of high achievement have been rudely challenged by the products of quite different historical processes. A people whose socially dominant classes have been uninterested in the development of the body and in athletic sports has been forced into an age whose standards are set by those who rejoice in a sound body and in games involving physical competition. The contrasts between the two civilizations could be multiplied. One world of traditions and customs has been violently entered by another with a quite different background.

Some similarities, to be sure, exist between the old China and the modern West. The Chinese have been this-worldly and interested in constructing a civilization that will bring physical comfort and cultural welfare to all its members. So, increasingly, is the Occident. By tradition the Chinese are disposed to take kindly to the scientific processes and the mechanical devices of the West and to enter into successful competition in its commercial life. It seems fairly clear that the Chinese have more in common with the modern West than they have had with India.

When the similarities between the old China and the Occident have been pointed out, however, the fact remains that in many basic characteristics the two civilizations have been antipathetic. As a consequence the old Chinese culture has been disrupted, with great suffering to millions of Chinese and with danger to the rest of the world. The triumph of the Communists on the mainland and the persistence of the Republic of China on T'aiwan when these lines were penned, for the time were bringing an approach to order. But they were only the latest stage in the revolution and presumably were far from the final outcome. Here is a spectacle the like of which in sheer magnitude human beings have never before seen. The largest fairly homogeneous group of mankind is experiencing the most thoroughgoing revolution in its history. The outcome remains uncertain. The Chinese may be stimulated to fresh originality and build a civilization

that will integrate in partially or entirely new forms some of the old with many of the features of the Occident. On the other hand they may sink more or less permanently into chaos and retain only enfeebled remnants of their older culture, unsuccessfully combined with unintelligently adopted institutions and ideas from the Occident. There is every indication that the full outcome will not be clearly discerned for at least a generation and probably very much longer. So shattering an experience to so large a body of mankind cannot be passed through quickly.

The world should not lose faith in China even if the process requires centuries. Many of us who have loved the Chinese have a hopeful confidence in the ultimate result and base it upon what we know of Chinese history and of individual Chinese of today. We see no clear signs of degeneration in the native capacity of the race. Remembering as we do the ability which the Chinese have shown in the past to construct a civilization, we believe that they will ultimately recover from the stunning blows dealt them and will once more create a worthy culture. It is improbable, however, that we or our children's children will live to see our faith fully justified. The next century or more probably has in store sufferings as intense as the Chinese have ever known. Some of us, however, are not without faith that these will prove the birth pangs of a new and greater China, even though we cannot now clearly forecast its features.

# Proper Names and Chinese Words Used in the Text and Their Corresponding Chinese Characters

Achmach (in Chinese A-ho-ma 阿合馬)
Ahmad (in Chinese A-ho-ma 阿合馬)
A-lo-han 阿羅漢
A-lo-pên 阿羅本
Amban (Chinese An-pan 諳版)
(Manchu word meaning Ta Ch'ên 大臣)
A-mi-t'o (same as O-mi-t'o)
A-mi-t'o-fo (same as O-mi-t'o-fo)
Amoy (Hsia mên) 厦門
Amur (Heilungchiang 黑龍江)
Amursana (Chinese A-mu-êhr-sa-na 阿睦爾撒納)
Anfu (Club) 安福
Anhsi 安西
Anhui 安徽
An Lu-shan 安祿山
Annam (also Annan) 安南
Anpei 安北
An Shan 安山
An-shih-kao 安世高
Antung 安東
Anyang 安陽

Burma (Chinese Mien 緬 or Mien-tien 緬甸)

Canton (Kwangchow) 廣州
Ch'ahar 察哈爾
Champa (in Chinese formerly Lin-i 林邑
and later Chan-ch'êng 占城)
Ch'an (sect of Buddhism) 禪
Ch'ang-an 長安
Chang Ch'ien 張騫
Ch'ang Chien 常建
Chang Chih-tung 張之洞
Ch'angchow 常州
Ch'angch'un 長春
Chang Fei 張飛

Chang Hsien-chung 張獻忠
Chang Hsüeh-cheng 章學誠
Chang Hsüeh-liang 張學良
Chang Hsün 張勳
Chang I 張儀
Chang Ling 張陵
Chang Pang-ch'ang 張邦昌
Changsha 長沙
Chang Tao-ling 張道陵
Chang Tsai 張載
Chang Tso-lin 張作霖
Chan Kuo ("Contending States") 戰國
Chan Kuo Tsê 戰國策
Chao (dynasty) 趙
Chao (state in Chou dynasty, formerly part of Chin 晉) 趙
Ch'aochow 潮州
Ch'aohsien 朝鮮
Chao-hui 兆惠
Chao Kao 趙高
Chao K'uang-yin 趙匡胤
Chao mêng-fu 趙孟頫
Chefoo 芝罘
Chêkiang 浙江
Ch'ên (dynasty) 陳
Chên Chün 眞君
Chêng (Shih Huang Ti) 政
Chêng Ch'êng-kung 鄭成功
Chêng Ch'iao 鄭樵
Ch'êng Hao 程顥
Chêng Ho 鄭和
Ch'êng Huang Miao 城隍廟
Ch'êng I 程頤
Ch'êng I-ch'uan 程伊川
Ch'êng Ming-tao 程明道
Ch'êng Tsu 成祖
Chengtu 成都
Ch'ên Huan-chang 陳煥章
Chên Jên 眞人
Ch'ên Pa-hsien 陳霸先
Ch'ên Shou 陳壽
Ch'ên Shu 陳書
Ch'ên Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀
Ch'ên Tzŭ-ang 陳子昂
Ch'ên Wang 成王
Chên-yen (Buddhist sect) 眞言
ch'i (in Sung philosophy and in fêng-shui) 氣
Ch'i (state in Chou dynasty) 齊
Ch'i (dynasty) 齊
Chia Ch'ing 嘉慶
Chiang Kai-shek (Chiang Chieh-shih) 蔣介石
Chia Ssŭ-tao 賈似道
Chieh 桀
Ch'ien Chao (dynasty) 前趙
Ch'ien Ch'in (dynasty) 前秦
Ch'ien Han Shu 前漢書
Chien-k'ang (later Nanking) 建康
Ch'ien Liang (dynasty) 前涼
Ch'ien Lung 乾隆
Ch'ien-t'ang 錢塘
Ch'ien Tzŭ Wên 千字文
Chien-yeh 建業
chih chou 知州
chih chün 制軍
chih fu 知府
chih hsien 知縣
Chih I 智顗
Chihli 直隸
Ch'i Hsiung ("seven martial" [states] of Chou dynasty) 七雄
chih t'ai 制台
Ch'i-lin 麒麟
chin (catty) 斤
Ch'in (dynasty, 3d century B.C.) 秦

Chin (dynasty, 3d and 4th centuries A.D.) 晋
Chin (state of—in Chou dynasty) 晋
Chin (dynasty, 12th and 13th centuries A.D.) 金
Ching (Classic or Sutra) 經
Ch'ing (Manchu dynasty) 清
Ch'ing Hai (Kokonor) 青海
Ch'in-ling 秦嶺
Ch'ing ming (festival) 清明
Ching Pao 京報
Ch'ing Shih Kao 清史稿
Ching Tê 景德
Ching-tê Chên 景德鎮
Ching Ti 景帝
ching t'ien ("well field" system) 井田
Ch'ing T'u (sect of Buddhism) 淨土
Chinkiang 鎮江
Ch'in Kuei 秦檜
chin shih (literary degree) 進士
Chin Shih (History of the Chin dynasty 12th and 13th centuries A.D.) 金史
Chin Shu (History of the Chin dynasty 3d and 4th centuries A.D.) 晋書
Chin-tan Chiao 金丹教
Chin Wu Ti 晋武帝
Ch'i-tan (Khitan) 契丹
Chiu Hua Shan 九華山
Chiu T'ang Shu 舊唐書
Chiu Wu Tai Shih 舊五代史
Chou (dynasty) 周
chou (prefectures under T'ang T'ai Tsung) 州
chou (administrative division) 州
Chou En-lai 周恩來
Chou Hsin 紂辛
Chou Kuan 周官
Chou Kung 周公
Chou Li 周禮
Chou Shu 周書
Chou Shu-jen 周樹人
Chou Tun-i 周敦頤
Ch'u (state of—in Chou dynasty) 楚
Ch'u (state at beginning of Sung) 楚
Ch'üanchow 泉州
Chuang Tzŭ 莊子
Chu Chiu-t'ao 朱九濤
Ch'ü fou 曲阜
Chu Hsi 朱熹
chü jên 舉人
Chu-ko Liang 諸葛亮
chün (provinces in Ch'in dynasty) 郡
Chün Chi Ch'u 軍機處
Ch'un Ch'iu 春秋
Chung Chia 狆家
Ch'ung Êrh 重耳
Chung Hua Min Kuo 中華民國
Chungking 重慶
Chung Kuo 中國
Chung-kuo Li-shih Yen-chiu Fa 中國歷史研究法
Chung Yung 中庸
chün tzŭ 君子
Chusan (archipelago) 舟山
Chu Shu Chi Nien 竹書紀年
Chu Tao-shêng 竺道生
Chu Ti 朱棣
Chu Wên 朱温
Ch'ü Yüan 屈原
Chu Yüan-chang 朱元章

Chu Yün-wên 朱允炆
Co-hong 公行
Confucius (K'ung Fu Tzŭ) 孔夫子

Dairen, see Talienwan 大連灣
Dalai Lama (Chinese ta-lai-la-ma 達賴喇嘛
also Chin-kang Ta-shih 金岡大師)
Dalny, see Talienwan

Eleuths (Chinese O-lu-t'ê 厄魯特)
Êrh-Shih Huang Ti 二世皇帝
Êrh Ya 爾雅

Fa Chia 法家
Fa-hsiang (Buddhist sect) 法相
Fanch'êng 樊城
Fan Chung-yen 范仲淹
fang chang 方丈
fan t'ai 藩台
fantan 番攤
Fan Yeh 范曄
fa-shih 法師
Fa T'ang 法堂
Fên (River) 汾
fêng (a sacrifice) 封
Fêng-huang 鳳凰
Fêng Kuo-chang 馮國璋
Fêng Tao 馮道
Fêngt'ien (Mukden) 奉天
Fêng Yü-hsiang 馮玉祥
Fêng Yün-shan 馮雲山
Foochow 福州
Formosa (T'aiwan 臺灣)
fu (administrative division) 府
fu (good fortune or happiness) 福
Fu Chien 苻堅
Fu Hsi 伏羲
Fukien 福建
Fulin 拂菻 or 拂菻
Fushun 撫順
fu t'ai 撫台
fu yüan 撫院

Galdan (Chinese Ka-êhr-tan 噶爾丹)
Gobi 戈壁 (also called Sha Mo 沙漠
and Han Hai 旱海
Golden Sand, River of the (upper reaches of the Yangtze) Chin-sha Chiang 金沙江
Gurkhas (Chinese K'uo-êhr-k'o 廓爾喀)

Hainan 海南
Hakka 客家
Hami 哈密
Han (dynasty) 漢
Han (state in Chou dynasty, formerly part of Ch'in 晉)漢
Han (state) 韓
Han (River in Kwangtung) 韓
Han (River in Hupeh) 漢
Han Chi 漢紀
Han Fei Tzŭ 韓非子
Hangchow 杭州
Han Hsüeh 漢學
Han Jên 漢人
Han Kan 韓幹
Hankow 漢口
Han Learning (School) (Han Hsüeh P'ai) 漢學派
Hanlin 翰林
Hanlin Yüan 翰林院
Han Wên-kung 韓文公
Hanyang 漢陽

Hanyehp'ing 漢冶萍
Han Yü 韓愈
Heilungkiang 黑龍江
Hei Miao 黑苗
Hochienfu 河間府
ho lun ch'üan 火輪船
Honan 河南
Honanfu 河南府
Hongkong 香港
Hopei 河北
ho shang 和尚
Ho Shên 和珅
Hou Chao (dynasty) 後趙
Hou Ch'in (dynasty) 後秦
Hou Chin (dynasty) 後晉
Hou Chou (dynasty) 後周
Hou Han (dynasty) 後漢
Hou Han Shu 後漢書
Hou Liang (dynasty, 4th century, founded by Lü Kuang 後涼
Hou Liang (dynasty, 10th century) 後梁
Hou Shu (dynasty) 後蜀
Hou T'ang (dynasty) 後唐
Hou T'u 后土
Hsia (dynasty) 夏
Hsia (state) 夏
Hsian 西安
Hsiang (River) 湘
Hsiang Chi 項籍
Hsiang Liang 項梁
Hsiangyang 襄陽
Hsiang Yü 項羽
Hsiao (duke or prince of Ch'in) 孝
hsiao (filial piety) 孝
Hsiao Shêng (Hinayana) 小乘
Hsiao Ching 孝經
Hsiao Tao-ch'êng 蕭道成
Hsiao Tzŭ-hsien 蕭子顯
Hsiao Y'en 蕭衍
Hsieh Ho 謝赫
hsien (administrative division) 縣
hsien 仙 (Taoist Immortal)
Hsien Fêng 咸豐
Hsien Nai Nai 仙奶奶
Hsien Pei 鮮卑
Hsien-t'ien Chiao 先天教
Hsien Yang 咸陽
Hsi Hsia 西夏
Hsi K'ang 西康
Hsi Kiang (West River) 西江
Hsin (name of Wang Mang's dynasty) 新
Hsin Chiang, same as Sinkiang 新疆
Hsin Ch'ing Nien Tsa Chih 新青年雜誌
hsin fa 新法
Hsinganling (Khingan) 興安嶺
Hsing Pu 刑部
Hsin Huang Ti 新皇帝
Hsinking 新京
Hsin T'ang Shu 新唐書
Hsin Wu Tai Shih 新五代史
Hsin Yüan Shih 新元史
hsi ssŭ 細絲
Hsi Ti 西帝
Hsiung Nu 匈奴
hsiu ts'ai 秀才
Hsi Wang Mu 西王母
Hsi Wei (dynasty) 西魏
Hsüan Tê 宣德
Hsüan Tsang 玄奘
Hsüan Tsung 玄宗
Hsüan T'ung 宣統
Hsüan Wang 宣王
Hsüeh Kung 學宮
Hsüeh Shu Chiang Yen Chi 學術講演集

Hsü Hsia-k'o 徐霞客
hsün fu 巡撫
Hsün K'uang 荀況
Hsün Tzŭ 荀子
Hsün Yüeh 荀悅
Hsü Shih-ch'ang 徐世昌
Hsü Ta 徐達
Hsü Tzŭ-chih-t'ung-chien 續資治通鑑長編
Huai Ho 淮河
Huai-nan Tzŭ 淮南子
Hua Miao 花苗
Huan (Huan [Kung 公] of Ch'i) 桓
Huang Ch'ao 黃巢
Huang Ho 黃河
Huang-p'u 黃浦
Huang Shang 皇上
Huang Ti (legendary Yellow Emperor) 黃帝
Huang Ti (imperial title) 皇帝
Huang Tsung-hsi 黃宗羲
Huan Wên 桓溫
Hua-yen 華嚴
Hu Hai 胡亥
Hui-hui 回回
Hui-nêng 慧能
Hui Ssŭ 慧思
Hui Ti 惠帝
Hui Tsung 徽宗
Hui Tzŭ 惠子
Hui Yüan 慧遠
Hulutao 葫蘆島
Hunan 湖帝
Hung 洪
Hung Hsiu-ch'üan 洪秀全
Hung Jên 洪仁
Hung Lou Mêng 紅樓夢
Hung Wu 洪武
Hupeh 湖北
Hu Pu 戶部
Hu Shih 胡適
Hu Wei 胡渭
Hu Yüan 胡瑗

I Ching (Classic) 易經
I Ching (Buddhist pilgrim) 義淨
I Ho Ch'üan 義和拳
I Ho T'uan 義和團
i jen 一人
i ko jên 一個人
i ko shih t'ou 一個石頭
Ili (territory) 伊犁
I Li (book) 儀禮
I Ti 義帝

Japan (in Chinese Jih-pên) 日本
Jehol 熱河 or Jê-ho-êrh 熱河兒
jên 仁
Jenghiz Khan (in Chinese Ch'êng-chi-ssŭ 成吉思). Also known by his dynastic title, T'ai Tsu 太祖
Jên Huang 人皇
Juan Juan 蠕蠕
Ju Chia 儒家
Ju Chiao 儒教
Jung Lu 榮祿

Kachin (Chinese Yeh-jên 野人 or Shan t'ou 山頭)
K'aifêng 開封
K'ailan 開欒
Kan (River) 贛
k'an chien 看見
k'ang 炕
K'ang Hsi 康熙
K'ang Hsi Tzŭ Tien 康熙字典
K'ang Yu-wei 康有爲
Kansu 甘肅

Kan Ying P'ien 感應篇
Kao Hsien-chih 高仙芝
kaoliang 高粱
kaolin 高嶺
Kao P'ien 高駢
Kao Ti 高帝
Kao Tsu 高祖
Kao Tsung 高宗
Karakorum (in Chinese K'o-la-k'u-lun 喀拉庫倫
also K'o-la-ho-lin 喀喇和林)
Kashgar (in Chinese K'o-shih-ka-êhr 喀什噶爾
Also Shu-fu-hsien 疏附縣)
Keh-Lao (Ch'i-lao 犵狫)
Kêng Ching-chung 耿精忠
Khalkhas (Chinese K'o-êhr-k'o 喀爾喀
Khoten (in Chinese Yü-t'ien 于闐)
Khubilai (in Chinese Hu-pi-lieh 忽必烈 or Hsieh-ch'an 薛禪)
Also known by his dynastic title Shih Tsu 世祖)
Kiangsi 江西
Kiangsu 江蘇
Kiaochow 膠州
Kirin 吉林
Kiukiang 九江
Kokonor (Ch'ing Hai 青海)
Ko Lao Hui 哥老會
Korea (Chaohsien 朝鮮)
kotow (k'o-t'ou) 磕頭
k'ou 口
Kuan Chung 管仲
Kuang Hsü 光緒
Kuang Wu Ti 光武帝
kuan hua 官話
Kuan Ti 關帝
Kuan-yin 觀音
Kuan Yü 關羽
Kuo Hsi 郭熙
Kuominchun 國民軍
Kuomintang 國民黨
kuo-yü 國語
Ku Shih Pien 古史辨
Ku T'ing-lin 顧亭林
ku wên 古文
Ku Yen-wu 顧炎武
Kwangchow (bay) 廣州
Kwangsi 廣西
Kwangtung 廣東
Kweichow 貴州
Kyushu (Chinese Chiu-chou 九州)

Lanchow 蘭州
lao hu 老虎
Lao T'ien Fo Yeh 老天佛爺
Lao T'ien Yeh 老天爺
Lao Tzŭ 老子
lei shu 類書
li (law) 例
li (abstract right, the eternal fitness of things) 理
Liang (dynasty) 梁
liang (tael) 兩
Liang Ch'i ch'ao 梁啓超
Liang Shu 梁書
Liang Wu Ti 梁武帝
Liao (dynasty) 遼
Liao (River) 遼
Liao Chai Chih I 聊齋誌異
Liaoning 遼寧
Liao Shih 遼史
Liaotung (Peninsula) 遼東
Li Chao-tao 李昭道
li chee 荔枝
Li Chi 禮記
Lieh Tzŭ 列子

Li Fan Yüan 理藩院
Li Hung-chang 李鴻章
Likin 釐金
Li K'o 李克
Li K'o-yung 李克用
Li Kuang-li 李廣利
Li Kuang-pi 李光弼
Li K'uei 李悝
Li Lin-fu 李林甫
Li Lung-chi 李隆基
Li Lung-mien 李龍眠
Lin-an 臨安
Ling-hu Tê-fên 令狐德芬
Lin Tzê-hsü 林則徐
Li Ping 李冰
Li Po 李白
Li Po-yao 李百藥
Li Pu (Board of Civil Office) 吏部
Li Pu (Board of Rites) 禮部
Li Sao 離騷
Li Shih-chên 李時珍
Li Shih-min 李世民
Li Ssŭ 李斯
Li-Ssŭ-hsün 李思訓
Li T'ai-po 李太白
Li Tao 李壽
Li Tê-lin 李德林
Li Ts'un-hsü 李存勖
Li Tung-yang 李東陽
Li Tzŭ-ch'êng 李自成
Liu (ruling family of Han dynasty) 劉
Liu An 劉安
Liu Chih-chi 劉知幾
Liu Chih-yüan 劉知遠
Liu Ch'iu (Islands) 琉球
Liu Hsiang 劉向
Liu Hsin 劉歆
Liu Pang 劉邦
Liu Pei 劉備
Liu Shao-ch'i 劉少奇
Liu Sung (dynasty) 劉宋
Liu Ts'ung 劉聰
Liu Tsung-yüan 柳宗元
Liu Yü (founder of Liu Sung dynasty) 劉裕
Liu Yü (12th century) 劉豫
Liu Yüan 劉淵
Li Yen-shou 李延壽
Li Yüan 李淵
Li Yüan-hung 黎元洪
Lohan (arhat) 羅漢
Loi (li 黎)
Lo-lo 玀玀 Also written Lao-lao 猺猺 and Liao-liao 獠獠
Loyang 洛陽
lü 律
Lü (Empress of Ch'ien Han dynasty) 呂
Lu (state in Chou dynasty) 魯
Lu Chia 陸賈
Lu Chiu-yüan 陸九淵
Lü Hou 呂后
Lu Hsiang-shan 陸象山
Lu Hsün 魯迅
Lü Kuang 呂光
Lun 論
lung 龍
Lung Mên 龍門
Lung Wang 龍王
Lun Yü 論語
Lü Pu-wei 呂不韋
Lü Shih 呂氏
Lü-tsung 律宗
Lü Yen 呂嵒

Man Chia 蠻家

Manchuria (Tung san shêng 東三省 Three Eastern Provinces, or simply Tung shêng 東省 The Eastern Provinces)
Manchuokuo 滿洲國
Mangu (in Chinese Mêng-ko 蒙哥)
Man Tzŭ 蠻子
Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東
Ma Tuan-lin 馬端臨
Ma Yüan (1st century B.C.—1st century A.D.) 馬援
Ma Yüan (Sung dynasty artist) 馬遠
Mei Tsŭ 梅驚
Mencius 孟子
Mêng T'ien 蒙恬
Mêng Tzŭ 孟子
Mêng Tzŭ Shu 孟子書
Miao (aboriginal people) 苗
miao (temple) 廟
Miao Chia 苗家
Miaotzŭ 苗子
Mi-Chiao 密教
Mi Fei 米芾
Mi-lo-fo 彌勒佛
Min (River, in Fukien) 閩
Min (River, in Szechwan) 岷
Min (state at beginning of Sung) 閩
Ming (dynasty) 明
Ming Chia 名家
Ming Huang Ti 明皇帝
Ming Shih 明史
Ming Ti 明南
Mongol (Mêng ku) 蒙古
Mongolia (Mêng ku) 蒙古
Mo-so 摩娑
Mo Ti 墨翟
Mo Tzŭ 墨子
mou (measure of land) 畝
Mu (prince of Ch'in) 穆
Mu Ch'i 牧溪
Mu-jung 慕容
Mukden. See Fêngt'ien
Mu Wang 穆王

Nan Chao 南詔
Nan Ch'i Shu 南齊書
Nan Han 南漢
Nanking 南京
Nan Pei Ch'ao 南北朝
Nan P'ing 南平
Nan Shan 南山
Nan Shih 南史
Nan T'ang 南唐
Nan Wang 赧王
Nan Yüeh 南越
Nayan (in Chinese Nai-yen 乃顏)
Nei Ching 內經
Nei Ko 內閣
Newchwang 牛莊
nieh t'ai 臬台
Nienfei 撚匪
nien hao 年號
Ninghsia 寧夏
Ninghsia Hui 寧夏回
Ningpo 寧波
Nonni (nên-kiang 嫩江)
Nüchên 女眞 (better Jûchen)
Nü Kua 女媧
Nurhachu (in Chinese Nu-êhr-ha-ch'ih 努爾哈赤 His dynastic title was T'ai Tsu Kao 太祖高 and his reign title T'ien Ming 天命)

Ogotai (in Chinese Wo-k'uo-t'ai 窩闊台) His dynastic title was T'ai Tsung 太京)
O Mei Shan 峨嵋山

O-mi-t'o 阿彌陀
O-mi-t'o-fo 阿彌陀佛
Ordos (Ho t'ao) 河套
Ou-yang Hsiu 歐陽修

Pa Hsien 八仙
Pai Chia Hsing 百家姓
p'ai fang 牌坊
Pai Ho 白河
pai hua 白話
Pai-lien Chiao 白蓮教
Pai-lien Hui 白蓮會
p'ai lou 牌樓
pa kua 八卦
Panch'an Lama 班禪喇嘛
Pan Chao 班昭
Pan Ch'ao 班超
Panghu 澎湖
Pan Ku 班固
P'an Ku 盤古
Pan Piao 班彪
Pan Yung 班勇
pao chia 保甲
Pei Ch'i (dynasty, 6th century A.D.) 北齊
Pei Ch'i Shu 北齊書
Pei Chou (dynasty, 6th century A.D. 北周)
Pei Han (dynasty) 北漢
Peip'ing 北平
Pei Shih 北史
Peit'ing 北庭
Peking 北京
Pên-t'sao-kang-mu 本草綱目
Petuntse 白墊子
Pien Liang 汴梁
P'ien t'i (a style of writing) 駢體
P'i-lu-fo 毗盧佛
P'ing Ch'êng 平城
Ping Pu 兵部
P'ingyang 平壤
Po Chü-i 白居易
P'o Hai 渤海
P'o-yang (Lake) 鄱陽
P'u-hsien 普賢
p'u-sa 菩薩
P'u Sung-ling 蒲松齡
p'u-t'i-sa-to 菩提薩埵
P'u-t'o 普陀
P'u-t'o Shan 普陀山
P'u-yi (P'u-i), Henry 溥儀 (the last Manchu Emperor)

Quemoy (Kinmeng) 金門

San Ch'ing 三清
San Fan (rebellion) 三藩
San Ho Hui 三合會
San Kuan 三官
San Kuo 三國
San Kuo Chih 三國志
San Kuo Chih Yen I 三國志演義
San Min Chu I 三民主義
San Pao 三寶
San Tsang 三藏
San Tzu Ching 三字經
Shameen 沙面
Shan (a sacrifice) 禪
Shang (dynasty) 商
Shang Chih-hsin 尙之信
Shang-ch'uan (island) 上川
Shanghai 上海
Shang K'o-hsi 尙可喜
Shang Shu Ku Wên Shu Chêng 尙書古文疏證
Shang Ti 上帝
Shang Yang (also called Wei Yang) 商鞅

Shanhaikuan 山海關
Shansi 山西
Shantung 山東
Shao Yung 邵雍
Shê 社
Shên 神
Shên Chiao 神教
shên chu 神主
shêng 省
Shêng Jên 聖人
Shêngking 盛京
Shêng Tsŭ Jên 聖祖仁
Shêng Yü 聖諭
Shên Nung 神農
Shensi 陝西
Shên Yo 沈約
shih (poetry) 詩
shih (stone) 石
Shih Chi 史記
Shih-chia-fo 釋迦佛
Shih chia-mou-ni 釋迦牟尼
Shih Ching 詩經
Shih Ching-t'ang 石敬塘
Shih Huang Ti (of Ch'in dynasty) 始皇帝
Shih Ssŭ-ming 史思明
shih t'ou 石頭
Shih T'ung 史通
shou 壽
Shu (state in present Szechwan) 蜀
Shu Ching 書經
Shu Han 蜀漢
Shun 舜
Shun Chih 順治
Shuo Wên 說文
shu yüan 書院
Sinkiang 新疆
Soochow 蘇州
Soong, T.V. (Sung Tzŭ-wên) 宋子文
Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien 司馬遷
Ssŭ-ma Kuang 司馬光
Ssŭ-ma T'an 司馬談
Ssŭ-ma Yen 司馬炎
Ssŭ Shu 四書
Ssŭ T'ien Wang 四天王
suan p'an (abacus) 算盤
Su Ch'in 蘇秦
Sui (dynasty) 隋
Sui Jên 燧人
Sui Shu 隋書
Suiyüan 綏遠
Sun Ch'üan 孫權
Sun Ch'üan-fang 孫傳芳
Sun Fu 孫復
Sung (state of—in Chou dynasty) 宋
Sung (dynasty) 宋
Sungari (Sunghua-kiang 松花江)
Sung Chih-wên 宋之間
Sung Hui-yao Chi-kao 宋會要輯縞
Sung Shih 宋史
Sung Shu 宋書
Sung Yün 宋雲
Sun Wên 孫文
Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙
Su Shih 蘇軾
Su Tung-p'o 蘇東坡
Swatow 汕頭
Szechwan 四川

Ta Shêng (Mahayana) 大乘
Ta Ch'i 大齊
Ta Ch'in 大秦
Ta Ch'ing (dynasty) 大清
Ta Ch'ing Hui Tien 大清會典

Ta Ch'ing Lü Li 大清律例
Ta Hsüeh 大學
Tai Chên 戴震
t'ai chi 太極
T'ai Hsü 太虛
T'ai Hu 太湖
T'ai I 太一
T'ai P'ing 太平
T'ai P'ing Yü Lan 太平御覽
T'ai Shan 泰山
T'ai Tsu 太祖
T'ai Tsung 太宗
T'ai Wan (see Formosa) 臺灣
T'aiyüan 太原
Talai Lama 達賴喇嘛
Talienwan (Dalny, or Dairen) 大連灣
Talifu 大理府
Ta Li Ssŭ 大理寺
tan (picul) 擔
T'ang (dynasty) 唐
T'ang Jên 唐人
Tangpu 黨部
T'ang T'ai Tsung 唐太宗
Tao (of Taoism) 道
tao (provinces under T'ang T'ai Tsung) 道
T'ao Ch'ien 陶潛
T'ao Han 陶翰
Tao Hsüan 道宣
Tao Kuang 道光
Tao Nai Nai 道奶奶
Tao Shêng 道生
tao shih 道士
T'ao Shuo 陶說
tao t'ai 道台
Tao Tê Ching 道德經
Tao-tê-hsüeh-shê 道德學社
t'ao t'ieh 饕餮
Tao Yüan 道院
T'ao Yüan-ming 陶淵明
Tarim River (T'a-li-mu-ho 塔里木河)
Tat'ung 大同
Ta Yü 大禹
Tê (virtue) 德
Têngchow (Shantung) 登州
Ti (an imperial title) 帝
Ti (Earth) 地
tiao 吊
Tibet (Tsang 藏 or Hsi Tsang 西藏)
ti ch'i 地氣
tien (lightning) 電
tien (hall) 殿
T'ien (Heaven) 天
tien ch'ê 電車
tien ch'i 電氣
t'ien ch'i 天氣
T'ien Hsia 天下
T'ien Huang 天皇
T'ien Lao Yeh 天老爺
T'ien Li 天理
T'ien Ming (Heaven's decree) 天命
tien pao 電報
T'ien Shan 天山
T'ien Shih 天師
T'ien T'ai (sect of buddhism) 天台
Tientsin 天津
T'ien Tzŭ 天子
Ti Huang 地皇
t'ing 廳
Ting Wu Lan T'ing 定武蘭亭
ti-pao 地保
Ti-tsang 地藏
Tongking 東京
T'o Pa (Toba) 拓跋
T'o-t'o 脫脫

T'oung Pao 通報
Tsa 雜
Tsai Li Chiao 在理教
Ts'ai T'ing-kan 蔡廷幹
Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei 蔡元培
ts'ao (grass) 草
Ts'ao Hsüeh-ch'in 曹雪芹
Ts'ao Kun 曹錕
Ts'ao P'ei 曹丕
Ts'ao Ts'ao 曹操
Tsêng Kuo-fan 曾國藩
Tsin (dynasty) 晉
Tsinanfu 濟南府
Ts'ing Hua 清華
Tso Chuan 左傳
Tso Tsung-t'ang 左宗棠
Ts'ui Shu 崔述
Tsung K'apa 宗喀巴
Tsungli Yamen 總理衙門
ts'ung shu 叢書
tsung tu 總督
T'u 土
Tuan Ch'i-jui 段祺瑞
Tu Ch'a Yüan 都察院
T'u Chüeh 突厥
tuchün 督軍
Tu Fu 杜甫
T'ung Ch'êng 桐城
T'ung Chêng Ssŭ 通政司
T'ung Chien Chi Shih Pên Mo 通鑑紀史本末
T'ung Chien Kang Mu 通鑑綱目
T'ung Chih (a history) 通志
T'ung Chih (Ch'ing Emperor) 同治
t'ung chih (sub-prefect) 同知
Tung Cho 董卓
Tung Chou Chün 東周君
T'ung Chung-shu 董仲舒
Tung Han (dynasty) 東漢
Tunglin 東林
Tung San Shêng 東三省
(The Three Eastern Provinces, Manchuria
Tung Ti 東帝
T'ung Tien 通典
T'ung-t'ing (Lake) 洞庭
Tung Wei (dynasty) 東魏
Tung Yo 東嶽
Tun-huang 敦煌
Turfan (T'u-lu-fan t'ing) 吐魯番廳
Turgut (Chinese T'u-êhr-hu-t'ê 土爾扈特)
Tu Wên-hsiu 杜文秀
Tu Yu 杜佑
Tzŭ Chih T'ung Chien 資治通鑒
Tz'ŭ-ên-tsung 慈恩宗
Tz'ŭ Hsi 慈禧
Tzŭ Ying 子嬰

Uighurs (Chinese Hui-ho 廻紇 or 回紇 Also 袁紇, 烏紇, 韋紇, 紇國)
Urga (Chinese K'u-lun 庫倫)
Ussuri (Wu-su-li 烏蘇利)

Wai Wu Pu 外務部
Wang 王
Wang An-shih 王安石
Wang Ching-wei 汪精衛
Wang Ch'ung 王充
Wang Fu-chih 王夫之
Wang Hsi-chih 王羲之
Wang Mang 王莽
Wang Pi 王弼
Wang Wei 王維
Wang Yang-ming 王陽明
Wanhsien 萬縣

Wan Li 萬歷
Wan-li-ch'ang-ch'êng 萬里長城
Wan Shou Kung 萬壽宮
Wan Sui Yeh 萬歲爺
Wei (dynasty) 魏
Wei (state in Chou dynasty formerly part of Chin 晋) 魏
Wei (River) 渭
Wei Chung-hsien 委忠賢
Wei-shih-hsiang-chiao 唯識相教
Wei Shou 魏收
Wei Shu 魏書
Wei-t'o 韋陀
Wei Yang (also called Shang Yang) 衛鞅
Wên (personal name Ch'ung Êhr 重耳) 文
Wên Ch'ang 文昌
Wên Hsien T'ung K'ao 文獻通考
wên li 文理
Wên Miao 文廟
Wên-shu 文殊
Wên Ti 文帝
Wên Wang 文王
wu (witch) 巫
Wu (dynasty in Yangtze Valley) 吳
Wu (state in Chou dynasty) 吳
Wuchang 武昌
Wu Chiao 巫教
Wu Ching 五經
Wuhan 武漢
Wu Hou 武后
Wuhu 蕪湖
Wu Miao 武廟
Wu P'ei-fu 吳佩孚
Wu San-kuei 吳三桂
Wu Shêng Miao 武聖廟
Wusih 無錫
Wu T'ai Shan 五臺山
Wu Tao-hsüan 吳道玄
Wu Tao-tzŭ 吳道子
Wu Tao-yüan 吳道元
Wu Ti (title of several emperors) 武帝
Wu Ti (The Five Sovereigns) 五帝
Wu Tsê T'ien 武則天
Wu Wang 武王
Wu Wei 無爲
Wu Yüeh 吳越

Yakub Beg (Chinese Ya-ku-po-k'o 牙固伯克)
Yalu 鴨綠
Yang (of Yin Yang) 陽
Yang Chien 楊堅
Yang chow 揚州
Yang Chu 楊朱
Yang Hsiung 楊雄
Yang Kuang 楊廣
Yang Kuei-fei 楊貴妃
Yang Shao (culture) 仰韶
Yang Ti 煬帝
Yangtze Kiang 揚子江
Yang Yen 楊炎
Yao (a non-Chinese people in the South) 猺
Yao (ruler before the Hsia dynasty) 堯
Yao Ch'a 姚察
Yao Chien 姚簡
Yao Chi-hêng 姚際恆
Yao-shih-fo 藥師佛
Yarkand (in Chinese Yeh-êhr-ch'iang 葉爾羌 or So-ch'ê-fu 莎車府)
Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai 耶律楚才
Yeh Ming-shên 葉名琛
Yehonala 葉赫耶拉

Yen (state in the North in 4th and 5th centuries A.D.) 燕
Yenan 延安
Yenching 燕京
Yen Hsi-chai 顏習齋
Yen Hsi-shan 閻錫山
Yen Hui 顏回
Yen, James Y.C. (Yen Yang-ch'u) 晏陽初
Yen Jo-chü 閻若璩
Yen Li-pên 閻立本
Yen Li-tê 閻立德
Yen Yüan 顏元
Yin (of Yin Yang) 陰
Yin (dynasty) 殷
Yo 嶽
Yo Fei 岳飛
Yü (jade) 玉
Yü 禹 (or Ta Yü 大禹) (founder of the Hsia dynasty)
Yüan 院
Yüan (dollar) 元
Yüan (dynasty) 元
Yüan Chao Pi Shih 元朝祕史
Yüan Ch'u 袁樞
Yüan Shih 元史
Yüan Shih-k'ai 袁世凱
Yüan Shih T'ien Tsun 元始天尊
Yüan Wei (dynasty in 4th to 6th centuries A.D.) 元魏
Yüan Yu 元祐
Yüan Yüan 阮元
Yu Ch'ao 有巢
Yüeh (state in Chou dynasty) 越
Yüeh (peoples on the south coast in Ch'in and Han times and earlier) 越
Yüeh Chih 月氏
Yü Hsien 毓賢
Yü Huang 玉皇
Yü Huang Shang Ti 玉皇上帝
Yü Mên 玉門
yung 永
Yung Chêng 雍正
Yung Lo 永樂
Yung Lo Ta Tien 永樂大典
Yung Wing 容閎
Yünnan 雲南
Yünnanfu 雲南府
Yu Wang 幽王

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
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